New York Law Review

Tag: disorderly conduct

  • People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123 (2011): Establishing Disorderly Conduct with Risk of Public Disturbance

    People v. Weaver, 16 N.Y.3d 123 (2011)

    A person can be convicted of disorderly conduct if their actions, though not directly causing public disturbance, recklessly create a risk of such disturbance, considering the time, place, conduct, and potential impact on the public.

    Summary

    Tony Weaver was convicted of disorderly conduct for yelling obscenities at his wife and a police officer in a public area. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Weaver’s actions recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if no actual disturbance occurred. The Court emphasized that the potential for public disruption, rather than actual disruption, is sufficient for a disorderly conduct conviction, considering factors like the time and location of the incident and the presence of other people.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, Sergeant House encountered Weaver yelling at his wife in a parking lot outside a hotel. Weaver then entered a mini-mart gas station. Upon exiting, he resumed yelling obscenities at his wife in a loud and aggressive manner. Sergeant House warned Weaver to calm down, but he responded with further obscenities directed at her. The incident occurred near a hotel and mini-mart that were open for business, with customers present.

    Procedural History

    Weaver was indicted for assault, resisting arrest, and two counts of disorderly conduct. A jury acquitted him of assault but convicted him of the other charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain the disorderly conduct convictions, specifically whether Weaver’s behavior recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.

    Holding

    Yes, because Weaver’s conduct, considering the time, place, and nature of his actions, recklessly created a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, satisfying the elements of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20 (1), (3).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 240.20 (1) and (3), which define disorderly conduct as engaging in fighting or violent behavior, or using obscene language in a public place, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof. The Court emphasized that the disruptive behavior must be of a public, rather than individual, dimension, citing People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980). The Court stated that a person may be guilty of disorderly conduct even if the action does not result in actual public disturbance, if the conduct recklessly creates a risk of such disruption. Factors considered included the time and place of the incident, the nature of the conduct, the number of people in the vicinity, and whether they were drawn to the disturbance.

    The court noted, “[D]isorderly conduct is a statutory creation. Intended to include in the main various forms of misconduct which at common law would often be prosecuted as public nuisances…a common thread that ran through almost all of this legislation was a desire to deter breaches of the peace or, more specifically, of the community’s safety, health or morals.” (People v Tichenor, 89 NY2d 769, 773-774 [1997]).

    Here, the Court found that the incident occurred in a public place during early morning hours, with people nearby. Weaver’s conduct escalated despite warnings from the police, and his loud, aggressive, and obscene behavior created a risk of public disturbance. The Court concluded that “there is a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which a jury could have found that his conduct reached the point of ‘a potential or immediate public problem’.” (Munafo, 50 NY2d at 331).

  • People v. Baker, 20 N.Y.3d 269 (2012): Sufficiency of Information for Disorderly Conduct

    People v. Baker, 20 N.Y.3d 269 (2012)

    An information charging disorderly conduct must contain factual allegations establishing a prima facie case that the defendant intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created a risk thereof.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term’s order and dismissed the information against the defendant, holding that the factual allegations in the information were insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disorderly conduct. The information stated that the defendant, along with others, stood on a public sidewalk at 2:01 a.m., obstructing pedestrian traffic after being directed to move by a police officer. The court found that the information lacked allegations demonstrating that the defendant acted with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created such a risk.

    Facts

    On June 12, 2004, at approximately 2:01 a.m., the defendant was observed by a police officer standing with a group of people on a public sidewalk at 42nd Street and Seventh Avenue in Manhattan. The group was not moving, causing pedestrians to walk around them. The officer directed the defendant to move, but the defendant refused and then ran away as the officer attempted to stop him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged by information with disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(5) and resisting arrest under Penal Law § 205.30. The defendant moved to dismiss the information for facial insufficiency, which the court denied. The defendant pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct, and the resisting arrest charge was dismissed. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the factual allegations in the information were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20(5).
    2. Whether the charge of resisting arrest can stand when the underlying charge of disorderly conduct is deemed facially insufficient.

    Holding

    1. No, because the information failed to allege facts demonstrating that the defendant acted with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly created such a risk.
    2. No, because the resisting arrest charge requires a lawful, “authorized” arrest, and the information was insufficient to establish that the arrest for disorderly conduct was authorized.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the information was jurisdictionally defective because it failed to set forth a prima facie case of disorderly conduct. The court emphasized that an information must contain non-hearsay allegations that, if proven true, establish every element of the offense charged. The court reasoned that merely standing on a sidewalk at 2:01 a.m., even if it inconveniences pedestrians, is not enough to establish the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly create a risk thereof. The court quoted People v. Carcel, 3 N.Y.2d 327, 331 (1957) stating that “something more than a mere inconvenience of pedestrians is required to support the charge.” The court further cited People v. Nixon, 248 N.Y. 182, 185 (1928), stating that while congregating on the street may display “atrociously bad manners” by “discommoding some other persons,” such conduct alone does not necessarily give rise to disorderly conduct. Regarding the resisting arrest charge, the court noted that Penal Law § 205.30 requires that the arrest be “an authorized arrest.” Because the information lacked sufficient facts to support the underlying disorderly conduct charge, it could not be deemed sufficient to allege that the arrest was “authorized.”

  • People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769 (1997): Constitutionality of New York’s Disorderly Conduct Statute

    People v. Tichenor, 89 N.Y.2d 769 (1997)

    New York’s disorderly conduct statute, Penal Law § 240.20(3), is constitutional because it applies to words and conduct that create a risk of public disorder and requires a culpable mental state, distinguishing it from statutes that regulate pure speech.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of New York’s disorderly conduct statute, Penal Law § 240.20(3), affirming the defendant’s conviction. The defendant was arrested after uttering obscenities at a police officer, shoving him, and then engaging in a scuffle with bar patrons after attempting to re-enter a bar. The Court found that the statute, which prohibits the use of abusive or obscene language with the intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, is not overbroad or vague because it targets conduct creating a risk of public disorder, not protected speech. The court distinguished this statute from the one struck down in People v. Dietze, emphasizing the requirement of a culpable mental state and the focus on preventing public disturbances.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Tichenor outside a bar. Tichenor uttered an obscenity at the officer and spat on the ground near his feet. Tichenor then shoved the officer while continuing to use obscene language. As the officer attempted to arrest Tichenor, a group of people gathered in the doorway of the bar, yelling at the officer. Tichenor then pulled away and re-entered the bar. The officer followed, and a scuffle ensued with bar patrons joining in. Tichenor was eventually arrested after other officers arrived.

    Procedural History

    Tichenor was convicted in Saratoga Springs City Court of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. He was acquitted of harassment. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted Tichenor leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 240.20(3), the disorderly conduct statute, is unconstitutional under the State and Federal Constitutions for violating free speech, and being vague or overbroad.
    2. Whether the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Tichenor because his confrontation with the officer was a private encounter and whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the disorderly conduct statute applies to words and conduct creating a risk of public disorder and requires a culpable mental state, distinguishing it from statutes regulating pure speech.
    2. No, because the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that Tichenor intended to cause and incite a public disturbance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the disorderly conduct statute is constitutional, reaffirming prior decisions upholding similar statutes. The Court distinguished People v. Dietze, where a harassment statute was struck down, by emphasizing that the disorderly conduct statute requires intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof. This requirement, coupled with the objective standard of public disturbance, narrows the statute’s scope and prevents it from being applied to pure speech. The Court stated that “the statutory requirement that the defendant possess an intent ‘to cause, or recklessly create a risk of, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, narrows the definition, so that no inadvertent * * * act may be punished’.” The Court also rejected Tichenor’s argument that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to him, finding that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that he intended to cause a public disturbance, noting that “[d]isorderly conduct occurs when a person, with intent to cause a public annoyance or alarm in a public place, uses abusive or obscene language (Penal Law § 240.20 [3]).” The Court emphasized that the events leading to the arrest, including the gathering of bar patrons and the ensuing scuffle, supported the inference that Tichenor intended to incite a public disturbance. The court further reasoned that “the fact that the defendant slipped away from the officer’s grasp and reentered the bar after the street confrontation further supports a ready inference that the defendant intended to cause a ‘public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.’”

  • People v. Bakolas, 59 N.Y.2d 51 (1983): Constitutionality of “Unreasonable Noise” Statutes

    59 N.Y.2d 51 (1983)

    A statute prohibiting “unreasonable noise” with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm is constitutional, both for vagueness and overbreadth, if it is construed to describe noise that a reasonable person would not tolerate under the circumstances and requires a public intent or risk.

    Summary

    Ioannis and Evangelos Bakolas were arrested and charged with violating a New York Penal Law prohibiting unreasonable noise. The Rochester City Court initially dismissed the charge, finding the term “unreasonable noise” unconstitutionally vague. The County Court reversed, reinstating the charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s decision, holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because the culpability requirement (intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm) narrowed the definition of “unreasonable noise” to that which a reasonable person would not tolerate and prevented inadvertently disturbing acts from being punished.

    Facts

    Ioannis Bakolas was stopped for a traffic violation and became abusive, yelling and threatening the officer. He refused to return to his vehicle and stood in the roadway, causing traffic to swerve. Evangelos Bakolas was observed yelling at the same officer while standing in the westbound traffic lane, refusing to desist or move from the roadway.

    Procedural History

    The Bakolases were charged in Rochester City Court with violating subdivisions of section 240.20 of the Penal Law. The City Court upheld some charges but ruled subdivision 2, regarding “unreasonable noise,” unconstitutionally vague and dismissed it. The County Court of Monroe County reversed, reinstating the subdivision 2 charges. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether subdivision 2 of section 240.20 of the Penal Law, prohibiting “unreasonable noise,” is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

    Holding

    No, because the term “unreasonable noise” is capable of definition and the statute requires intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, thus narrowing its scope to conduct that is publicly offensive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “unreasonable noise” describes a noise of a type or volume that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would not tolerate. The statute’s requirement of intent to cause or recklessly create a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm narrows the definition, ensuring that no inadvertently disturbing act may be punished. The court distinguished this case from People v. New York Trap Rock Corp., noting that the ordinance in that case had a subjective standard (annoyance of “a person”) and was capable of ad hoc enforcement. The court stated, “the objective standard of public disturbance, the requirement of unreasonableness, and the narrowing effect of the fact that all of the other acts proscribed by the section are publicly offensive, permit, if they do not require, the construction above set forth.” The court also noted that similar statutes in other states have been upheld against vagueness arguments. Regarding the overbreadth argument, the court stated, “Although the facts recited in the information involve speech, protected speech may be restricted as to time, place and manner… The activity prohibited by section 240.20 is speech so unreasonably noisy as ‘to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm’. Such a prohibition is not on its face impermissibly overbroad.”

  • People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980): Criminal Trespass Requires Unlawful Entry Without License or Privilege

    People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980)

    For a criminal trespass conviction, the prosecution must prove the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully on property without license or privilege to do so.

    Summary

    James Munafo, Sr., was convicted of trespass and disorderly conduct for protesting the State Power Authority’s construction on his land. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Munafo, as the landowner, had a privilege to be on his property, thus negating the trespass charge. The court also found the disorderly conduct charge insufficient because Munafo’s actions, though disruptive, did not create a public disturbance, given the secluded location and the lack of widespread impact.

    Facts

    The State Power Authority appropriated a right-of-way across Munafo’s farm. Disturbed by the construction of a transmission line, Munafo protested by firing a rifle at a target on his property near the construction site (but without endangering anyone). After police confiscated the rifle, he positioned himself in front of a backhoe, refusing to move, leading to his arrest. Approximately 8-10 people not associated with the power authority were present.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court of the Town of Russell convicted Munafo of trespass and disorderly conduct. The County Court of St. Lawrence County affirmed the convictions. Munafo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Munafo’s presence on his own property, subject to the Power Authority’s easement, constituted criminal trespass.

    2. Whether Munafo’s actions constituted disorderly conduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because Munafo, as the landowner, retained a privilege to be on his property, and the Power Authority’s easement did not negate that privilege.

    2. No, because Munafo’s actions did not create a public disturbance as required for a disorderly conduct conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the trespass charge, the court emphasized that criminal trespass requires knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully on property without license or privilege. While the Power Authority had an easement, Munafo retained ownership and possessory interest in the land. The court noted the incongruity of interpreting the law to prevent a landowner from traversing his own property. The court cited the Penal Law § 140.00(5) which discusses the power of an owner to convert lawful entries into unlawful ones. The court found no indication that the legislature intended to criminalize a landowner’s presence on his property subject to an easement.

    Regarding the disorderly conduct charge, the court explained that it aims to deter breaches of the peace, defined as “public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” The court focused on whether the disruptive behavior had public ramifications. Here, Munafo’s actions occurred in a secluded area of his property, away from public thoroughfares. The number of people present was small, and there was no evidence that Munafo incited or involved them. Therefore, the dispute remained between Munafo and the Power Authority, not a public disturbance. The court distinguished this case from situations involving obstruction of public passage or refusal to disperse from a congregated crowd. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, stating that “the differences between the authority and the defendant were confined to these two disputants rather than spread to the public.”

  • Matter of Felix v. New York City Transit Authority, 61 N.Y.2d 708 (1984): Public Officer’s Law and Arbitrator’s Power

    61 N.Y.2d 708 (1984)

    An arbitrator’s award in a disciplinary proceeding should be confirmed unless the arbitrator exceeded their powers; a guilty plea to a ‘violation’ under the Penal Law, as opposed to a ‘crime,’ does not trigger the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether an arbitrator exceeded their power by not ordering the dismissal of a New York City Transit Authority employee who pled guilty to disorderly conduct after being charged with official misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the arbitrator did not exceed their power because a plea to disorderly conduct, a violation under the Penal Law, does not constitute a conviction of a crime involving a violation of oath of office under Public Officers Law § 30, which would mandate forfeiture of public office. The court emphasized the distinction between a ‘violation’ and a ‘crime’ as defined in the Penal Law.

    Facts

    A New York City Transit Authority employee (petitioner) was found guilty by an arbitrator of releasing an impounded car without authority and filing a false report, among other charges. The petitioner was initially indicted on a charge of official misconduct (Penal Law § 195.00) but pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct (Penal Law § 240.20). Considering the petitioner’s prior good record, the arbitrator imposed a penalty of suspension without pay, resulting in a loss of salary and holiday pay.

    Procedural History

    Special Term held that the arbitrator did not exceed their powers by not ordering the employee’s discharge. The Appellate Division agreed with Special Term’s decision. The City appealed, arguing that the employee forfeited their office under Public Officers Law § 30 due to the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arbitrator exceeded their powers by failing to order the petitioner’s discharge, given that the petitioner pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct after being indicted on a charge of official misconduct, and whether this plea triggered the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30.

    Holding

    No, because disorderly conduct is classified as a ‘violation’ under the Penal Law, not a ‘crime,’ and therefore does not trigger the forfeiture provisions of Public Officers Law § 30, which requires a conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of the oath of office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning centered on the interpretation of Public Officers Law § 30 (subd 1, par e), which states that a public office becomes vacant upon a public officer’s conviction of a felony or a crime involving a violation of their oath of office. The court emphasized that the definition of a ‘crime’ is determined by the Penal Law. According to Penal Law § 10.00, a ‘crime’ is defined as a misdemeanor or a felony, explicitly distinguishing it from a ‘violation.’ Since disorderly conduct is classified as a ‘violation’ under Penal Law § 240.20, it does not qualify as a ‘crime’ under Public Officers Law § 30.

    The court further reasoned that even though the petitioner was initially accused of acts violating their oath of office, they were only convicted of disorderly conduct. None of the acts falling within the definition of disorderly conduct are directly connected to a violation of the oath of office. The court acknowledged the practice of plea bargaining but reiterated that the forfeiture provision of Public Officers Law § 30 is triggered only by a ‘conviction’ of a crime, not a mere accusation or a plea to a violation. The court stated, “what triggers the forfeiture provision of section 30 is only a ‘conviction’. Though a guilty plea is a ‘conviction’ under that section, petitioner’s plea was to a violation rather than to a crime.”

  • People v. Williams, 41 N.Y.2d 762 (1977): Establishing Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt in Disorderly Conduct Cases

    People v. Williams, 41 N.Y.2d 762 (1977)

    To sustain a conviction for resisting arrest or disorderly conduct, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the legality of the underlying arrest and the defendant’s specific actions constituting resistance or disorderly behavior.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest, finding the prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution did not adequately prove the basis for her brother’s arrest, which she was accused of resisting, and the evidence of her resisting her own arrest was insufficient. The officer’s testimony regarding the disorderly conduct charge was too ambiguous to prove she failed to comply with a lawful order to disperse.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting the arrest of her brother and her own arrest. The arrest occurred outside a building. The specifics of the events leading to the arrest, particularly the reasons for her brother’s arrest, were not clearly established during the trial.

    Procedural History

    The case was initially heard at a lower court, which convicted the defendant. The defendant appealed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the conviction and reversed the lower court’s decision, dismissing the information.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted her own arrest.

    2. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant resisted the lawful arrest of her brother, including establishing a legal basis for that arrest.

    3. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of disorderly conduct for failing to comply with a lawful order to disperse.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was insufficient evidence that the defendant resisted her own arrest outside the building.

    2. No, because the prosecution failed to prove the basis for the underlying arrest of her brother, as required by Penal Law § 205.30.

    3. No, because the police officer’s testimony about what he said to the defendant was too ambiguous to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that she was guilty of disorderly conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all charges. Regarding the charge of resisting her brother’s arrest, the court emphasized the requirement under Penal Law § 205.30 that the prosecution prove the legality of the underlying arrest. The court noted the prosecution made no effort to establish the basis for her brother’s arrest, and the trial court even sustained the prosecutor’s objection when the defendant attempted to elicit this information. The court stated, “[S]peculation and conjecture are no substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” As to the disorderly conduct charge, the court found the officer’s testimony too ambiguous to establish that the defendant failed to comply with a lawful order to disperse, as required by Penal Law § 240.20, subd 6. The court focused on the lack of concrete evidence and the ambiguity of the testimony, reinforcing the high standard of proof required for criminal convictions. The court implied that a lawful order must be clear and understandable to support a conviction for failing to obey it.

  • People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 194 (1973): Upholding Dismissal in the Interest of Justice

    People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 194 (1973)

    A trial court’s discretion to dismiss a case in the interest of justice should be respected when the prosecutor’s conduct causes undue hardship on the defendant and wastes judicial resources, particularly in minor cases where no significant harm occurred.

    Summary

    Ten teenagers were arrested for disorderly conduct. On the trial date, the prosecutor and arresting officers were absent, despite the prosecutor having requested an early trial time. The trial judge dismissed the charges in the interest of justice, citing the inconvenience to the defendants, the minor nature of the charges, and the lack of prosecutorial diligence. The County Court reversed, but the Appellate Division reversed again, reinstating the original dismissal. The court emphasized that the trial judge’s discretion should be respected, especially when the prosecutor’s actions burdened the defendants and the court unnecessarily.

    Facts

    On April 4, 1972, ten teenagers were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct for fighting on Main Street in Buffalo, resulting in traffic stoppage.
    The cases were set for trial on April 12 after their arraignment.
    On April 11, the prosecutor requested an early trial time on April 12.
    On April 12, the defendants were present, but neither the prosecutor nor the arresting officers (complaining witnesses) appeared.
    The judge recessed twice to allow the prosecutor time to appear.
    After a three-hour wait, the judge dismissed the charges in the interest of justice.

    Procedural History

    The City Court dismissed the informations in the interest of justice.
    The Erie County Court reversed the City Court’s order.
    The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s decision, reinstating the City Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City Court abused its discretion when it dismissed the informations against the defendants in the interest of justice, pursuant to CPL 170.40, due to the absence of the prosecutor and complaining witnesses and the minor nature of the charges.

    Holding

    Yes, because the absence of the prosecutor and arresting officers caused an inexcusable and unjustified imposition on the time of the trial court and the defendants. The charges involved violations that caused neither damage nor injury and the defendants had already been required to post bail and return for trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court recognized that while the decision to dismiss an information is discretionary, that discretion is not absolute. However, the Appellate Division found no abuse of discretion in this case. The court emphasized the prosecutor’s failure to appear despite requesting an early trial, which indicated a lack of diligent prosecution. The court also considered the minor nature of the charges (violations causing no damage or injury), the fact that the defendants had already posted bail and appeared for trial, and the potential for further proceedings to cause additional expense and lost time from work or school.

    The court highlighted the “inexcusable and unjustified imposition on the time of the trial court and the defendants and their families” caused by the prosecutor’s and arresting officers’ absence.

    The trial judge properly considered that the youthful defendants faced only minor charges, had already posted bail, and that further proceedings would entail additional expense and lost time.

    The court implied that repeatedly dismissing cases without prejudice would not address the underlying problem of police absenteeism and tardiness. The dismissal was deemed an appropriate response to the specific circumstances, sending a message about the importance of prosecutorial diligence and respect for the court’s and defendants’ time.

  • People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325 (1970): Limits on Disorderly Conduct and Harassment Charges

    People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325 (1970)

    A conviction for disorderly conduct for refusing to obey a police officer’s direction to move on requires that the officer’s direction be reasonably related to maintaining public order, while a harassment conviction based on a threat requires evidence beyond mere bravado to prove intent to harass, annoy, or alarm through physical contact.

    Summary

    Russell Todaro was convicted of disorderly conduct and harassment. The charges stemmed from an incident where Todaro and his companions allegedly refused to move on when instructed by a police officer on a busy New York City street corner. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the disorderly conduct conviction, finding the officer’s directive was not arbitrary given his duty to maintain public order. However, the court reversed the harassment conviction because Todaro’s statement, “I’ll get you for this,” made after his arrest, was insufficient to prove an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm the officer through physical contact.

    Facts

    A police officer observed Russell Todaro and three companions for about an hour at the corner of Seventh Avenue and 42nd Street in New York City. The officer asked them to move on several times. After repeated requests, Todaro refused, using abusive language. The officer then arrested Todaro for disorderly conduct. While in the patrol car, Todaro allegedly said, “I’ll get you for this,” leading to an additional charge of harassment.

    Procedural History

    Todaro was convicted in the trial court of disorderly conduct and harassment. He appealed to the Appellate Term, arguing insufficient evidence. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction, despite the People’s concession of insufficient evidence. One Justice dissented. Todaro then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for disorderly conduct under Penal Law § 240.20, subds. 3, 6?

    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for harassment under Penal Law § 240.25, subd. 1, based on the statement “I’ll get you for this”?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the officer’s direction to move on was not arbitrary, and the trial court could find that Todaro consciously disregarded the risk that his actions and language would cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.

    2. No, because the single, equivocal statement was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Todaro intended to harass, annoy, or alarm the officer through physical contact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on People v. Galpern, which held that refusing to obey a police officer’s direction is justified only if the direction was “purely arbitrary and was not calculated in any way to promote the public order.” The court reasoned that the circumstances in Todaro’s case did not indicate arbitrariness, as the officer was maintaining order on a busy street corner. The court emphasized that the disorderly conduct statute addresses the risk of disorder, not just the accomplished fact of disorder. The court stated, “On this record, the trial court could well have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that ‘public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm’ might result from his use of clearly ‘abusive and obscene language’ in response to the officer’s repeated requests to move on and his refusal to comply with such requests.”

    Regarding the harassment charge, the court found the evidence insufficient. Penal Law § 240.25, subd. 1 requires proof that the defendant, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, attempted or threatened to “strike, shove, kick or otherwise subject him to physical contact.” The court stated, “Something more must be established than that a teenager, angered or annoyed at being arrested upon what he considered to be insufficient grounds, expressed his anger or annoyance in terms of apparent bravado, particularly in the absence of proof of any further words or acts tending to confirm the criminal nature of the act charged.”

  • Matter of Zinner v. New York State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 230 (1969): Licensee’s Liability for a Single, Isolated Act of Disorderly Conduct

    Matter of Zinner v. New York State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 230 (1969)

    A liquor licensee cannot be held to have “suffered or permitted” premises to become disorderly based on a single, isolated, and surreptitious act by an employee if the licensee had no knowledge or opportunity to acquire knowledge of the act.

    Summary

    Zinner, a restaurant liquor licensee, faced license cancellation after an employee enticed an 8-year-old boy into the bathroom and acted indecently with him. The New York State Liquor Authority (SLA) argued Zinner violated Alcoholic Beverage Control Law §106(6) by suffering or permitting the premises to become disorderly. The Court of Appeals reversed the SLA’s determination, holding that a single, concealed act, unrelated to the employer’s business, and without the licensee’s knowledge or opportunity for knowledge, does not constitute “suffering or permitting” the premises to become disorderly. The court emphasized the lack of continuity or permanence in the disorderly condition.

    Facts

    An employee of Zinner’s restaurant-bowling alley lured an 8-year-old boy into a second-floor bathroom and committed a lewd act in exchange for a dollar. The incident occurred several hours before the bar opened to the public. The employee, Murray, testified to the act. The licensee’s president, Zinner, testified he was on the premises working in the office but did not see the boy enter. The employee had no prior history of misconduct.

    Procedural History

    The State Liquor Authority (SLA) canceled Zinner’s restaurant liquor license and imposed a $500 bond claim. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the finding of a violation but modified the penalty to a 15-day suspension and a $150 bond forfeiture, citing the licensee’s long record of compliance. Zinner appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, and the SLA cross-appealed, seeking reinstatement of the original penalty.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the commission of a single, isolated, and surreptitious illegal act by an employee, under circumstances where the licensee could not with reasonable diligence acquire knowledge, constitutes “suffering or permitting” the licensed premises to become disorderly within the meaning of Alcoholic Beverage Control Law §106(6).

    Holding

    No, because a single, concealed act, unrelated to the employer’s business, and without the licensee’s knowledge or opportunity for knowledge, does not establish that the licensee should have known that a disorderly condition prevailed. The court emphasized that “sufferance…implies knowledge or the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished the case from People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co., 225 N.Y. 25, where the employer was held responsible for the continuous employment of a child in violation of labor laws. In Price, the employer had the opportunity to know about the violation. The court quoted Matter of Migliaccio v. O’Connell, 307 N.Y. 566, emphasizing that substantial evidence of disorderliness, beyond a single occurrence the licensee may not have been aware of, is required to establish constructive knowledge. Here, the employee’s act was a single, concealed incident, unconnected to his duties or the business itself. The licensee had no reason to suspect the employee’s behavior, and no amount of supervision could practically have prevented the crime. The court stated, “Sufferance as here prohibited implies knowledge or the opportunity through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge. This presupposes in most cases a fair measure at least of continuity and permanence”. Since the act was not continuous, and there was no way for the owner to know about the possibility of the act, it was error to hold the licensee responsible. The court concluded that the petitioner did not permit or suffer the premises to become disorderly within the meaning of the statute.