Dorst v. Pataki, 87 N.Y.2d 698 (1996)

The Legislature can delegate rulemaking authority to the Governor, even without specific expertise, as long as the delegation is accompanied by a general policy framework and standards, such as public safety.

Summary

Two female inmates challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to Correction Law § 851 (2) and Executive Order No. 5.1, arguing that they violated the separation of powers doctrine by delegating law-making power to the Governor. The amendment allowed the Governor to exclude classes of inmates from temporary release programs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the delegation was constitutional because the legislature provided a general policy framework (community safety and inmate welfare) to guide the Governor’s actions, and that the Governor’s role as chief executive officer justified the delegation. This case clarifies the permissible scope of legislative delegation to the executive branch, particularly the Governor.

Facts

Plaintiffs, female inmates convicted of violent felonies, were deemed ineligible for temporary release programs due to Governor Pataki’s Executive Order No. 5.1. The order barred inmates convicted of crimes involving serious physical injury or the use of dangerous weapons from participating in temporary release programs. This order was based on a 1995 amendment to Correction Law § 851 (2), which allowed the Governor to exclude or limit participation in temporary release programs by certain classes of inmates.

Procedural History

The plaintiffs initially challenged the law in Supreme Court, which rejected their claim. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the 1995 amendment to Correction Law § 851 (2) unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the Governor in violation of the separation of powers doctrine?
2. Whether the 1995 amendment to Correction Law § 851 (2) is invalid because it lacks appropriate standards for the Governor’s exercise of the delegated power?

Holding

1. No, because the Legislature set the overall policy regarding temporary release programs, and the delegation to the Governor was consistent with that policy.
2. No, because the statute explicitly directs that additional regulation of inmate participation in temporary release programs is to be “guided by consideration for the safety of the community and the welfare of the inmate.”

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Legislature is free to delegate rulemaking authority to the executive branch, including the Governor, as long as the Legislature articulates a basic policy framework. The Court cited Bourquin v Cuomo, 85 NY2d 781, 785, stating that executive rulemaking may entail some policy selectivity without offending the separation of powers doctrine, as long as the basic policy choices have been made by the Legislature. The Court found that Correction Law § 852 (1) provided sufficient guidance, directing the Commissioner of Correctional Services to consider community safety and inmate welfare when implementing temporary release programs. The court found it of no moment that the articulation of general policy was directed toward the Commissioner of Correctional Services and not reiterated when the Governor was given similar rulemaking authority. The court referenced Clark v Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185, to support this idea. The court also relied on Touby v United States, 500 US 160, where the Supreme Court upheld a congressional delegation to the Attorney General, noting that the separation of powers doctrine focuses on the distribution of power among the branches, not within a single branch.

Regarding the lack of specific standards, the Court held that the requirement to consider community safety and inmate welfare was sufficient. The Court compared this standard to the one upheld in Matter of Big Apple Food Vendors’ Assn. v Street Vendor Review Panel, 90 NY2d 402, 407. The court stated: “The community safety criterion here falls well within the parameters of our holding in Matter of Big Apple Food Vendors’ Assn. v Street Vendor Review Panel concerning the adequacy of general legislative standards for administrative or executive action or rulemaking, and of our earlier precedents on that subject.”