New York Law Review

Tag: Discrimination Law

  • Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 20 N.Y.3d 482 (2013): SDHR Jurisdiction Over Public School Discrimination Complaints

    Matter of North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 20 N.Y.3d 482 (2013)

    Executive Law § 296(4), which prohibits discrimination by “education corporations or associations,” does not apply to public school districts, and therefore the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) lacks jurisdiction to investigate complaints against public school districts under that provision.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) has jurisdiction to investigate discrimination complaints against public school districts under Executive Law § 296(4). Students filed complaints with the SDHR, alleging that their school districts permitted harassment based on race and/or disability. The school districts argued that they are not “education corporations or associations” under the statute. The Court of Appeals held that public school districts are not “education corporations or associations” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), reversing the Appellate Division’s order in North Syracuse and reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment, and reversing the Appellate Division’s order in Ithaca City School Dist. and reinstating the Supreme Court’s order. Therefore, the SDHR lacks jurisdiction over these complaints.

    Facts

    Students in the North Syracuse Central School District and Ithaca City School District filed complaints with the SDHR, alleging that their respective school districts engaged in unlawful discriminatory practices by allowing harassment based on race and/or disability.

    Procedural History

    Both school districts initiated CPLR article 78 proceedings seeking to prohibit the SDHR from investigating the complaints, arguing that public school districts are not “education corporations or associations” under Executive Law § 296(4). In North Syracuse, the Supreme Court initially granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, stating the school district should have first exhausted administrative remedies. In Ithaca City School Dist., the Supreme Court initially annulled the SDHR’s determination of discrimination and award of damages, but the Appellate Division modified the award and confirmed the determination, concluding that public school districts are “educational institutions” over which the SDHR has jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public school district is an “education corporation or association” as contemplated by Executive Law § 296(4), thereby granting the SDHR jurisdiction to investigate complaints against them.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative history of Executive Law § 296(4) indicates that the term “education corporation or association” refers to private, non-sectarian entities that are exempt from taxation under RPTL article 4, and public school districts do not fall into this category.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals examined the legislative history of Executive Law § 296(4), tracing the term “education corporation or association” back to the Tax Law. The Court highlighted that Tax Law § 4 differentiated between the tax-exempt status of municipal corporations, like school districts, and that of private corporations or associations organized for various purposes, including education. The Court noted that the language of Executive Law § 296(4) was taken almost verbatim from Tax Law § 4(6), indicating the Legislature’s intention for the term to have the same meaning in both laws. The Court emphasized that the phrase “non-sectarian” in Executive Law § 296(4) was intended to carve out an exception for parochial schools, reserving jurisdiction for the SDHR to investigate complaints against private, non-sectarian education corporations or associations. The court rejected the SDHR’s argument to liberally construe the statute to include public school districts, finding no underlying directive to support such a construction. The Court concluded that public school districts, as part of a public system, are distinct from private, non-sectarian institutions and do not need to “hold themselves out to the public to be non-sectarian” to receive tax-exempt status.

  • Hoffman v. Parade Publications, 16 N.Y.3d 185 (2011): Impact Requirement for Non-Resident Discrimination Claims

    16 N.Y.3d 185 (2011)

    Non-residents alleging discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) must demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within the respective jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Howard Hoffman, a Georgia resident, sued Parade Publications in New York, alleging age discrimination after his termination. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the NYCHRL and NYSHRL apply to non-residents whose alleged discriminatory termination was decided in New York City, but whose employment and the impact of termination were outside New York. The Court held that non-residents must demonstrate that the discriminatory conduct had an impact within New York City or State to invoke the protection of these laws, emphasizing that the purpose of the laws is to protect those within New York’s borders.

    Facts

    Howard Hoffman, a resident of Georgia, worked as a managing director for Parade Publications, overseeing accounts in 10 states from an office in Atlanta. Randy Siegel, president and publisher of Parade, terminated Hoffman’s employment via a phone call from Parade’s New York City headquarters. Hoffman never worked in New York, and his responsibilities were geographically limited to the Southern and Southwestern United States.

    Procedural History

    Hoffman sued Parade Publications in New York, alleging violations of the NYCHRL and NYSHRL. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that a discriminatory decision made in New York City was sufficient for jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Supreme Court’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a non-resident plaintiff, alleging discrimination under the NYCHRL and NYSHRL, must plead and prove that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within New York City or State to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

    Holding

    No, because the policies underpinning the NYCHRL and NYSHRL require that their protections extend to those who inhabit or are “persons in” the City and State of New York, and therefore a non-resident plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged discriminatory conduct had an impact within those respective boundaries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the NYCHRL is designed to protect the rights and privileges of New York City’s inhabitants. The statute focuses on addressing prejudice and discrimination that threaten the health, morals, safety, and welfare of the city and its residents. The Court emphasized the importance of confining the NYCHRL’s protections to those who work in the city. The Court stated that focusing solely on where the termination decision is made leads to impractical results, expanding the NYCHRL to cover plaintiffs with only tangential connections to the city. The Court reasoned the impact requirement is simple to apply, leads to predictable results, and appropriately confines the NYCHRL’s protections. Similarly, the Court held that the NYSHRL is intended to protect inhabitants and persons within the state. The Court also pointed to the “extraterritorial” provision of the NYSHRL, Executive Law § 298-a, which specifically addresses discriminatory acts committed outside New York against New York residents and businesses, further supporting the view that the law primarily protects those within the state. The dissenting opinion argued that the discriminatory act (termination) occurred in New York City, thus New York courts should have jurisdiction. The dissent emphasized that it would be contrary to the purpose of both statutes to leave it to the courts of other jurisdictions to appropriately respond to acts of discrimination that occurred in New York.

  • Scott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 429 (1995): Discrimination Claims by Independent Contractors Under the Human Rights Law

    Scott v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 86 N.Y.2d 429 (1995)

    An independent contractor cannot bring a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a) unless they can demonstrate an employer-employee relationship; discrimination claims under Executive Law § 296(13) require showing a boycott, blacklisting, or concerted effort to disadvantage a protected class.

    Summary

    Marilyn Scott, an insurance agent, sued Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company and its general agent, G. James Blatt, alleging discrimination based on gender, age, and marital status after her contract was terminated. Scott claimed violations of New York’s Human Rights Law, specifically Executive Law § 296(1)(a) and § 296(13). The court held that as an independent contractor, Scott could not claim discrimination under § 296(1)(a) because she failed to prove an employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, the court determined that § 296(13) did not apply because Scott did not demonstrate a boycott, blacklisting, or a concerted effort by the defendants to economically disadvantage women or any other protected group.

    Facts

    Marilyn Scott was hired as an insurance agent by G. James Blatt, a general agent for Massachusetts Mutual, in 1981 under a career contract explicitly stating that no employer-employee relationship was created. In 1987, she became a district manager. Both contracts were terminable at will. Blatt terminated Scott’s contract and her license to sell certain mutual funds in 1992. Scott was responsible for her operating expenses, support staff, and taxes were not withheld from her pay. She could also sell competitors’ products. She claimed she was required to recruit and train agents according to MassMutual’s guidelines, but this applied only to agents financed by MassMutual.

    Procedural History

    Scott sued Massachusetts Mutual and Blatt in New York Supreme Court, alleging discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Scott, as an independent contractor, can bring a discrimination claim under Executive Law § 296(1)(a).
    2. Whether Scott’s discrimination claim can proceed under Executive Law § 296(13), even if she is an independent contractor.

    Holding

    1. No, because Scott failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether an employer-employee relationship existed.
    2. No, because Scott failed to present evidence of a boycott, blacklisting, or a concerted effort to economically disadvantage a protected class.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court stated that an employer-employee relationship exists when the employer exercises control over the results produced or the means used to achieve the results. Minimal control is insufficient. Here, Scott financed her operations, was paid by performance, didn’t have taxes withheld, could sell competitors’ products, and contracted as an independent contractor, demonstrating a high degree of independence. The court cited Matter of Ted Is Back Corp. [Roberts], 64 NY2d 725, 726, stating that "a determination that an employer-employee relationship exists may rest upon evidence that the employer exercises either control over the results produced or over the means used to achieve the results." Thus, summary judgment was proper.

    Regarding the second issue, the court analyzed Executive Law § 296(13), noting its focus on boycotts, blacklisting, and refusals to deal. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the term ‘discriminate’ immediately precedes the list of terms including boycott, blacklisting and refusals to trade, that term should be construed to refer to similar types of commercial activity." Legislative history revealed that § 296(13) was enacted to address economic warfare against protected classes, such as the Arab Boycott Law. The court stated, "While the enactment found its impetus in the Arab boycott of Jewish businesses, it was drafted more broadly to prohibit not only boycotts imposed by foreign entities, but any business tactics, utilized in New York State or against a New York resident or corporation, which are driven by ‘religious or racial bigotry’" The court found no evidence of a formal boycott or blacklisting campaign against Scott, nor any pattern of conduct commercially disadvantaging only members of a protected class. Thus, the claim under § 296(13) was properly dismissed. The court emphasized that even without a formal boycott, a pattern of discriminatory conduct could suffice, citing Harvey v NYRAC, Inc., 813 F Supp 206. However, Scott’s allegations were insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

  • Board of Education of City of New York v. State Division of Human Rights, 42 N.Y.2d 812 (1977): Insufficient Evidence to Support Discrimination Claim in Pregnancy Leave Policy

    Board of Education of City of New York v. State Division of Human Rights, 42 N.Y.2d 812 (1977)

    A determination of discrimination by the State Division of Human Rights requires sufficient evidence on the record to support the finding, particularly regarding comparable policies for non-pregnancy-related disabilities.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed a determination by the State Division of Human Rights that the Board of Education’s pregnancy leave policy was discriminatory. The original policy mandated unpaid leave without sick leave credit for pregnant teachers. After the board implemented a new policy offering pregnant teachers a choice between sick leave for actual disability and a more extended leave of absence without sick leave credit, the Division found this new policy still discriminatory. The Court of Appeals reversed the Division’s order, finding insufficient evidence in the record to compare the policy with those for non-pregnancy-related disabilities. The court emphasized that without such comparison, it’s impossible to determine whether the policy was indeed discriminatory.

    Facts

    1. The Board of Education and the teachers association had a collective bargaining agreement adopting the Board’s pre-existing maternity leave policy.
    2. The original policy required pregnant teachers to take unpaid leave beginning no later than the end of the sixth month of pregnancy and ending at the start of the academic semester following six months after delivery, without sick leave credit.
    3. The Board later replaced this policy with a new one, giving pregnant teachers the option to take sick leave for actual disability with full sick leave credits or a leave of absence for a more extended period without sick leave credits.
    4. The Division of Human Rights found the new policy violated the Human Rights Law, leading to an enforcement proceeding.

    Procedural History

    1. The State Division of Human Rights initially determined that the Board of Education’s original maternity leave policy violated the Human Rights Law.
    2. The Board of Education abandoned the original policy and implemented a new, substitute policy.
    3. The Division then determined the new policy still violated the Human Rights Law and initiated an enforcement proceeding at the Appellate Division.
    4. The Appellate Division agreed there was a violation of the terms of the Division orders but rejected the Division’s substantive contentions and modified the order to direct the Board of Education to implement its substituted policy.
    5. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the State Division of Human Rights’ determination that the Board of Education’s new pregnancy leave policy was discriminatory under the Human Rights Law, particularly concerning the lack of sick leave credits for the extended leave of absence option.

    Holding

    No, because there was insufficient evidence in the record to compare the Board of Education’s policies regarding non-pregnancy-related disabilities with the policy for pregnant teachers, making it impossible to determine if the policy was discriminatory.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the absence of evidence regarding the Board’s policies for non-pregnancy-related disabilities. The Court acknowledged that while sick leave with full credit was available for all disabilities during periods of actual disability, the record was silent on whether an alternative leave of absence option existed for non-pregnancy-related disabilities and, if so, whether its terms were comparable to those offered to pregnant teachers. The court stated, “Critical in our view is the fact that there is no sufficient proof as to the comparable policies of the Board of Education with respect to non-pregnancy-related disabilities…More precisely, it cannot be determined whether there is any option at all, or, if a choice is open, whether its terms correspond to those offered to pregnant teachers as an alternative, and in particular whether sick leave credits may be applied against a leave of absence.” The Court reasoned that without knowing whether similar leave options existed for other disabilities, it was impossible to determine whether the pregnancy leave policy was discriminatory. The court concluded, “In this state of the record we can only conclude that there is not sufficient evidence on this record considered as a whole to support the determination of the division and thus to entitle it to the enforcement order that it seeks.” The key to determining discrimination lies in comparing the treatment of pregnant teachers with the treatment of other employees with disabilities. Absent such comparison, a finding of discrimination cannot be sustained.

  • Gilinsky v. Columbia University, 42 N.Y.2d 614 (1977): Standard for Judicial Review of Agency Discrimination Findings

    Gilinsky v. Columbia University, 42 N.Y.2d 614 (1977)

    The State Human Rights Appeal Board’s review of a Commissioner’s determination of discrimination is limited to whether the order is supported by substantial evidence, and the Board cannot substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s when the evidence is conflicting.

    Summary

    Dr. Alberta Gilinsky, a tenured professor, alleged sex discrimination after Columbia University rejected her application for a faculty position. The Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights found no discrimination, but the State Human Rights Appeal Board reversed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Board’s decision, holding that the Board exceeded its statutory authority by substituting its own judgment for the Commissioner’s when substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s finding of no discrimination. The court emphasized that neither the Board nor the courts should invade academic oversight in faculty appointments absent clear evidence of discrimination.

    Facts

    Dr. Gilinsky, a tenured professor at the University of Bridgeport, applied for a faculty position in the Department of Psychology at Columbia University in February 1972. She was informed that her application was rejected due to a lack of vacancies in her area of specialization. Dr. Gilinsky then filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights, alleging sex discrimination by Columbia University.

    Procedural History

    The Chief Hearing Examiner of the State Division held hearings. The Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights determined that Columbia University did not discriminate against Dr. Gilinsky based on her sex. The State Human Rights Appeal Board reversed the Commissioner’s determination. Columbia University appealed the Board’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, annulling the Board’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Human Rights Appeal Board exceeded its statutory authority by setting aside the Commissioner’s determination that Columbia University did not discriminate against Dr. Gilinsky, when the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

    Holding

    Yes, because the State Human Rights Appeal Board is not empowered to find new facts or take a different view of the weight of the evidence if the Commissioner’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the State Human Rights Appeal Board’s review is limited to whether the Commissioner’s order is supported by substantial evidence, and the Board cannot substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s when the evidence is conflicting. The court found that the Commissioner’s determination was supported by substantial evidence, including evidence that Columbia University had no need for an additional faculty member in Dr. Gilinsky’s area of specialization and that the university had imposed restrictions on new faculty appointments due to operating deficits. The court emphasized that the Board improperly substituted its own view of the evidence for the Commissioner’s determination, particularly regarding Dr. Gilinsky’s area of expertise and the university’s budgetary constraints. The court also noted the danger of relying solely on statistical evidence of gender imbalance in faculty positions without considering the pool of qualified candidates and budgetary limitations. Quoting Matter of Pace Coll. v Commission on Human Rights of City of N.Y., the court cautioned that “[n]either the commission nor the courts should invade, and only rarely assume academic oversight, except with the greatest caution and restraint, in such sensitive areas as faculty appointment, promotion and tenure, especially in institutions of higher learning.”