Colarusso v. Dunne, 672 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1996)

New York law imposes a duty on dog owners to restrain their dogs, and a violation of a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large can be evidence of negligence if the dog’s unrestrained behavior causes injury.

Summary

This case concerns a child injured when a car swerved to avoid a dog in the street. The central issue is whether the dog owner’s violation of a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large constitutes evidence of negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that such an ordinance violation could indeed be considered evidence of negligence, reversing the lower court’s decision. The court reasoned that local ordinances reflect public policy, and their violation is relevant to determining negligence when the ordinance aims to prevent the type of accident that occurred.

Facts

The defendant’s dog, while previously secured on an enclosed porch with a latched aluminum door, escaped. The manner of escape (whether the dog released himself or was released by another) is unknown. The dog ran into the street. A car braked to avoid hitting the dog and consequently struck a child on a bicycle, causing injury.

Procedural History

The plaintiff sued the dog owner for negligence. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the negligence claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the common-law presumption of negligence for unattended domestic animals does not apply to dogs. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the negligence cause of action.

Issue(s)

Whether the presence of a dog in the street, in violation of a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large, gives rise to a presumption or inference of negligence on the part of the dog’s owner.

Holding

Yes, because a local ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large reflects a community’s public policy, and a violation of that ordinance is relevant evidence of negligence if the violation proximately causes injury of the type the ordinance was designed to prevent.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that local ordinances reflect a locality’s public policy. The ordinance in question explicitly aimed to protect the health, safety, and well-being of persons and property from the dangers of uncontrolled dogs. The court stated, “That current statement of public policy on the question is surely entitled to some recognition by the courts.” The Court distinguished dogs from other animals by noting the existence of state and local laws specifically aimed at restraining dogs, signaling a departure from earlier expectations that dogs could roam freely. The court rejected the argument that extending a presumption of negligence to dog owners would necessarily extend to owners of other animals like cats or birds, because there were no comparable laws for those animals. The Court emphasized that while the dog owner presented evidence suggesting the dog was well-behaved and had never escaped before, these factual issues were for a jury to determine, making summary judgment inappropriate. Quoting Ugarriza v Schmieder, the Court reiterated that summary judgment is improper when there are genuine issues of material fact. The dissent argued in favor of reinstating the negligence cause of action, noting that the ordinance was aimed at preventing the precise type of accident that occurred. The dissent also emphasized that ordinances restricting dogs from running at large are sufficiently common that state law authorizes the seizure of dogs found to be in violation of such laws.