New York Law Review

Tag: disorderly conduct

  • Matter of Versaggi v. New York State Liquor Authority, 27 N.Y.2d 153 (1970): Annulment of Liquor License Requires Proof Licensee Knew or Should Have Known of Disorderly Conduct

    Matter of Versaggi v. New York State Liquor Authority, 27 N.Y.2d 153 (1970)

    To annul a liquor license based on disorderly conduct on the premises, the New York State Liquor Authority must demonstrate that the licensee knew or should have known of the disorderly conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the evidence presented by the New York State Liquor Authority (SLA) was insufficient to prove that the licensee, Versaggi, knew or should have known of the alleged disorderly conduct on her premises. The court emphasized that merely proving a solicitation for lewd and immoral purposes is not enough; the SLA must establish that the licensee was aware or should have been aware of the behavior. The case highlights the importance of proving a licensee’s knowledge or constructive knowledge when seeking to annul a liquor license for allowing a disorderly premises.

    Facts

    A police officer testified that he observed approximately 30 males in Versaggi’s establishment, some wearing makeup and engaging in behavior such as sitting on each other’s laps and kissing. The licensee allegedly locked the door and used a buzzer system to control entry after the officer had been on the premises for about a half hour. The SLA sought to annul Versaggi’s liquor license, arguing that she permitted the premises to become disorderly.

    Procedural History

    The SLA annulled Versaggi’s liquor license. The Appellate Division affirmed the SLA’s determination. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to the Special Term for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by the SLA was sufficient to prove that the licensee, Versaggi, knew or should have known of the disorderly conduct on her premises, thereby justifying the annulment of her liquor license.

    Holding

    No, because the SLA failed to present substantial evidence that Versaggi knew or should have known of the disorderly conduct. The evidence of locking the door and using a buzzer system did not sufficiently demonstrate her awareness of the specific behavior cited as disorderly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that to annul a liquor license under section 106(6) of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, the SLA must show that the licensee “suffered or permitted” the premises to become disorderly. The court emphasized that proof of solicitation for lewd purposes alone is insufficient. The licensee must have “knowledge, actual or constructive, of the alleged disorder.”

    The court found that the locking of the door and use of the buzzer system were as consistent with an effort to maintain order as with a tacit approval of the conduct alleged. The court distinguished this case from others where the licensee’s involvement in the disorderly conduct was more direct or obvious. The court cited Matter of Migliaccio v. O’Connell, 307 N.Y. 566, emphasizing the need for substantial evidence showing the licensee should have known a disorderly condition prevailed, beyond a brief occurrence.

    The dissenting opinion argued that the overt nature of the behavior, combined with the licensee’s control over who entered the premises, made it inconceivable that she was unaware of the disorderly conduct. The dissent cited the officer’s testimony regarding the patrons’ attire and behavior, stating, “Even if we credited the licensee’s statements that she did not, in fact, observe the behavior which the officer described, nevertheless his description of the premises was such that it was not unreasonable for the Authority to conclude that the licensee should have known of the disorderly conduct taking place in her establishment.”

    The majority, however, found that the evidence was not substantial enough to impute knowledge or constructive knowledge to the licensee. The key takeaway is that the SLA must present concrete evidence linking the licensee to the disorderly conduct, not merely evidence of the conduct itself.

  • People v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 214 (1967): Sufficiency of Evidence for Disorderly Conduct

    People v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 214 (1967)

    To support a conviction for disorderly conduct based on causing a crowd to collect, the evidence must sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant’s actions actually caused the crowd to collect, and that the defendant acted with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or that a breach of the peace would naturally result from their actions.

    Summary

    Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct for allegedly causing a crowd to collect after refusing a police officer’s order to move. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Smith’s actions caused the crowd to collect or that he intended to provoke a breach of the peace. The court emphasized that the crowd had initially gathered to observe an arrest, and the evidence was unclear about the extent to which the crowd had dispersed before Smith’s interaction with the officer. The court found the testimony to be too vague to establish that Smith caused the crowd to re-collect. Moreover, the court found no evidence suggesting Smith intended to cause a breach of peace.

    Facts

    Following a high-speed chase, police arrested Kenneth Case in a parking lot. Officers Carlucci and Summa were at the scene. Smith and his friend Stein were in the parking lot near Stein’s car after leaving a nearby restaurant. Officer Carlucci instructed Officer Summa to disperse a crowd of 25-30 people that had gathered. Carlucci then told Smith and Stein to move, but they did not comply. An exchange occurred between Smith, Stein, and Carlucci. Smith and Stein were subsequently arrested and charged with violating subdivisions 3 and 4 of section 722 of the Penal Law (disorderly conduct).

    Procedural History

    Smith and Stein were found guilty of disorderly conduct by an Acting Police Justice. Smith appealed to the County Court of Westchester, which upheld the conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support a violation of subdivision 4 (causing a crowd to collect). Smith then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of an Associate Justice of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Smith violated subdivision 4 of section 722 of the Penal Law by causing a crowd to collect with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith’s actions caused the crowd to collect or that Smith acted with the intent to provoke a breach of the peace.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that, to support a conviction under subdivision 4 of section 722, the prosecution needed to prove that Smith’s actions (1) collected those who did collect, and (2) did so with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or that a breach of the peace would naturally result from his actions. The court found the evidence lacking on both counts. The court noted the crowd had originally gathered to observe the arrest. The testimony regarding the crowd’s dispersal and re-collection was vague and indefinite. The court stated, “All that the transcript of the testimony indicates is that the crowd had started to leave in response to the order of Officer Carlucci and then came back.” There was no specific evidence as to the extent to which the crowd had dispersed or their location relative to Smith, Stein, and Carlucci at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the court found no evidence indicating that Smith’s actions were motivated by an intent to breach the peace. Smith was standing with his friend near his car in a parking lot, the prisoner was already under arrest, and first aid had been administered. The court concluded that Smith’s presence and refusal to move did not indicate an intent to occasion a breach of the peace or an act from which a breach of the peace was likely to occur. The court cited People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 429, defining a breach of the peace as “a disturbance of public order by an act of violence, or by any act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of the community.”

  • People v. Dunn, 28 N.Y.2d 667 (1971): Establishing Responsibility for Animals “Running at Large”

    People v. Dunn, 28 N.Y.2d 667 (1971)

    The term “run at large” in relation to domestic animals requires evidence of generalized wandering or running, not merely isolated instances of an animal being on a neighbor’s property, to establish quasi-criminal responsibility.

    Summary

    Dunn was convicted of disorderly conduct for allowing her cats to “run at large” in violation of a village ordinance after her cat was found on a neighbor’s (who was also a policeman) lawn on two occasions. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunn was responsible for violating the ordinance. The court clarified that the term “run at large” implies a more generalized pattern of wandering, not isolated instances.

    Facts

    The key facts are:

    Dunn owned a cat. A neighbor, who was also a policeman, observed Dunn’s cat on his lawn on two separate occasions. Dunn’s property was fenced in. The neighbor initiated a prosecution against Dunn, alleging she violated a village ordinance by allowing her cats to “run at large”.

    Procedural History

    The Village Court convicted Dunn of disorderly conduct. Dunn appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and dismissed the information against Dunn.

    Issue(s)

    Whether two isolated instances of a cat being on a neighbor’s lawn are sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cat’s owner “allowed” the cat to “run at large” in violation of a village ordinance, thereby establishing quasi-criminal responsibility.

    Holding

    No, because the term “run at large” requires a more generalized pattern of wandering or running of animals than merely being present on a neighbor’s property on two isolated occasions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the prosecution failed to prove Dunn’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the information alleged Dunn “did allow two cats to run at large.” The court found that the mere ability of the cat to get over or through the fence on two occasions was insufficient to establish personal quasi-criminal responsibility. The court then addressed the meaning of “run at large,” stating: “Additionally, the term ‘run at large’ in relation to domestic animals does not normally mean that an animal is found on a neighbor’s property in an isolated instance. The term has had a consistent judicial construction to mean a more generalized wandering or running of animals”. The court cited precedent to support this interpretation. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.