New York Law Review

Tag: Division of Parole

  • People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 242 (1996): Defining “Control” for Rosario Material Disclosure

    People v. Kelly, 88 N.Y.2d 242 (1996)

    Prosecutors are only required to disclose witness statements under People v. Rosario that are in their actual possession or control, and records held by independent state agencies like the Division of Parole are not generally considered to be under prosecutorial control.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether prosecutors must provide defense counsel with interview notes and reports from the State Division of Parole under CPL 240.45(1)(a) and People v. Rosario. The Court held that such records are not generally under the control of prosecutors because the Division of Parole is an independent state agency. The Court emphasized that the prosecutorial duty to disclose Rosario material extends only to documents within the actual possession or control of the prosecutor’s office, clarifying that agencies like Parole, while part of the Executive branch, operate outside the law enforcement chain for Rosario purposes. This decision overturned lower court rulings that had vacated convictions based on the non-disclosure of parole records.

    Facts

    Defendants Kelly, Brown, and White were convicted in separate jury trials for drug-related offenses and rape, respectively. In each case, the arresting police officer had been interviewed by the defendant’s parole officer, and records of these interviews were maintained by the New York State Division of Parole. These records were not disclosed to the defense during the trials. The defendants subsequently sought to vacate their convictions, arguing that these parole records constituted Rosario material that should have been disclosed.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court vacated the judgments in CPL 440.10 proceedings, holding that the parole officers’ interview notes were Rosario material that the prosecution should have provided to the defense. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the Supreme Court’s orders, reasoning that the Division of Parole was a distinct state agency, and its records were not in the possession or control of the prosecutors. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether interview notes and reports of the State Division of Parole constitute material that prosecutors are required to provide to defense counsel under CPL 240.45 (1)(a) and People v Rosario.

    Holding

    No, because Parole Division records are not generally in the possession or control of prosecutors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the obligation to disclose Rosario material is limited to items in the actual possession or control of the prosecution. The Court emphasized that the Division of Parole functions as an independent state administrative agency, separate from local law enforcement. The Court distinguished the Division of Parole from agencies directly involved in law enforcement, stating that while parole officers have some law enforcement functions, their primary role is the supervision of parolees. The Court relied on People v. Howard, noting that the Department of Correctional Services is “at the end of the State’s law enforcement chain,” and the Division of Parole is generally beyond that chain. The Court highlighted the importance of prosecutorial control as the legally dispositive issue. The Court stated, “We are persuaded and satisfied that records of the State Division of Parole should not generally be deemed to be in the control of 62 county prosecutors, nor of any other prosecutorial office subject to the Rosario rule.” The Court explicitly rejected the First Department’s decision in People v. Fields to the extent it conflicted with this holding.

  • People ex rel. Brown v. NYS Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391 (1987): Parole Revocation Hearings and Statutory Time Limits

    People ex rel. Brown v. New York State Div. of Parole, 70 N.Y.2d 391 (1987)

    A parolee’s court appearance does not automatically excuse the Division of Parole’s failure to hold a timely revocation hearing unless the parolee deliberately manipulates the system; the Division must still demonstrate reasonable diligence within the statutory 90-day period.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases address whether the Division of Parole’s failure to hold final revocation hearings within 90 days of a probable cause determination can be excused when a parolee or their attorney is unavailable. In Brown, the parolee had a conflicting court appearance, while in Citro, the parolee’s attorney failed to appear. The court held that in Brown, the Division failed to meet its burden of showing that the parolee was not subject to its practical control, thus the delay was not excused. In Citro, the court found a portion of the delay was attributable to the parolee’s counsel’s failure to properly request an adjournment, but the remaining delay was the Division’s fault for failing to schedule the hearing on the next available date.

    Facts

    Brown: Robert Brown was paroled in April 1985, arrested in November 1985 for new crimes, and a parole violation warrant was issued. A final hearing was scheduled for February 4, 1986, then rescheduled to February 13 at the Division’s request. After another adjournment, Brown informed the Administrative Law Judge of a conflicting court appearance on February 25. The hearing was scheduled for February 24, but Brown was taken to his arraignment instead, without prior notice. The hearing was held on March 17, 1986, 108 days after the probable cause determination.

    Citro: Albert Citro was paroled in May 1983 and later charged with a parole violation. A final hearing was scheduled for August 13, 1985, but Citro was transferred facilities, leading to a rescheduled hearing on September 25, 1985 (86 days after the probable cause determination). Citro’s counsel didn’t appear on September 25, and the hearing was adjourned to October 9, 1985. Counsel claimed she notified the parole officer of the conflict but didn’t file a formal adjournment request.

    Procedural History

    Brown: The Supreme Court dismissed Brown’s habeas corpus petition challenging the timeliness of the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Citro: The Special Term granted Citro’s habeas corpus petition and restored him to parole. The Appellate Division affirmed on different grounds, finding part of the delay chargeable to the parolee and part to the Division. The Court of Appeals granted the respondent leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. In Brown: Whether the Division of Parole should be excused for failing to afford the parolee a revocation hearing within the 90-day period because he was not subject to its “convenience and practical control” due to a conflicting court appearance.

    2. In Citro: Whether the adjournment of the revocation hearing from September 25, 1985, to October 9, 1985, should be chargeable to the Division of Parole, rendering the October 9, 1985, hearing untimely.

    Holding

    1. In Brown: No, because the parolee was within a facility amenable to the Division’s jurisdiction, and the Division failed to prove that the parolee’s nonappearance was attributable to any of the statutory exceptions or that the parolee was otherwise not subject to the practical control of the Division during the 90-day period.

    2. In Citro: Yes, in part. The delay from September 25 to October 2 was chargeable to the parolee, but the delay from October 2 to October 9 was chargeable to the Division, because the Division bypassed an earlier available hearing date without justification.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Brown: The court reasoned that a parolee is subject to the Division’s control when in the custody of a correctional facility over which the Parole Board has jurisdiction. The Division had the responsibility to coordinate the hearing within the 90-day period. While parolees cannot abuse the system, Brown’s court appearance was not a deliberate manipulation. The court stated, “Executive Law § 259-i (3) (f) (i) reflects a legislative judgment that 90 days is sufficient time to overcome unexpected contingencies, such as court appearances, so long as the parolee is subject during that time to the Division’s practical control. The Division is not entitled to an extension based simply on a showing of its lack of fault.”

    Citro: The court held that the initial delay was due to counsel’s failure to comply with regulations for requesting an adjournment. However, the Division could not bypass an earlier available hearing date (October 2) without justification. Since the notice of the rescheduled hearing wasn’t mailed until October 2, counsel had no opportunity to obtain a shorter adjournment. The court stated that the Division cannot bypass an earlier available date at which a parolee’s counsel is willing and ready to proceed without establishing any justification for doing so.