New York Law Review

Tag: discrimination

  • State Commission for Human Rights v. Speer, 29 N.Y.2d 555 (1971): Scope of Damages Awardable by Human Rights Division

    State Commission for Human Rights v. Speer, 29 N.Y.2d 555 (1971)

    The State Division of Human Rights possesses broad authority to award compensatory damages, including for mental anguish and suffering, in cases of unlawful discrimination, but the amount of such damages must be supported by evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns the scope of the State Division of Human Rights’ power to award damages for mental anguish and suffering resulting from unlawful discrimination. The New York Urban League and John Gaynus filed a complaint alleging discriminatory rental practices. The Human Rights Appeal Board awarded compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Division of Human Rights could award damages for mental anguish, but the amount awarded must be supported by evidence. The matter was remitted to determine if the evidence justified the damage award.

    Facts

    • The New York Urban League and John Gaynus, as Director of Operation Open City, filed a complaint with the State Commission for Human Rights.
    • The complaint alleged discriminatory rental practices by Edmund M. Speer, Jr., as Trustee, and others.
    • The Human Rights Appeal Board made an award that included compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering.

    Procedural History

    • The State Commission for Human Rights initially heard the complaint.
    • The Human Rights Appeal Board reviewed the Commission’s decision and made its own award.
    • The Appellate Division reversed the Appeal Board’s determination.
    • The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the State Division of Human Rights has the authority to award compensatory damages for mental anguish and suffering in discrimination cases?
    2. Whether the amount of damages awarded by the Division of Human Rights must be supported by evidence?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the State Division of Human Rights has broad authority to award compensatory damages to individuals who have suffered as a result of unlawful discriminatory practices.
    2. Yes, because any award for damages, including those for mental anguish and suffering, must be justified by the evidence presented.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals, in reversing the Appellate Division, adopted the dissenting opinion from the lower court, which supported the Human Rights Division’s authority to award damages for mental anguish and suffering. The court emphasized that the purpose of the human rights laws is to eliminate discrimination, and this purpose is best served by allowing the Division to provide complete relief to victims of discrimination. However, the Court also stressed that any award of damages must be supported by evidence; the amount awarded must be reasonable and proportionate to the harm suffered. The Court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine whether the evidence justified the specific amount of damages awarded in this case. The dissenting judge believed that the Legislature never intended to allow the commission the power to award damages for pain, suffering and mental anguish since these claims often involved large sums of money and deprived the defendant of the right to a jury trial.

  • People v. Chestnut, 26 N.Y.2d 481 (1970): Intentional Discrimination Required to Show Jury Bias

    People v. Chestnut, 26 N.Y.2d 481 (1970)

    To successfully challenge a jury’s composition based on underrepresentation of a minority group, a defendant must prove intentional and systematic exclusion, not merely demonstrate a statistical disparity.

    Summary

    Six defendants were convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions before a grand jury after being granted immunity. They challenged the convictions, arguing that the grand jury was unlawfully constituted due to the underrepresentation of minority groups. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that a statistical disparity in jury representation is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation without evidence of intentional and systematic discrimination in the jury selection process. The court emphasized that the state does not have an affirmative duty to ensure proportional representation on juries, absent discriminatory intent.

    Facts

    The defendants were called as witnesses before a New York County Grand Jury investigating riots. The Grand Jury granted them immunity. The defendants refused to answer questions, even after being directed to do so by the foreman. The Grand Jury directed the District Attorney to file informations against each defendant for criminal contempt.

    Procedural History

    The defendants sought to remove the case to the U.S. District Court, claiming racial discrimination in jury selection, but the court lacked jurisdiction. They then applied to the New York Supreme Court to revoke approval of the Grand Jury’s directive. After a hearing, the Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendants were convicted in the Criminal Court, and the Appellate Term affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a statistical disparity in the representation of minority groups on a grand jury, without evidence of intentional discrimination, violates a defendant’s constitutional rights?
    2. Whether the state has an affirmative duty to ensure that juries are composed of a cross-section of the community, regardless of discriminatory intent in the jury selection process?
    3. Whether multiple contempt charges were appropriate when the defendants made it clear from the outset that they would not answer any questions?

    Holding

    1. No, because intentional and systematic discrimination must be proven, and a showing of mathematical disparity alone is insufficient.
    2. No, because the Constitution does not mandate a compulsory system to ensure proportional representation of minority groups on grand jury panels if there is no proof of intentional exclusion.
    3. No, because the defendants’ refusal to answer questions about a particular subject constituted a single act of contempt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, stating that intentional and systematic discrimination must be proven to sustain a claim of an illegally constituted jury. A mere showing of mathematical disparity is insufficient. The court distinguished Supreme Court cases, noting that while statistical disparity can be evidence of purposeful discrimination, it is not grounds, in itself, for concluding a jury is impermissibly constituted.

    The court noted the absence of evidence indicating a policy of purposeful exclusion of minority groups. The underrepresentation of minority groups on grand juries was attributed to their reluctance to volunteer for jury duty, which does not establish unconstitutional discrimination. The court found the County Clerk’s office tried diligently to fulfill their statutory duty to select grand jurors who are “intelligent; of sound mind and good character [and] well informed.”

    The court also addressed the multiple counts of contempt, citing People v. Riela, holding that a witness’s refusal to answer questions about a particular subject constitutes a single act of contempt, regardless of the number of questions asked. The court modified the judgments to reflect a single count of contempt for each defendant (except Shallit, who only had one count to begin with).

  • Matter of State Commission for Human Rights v. Farrell, 24 N.Y.2d 961 (1969): Enforceability of Court-Ordered Aptitude Tests

    Matter of State Commission for Human Rights v. Farrell, 24 N.Y.2d 961 (1969)

    A court-ordered aptitude test, despite its imperfections, should be upheld when implemented in good faith and without evidence of improper conduct by the candidates who relied on the established procedure.

    Summary

    This case concerns the validity of an aptitude test administered under a court order designed to prevent racial discrimination in apprenticeship programs. Despite concerns about the test’s reliability due to repeated use of the same questions, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision to uphold the test results. The court reasoned that the candidates acted in good faith by preparing for the test as prescribed by the court order, and absent evidence of misconduct, the results should not be invalidated mid-process. The decision highlights the challenges in devising fair and effective methods for combating discrimination and the importance of maintaining consistency once a system is in place, even if it’s imperfect.

    Facts

    The State Commission for Human Rights initiated proceedings to address racial discrimination in building trades apprenticeship programs. The Supreme Court ordered an aptitude test to be administered by New York University. The same examination was given to apprenticeship applicants for three successive classes. Some applicants who failed previous exams received tutoring, which included familiarization with previous test questions. The New York University Testing and Advisement Service reported that, in numerous instances, the grades did not furnish a true index of the abilities of the applicants.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court authorized the examination. The Appellate Division affirmed the results of the examination. The Court of Appeals was asked to review the lower court decisions, which had upheld the validity of the aptitude test results, despite concerns about the testing methodology.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court-ordered aptitude test, administered to prevent racial discrimination in apprenticeship programs, should be invalidated due to concerns about its reliability and the potential for coaching and foreknowledge of the questions.

    Holding

    No, because the candidates acted in good faith by preparing for the test as prescribed by the court order, and absent evidence of misconduct, the results should not be invalidated mid-process. Changes should not be made while the candidates are playing the game, in the absence of evidence of ulterior conduct, after they have legitimately expended time and money in endeavoring to qualify themselves to be examined and hired as apprentices under the present procedure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the concerns raised about the reliability of the aptitude test, particularly the fact that the same questions were used in multiple administrations and that some applicants received tutoring that gave them an unfair advantage. However, the court emphasized that the candidates acted in good faith by preparing for the test as it was prescribed by the court order. The court also noted that there was no evidence of improper conduct by the candidates or the tutoring services. The court reasoned that changing the rules mid-process would be unfair to those who had legitimately expended time and money in preparing for the examination. The court suggested that the testing system might need to be reconsidered and that other or supplementary methods of avoiding racial discrimination might need to be devised and put into effect. However, the court concluded that, at this stage, the system established by the court order should not be reversed in midstream. As Justice Van Voorhis stated in his concurrence, “[T]he rules should not be changed while the candidates for apprenticeships are playing the game, in the absence of evidence of ulterior conduct, after they have legitimately expended time and money in endeavoring to qualify themselves to be examined and hired as apprentices under the present procedure.”

  • Matter of Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Standards & Appeals, 16 N.Y.2d 665 (1965): Remand for Zoning Board Reconsideration Based on New Evidence

    Matter of Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Board of Standards & Appeals, 16 N.Y.2d 665 (1965)

    A court may remand a zoning board decision for reconsideration when additional evidence surfaces that could bear on allegations of discrimination or arbitrariness by the board, especially when the board indicates it would not object to a reconsideration.

    Summary

    Humble Oil sought a variance and building permits, which were denied by the Zoning Board. Humble Oil then presented additional evidence to the Special Term arguing discrimination and arbitrariness. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and Special Term decisions, remitting the case to Special Term with instructions to remand the matter to the Zoning Board of Appeals. The court reasoned that the additional evidence presented to the Special Term warranted reconsideration by the Board, especially since the Board indicated it wouldn’t oppose it, to ensure a full and fair determination based on all relevant information.

    Facts

    1. Humble Oil & Refining Co. applied to the Zoning Board of Appeals for a variance and building permits.
    2. The Zoning Board denied Humble Oil’s application.
    3. Humble Oil then presented additional matter (evidence), via affidavit and exhibit, to the Special Term, alleging discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of the Board.

    Procedural History

    1. The Special Term initially ruled against Humble Oil.
    2. The Appellate Division affirmed the Special Term’s decision.
    3. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and the Special Term, remitting the proceedings to the Special Term with the direction to remand to the Zoning Board of Appeals for reconsideration.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the introduction of new evidence at the Special Term level, potentially indicating discrimination or arbitrariness by the Zoning Board, warrants a remand to the Board for reconsideration of the application for a variance and building permits.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the additional evidence presented to the Special Term may have a bearing on a charge of discrimination and arbitrariness on the part of the board, warranting reconsideration by the Board, especially where the Board indicated it would not object to such reconsideration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the record before the Zoning Board did not justify the petitioners’ application for a variance and building permits. However, the additional matter presented to the Special Term, suggesting discrimination and arbitrariness, warranted further consideration. The court emphasized fairness and completeness in administrative decision-making. The court considered the Zoning Board’s lack of objection to reconsideration as a key factor. The court cited Matter of Berg v. Michaelis, 21 A.D.2d 322, aff’d, 16 N.Y.2d 822, as precedent supporting the remand for reconsideration. The court also references Matter of Colonial Liq. Distrs. v. O’Connell, 295 N. Y. 129, 141 and People ex rel. Fordham Manor Ref. Church v. Walsh, 244 N. Y. 280, 289-291. The ruling emphasizes the importance of a complete and fair administrative record, particularly when allegations of bias or arbitrary action are raised. The court determined that Humble Oil should have the opportunity to present this matter to the Board for its consideration before an ultimate determination is made.

  • Board of Higher Education v. Carter, 14 N.Y.2d 138 (1964): Defining Agency Jurisdiction in Discrimination Cases

    Board of Higher Education v. Carter, 14 N.Y.2d 138 (1964)

    When a state agency has specific statutory authority over a particular area (like education), a general anti-discrimination law does not automatically override that specific authority unless the legislature clearly intends such a result.

    Summary

    The Board of Higher Education sought to prevent the State Commission for Human Rights from investigating alleged discrimination in faculty employment at Queens College, arguing that the Board had exclusive control over educational matters. The Court of Appeals held that the anti-discrimination statute applied to the Board, rejecting the argument that the Board’s educational authority exempted it. The court reasoned that the anti-discrimination law’s broad language encompassed all employers, including educational institutions, and that there was no legislative intent to create a blanket exemption for the Board. This case clarifies the scope of the State Commission for Human Rights’ jurisdiction and its interplay with other state agencies.

    Facts

    Anonymous charges of discrimination against Catholics in faculty employment and promotion at Queens College were made in 1958. The Board of Higher Education formed a subcommittee to investigate. While the Board’s investigation was ongoing, the State Commission for Human Rights also began an informal investigation into the same allegations. The Board asserted the Commission lacked jurisdiction, arguing its exclusive control over educational matters.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Higher Education initiated a proceeding to prevent the Commission from exercising jurisdiction. The lower courts initially sided with the Board, upholding its exclusive control. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission for Human Rights has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of discrimination in employment practices at Queens College, an institution under the control of the Board of Higher Education.

    Holding

    Yes, because the anti-discrimination statute applies broadly to all employers, and there is no express legislative intent to exempt the Board of Higher Education.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the anti-discrimination law’s broad language encompassed all employers, including educational institutions under the Board of Higher Education’s control. The court emphasized the importance of combating discrimination and found no evidence that the legislature intended to create a blanket exemption for the Board. The court stated that to find an exemption, “we would have to find express language in the statute providing for such exclusion.” The dissent argued that the Education Law already provided sufficient mechanisms to address discrimination in educational institutions and that allowing the Commission to exercise jurisdiction would create unnecessary conflict and confusion. The dissent highlighted the Temporary Commission against Discrimination’s initial intent to exclude non-profit educational institutions from the Commission’s jurisdiction, stating, “The Temporary Legislative Commission… intended to exclude from the jurisdiction of that Commission the non-profit educational institutions under the jurisdiction of the Board of Regents and the State Commissioner of Education”. However, the majority found this argument unpersuasive, emphasizing the importance of a unified approach to fighting discrimination and the absence of any explicit statutory language creating an exemption for the Board. This decision underscores the principle that general statutes apply unless specific exemptions are explicitly stated.