New York Law Review

Tag: Dog Sniff

  • People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985): Establishes Minimum Showing for Probable Cause in Search Warrant Applications

    People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985)

    A search warrant application must provide a magistrate with information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that evidence of illegal activity will be present at the specific time and place of the search.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, vacated the conviction judgments, and dismissed the indictments. The court held that the affidavit supporting the search warrant application failed to meet the minimum standard for establishing probable cause. The affidavit relied primarily on hearsay information without satisfying the “basis of knowledge” requirement. The court found the pen register results and surveillance data equally consistent with innocent activity. Additionally, a narcotics dog’s positive reaction at the defendant’s door was not sufficiently linked in time to justify probable cause at the time the warrant was issued.

    Facts

    Law enforcement sought a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment based on the following information: (1) Hearsay information from an undisclosed informant; (2) Pen register data showing calls to the defendant’s residence; (3) Surveillance of the defendant’s activities; and (4) A positive reaction by a narcotics detection dog at the defendant’s apartment door.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application provided the magistrate with information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that evidence of illegal activity would be present at the specific time and place of the search.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit relied primarily on hearsay information without satisfying the “basis of knowledge” requirement. The results of the pen register and surveillance were as consistent with innocence as with guilt. Furthermore, the dog sniff was not sufficiently related in time to the issuance of the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while there’s a strong preference for search warrants and applications shouldn’t be analyzed hypertechnically, the application must still establish probable cause. The court found the affidavit deficient for several reasons. First, the hearsay information failed to establish the informant’s basis of knowledge, a requirement for relying on such information to establish probable cause. Second, the pen register data and surveillance evidence were ambiguous and could be interpreted as consistent with legal activity. As the court noted, such evidence was “as consistent with innocence as with guilt.” Finally, the court found the dog sniff insufficient, stating it was not “so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time” (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210). The court emphasized that probable cause must exist at the time the warrant is issued, and the affidavit failed to establish that the presence of narcotics was likely at that specific time. The court cited People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, emphasizing that courts should not analyze applications in a “grudging or hypertechnical manner,” yet the warrant application must meet constitutional standards. The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of demonstrating a clear link between the alleged criminal activity and the specific location to be searched, as well as ensuring the reliability of any hearsay information used to support the warrant application.

  • People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981): Dog Sniffs and Fourth Amendment Rights

    People v. Price, 54 N.Y.2d 557 (1981)

    The use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

    Summary

    Leonard Price was arrested after a trained dog alerted police to the presence of drugs in his luggage at an airport. Price argued that the dog sniff was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and thus the subsequent warrant obtained based on the dog’s reaction was invalid. The New York Court of Appeals held that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it does not intrude upon a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court reasoned that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air. This case establishes an exception to the warrant requirement based on the limited and non-intrusive nature of a canine sniff.

    Facts

    Leonard Price and Carl Parsons were observed at the Los Angeles airport exhibiting nervous behavior and carrying large sums of cash while purchasing tickets for a flight to Buffalo shortly before departure.

    Detective Kaiser, suspicious of their behavior, alerted other officers who brought a trained narcotics detection dog named Frog to the airline’s baggage area.

    Frog alerted to the presence of controlled substances in the defendants’ luggage.

    Based on the dog’s reaction and Detective Kaiser’s observations, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was contacted, who then relayed the information to the New York State Police.

    The State Police obtained a search warrant for the defendants and their luggage.

    After the defendants claimed their baggage at the Buffalo airport, drug enforcement agents stopped and searched them, finding a large amount of heroin in one of the suitcases.

    Procedural History

    Price was indicted on charges related to criminal possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia.

    Price moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dog sniff in Los Angeles was an unlawful search requiring a warrant, and that the subsequent warrant in New York was therefore invalid.

    The trial court denied the motion to suppress.

    Price pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the use of a trained dog to sniff luggage for the presence of controlled substances in a public place constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, thus requiring a warrant.

    Holding

    No, because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the odors emanating from their luggage into the surrounding air in a public place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy, citing Terry v. Ohio and Katz v. United States.

    While acknowledging that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of closed luggage (United States v. Chadwick), the court distinguished this from the act of a dog sniffing the air surrounding the luggage.

    The court stated, “Since the dog does nothing more than smell the air surrounding the luggage in order to detect odors emanating from that luggage, there was no intrusion or search of the luggage. Defendant must assert a reasonable expectation that the air surrounding his luggage and the odor apparent in that surrounding air will remain private. In such circumstances, the Fourth Amendment affords no protection.”

    The court relied on analogous precedent regarding items in plain view and odors noticeable to the public, noting that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in items left in plain view of an officer lawfully in the position from which he observes the item (Harris v. United States), and that “there can be no reasonable expectation that plainly noticeable odors will remain private.”

    The court cited federal cases that have considered the use of drug-sniffing dogs and concluded that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the air surrounding one’s possessions (e.g., United States v. Fulero, United States v. Venema, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Solis, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court reasoned that “once one releases something into the open air, there can be little reasonable expectation of asserting one’s claims of privacy in either the item itself or in the surrounding air.”

    The court compared the use of a dog to track contraband to the use of dogs to track escaped criminals or lost persons, as well as the use of a flashlight to enhance an officer’s vision (People v. Cruz, People v. Sullivan).

    The court also noted that airline passengers surrender some expectation of privacy by entrusting their luggage to a common carrier responsible for ensuring passenger safety, referencing airport searches (People v. Kuhn, United States v. Bronstein, United States v. Goldstein).

    The court concluded that the police acted properly by seeking a warrant to search the luggage after the dog alerted to the presence of drugs (United States v. Chadwick), finding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant based on the defendants’ behavior, the large amount of cash they carried, and the dog’s reaction and training.