New York Law Review

Tag: Double Jeopardy

  • Matter of Martin v. County Court of Ulster County, 1 N.Y.2d 585 (1956): Availability of Prohibition to Prevent Double Jeopardy

    Matter of Martin v. County Court of Ulster County, 1 N.Y.2d 585 (1956)

    Prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when a public official acts clearly beyond their jurisdiction, and is not typically granted if the defense of double jeopardy can be raised during trial.

    Summary

    Martin sought prohibition to prevent his trial on a charge of violating Penal Law § 1053-a, arguing it would constitute double jeopardy after his acquittal on charges under the Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition was inappropriate because it is an extreme remedy reserved for cases where an official acts unquestionably beyond jurisdiction. The court reasoned that since a conviction under Penal Law § 1053-a is possible without proving Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, the defense of double jeopardy could be raised at trial if the prosecution relies on the same acts. Thus, prohibition was not warranted.

    Facts

    Martin was involved in an incident leading to charges under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, for which he was acquitted.
    Subsequently, he was indicted under Penal Law § 1053-a, related to the same incident.
    Martin then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial on the Penal Law charge, arguing it would constitute double jeopardy.

    Procedural History

    Martin applied for a writ of prohibition to the County Court of Ulster County to prevent the trial under Penal Law § 1053-a.
    The lower court denied the writ.
    Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a trial where the defendant claims it would constitute double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because prohibition is an extreme remedy reserved for instances where a public official is acting clearly and unquestionably beyond their jurisdiction, and the defense of double jeopardy can be raised during the trial itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where a public official is acting clearly and unquestionably beyond their jurisdiction. The court emphasized the restrictive nature of prohibition, stating it’s “reserved to those situations where a public official is to be restrained from the performance of an act which is clearly and unquestionably beyond his jurisdiction”.
    The court noted that a conviction under Penal Law § 1053-a could be obtained without necessarily proving a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1190, citing People v. Decina, 2 Y 2d 133 and People v. Eckert, 2 Y 2d 126.
    The court acknowledged Martin’s right to raise the defense of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel during the trial. If the prosecution relies on the same inseparable acts used in the prior Vehicle and Traffic Law prosecution, double jeopardy would apply, citing People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 Y 2d 259, 264.
    Judge Burke, concurring, emphasized that prohibition should only be granted in cases of “extreme necessity.” He stated that the test for double jeopardy is whether the defendant committed inseparable acts punishable by multiple statutes, or separate and distinct acts violating different laws. The court highlights that “in view of the fundamental character of the rule that a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause and the deep roots it throws into the history of the criminal law” (People v. Lo Cicero, 14 Y 2d 374, 378), the indictment must fall if the acts are the same.

  • People v. Bishop, 16 N.Y.2d 523 (1965): Double Jeopardy and Vacated Convictions

    People v. Bishop, 16 N.Y.2d 523 (1965)

    A defendant who successfully vacates a prior conviction, which formed the basis for a subsequent felony charge, is not placed in double jeopardy when the vacated conviction is later reinstated and the defendant is re-indicted on the felony charge.

    Summary

    Bishop was initially convicted in 1937. Based on this conviction, he was later indicted in 1960 for a felony. Bishop successfully vacated the 1937 conviction, eliminating the basis for the 1960 felony charge. Consequently, the trial judge dismissed the felony charge. However, the order vacating the 1937 conviction was later reversed, reinstating the original conviction. Bishop argued that a subsequent indictment for the same felony constituted double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Bishop himself had the initial conviction vacated, and it was later reinstated, prosecuting him on a superseding indictment did not violate double jeopardy principles.

    Facts

    1. In 1937, Bishop was convicted of a crime.
    2. In 1960, he was indicted for carnal abuse as a felony, the felony charge predicated on the 1937 conviction.
    3. Bishop successfully sought and obtained an order vacating the 1937 judgment of conviction.
    4. Due to the vacated 1937 conviction, the trial court dismissed the felony charge against Bishop.
    5. The appellate division reversed the vacatur of the 1937 conviction, thereby reinstating the original conviction.
    6. Trials on the 1960 indictment resulted in disagreement and mistrials.

    Procedural History

    1. 1937: Bishop convicted.
    2. 1960: Bishop indicted for carnal abuse as a felony based on the 1937 conviction.
    3. Trial court: Vacated the 1937 conviction; dismissed the 1960 felony charge.
    4. Appellate Division: Reversed the order vacating the 1937 conviction; reinstated the conviction (People v. Bishop, 14 A D 2d 376, affd. 11 Y 2d 854).
    5. The People sought to proceed against Bishop on a superseding indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prosecuting Bishop on a superseding indictment charging him with carnal abuse as a felony, after he successfully vacated the prior conviction upon which the felony charge was based, but which was later reinstated, constitutes double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because Bishop was never placed in jeopardy of conviction for the crime of carnal abuse as a felony due to his successful vacatur of the predicate conviction, and the reinstatement of that conviction allows the People to proceed on the superseding indictment without violating double jeopardy principles.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when Bishop successfully vacated the 1937 judgment of conviction, he eliminated any danger of being convicted of the felony based on that conviction. The court stated, “In other words, by procuring the vacatur of the earlier judgment, the respondent rendered his conviction of the felony impossible as a matter of law.” The trial judge’s dismissal of the felony charge merely reflected this situation, it was not a dismissal on the merits. When the order vacating the 1937 judgment was reversed and the conviction reinstated, the People were then free to proceed against Bishop on a superseding indictment. The court emphasized that the crucial factor was that Bishop, by his own action, created the situation where the felony charge was initially unsustainable. Therefore, the subsequent prosecution did not constitute double jeopardy. The court’s decision rested on the principle that a defendant should not be able to benefit from an error he himself induced.

  • People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374 (1964): Double Jeopardy and Federal Acquittal

    People v. Lo Cicero, 14 N.Y.2d 374 (1964)

    A prior acquittal in federal court for a crime arising from the same act bars a subsequent state prosecution for the same crime or legally constituent elements thereof, but not for separate offenses.

    Summary

    Lo Cicero was acquitted in federal court on charges of robbery obstructing interstate commerce. He was subsequently indicted in state court on charges arising from the same incident: robbery, grand larceny, assault, and kidnapping. Lo Cicero moved to dismiss the state indictment based on double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the federal acquittal barred the state prosecution for robbery, grand larceny, and assault because these charges were based on the same act and could have been proven in the federal case. However, the kidnapping charge was a separate offense not included in the federal prosecution and thus not barred.

    Facts

    Lo Cicero and co-defendants were indicted in federal court for hijacking a truck containing goods in interstate commerce. Before the federal trial, Lo Cicero was also indicted in state court on charges stemming from the same hijacking incident: robbery, grand larceny, assault, and kidnapping of the truck driver. Lo Cicero was acquitted in federal court.

    Procedural History

    The Kings County Court granted Lo Cicero’s motion to dismiss the state indictment based on double jeopardy following his acquittal in federal court. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the indictment. Lo Cicero appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a prior acquittal in federal court bars a subsequent state prosecution for the same crime arising from the same act?
    2. Whether a prior acquittal in federal court bars a subsequent state prosecution for legally constituent elements of the same crime arising from the same act?
    3. Whether a prior acquittal in federal court bars a subsequent state prosecution for a separate offense arising from the same incident?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because New York Penal Law § 33 and Code of Criminal Procedure § 139 consider the federal government as “another state or country” for double jeopardy purposes, and a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause.
    2. Yes, because the state charges of grand larceny and assault were legally constituent elements of the robbery charge for which Lo Cicero was acquitted in federal court.
    3. No, because the kidnapping charge was a separate offense not included in the federal prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted New York Penal Law § 33 and Code of Criminal Procedure § 139, which address double jeopardy, to include the federal government within the meaning of “another state or country.” The court reasoned that a narrow interpretation excluding the federal government would undermine the fundamental principle against being twice tried for the same offense. The court noted that the statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional doubts, especially considering evolving interpretations of double jeopardy protections. The court distinguished the kidnapping charge from the other charges, stating that because the federal prosecution did not include that separate offense, the state prosecution was not barred.

    The court stated, “We can think of no reason why the considerations underlying the admitted immunity predicated on a former judgment of a sister State or a foreign country are less compelling in regard to the Federal jurisdiction; nor have any been called to our attention by the People.” They also stated, “Since the language of both section 33 of the Penal Law and section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though not entirely clear, will bear the construction which so clearly fulfills the purpose for which they exist, we hold that the United States comes within the definition of ‘another state or country’ as used in the two relevant statutes.”

    Regarding collateral estoppel, the court held that it could not be applied against the State of New York because the state was not a party to the federal prosecution and had no control over that case. Collateral estoppel requires that the party sought to be estopped be identical to, or in strict privity with, the party who previously had their day in court and lost.

  • People v. Di Lapo, 14 N.Y.2d 170 (1964): Double Punishment for Separate Acts in a Single Transaction

    People v. Di Lapo, 14 N.Y.2d 170 (1964)

    Under New York Penal Law § 1938, multiple punishments are permissible for separate and distinct acts that violate different penal law sections, even if they arise from a single transaction.

    Summary

    Di Lapo was initially convicted of assault with intent to kill following a murder trial. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery first degree stemming from the same incident. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms for both offenses. Di Lapo argued that Penal Law § 1938 barred the second punishment because the assault and attempted robbery constituted a single act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the consecutive sentences, holding that the acts of attempted robbery and assault, while related, contained distinct elements that justified separate punishments.

    Facts

    Di Lapo and others went to the victim’s house with the intent to rob him. Two accomplices broke into the house, followed by Di Lapo. The victim shouted a warning and fired a gun. Di Lapo returned fire, wounding the victim. The group fled without stealing anything. Di Lapo was later charged with murder, burglary, and attempted robbery. He was acquitted of murder but convicted of assault with intent to kill. He later pleaded guilty to attempted robbery first degree related to the same incident.

    Procedural History

    Di Lapo was initially indicted for murder and several counts of burglary and attempted robbery. He was convicted of assault with intent to kill in the murder trial. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted robbery first degree. The Erie County Court sentenced him to a consecutive term for the attempted robbery. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the judgment. Di Lapo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Penal Law § 1938, the elements of attempted robbery first degree and assault with intent to kill were so identical that double punishment was impermissible despite the propriety of prosecuting them as separate crimes.

    Holding

    No, because there were separate acts or elements that constituted assault with intent to kill and attempted robbery independently; therefore, double punishment was permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed Penal Law § 1938, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same act or omission when it is made criminal and punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. The court relied on People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259 (1957), which held that “if separate and distinct acts were committed, and that they violated more than one section of the Penal Law, punishment for each of them would be proper although they arose out of a single transaction.” The court distinguished the attempted robbery, which involved breaking into the house with the intent to steal and putting the victim in fear, from the subsequent act of shooting the victim, which constituted a separate act with a separate intent to kill. The court found it “not impossible to say that there were separate acts or elements making out, separately, assault with intent to kill and attempted robbery, and that double punishment was, therefore, permissible.” Although the two crimes were closely related in time and arose from the same series of events, the court concluded that they were sufficiently distinct to justify separate punishments. The court also noted that a previous denial of habeas corpus relief for Di Lapo did not affect the current question of double punishment because the prior ruling addressed the validity of the indictment itself, not the permissibility of consecutive sentences.