Petrone v. Fernandez, 12 N.Y.3d 546 (2009)

In New York, liability for harm caused by a domestic animal, including a dog, is determined solely by the rule of strict liability based on the animal’s known or should-have-been-known vicious propensities, precluding negligence claims based on violations of leash laws alone.

Summary

A mail carrier, Melanie Petrone, was injured when she jumped back into her car to avoid an unleashed Rottweiler. She sued the dog owner, alleging negligence based on a violation of the local leash law and the dog’s supposed vicious propensities. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the rule of strict liability for known vicious propensities, as established in Collier v. Zambito and Bard v. Jahnke. A violation of a leash law is irrelevant in the absence of such knowledge.

Facts

Melanie Petrone, a mail carrier, encountered an unleashed Rottweiler on a customer’s lawn. The dog was on the unfenced lawn of the defendant’s property. Fearing the dog, Petrone retreated to her vehicle. While attempting to get back into her car, she injured her finger. The dog did not bite, threaten, or make any contact with Petrone. She sued, alleging the dog owner was negligent for violating the local leash law.

Procedural History

The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendant, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that a dog owner could be liable for violating a leash ordinance, even without prior vicious propensities. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order, dismissing the negligence claim.

Issue(s)

Whether a dog owner may be held liable for injuries sustained as a result of an unleashed dog’s behavior based solely on a violation of a local leash ordinance, absent evidence of the dog’s known vicious propensities.

Holding

No, because in New York, liability for harm caused by a domestic animal is determined solely by the rule of strict liability for harm caused by an animal whose owner knows or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities, precluding negligence claims based solely on violations of leash laws.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in Collier v. Zambito and Bard v. Jahnke, which established that strict liability, based on the owner’s knowledge of an animal’s vicious propensities, is the sole basis for liability in domestic animal injury cases. The court stated, “[W]hen harm is caused by a domestic animal, its owner’s liability is determined solely by application of the rule articulated in Collier…i.e., the rule of strict liability for harm caused by a domestic animal whose owner knows or should have known of the animal’s vicious propensities.” The Court reasoned that a leash law violation is, at best, evidence of negligence, but negligence is no longer a basis for liability after Collier and Bard. Judge Pigott concurred, but expressed reservations about the elimination of negligence as a basis for liability, stating, “[N]egligence by an owner, even without knowledge concerning a domestic animal’s [vicious] propensity, may create liability”. However, he felt constrained by the precedent of Bard v. Jahnke. The ruling reinforces the focus on an animal’s known history rather than an owner’s general negligence.