Matter of Adoption of K. (Anonymous), 39 N.Y.2d 58 (1976)

An irrevocable consent to adoption, executed in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 115-b, is valid even if the natural mother is under 21 years of age (but over 18) at the time of execution, as the statute makes no provision for the defense of infancy.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an irrevocable consent to adoption, executed by a natural mother four months before her 21st birthday, could be revoked based on infancy and duress. The Surrogate’s Court found the consent was voluntary and made after full disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that since the consent was executed as required by statute and the statute lacks a provision for the defense of infancy, the consent was valid and irrevocable. This case clarifies that the statutory requirements for consent under Domestic Relations Law § 115-b supersede common-law defenses of infancy in the context of adoption.

Facts

On October 31, 1973, the appellant (natural mother), appeared before a Surrogate’s Court Judge and executed an irrevocable consent to adoption pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. The appellant was four months shy of her 21st birthday at the time of consent. Approximately five months later, she attempted to revoke her consent, claiming duress and infancy.

Procedural History

The Surrogate’s Court conducted a hearing to review the procedures followed and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the consent. The Surrogate’s Court found no duress and concluded the consent was voluntary, made after full disclosure, and with full understanding of its legal consequences. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether an irrevocable consent to adoption, executed by a natural mother who is under 21 years of age but over 18, is valid and irrevocable, notwithstanding the common-law defense of infancy, when the consent was effectuated in the manner required by Domestic Relations Law § 115-b.

Holding

Yes, because the consent was effectuated in the manner required by statute, and the statute makes no provision for the defense of infancy. Therefore, the consent was valid and irrevocable.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing that the appellant’s consent was effectuated in the manner required by Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. The court highlighted the Surrogate’s thorough explanation to the natural mother regarding the gravity of her consent, as mandated by subdivision 2 of § 115-b. The court also noted that the appellant had received clarification from the adoption clerk and the attorney for the adoptive parents and had consulted with her parents and friends before executing the consent. Because the statute doesn’t provide for the defense of infancy in this context, the court found no basis to disturb the determination that the consent was valid and irrevocable. The court reasoned that the specific statutory framework for adoption consent superseded the general common-law principles related to infancy.