New York Law Review

Tag: Divorce Decree Validity

  • Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 28 N.Y.2d 62 (1971): Statute of Limitations and Laches in Declaratory Judgment Actions Regarding Marital Status

    Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 28 N.Y.2d 62 (1971)

    A declaratory judgment action regarding marital status accrues upon the maturation of the right being asserted (e.g., a widow’s pension), not necessarily when the controversy regarding marital status first arises; furthermore, laches requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the opposing party.

    Summary

    Erminia Sorrentino sued to declare her the lawful widow of Alphonse Sorrentino, challenging the validity of his Nevada divorce and subsequent remarriage to Verna Mieyzwa. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations did not bar the action, as Erminia’s right to a widow’s pension only matured upon Alphonse’s death, and she promptly sued thereafter. The court also found no laches, as Erminia’s delay in bringing the action did not unduly prejudice Verna, especially since Verna could testify to Alphonse’s domicile in Nevada. The court upheld the finding that Alphonse never established a bona fide residence in Nevada, rendering the divorce invalid.

    Facts

    Erminia and Alphonse Sorrentino married in 1927 and separated in 1939, after which Alphonse voluntarily paid support. In 1951, Alphonse obtained a default divorce decree in Nevada and immediately married Verna Mieyzwa. Erminia was served with process but, relying on legal advice, did not appear in the Nevada action. Alphonse and Verna resided in New Jersey until Alphonse’s death in 1965. In 1952, Erminia obtained a support order from the New York Family Court, which implicitly recognized her marital status. Both Erminia and Verna applied for a widow’s pension after Alphonse’s death.

    Procedural History

    Erminia sued in Supreme Court for a declaratory judgment that she was Alphonse’s lawful widow and that the Nevada divorce was invalid. The trial court initially dismissed the complaint but, after granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, ruled in Erminia’s favor. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and laches.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a divorce decree begins to run when the party becomes aware of the controversy or when the right being asserted matures (e.g., entitlement to a widow’s pension).

    2. Whether Erminia’s delay in bringing the action constituted laches, barring her claim.

    Holding

    1. No, because the statute of limitations begins to run when the right being asserted matures, not simply when a justiciable controversy arises.

    2. No, because laches requires both unreasonable delay and prejudice to the opposing party, and neither was sufficiently established here.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the statute of limitations should not bar an action to enforce a right before it has even matured. Erminia’s right to the widow’s pension only matured upon Alphonse’s death; thus, the statute of limitations began to run at that time. Regarding laches, the court emphasized that mere delay is insufficient; prejudice to the opposing party must also be shown. The court noted that Erminia had diligently obtained a support order and a determination that she was still married to Alphonse. Moreover, the court found that Verna was not unduly prejudiced by Alphonse’s death, as she could testify to his intent regarding domicile in Nevada. The court cited Feldman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 App. Div. 123, 125, stating that “Laches…is not mere delay but delay that works disadvantage or injury.” The court also distinguished cases where remarriage and reliance on the divorce decree created prejudice. The court was bound by the finding that Alphonse never established a bona fide residence in Nevada, thus the divorce was invalid.

  • Domini v. Domini, 283 A.D. 2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954): Enforceability of Foreign Divorce Decrees in Support Proceedings

    283 A.D. 2d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954)

    A facially valid foreign divorce decree is entitled to full faith and credit unless the party challenging it demonstrates that the party who obtained the divorce lacked domicile in the foreign jurisdiction.

    Summary

    This case concerns a wife’s attempt to obtain support from her husband in New York after he obtained a divorce decree in Illinois. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Illinois divorce decree was presumptively valid and binding because the wife failed to present any evidence to challenge the husband’s claim of domicile in Illinois. The court emphasized that the burden of proof rests on the party challenging the jurisdiction of the foreign court. The court reversed the lower court’s order for support and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

    Facts

    The husband and wife were married in New York in 1907 and lived together until 1926 when the husband moved to Illinois. In 1930, the husband obtained a divorce decree in Illinois; the wife was not a resident of Illinois and was only served by publication, and she did not appear in the Illinois action. After being dismissed from his job in Illinois, the husband returned to New York in 1930 and remarried in 1932. The wife later sought support from the husband in New York Family Court in 1934.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court ordered the husband to pay $10 weekly for the wife’s support, finding that the Illinois divorce was invalid due to a lack of bona fide domicile. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court erred in determining the Illinois divorce decree was not binding due to a lack of bona fide domicile, when the wife presented no evidence to challenge the husband’s domicile in Illinois.

    Holding

    Yes, because the wife failed to meet her burden of disproving the husband’s intention to establish domicile in Illinois; therefore, the Illinois decree is entitled to full faith and credit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Family Court failed to give proper weight to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court stated that the burden was on the wife to challenge the jurisdictional validity of the Illinois divorce decree by disproving the husband’s intention to establish domicile in Illinois. Because the wife offered no evidence to rebut the husband’s claim of domicile, the Illinois decree was presumptively valid. The court cited Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 and Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, which address the requirements for giving full faith and credit to foreign divorce decrees. The court emphasized the importance of domicile in establishing jurisdiction for divorce actions. The court also addressed a prior support order issued by a Magistrate’s Court, but found that a subsequent order “reserved generally” effectively nullified the prior order. The court reasoned that the new order was based solely on the new petition and hearing, not on the prior order. The court stated, “When a case is reserved generally it wipes the order out and wipes any arrears out… unless something had been done since February 9, 1934, there is no order in existence today… I think we better make a new order here.” The court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, noting that the issue of support might be revisited under the Domestic Relations Court Act, which limits support orders after a valid divorce decree.