New York Law Review

Tag: Domestic Relations Law § 72

  • E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority

    E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150, 863 N.E.2d 100, 831 N.Y.S.2d 96 (2007)

    Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) grants grandparents standing to seek visitation under specific circumstances, but courts must give special weight to a fit parent’s decisions regarding their child’s best interests.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandparent was properly granted visitation rights under New York’s Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) and whether that statute is constitutional under Troxel v. Granville. After the child’s mother died, the grandmother lived with the father and child for 3.5 years, becoming a primary caregiver. When the father ended the arrangement and limited visitation, the grandmother sought court-ordered visitation. The Court of Appeals held that the statute was properly applied and is constitutional, both facially and as applied, emphasizing that while the statute allows for grandparent visitation, it requires significant deference to the decisions of a fit parent.

    Facts

    A.D. (mother) died of cancer, and her mother, E.S. (grandmother), moved in with A.D.’s husband, P.D. (father), and their son, C.D., to help care for them. After the mother’s death, the grandmother continued to live with the father and child for 3.5 years, providing significant care and support for the child. The relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated, leading the father to demand the grandmother move out and severely restrict her access to the child. The grandmother then sought court-ordered visitation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the grandmother visitation rights. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying the visitation schedule in deference to the father’s wishes. The father appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing the statute was unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville and that the visitation order was an abuse of discretion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the grandparent was properly granted visitation rights with her grandson pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)?

    2. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville?

    3. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the grandmother established an extraordinarily close relationship with the child for several years, and the trial court properly considered the child’s best interests.

    2. No, because Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is narrowly drafted and can be interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision, aligning with the principles established in Troxel v. Granville.

    3. No, because the trial court properly employed the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest of his child and then thoroughly considered all relevant circumstances before granting visitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to seek visitation, but it does not create an absolute right. The court emphasized the importance of the two-part inquiry: first, determining standing based on death or equitable circumstances, and second, determining whether visitation is in the child’s best interest. The court stressed that the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests is strong, and courts should not lightly intrude on the family relationship against a fit parent’s wishes.

    The court distinguished this case from Troxel v. Granville, where the Washington statute was deemed overly broad. The Court quoted Justice Altman, stating that section 72(1) “can be, and has been, interpreted to accord deference to a parent’s decision, although the statute itself does not specifically require such deference. Further, [section 72(1)] is drafted much more narrowly than the Washington statute [considered in Troxel].” The court noted that the trial court in this case was “mindful” of the father’s parental prerogatives and employed the strong presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests.

    The Court of Appeals concluded that, unlike in Troxel, the trial court did not presuppose that grandparent visitation was warranted. Instead, the court properly considered all circumstances, including the child’s wishes, the grandmother’s caregiving skills, and the father’s objections, before granting visitation. The Court reiterated that affirmed findings of fact from the lower courts are binding and that there was no abuse of discretion in applying the statute.

  • E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007): Grandparent Visitation Rights and Parental Authority After Troxel

    E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y.3d 150 (2007)

    New York’s grandparent visitation statute (Domestic Relations Law § 72(1)) is constitutional, both facially and as applied, because it allows judicial intervention only when equitable circumstances exist, requires consideration of the child’s best interests, and presumes that a fit parent’s decisions are in the child’s best interests.

    Summary

    After a mother’s death, the maternal grandmother provided substantial care for her grandson for several years. When the relationship between the grandmother and the child’s father soured, the father limited the grandmother’s access to the child. The grandmother petitioned for visitation rights under Domestic Relations Law § 72(1). The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute was constitutional and that the visitation order was appropriate, emphasizing that the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing, while still according special weight to the parent’s decisions regarding the child’s best interests, in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville.

    Facts

    A mother (A.D.) died of cancer, and her mother (E.S., the grandmother) moved into the marital home to care for A.D. and her son (C.D.). After A.D.’s death, the grandmother continued to live with the father (P.D.) and C.D. for 3.5 years, providing significant care for C.D. The relationship between the father and grandmother deteriorated, leading the father to demand that the grandmother move out and restricting her contact with C.D.

    Procedural History

    The grandmother commenced a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking visitation rights. The Supreme Court granted visitation to the grandmother. The Appellate Division affirmed, modifying the visitation schedule in deference to the father’s wishes. The father appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutional in light of Troxel v. Granville.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville?

    2. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) was unconstitutionally applied in this case?

    Holding

    1. No, because Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is narrowly drafted, affording a grandparent standing only when a parent is deceased or where equitable circumstances exist, and requires a determination of the child’s best interest, giving the parent’s decision presumptive weight.

    2. No, because the trial court was mindful of the father’s parental rights and employed the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests, but the grandmother overcame this presumption by demonstrating the extraordinarily close relationship she had with the child and the child’s deep love for her.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) is facially constitutional because it is narrower than the Washington statute in Troxel, which allowed “any person” to petition for visitation “at any time.” New York’s statute requires either the death of a parent or a showing of circumstances where equity would intervene. The court emphasized that the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing to seek visitation, but the court must still determine if visitation is in the best interest of the grandchild, giving special weight to the parent’s determination. The court noted the Troxel decision requires that courts accord “at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.”

    The court distinguished this case from Troxel, noting that the trial court was “mindful” of the father’s parental prerogatives and employed the presumption that the parent’s wishes represent the child’s best interests. The grandmother successfully demonstrated an extraordinarily close relationship with the child during the nearly five years she lived with him, essentially acting as his surrogate mother. The court found the father’s complaints about the grandmother’s caregiving skills were contrived. The court properly considered all the circumstances and the law guardian’s assessment before granting visitation.

    The Court of Appeals cited Matter of Emanuel S. v Joseph E., 78 NY2d 178, 181 (1991), emphasizing that visits with a grandparent are “often a precious part of a child’s experience” and provide benefits the child cannot derive from other relationships.

  • Sibley v. Sheppard, 405 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978): Grandparent Visitation Rights After Adoption

    405 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1978)

    A natural grandparent has the right to visitation with their grandchild, even after the child’s adoption, when authorized by court decree and in the best interest of the child.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a grandparent has visitation rights after their grandchild is adopted, despite the adoptive parents’ objections. The New York Court of Appeals held that Domestic Relations Law § 72 allows a grandparent to seek visitation rights, even post-adoption, if it’s in the child’s best interest. The court found that adoption does not automatically extinguish grandparental rights and that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring a child maintains beneficial family ties, especially after the death of the child’s parents. The court emphasized that visitation must not hinder the adoptive relationship and that the statute’s application doesn’t unconstitutionally infringe on the adoptive family’s privacy.

    Facts

    Agatha Sibley, the petitioner, sought visitation rights with her grandson, Willie Sheppard. Willie’s parents were deceased. Willie lived with Sibley until he was about two years old. Following his mother’s death, Willie was placed in foster care and eventually adopted by his paternal grandparents, Mamie and Willie Sheppard, the respondents. After the adoption, the respondents interfered with Sibley’s attempts to visit Willie.

    Procedural History

    Sibley initiated a habeas corpus action under Domestic Relations Law § 72 to obtain visitation rights. The Supreme Court ruled that the adoption didn’t extinguish Sibley’s rights and awarded her visitation. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Domestic Relations Law § 72 permits a grandparent to seek visitation rights with a grandchild after the child has been adopted.
    2. Whether granting visitation rights to a grandparent over the objection of adoptive parents constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on the adoptive family’s right to privacy.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Domestic Relations Law § 72 allows a grandparent to seek visitation rights with a grandchild, even after adoption, if it is in the child’s best interest and does not unduly hinder the adoptive relationship.
    2. No, because the State has a legitimate interest in protecting the best interests of the child, and granting visitation rights under limited circumstances is reasonably related to that goal and does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Domestic Relations Law § 72 permits a proceeding against any person who has custody of the child, including adoptive parents. Nothing in the statute excludes custody obtained through adoption. The Court highlighted that § 117, which describes the effects of adoption, doesn’t expressly terminate all contacts between the child and their natural relatives. The court stated, “The purpose of the section, as manifested by its own terms, is to facilitate maintenance of family ties between grandparents and grandchildren where one or both of the natural parents have died.” The court noted that the Legislature was presumed to know about both statutes (§ 117 and § 72) and intended each to have full effect.

    Regarding the constitutionality challenge, the Court acknowledged parents’ rights to raise their families but noted that such rights are not absolute. The Court applied a less rigorous standard of review, asking whether the law had a “reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State.” The Court found that allowing grandparent visitation, subject to the child’s best interests, was a valid exercise of the State’s power to protect children. The Court emphasized that visitation rights may not be awarded if they hinder the adoptive relationship. The court stated: “Section 72 expressly provides that the court’s decision is to be rendered ‘as the best interest of the child may require’. Consequently, visitation rights may not be awarded when doing so will hinder the adoptive relationship.”
    The court emphasized that the power to interfere is severely limited and does not extend to dictating other aspects of the child’s upbringing. The court acknowledged that protecting the best interest of a child is unquestionably a proper exercise of the police power.