New York Law Review

Tag: double counting

  • People v. Diaz, 11 N.Y.3d 212 (2008): “Double Counting” in Felony Murder Requires Separate Criminal Intent

    People v. Diaz, 11 N.Y.3d 212 (2008)

    In a felony murder case, the “double counting” prohibition articulated in People v. Cahill requires that the underlying felony involve a criminal intent distinct from the intent to kill required for the murder charge itself; the mere fact that a single factual element is common to both crimes does not violate this principle.

    Summary

    Diaz was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a victim during a kidnapping where the victim died. He argued that the indictment was insufficient because it improperly “double counted” the victim’s death, using it as an element of both the first-degree murder charge (killing in furtherance of kidnapping) and the first-degree kidnapping charge (abduction resulting in death). The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prohibition against double counting, as established in People v. Cahill, applies only when the same criminal *intent* underlies both the murder and the predicate felony. Here, the intent to abduct was distinct from the intent to kill, satisfying the requirement for an aggravated murder charge.

    Facts

    Diaz abducted Patrick Bhola. During the abduction, Diaz intentionally killed Bhola by stabbing and beating him. Diaz was subsequently indicted for several crimes related to the abduction and death, including first-degree murder.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Diaz’s motion to dismiss the indictment. Diaz then pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and second-degree murder, waiving his right to appeal with an exception for the “double counting” argument. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment for first-degree murder is legally insufficient when it uses the victim’s death as an element of both the first-degree murder charge (killing in furtherance of kidnapping) and the underlying first-degree kidnapping charge (abduction resulting in death), thereby “double counting” the death in violation of People v. Cahill?

    Holding

    No, because the prohibition against double counting as articulated in People v. Cahill is not violated where the murder and the predicate felony arise from two distinct criminal intents. The intent to abduct is separate and distinct from the intent to kill. It is of no moment that a factual circumstance other than the defendant’s intent—in this case, the victim’s death—is an element of both the murder and the predicate felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Cahill, where the defendant’s intent to commit murder was the sole intent underlying both the murder charge and the predicate burglary charge. In Cahill, the court reasoned that the legislature, in defining first-degree murder, required murder plus an additional aggravating factor and that using the “very same mens rea – the intent to kill” to define both the murder and the aggravating factor failed to narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.

    The Court emphasized that Cahill concerned the double counting of a single criminal *intent*, not the mere presence of a common factual element. In this case, the intent to abduct the victim was separate and distinct from the intent to kill him. The Court stated, “Here, the murder defendant committed and the predicate crime that serves as an aggravation arise from two distinct intents—the intent to kill the victim and the intent to abduct him.” This distinct intent adequately aggravated the crime of murder to first-degree murder status.

    The Court also noted the illogical result that would follow if it accepted Diaz’s argument. The Court stated, “Indeed, that intention is an unlikely one to attribute to the Legislature—an intention to punish one of the most heinous of crimes, kidnapping accompanied by murder of the victim, less severely than many other murders.”

  • Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 94 N.Y.2d 696 (2000): Prohibition Against Double Counting in Divorce Settlements

    Grunfeld v. Grunfeld, 94 N.Y.2d 696 (2000)

    When calculating equitable distribution and maintenance in divorce cases involving professional licenses, courts must avoid double counting income streams already considered when valuing the license.

    Summary

    In a divorce action, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Appellate Division improperly based both the equitable distribution of the husband’s law license and his maintenance obligation on the same projected professional earnings, thus engaging in prohibited double counting. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, clarifying that the same income stream cannot be the basis for both a distributive award and a maintenance calculation.

    Facts

    Rochelle and Harold Grunfeld married while Harold was in law school. Harold became a successful customs lawyer. Rochelle gave up her teaching career to raise their children. As Harold’s income grew, so did their lifestyle. The couple separated in 1991, and Rochelle initiated divorce proceedings in 1992.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dissolved the marriage, granted Rochelle custody of their child, ordered child support, and awarded maintenance. The court determined the value of Harold’s law practice and license, excluding the license from marital assets to avoid double counting income already considered for maintenance. The Appellate Division modified, including one-half the value of Harold’s professional license in the distribution without adjusting maintenance. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred by including the value of the husband’s professional license in the equitable distribution award without adjusting the maintenance award, thus resulting in an impermissible double counting of income.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division double counted the husband’s income by ordering distribution of the value of the law license without adjusting the maintenance award, which was also based on the same income stream. This is inconsistent with the prohibition against double counting as articulated in McSparron v. McSparron.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the principle that professional licenses acquired during marriage are marital property subject to equitable distribution (O’Brien v. O’Brien). However, it cautioned against double counting income streams. The Court explained that a professional license’s value is tied to the future earnings it enables. If those same earnings are also used to determine maintenance, the licensed spouse is essentially being charged twice for the same asset. The Court stated, “To the extent, then, that those same projected earnings used to value the license also form the basis of an award of maintenance, the licensed spouse is being twice charged with distribution of the same marital asset value, or with sharing the same income with the nonlicensed spouse.” The Court noted that there are two ways to avoid this problem: reducing the distributive award based on the income already considered for maintenance or reducing the maintenance award itself. The Court remanded the case, instructing the Supreme Court to recalculate the distributive award, taking into account any income from outside sources used in setting maintenance. The court also found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing the practice at the date the action was commenced, following the active/passive asset distinction. The court also affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to order interest on the unpaid portion of the distributive award, as the husband had not been paying in a timely fashion.