New York Law Review

Tag: Dismissal of Indictment

  • Britt v. Legal Aid Society, 95 N.Y.2d 443 (2000): Accrual of Criminal Legal Malpractice Claims

    Britt v. Legal Aid Society, 95 N.Y.2d 443 (2000)

    A cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated, i.e., on the date when the indictment against the plaintiff is dismissed.

    Summary

    Danny Britt sued the Legal Aid Society and attorney Norman Bock for legal malpractice arising from Bock’s representation in a rape case. Britt alleged Bock coerced him into pleading guilty, which he later withdrew. The New York Court of Appeals addressed when the statute of limitations begins to run for criminal legal malpractice claims. The Court held the cause of action accrues when the criminal proceeding terminates with a dismissal of the indictment, not when the conviction is vacated. This allows the plaintiff to assert innocence, a required element of such claims. Britt’s action, commenced after the indictment was dismissed, was therefore timely.

    Facts

    Danny Britt was indicted for rape in 1990. Attorney Norman Bock of the Legal Aid Society was assigned to represent him. Britt claimed he wanted to go to trial because he was innocent and that Bock was unprepared. On the trial date in March 1991, Britt asked the court to replace Bock, but the request was denied. Britt then pleaded guilty to attempted rape. He subsequently moved to withdraw his plea, alleging coercion by Bock. New counsel was appointed for this motion. After the motion was denied and Britt was sentenced, the Appellate Division remanded for a hearing on the plea’s voluntariness.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially denied Britt’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The Appellate Division remanded for a hearing, after which the trial court found Bock’s ineffective assistance rendered Britt unable to consider the plea properly, vacating the guilty plea on September 30, 1994. Britt was released from prison in December 1994. On March 7, 1996, the indictment against him was dismissed. Britt sued for malpractice in September 1997. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, holding the claim accrued upon vacatur or reversal of the conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed but clarified that accrual occurs upon dismissal of the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action for criminal legal malpractice accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated by dismissal of the indictment, or at an earlier point such as when the underlying conviction is vacated?

    Holding

    Yes, because the cause of action accrues for Statute of Limitations purposes when the criminal proceeding is terminated, specifically on the date the indictment against the plaintiff is dismissed. Only then can a plaintiff assert their innocence or a colorable claim of innocence, a necessary element of a criminal legal malpractice claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the unique nature of criminal legal malpractice claims, particularly the requirement that a plaintiff must allege innocence or a colorable claim of innocence, as established in Carmel v. Lunney. The Court reasoned that until the criminal proceeding is terminated without a conviction, a plaintiff cannot truly assert innocence, as the possibility of a renewed conviction remains. The court stated, “Accrual occurs ‘when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.’” Vacating the conviction alone isn’t enough, since retrial and conviction remain possible. Dismissal of the indictment is required for the cause of action to fully accrue.

    The Court also addressed the policy considerations, including the need to avoid conflicting determinations on the issue of guilt, citing Smith-Hunter v. Harvey and Heck v. Humphrey. Allowing a malpractice suit before the criminal charges are resolved could lead to a civil court indirectly challenging the validity of a potential or existing criminal judgment. The Court acknowledged the purpose of statutes of limitations—preventing stale claims—but balanced that against the injured party’s right to a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim. The court stated, “[C]ivil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”

  • People v. Hatterson, 63 N.Y.2d 586 (1984): Deprivation of Counsel at Arraignment Requires Dismissal

    People v. Hatterson, 63 N.Y.2d 586 (1984)

    An unjustified court order barring a defendant’s attorney from contacting him for 30 days after arraignment constitutes a per se violation of the right to counsel, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Summary

    Defendant Hatterson, an inmate, was charged with assault. At his arraignment, the Town Justice, due to Hatterson’s disruptive behavior, found him in contempt and ordered his counsel not to contact him for 30 days. The Court of Appeals held that this order violated Hatterson’s right to counsel, which attached at arraignment, and was not subject to harmless error analysis. Because the deprivation of counsel occurred at a critical stage and its effects could not be remedied by a new trial, the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    Hatterson, an inmate at Eastern Correctional Facility, was arrested on August 7, 1985, and arraigned the same day on assault charges stemming from an altercation with a correction officer. During the arraignment, Hatterson repeatedly disobeyed the Town Justice’s orders to be quiet. As a result, the judge held Hatterson in contempt and issued an order prohibiting his counsel from contacting him for 30 days.

    Procedural History

    Hatterson moved to dismiss the indictment before trial, arguing he was denied the opportunity to appear before the Grand Jury and received ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion was denied, and Hatterson was convicted after trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no merit in his claims. Hatterson then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court order prohibiting a defendant’s attorney from contacting him for 30 days after arraignment, due to the defendant’s contemptuous behavior during the arraignment, constitutes a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel requiring reversal.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court’s punitive order denying defendant his constitutional right to counsel after such right had attached was without justification and constituted a per se violation not subject to harmless error analysis, requiring dismissal of the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that Hatterson’s right to counsel attached at arraignment, citing Powell v. Alabama, Coleman v. Alabama, Kirby v. Illinois, and People v. Meyer. While acknowledging the court’s right to impose reasonable rules, it deemed the order prohibiting contact with counsel for 30 days as “purely punitive and without justification.” The Court relied on People v. Crimmins, stating that some errors deny a defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial, requiring reversal without evaluating the error’s impact on the conviction. The Court also referenced People v. Felder, where denial of the constitutional right to counsel mandated reversal and a new trial. The Court reasoned that the denial of counsel at arraignment was a critical error that could not be remedied by a new trial. The court stated: “the court’s ruling, entered at the time of arraignment, affected defendant’s representation in such a way that the error cannot be corrected by a new trial”. Therefore, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment, emphasizing the fundamental nature of the right to counsel at arraignment.

  • People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356 (1973): Consequences of Wiretapping Attorney-Client Communications

    People v. Pobliner, 32 N.Y.2d 356 (1973)

    While intercepting attorney-client communications is improper, dismissal of an indictment is only warranted if the interception undermines the right to counsel and the prosecution directly or indirectly uses illegally obtained evidence to gain an unfair advantage.

    Summary

    Jay Pobliner was convicted of murdering his wife. A key issue on appeal was whether intercepted telephone conversations between Pobliner and his lawyers before the indictment warranted dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that although the wiretapping was improper, the defense was not so prejudiced as to require dismissal. The court found no indication the prosecution unfairly leveraged wiretap information. The defense waived a full hearing on the wiretap’s impact, and other issues raised, such as admitting crime scene photos and testimony about extramarital affairs, did not constitute reversible error. The court found that the drastic remedy of dismissing an indictment is reserved for only the most egregious violations of the right to counsel.

    Facts

    Brenda Pobliner was found murdered in her bed with multiple gunshot wounds. Her husband, Jay, had spent the previous evening with a friend, Iilis Jurisson. Jay later confessed to a friend, Joe Hall, that he shot his wife while she slept in Jurisson’s presence. After the murder, Jay took Jurisson to Manhattan, had breakfast with his parents, and went to work. After arriving at work, he called his wife. Receiving no answer, he called a neighbor, who discovered the body. He told the men where his automobile was parked that his wife was bleeding. The prosecution emphasized Jay’s “guilty knowledge” and his confession to Joe Hall. The murder weapon was never found, but the prosecution showed Pobliner previously purchased an unregistered pistol.

    Procedural History

    Following the murder, the police investigation focused on Jay. Unable to make headway, they obtained judicial eavesdropping orders for telephones in his parents’ apartment, where he was staying. Pobliner was indicted after Joe Hall revealed Pobliner’s confession. At the preliminary hearing, the defense moved for a hearing on the wiretap’s validity. The prosecutor stated that no wiretap evidence would be used directly. The court denied the motion but advised defense counsel to object if wiretap evidence was used indirectly during trial. Pobliner was convicted at the second trial, the first ending in a mistrial, and he appealed, arguing the wiretap warranted dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the interception of attorney-client communications before indictment warrants dismissal of the indictment.
    2. Whether the prosecutor improperly used information from the wiretap during cross-examination of a defense witness.
    3. Whether the trial court properly admitted photographs of the victim’s body.
    4. Whether testimony regarding the defendant’s extramarital affair was properly admitted.

    Holding

    1. No, because dismissal is a drastic remedy reserved for extreme cases where the interception undermines the right to counsel and prejudices the defense.
    2. No, because the defense failed to properly object and waived a full hearing on the issue.
    3. Yes, because the photographs were relevant to material issues in the case and were not solely intended to inflame the jury.
    4. Yes, because the evidence of the affair was relevant to motive.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the wiretapping was improper but stated that dismissing the indictment is a drastic remedy, only appropriate when the interception undermines the right to counsel and the prosecution exploits the illegal evidence to gain an unfair advantage, citing Hoffa v. United States. The court distinguished State v. Cory, where dismissal was warranted because pervasive eavesdropping made a fair retrial impossible. Here, the court found no showing that the wiretap affected the defense’s trial strategy, questioning of witnesses, or evidence introduction. The prosecutor agreed to exclude wiretap conversations and derivatives, and hearings during trial addressed specific objections. The defense waived a full hearing on the wiretap’s legality, fearing further evidence might become admissible. The court found the admission of photographs of the victim relevant to disputed issues. They showed the victim was in a sleeping position when shot, corroborating Hall’s testimony. The photos also illustrated the deliberateness of the killing, supporting the prosecution’s theory. Similarly, the court found the testimony about Pobliner’s affair relevant to establishing a motive for the murder.