New York Law Review

Tag: Double Jeopardy

  • People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 158 (1974): People’s Right to Appeal Dismissals in Non-Jury Trials

    People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 158 (1974)

    The People have the right to appeal a trial order of dismissal in both jury and non-jury cases when the dismissal is based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether the People can appeal a trial order of dismissal in a non-jury trial. In Fellman, the defendant was indicted for perjury. At the close of the People’s case, the trial court granted a trial order of dismissal, finding the evidence legally insufficient. In Sabella, the defendant requested a judgment of acquittal after a non-jury trial, which the court granted. The Court of Appeals held that the People may appeal a trial order of dismissal in both jury and non-jury cases when the dismissal is based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. However, the court found that in Sabella, the defendant was acquitted on the merits, precluding appeal. In Fellman, the court found the dismissal was based on legal insufficiency and thus appealable, reinstating the indictment.

    Facts

    In Fellman:

    • Fellman, an architect, testified before a grand jury investigating corruption.
    • He stated that payments to Wingler, a health department employee, were legitimate fees for engineering services.
    • He specifically claimed a $1,000 check related to an alternate pool plan due to a soil failure.
    • At trial, Roberts, the pool project designer, testified there was no soil failure and the alternate plan was received earlier. Roberts further testified that Fellman told him that the payments were payoffs.
    • The People presented additional testimony contradicting Fellman’s claims.

    In Sabella, the defendant was subpoenaed before a grand jury. He refused to answer questions, claiming illegal wiretap evidence was being used. He was subsequently indicted for contempt.

    Procedural History

    In Fellman:

    • The trial court granted Fellman’s motion for a trial order of dismissal.
    • The Appellate Division was divided on whether the circumstantial evidence sufficiently corroborated Roberts’ testimony, leaving the trial court’s order standing.

    In Sabella:

    • The trial court granted the defendant’s request for a judgment of acquittal.
    • The Appellate Division dismissed the People’s appeal, holding that no appeal lies from a judgment on the merits in a criminal case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People may appeal from a trial order of dismissal in a non-jury case.

    2. Whether the trial courts in Fellman and Sabella dismissed on the law or acquitted the defendants on the merits.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because CPL 450.20(2) applies to both jury and non-jury cases, authorizing the People to appeal a trial order of dismissal when a charge is dismissed due to insufficient evidence as a matter of law.

    2. In Fellman, the court dismissed on the law, but erred in doing so. In Sabella, the court acquitted the defendant on the merits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 450.20(2) allows the People to appeal trial orders of dismissal in both jury and non-jury cases. The Court acknowledged the difficulty in distinguishing legal from factual determinations in non-jury trials but stated that this is a normal part of the appellate process. Regarding Sabella, the Court determined that the defendant requested an acquittal, not a trial order of dismissal, and the court’s finding of insufficient proof of intent was based on the factual determination that the defendant acted in good faith, indicating an acquittal on the merits. The court stated, “Here the defendant was clearly acquitted on the merits and it matters not that the court chose to characterize the holding as a dismissal on the law, which the defendant in any event had not requested.” Allowing an appeal in Sabella would violate the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

    In Fellman, the defendant explicitly requested a trial order of dismissal based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence. The court held that, for the purpose of the motion, all evidence favoring the People is deemed credible. The finding of insufficiency turned on the legal conclusion that the circumstantial evidence of corroboration in a perjury case must meet the standard applicable to cases based wholly on circumstantial proof. According to CPL 70.10(1), legally sufficient evidence is “competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged…” Therefore, the People have the right to appeal the dismissal. The court also clarified the standard for corroborating perjury testimony, stating that “the circumstantial evidence serves only to corroborate the direct testimony of a single witness, it need not exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but guilt.” The court found that the evidence presented was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case of perjury.

    The court quoted the Commission Staff Comment to Proposed CPL 150.20, noting that the change allowing the People to appeal “stems from the apparent injustice of denying the People any remedy when the trial court dismisses a charge during trial upon the basis of an erroneous determination of law that the trial evidence does not establish a prima facie case.”

  • People v. La Ruffa, 37 N.Y.2d 58 (1975): Waiver of Double Jeopardy Through Guilty Plea

    People v. La Ruffa, 37 N.Y.2d 58 (1975)

    A defendant’s knowing and intelligent guilty plea, made with advice of counsel, constitutes a waiver of their right against double jeopardy, even if subsequent legal developments expand that right retroactively.

    Summary

    La Ruffa was initially convicted of second-degree murder, but that conviction was overturned. He was retried for first-degree murder. During the second trial, La Ruffa, with counsel, pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Years later, he sought to vacate the conviction, arguing double jeopardy because he was retried on the original first-degree murder charge after initially being convicted of a lesser charge in the first trial. The court held that La Ruffa’s guilty plea waived his double jeopardy claim, even though the legal understanding of double jeopardy had evolved since his plea. The court emphasized the importance of finality in convictions resulting from valid guilty pleas.

    Facts

    La Ruffa was indicted for first-degree murder in 1952 and convicted of second-degree murder. His conviction was overturned on appeal, and a new trial was ordered. In 1957, during his retrial on the original first-degree murder indictment, La Ruffa, with advice of counsel, withdrew his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. He later attempted to withdraw his plea, claiming he was in a “bad state of mind,” but the motion was denied. No appeal was taken at that time.

    Procedural History

    In 1970, a coram nobis application led to the 1957 judgment being vacated due to a deprivation of the right to appeal. La Ruffa was resentenced nunc pro tunc as of April 4, 1957. On appeal, he argued double jeopardy. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the guilty plea waived the double jeopardy claim. This appeal followed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s knowing and intelligent guilty plea to a lesser charge constitutes a waiver of a double jeopardy claim, precluding him from later asserting that claim based on subsequent retroactive expansions of double jeopardy protections.

    Holding

    Yes, because a guilty plea, entered knowingly and intelligently with advice of counsel, constitutes a waiver of the right not to be twice subjected to the risk of punishment for the same offense, even if the constitutional law regarding double jeopardy evolves retroactively after the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and prevents retrying a defendant for a crime they were implicitly acquitted of by a conviction on a lesser offense, these developments in double jeopardy law occurred *after* La Ruffa’s guilty plea. The court stated, “When a defendant admits his guilt and consents to the entry of judgment against him, he does so under the law then existing.” It is not contended that the plea was involuntary or unintelligent. The court emphasized the importance of finality in convictions. Quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 757; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 773-774 the State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the finality of convictions attributable to guilty pleas valid under constitutional standards existent at the time. Because there was no claim of duress, coercion or lack of awareness, the negotiated plea, made with the advice of competent counsel in light of the then existing law, should not be set aside merely because of a subsequent change in double jeopardy law.

  • Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971): Double Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity for Mistrial

    Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971)

    A mistrial granted without manifest necessity, and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defendant, Grant, whose trial was terminated by a mistrial declared by the judge due to a potential, albeit remote, appearance of bias. The New York Court of Appeals held that declaring a mistrial under these circumstances, over the defendant’s strenuous objection and without manifest necessity, violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights, thus prohibiting a retrial. The court emphasized that the appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient to justify a mistrial; there must be a demonstrable and substantial basis, a “manifest necessity,” to override the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by the original tribunal.

    Facts

    The trial court judge, during Grant’s trial, recalled that his cousin was acquainted with Grant’s father. Grant’s father had previously contacted the judge’s chambers about a complaint of police harassment unrelated to the current case. The judge had no personal interaction with Grant or his father, and the contact was minimal (a call to the judge’s clerk a year prior). The judge, concerned that this recollection “might in some conceivable way affect his judgment,” “disqualified” himself and declared a mistrial “in the interests of justice.”

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced without a jury, and after a police witness testified, jeopardy attached. Grant’s counsel objected to the mistrial, arguing that no cause existed and noting a tactical advantage gained from the police officer’s testimony. After the mistrial was declared, Grant sought relief under CPLR Article 78, seeking to prohibit retrial based on double jeopardy. The Appellate Division prohibited the retrial. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mistrial, declared by a judge due to a remote possibility of bias and over the defendant’s objection, constitutes manifest necessity, thus permitting a retrial without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because the judge’s subjective appraisal of a remote possibility of bias was not within the ambit of the well-established rule that “manifest necessity” must be shown to justify a mistrial. The remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant, interdicted the mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the mistrial was improperly granted because it lacked “manifest necessity.” The court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a tribunal they believe to be favorably disposed to their fate. The court quoted United States v. Jorn, stating that the judge must consider “the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate”. Although the appearance of impropriety is a valid concern, it cannot be used as an “escape hatch from the performance of an unpleasant duty.” The court emphasized that “the necessity must be ‘manifest,’” and the remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with the prejudice to the defendant (losing a tactical advantage), made the mistrial improper. The Court distinguished between a genuine, demonstrable need for a mistrial and a mere subjective apprehension of bias. The court noted that a mistrial declared in the public interest and against the defendant’s will must have some basis of demonstrable substance.

  • People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972): Double Jeopardy and Defendant-Induced Mistrials

    People v. Michael, 30 N.Y.2d 376 (1972)

    A defendant may be retried without violating double jeopardy protections when the defendant’s own actions caused the mistrial, creating a ‘manifest necessity’ to halt the initial proceeding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of double jeopardy when a mistrial is declared due to the unavailability of witnesses, where the unavailability is attributed to threats made by the defendant. The New York Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible because the defendant’s actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial. Allowing retrial in such circumstances does not violate double jeopardy principles, as the defendant should not benefit from obstructing the judicial process.

    Facts

    During jury selection in the initial trial, the prosecutor discovered that two witnesses were difficult to locate. Following a holiday adjournment, the prosecutor informed the court that the missing witnesses had been threatened and that their disappearance was attributable to the defendant. At the subsequent trial, one witness testified to leaving the state because his life was threatened, and another testified that the defendant’s uncle and another person threatened her with a knife.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s application for a mistrial on November 28, 1967, after the jury had been sworn but before any witnesses were called. The defendant was then retried. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine whether the retrial violated the defendant’s protection against double jeopardy.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the mistrial granted on the People’s application due to witness unavailability, where the unavailability was allegedly caused by the defendant, precludes a subsequent trial based on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s own actions in threatening witnesses contributed to the mistrial, thus establishing a “manifest necessity” to abort the first trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if a defendant’s actions cause a trial to be aborted, they should not be allowed to claim double jeopardy as a constitutional safeguard. This situation falls within the scope of “manifest necessity,” which justifies interrupting a trial. The court distinguished this case from Downum v. United States, where the witness absence was due to the prosecutor’s failure to ensure their presence. Here, the defendant’s alleged intimidation of witnesses directly impeded the prosecution’s ability to present its case.

    The court emphasized that a defendant should not benefit from frustrating the trial process. Citing United States v. Perez, the court reiterated that “manifest necessity” allows for the interruption of a trial. The court held that the retrial was permissible under the precedent established in Matter of Bland v. Supreme Ct., County of N.Y., indicating that actions taken by the defendant to disrupt the trial can waive double jeopardy protections.

    The court stated, “If the act of a defendant himself aborts a trial, he ought not readily be heard to say that by frustrating the trial he had succeeded in erecting a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy.”

  • People v. Graham, 27 N.Y.2d 678 (1970): Double Jeopardy Limits Retrial Severity

    People v. Graham, 27 N.Y.2d 678 (1970)

    When a defendant is convicted of a lesser offense at a first trial, double jeopardy prevents a subsequent retrial from resulting in a conviction for a greater offense on the same count.

    Summary

    Graham was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder: felony murder and common-law murder. His first trial resulted in a conviction for felony murder and second-degree murder on the common-law count. Upon retrial, he was convicted of felony murder and first-degree murder on the common-law count. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Graham was initially convicted of second-degree murder on the common-law count, double jeopardy principles barred a subsequent conviction for first-degree murder on the same count. The court modified the judgment, reducing the degree of the crime to second-degree murder.

    Facts

    The defendant, Graham, was indicted on two counts of first-degree murder. The first count was felony murder, and the second count was common-law murder. At his initial trial, Graham was convicted of felony murder and second-degree murder under the common-law murder count. A retrial was ordered, and at the second trial, Graham was convicted of both felony murder and first-degree murder under the common-law count.

    Procedural History

    The case began in the County Court where Graham was initially tried and convicted. After the first trial resulted in a conviction for felony murder and second-degree murder on the common-law count, a retrial was granted. At the retrial, the defendant was convicted of felony murder and first-degree murder under the common-law count. The case then went to the Appellate Division, and subsequently, was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s judgment, reducing the degree of crime for which the defendant was convicted on the common-law count from murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree and remanded the defendant to the County Court for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, after being convicted of second-degree murder on a common-law murder count in an initial trial, the defendant could be retried and convicted of first-degree murder on the same common-law murder count without violating double jeopardy principles.

    Holding

    No, because the initial conviction of second-degree murder on the common-law count limited the scope of permissible conviction on retrial to no more than second-degree murder on that count.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the principle of double jeopardy, citing People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174. The court reasoned that because Graham was initially convicted of murder in the second degree under the common-law count, he could not be tried for a greater offense (murder in the first degree) on the same count in a subsequent retrial. The court stated: “Having been convicted of murder, second degree, instead of murder, first degree, under the common-law count at the first trial, he could be tried for no more than murder, second degree, at the second trial.” This limitation stems from the constitutional protection against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. The court found no merit in the other arguments raised by the defendant. The decision emphasizes the finality and protection afforded by an initial conviction for a lesser included offense, preventing the prosecution from seeking a higher degree of culpability upon retrial.

  • Barnes v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74 (1970): Double Penalties for Drunk Driving

    Barnes v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74 (1970)

    The imposition of both administrative (license suspension for gross negligence) and criminal (license suspension for driving while impaired) penalties for conduct arising out of the same incident does not constitute unlawful double punishment.

    Summary

    Barnes, after an accident, faced both an administrative license suspension for gross negligence and a later mandatory suspension following a guilty plea to driving while impaired. He challenged the second suspension as double punishment. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the administrative and criminal penalties were separate and independent. The court reasoned that the administrative suspension aimed to protect the public, while the criminal suspension was a consequence of violating the law. The Court of Appeals found no statutory or constitutional bar to imposing both penalties.

    Facts

    Barnes was involved in a car accident after consuming four martinis. He was initially arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles held a hearing and determined Barnes was grossly negligent, suspending his license for 60 days. Later, Barnes pleaded guilty to driving while ability impaired, a lesser charge. This conviction triggered a second, mandatory 60-day license suspension.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles initially suspended Barnes’ license for gross negligence. Subsequently, after Barnes pleaded guilty to driving while impaired, the Commissioner imposed a second mandatory suspension. Barnes then initiated an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the second suspension. Special Term annulled the second suspension, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Commissioner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a discretionary administrative license suspension for gross negligence bars a subsequent mandatory license suspension based on a criminal conviction for driving while impaired, when both arise from the same incident.

    Holding

    No, because the administrative suspension for gross negligence and the criminal suspension for driving while impaired are separate and independent proceedings designed to serve different purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Vehicle and Traffic Law allows both the Commissioner and the courts to impose sanctions. The first suspension was permissive, based on “gross negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle,” and aimed to protect the public. The second suspension was mandatory, following a criminal conviction for driving while impaired. The court emphasized that these are separate proceedings, and the outcome of one does not affect the other. The court cited Helvering v. Mitchell, stating that revocation of a voluntarily granted privilege is a remedial sanction. The court stated, “Remedial sanctions may be of varying types. One which is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element is revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted.” The court found suspension of a driver’s license to be essentially civil, intended to protect the public. The court also noted that Barnes waived any double jeopardy claim by not raising it at trial. The court concluded that the Commissioner had a mandatory duty to suspend the license after the conviction, leaving no room for judicial review.

  • People ex rel. Zakrzewski v. Fay, 18 N.Y.2d 403 (1966): Double Jeopardy and Defective Indictments

    People ex rel. Zakrzewski v. Fay, 18 N.Y.2d 403 (1966)

    A trial on an indictment that alleges all the elements of a lesser-included offense places the defendant in jeopardy, and a subsequent indictment for the same conduct, even with an added element to charge a higher offense, violates double jeopardy protections.

    Summary

    Zakrzewski sought habeas corpus relief, arguing his sentence as a multiple felony offender was based on a prior conviction obtained in violation of double jeopardy. He was initially tried for first-degree burglary under an indictment that was later dismissed due to a perceived defect. A new indictment, alleging the same conduct with a minor addition, led to a conviction for second-degree burglary. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial indictment, even if defective for first-degree burglary, was sufficient for second-degree burglary, thus the first trial placed him in jeopardy. The subsequent indictment and conviction were deemed unconstitutional, warranting his release.

    Facts

    In 1924, Zakrzewski was indicted for first-degree burglary, accused of breaking into an occupied dwelling at night with another person, Jaruszewski. The jury found him guilty as charged. The district attorney moved to dismiss the indictment before sentencing, claiming it lacked the essential allegation that Zakrzewski was “assisted by a confederate actually present,” a requirement for first-degree burglary under the applicable penal law. The court dismissed the indictment and resubmitted the case to the grand jury.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury issued a second indictment, adding the clause that each defendant had been “aided by the other actually present.” Zakrzewski pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary under this second indictment, which later served as the basis for his treatment as a second felony offender. In 1955, he was convicted of third-degree burglary and sentenced as a multiple felony offender. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing the second indictment and conviction were void due to double jeopardy. The lower courts denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial on an indictment, which may be defective in alleging all elements of the highest crime charged but does allege all elements of a lesser included offense, places a defendant in jeopardy, thus barring a subsequent trial on a new indictment alleging the same conduct with a slightly different element.

    Holding

    Yes, because the original indictment contained all the elements of second-degree burglary, the crime for which Zakrzewski was ultimately convicted, and the trial had progressed to a verdict. Therefore, double jeopardy applied, and the second indictment was unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevents a person from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Jeopardy attaches when a defendant is put on trial before a competent court with a sufficient indictment. However, if the initial indictment is so defective that it couldn’t support a conviction, a retrial is permissible. Here, the court reasoned that the original indictment contained all essential elements of second-degree burglary, even if it lacked a critical element of first-degree burglary. The court cited People v. Oliver, 3 N.Y.2d 684, where an indictment for first-degree burglary lacking the element of “nighttime” was deemed sufficient for second-degree burglary. The court stated, “The misnomer in describing the offense as in the first instead of the second degree is of no moment”. Since the initial trial progressed to a verdict on an indictment sufficient for second-degree burglary, Zakrzewski was in danger of a valid judgment. Permitting the district attorney to terminate proceedings after a verdict and procure a new indictment violated double jeopardy. The court concluded that the second indictment was unconstitutional, and the conviction based on it could not serve as a predicate for multiple felony offender status, entitling Zakrzewski to release.

  • Esposito v. Farrar, 28 N.Y.2d 553 (1971): Establishes When Double Jeopardy Attaches in New York State

    Esposito v. Farrar, 28 N.Y.2d 553 (1971)

    In New York, a defendant is not placed in jeopardy until the jury has been examined and sworn, and evidence has been given.

    Summary

    The petitioners sought to prohibit their retrial on an indictment, arguing that it would violate the double jeopardy rule because a mistrial had been declared in their first trial after the jury was impaneled and sworn. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of their applications, holding that, under New York law, jeopardy does not attach until the jury has been sworn and evidence presented. The court reasoned that the timing of when jeopardy attaches is somewhat arbitrary but necessary to prevent prosecutorial harassment and that the New York rule was still applicable.

    Facts

    The petitioners were indicted for robbery, grand larceny, assault, and criminally possessing a loaded pistol.

    A jury was selected and sworn in Supreme Court, New York County.

    After the jury was sworn, the prosecutor requested and received a continuance.

    The prosecutor requested a further continuance because a complaining witness was unavailable. The court granted a continuance over the petitioner’s objection.

    The prosecutor then informed the court he had not located one witness but another was present. The petitioners moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute.

    The court denied the motion and declared a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners sought orders prohibiting the Supreme Court from proceeding with a retrial, arguing double jeopardy.

    The Appellate Division denied their applications.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether compelling the petitioners to stand trial on the indictment after a mistrial would violate the double jeopardy rule.

    Holding

    No, because under New York law, an indicted defendant who has pleaded not guilty is not placed in jeopardy until the jury has been examined and sworn, and evidence has been given.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the established New York rule that jeopardy attaches only after the jury is sworn and evidence is presented. The court acknowledged that the precise point at which jeopardy attaches varies among states and federal courts but emphasized the importance of having a cutoff point to prevent prosecutorial harassment. It stated, “It makes little difference whether this point be regarded as having been reached when the oath is administered to the jury or when the first witness for the People is sworn. If a prosecutor were attempting to harass a defendant, he could refrain from having the jury sworn, if jeopardy attaches at that point, and whether the point is reached on swearing the jury or the first witness makes little difference in protecting a defendant’s rights.”

    The court distinguished Downum v. United States, stating it does not mandate that all states have uniform rules regarding when jeopardy attaches. Instead, Downum means that once jeopardy has attached, a mistrial cannot be declared merely to obtain a witness whose presence was doubtful at the trial’s commencement.

    Because no witness had been sworn in the first trial, the appellant had not been placed in jeopardy; therefore, the court did not need to determine if the mistrial was a “manifest necessity.”

    The court concluded that changing the “time-honored New York rule” would not substantively impact the essence of double jeopardy, particularly as no evidence was presented in the first trial.

  • People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967): Double Jeopardy and Felony Murder Retrial

    20 N.Y.2d 440 (1967)

    When a jury is instructed that it can only return one verdict in a case involving both premeditated and felony murder, its silence on the felony murder theory does not constitute an acquittal, and retrial on that theory after a successful appeal does not violate double jeopardy.

    Summary

    Nathan Jackson was retried and convicted of felony murder after his initial conviction for common-law murder was overturned by the Supreme Court due to a coerced confession. On appeal, Jackson argued that the retrial for felony murder violated double jeopardy, and the trial court erred in its instructions regarding the termination of the underlying felony, along with issues relating to the sentencing hearing and the use of a special jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the original jury’s silence on the felony murder count, coupled with instructions to return only one verdict, did not constitute an acquittal. Thus, retrial on the felony murder charge was permissible.

    Facts

    Jackson robbed a hotel clerk at gunpoint, taking $56.50. He then escorted the clerk and several guests to a third-floor room, warning them not to follow him. As Jackson exited the hotel, Patrolman Ramos confronted him. A scuffle ensued, and Jackson shot and killed Ramos.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was initially convicted of first-degree murder. This conviction was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to a coerced confession (Jackson v. Denno). On retrial, Jackson was convicted of felony murder. He appealed, arguing double jeopardy and other errors. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the second conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Jackson’s retrial and conviction for felony murder violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

    2. Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in rulings and instructions to the jury concerning when the underlying felony had terminated.

    3. Whether the trial judge committed substantial error in the “second stage” penalty hearing by denying defendant the protection against involuntary confessions guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

    4. Whether Jackson’s trial before a special jury violated his rights under the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Holding

    1. No, because the jury in the first trial was instructed to render only one verdict, their silence on felony murder did not constitute an acquittal.

    2. No, because although the instruction was incomplete, the evidence of guilt was so convincing that any error was harmless.

    3. No, because the defendant did not properly object and show that the confession used during sentencing was coerced.

    4. No, because the use of special juries had been previously upheld as constitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that double jeopardy only applies when a defendant is retried for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Here, the jury in the first trial was instructed to return only one verdict, making it impossible to determine whether they had considered and rejected the felony murder charge. The court distinguished this case from those involving retrials on higher degrees of a crime after a successful appeal from a conviction on a lesser degree, where a “grisly choice” is imposed on the defendant’s right to appeal.

    Regarding the jury instruction on the termination of a felony, the court acknowledged that the trial judge’s response was uninformative. However, they concluded that the error was harmless because the evidence strongly suggested that the robbery and the shooting were closely connected in time and place, making it highly unlikely that the jury would have found the felony had terminated even with proper instruction.

    As to the introduction of confessions during the sentencing phase, the court held that the defendant was required to object to the confession’s use by demonstrating it was involuntary. Since he had only objected based on the lack of a Huntley hearing, he did not properly preserve the issue for appeal. Finally, the court dismissed the challenge to the special jury based on established precedent upholding their constitutionality, citing Fay v. New York.

  • People v. Graham, 25 N.Y.2d 172 (1969): Admissibility of Evidence Obtained After Improper Police Questioning

    People v. Graham, 25 N.Y.2d 172 (1969)

    Evidence obtained as a direct result of questioning a suspect after their attorney has instructed the police not to interrogate them in the absence of counsel is inadmissible, as is any derivative evidence obtained as a result of that questioning.

    Summary

    Graham was convicted of second-degree murder, but the Appellate Division reversed, citing the admission of a statement taken at the police station after Graham’s law firm contacted the police. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, holding that the misleading answer given by the Chief of Detectives that there was nothing wrong and no need for a lawyer nullified the law firm’s communication and therefore the statement was inadmissible. The court also addressed issues raised by the defendant regarding admissibility of other evidence and the permissible scope of retrial.

    Facts

    Maxwell Slick was killed. Graham was indicted for second-degree murder and convicted of first-degree manslaughter. Prior to making a statement to the police, Graham’s law firm had contacted the police. The Chief of Detectives gave a misleading answer that “there was nothing wrong and no need for a lawyer.” In his statement, Graham revealed where he threw the murder weapon. The gun was retrieved from the river at the location described in Graham’s statement.
    Prior to the killing, a conversation occurred between Graham and his wife in the presence of Maxwell Slick.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Graham of first-degree manslaughter based on an indictment for second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that a statement by Graham was improperly admitted into evidence. Both the People and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statement taken from Graham at the police station should have been excluded from evidence.
    2. Whether the gun, retrieved as a result of Graham’s statement, should be excluded from evidence.
    3. Whether the conversation between Graham and his wife in the presence of the victim is admissible as evidence.
    4. Whether, upon retrial, Graham can be tried on a charge more serious than manslaughter in the first degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because the misleading answer given by the Chief of Detectives threw defense counsel off guard, and the consequence is the same as though the police had been instructed by an attorney for defendant that he was not to be interrogated in the absence of counsel.
    2. Yes, because the gun’s retrieval was traced directly to the inadmissible statement, unless retrieval can be linked to another independent source.
    3. Yes, because the privilege protecting marital communications does not apply when a third person is present.
    4. No, because to retry Graham on a more serious charge than manslaughter in the first degree would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the misleading answer by the Chief of Detectives had the same effect as if the police had been explicitly instructed not to interrogate Graham without his attorney present, citing People v. Gunner, People v. Donovan, and People v. Sanchez. Therefore, the statement was inadmissible.

    The court applied the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, holding that the gun, located as a result of the inadmissible statement, was also inadmissible unless it could be linked to an independent source, citing Silverthorne Lbr. Co. v. United States.

    The court noted that marital privilege does not apply when a third person is present, citing People v. Daghita, People v. Melski, and People v. McCormack.

    The court then addressed the double jeopardy issue. Although New York’s Criminal Procedure Code had previously allowed retrial on a greater charge after a conviction on a lesser charge was overturned on appeal (People v. Palmer, People v. McGrath, People v. Ercole, Matter of Fiorillo v. Farrell), the Supreme Court case of Green v. United States established a different rule for federal courts, holding that retrying a defendant for a greater offense after a conviction on a lesser offense violates the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy. The court acknowledged that the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the Green rule to the states. Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hetenyi, the court concluded that subsequent Supreme Court decisions such as Malloy v. Hogan, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., and Pointer v. Texas supported the Second Circuit’s conclusion. Therefore, the court held that Graham could not be retried on a charge greater than manslaughter in the first degree.