New York Law Review

Tag: discretionary duty

  • Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525 (1984): Mandamus and Discretionary Agency Actions

    Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525 (1984)

    Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that compels a government entity to perform a ministerial duty, but it does not lie to compel acts involving discretion, especially when budgetary constraints are involved.

    Summary

    This case concerns a petition by patients at Creedmoor Psychiatric Center seeking transfer to facilities for the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled (OMRDD). The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health (OMH) could be compelled to transfer patients when lacking sufficient funding and facilities, and whether a prior decision estopped the state from relitigating the issue. The Court held that the prior decision did not have preclusive effect and that mandamus was inappropriate because the transfer of patients involved discretionary actions by the Commissioner, influenced by budgetary considerations. The court reversed the lower court decision compelling the transfer.

    Facts

    In 1977, New York State created separate offices for mental health (OMH) and mental retardation/developmental disabilities (OMRDD). By 1982, approximately 800 patients in OMH facilities were identified as clinically belonging in OMRDD facilities, including the 25 petitioners in this case. However, due to claimed lack of funds and facilities, these patients could not be immediately transferred. The state developed a three-year plan to transfer these patients, with newly appropriated funds. As of June 15, 1985, 340 patients remained in OMH facilities.

    Procedural History

    The petitioners, patients at Creedmoor, initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking a court order to compel their transfer to OMRDD facilities. Special Term granted the petition, directing transfer within 90 days, concluding that a prior case, Savastano v. Prevost, precluded relitigation of the issue. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing Savastano I. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the respondents are collaterally estopped by the decision in Savastano v. Prevost from litigating the issue of whether the Mental Hygiene Law mandates the immediate transfer of clinically eligible patients to OMRDD facilities.
    2. Whether mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the Commissioner of OMH to transfer patients to OMRDD facilities, given the Commissioner’s discretion and budgetary constraints.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prior case involved different plaintiffs, a small number of patients, and the state did not explicitly recognize the potential preclusive effects of an adverse determination in that prior case when it chose not to appeal after the patients were transferred.
    2. No, because the decision to transfer patients involves discretionary actions by the Commissioner, influenced by budgetary considerations, and mandamus only lies to compel the performance of a ministerial, nondiscretionary act.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that collateral estoppel did not apply because the Savastano I case involved only three patients who were promptly transferred, and there was no indication the State recognized the preclusive effect of that decision. The court emphasized that the realities of litigation weighed against preclusion.

    Regarding mandamus, the Court stated that it is appropriate only when there is a clear legal right to the relief sought and the act to be compelled is ministerial, not discretionary. While the Mental Hygiene Law establishes a policy of comprehensive services and treatment suited to patients’ needs, it does not mandate immediate transfer. The court emphasized that various sections of the Mental Hygiene Law vest discretion in the Commissioner, allowing consideration of budgetary restrictions. Specifically, section 13.15(a) allows the OMRDD Commissioner to take actions necessary to implement the chapter’s purposes “within the amounts made available therefor by appropriation.” Furthermore, section 29.07(a) permits the Commissioner to defer admissions when a facility’s capacity is exceeded. The Court noted the absence of any claim that respondents failed to formulate any transfer plan, further undermining the justification for mandamus. Finally, the Court remanded to consider constitutional rights to treatment claims.

  • People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70 (1900): Mandamus and the Comptroller’s Audit Authority

    People ex rel. Grannis v. Roberts, 163 N.Y. 70 (1900)

    Mandamus does not lie to compel a state comptroller to audit a claim in a specific manner, as the comptroller’s auditing function involves the exercise of judgment and discretion.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over payments for canal work. The relators, Grannis and O’Connor, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the state comptroller to pay drafts in full for work performed. The comptroller argued the contract was fraudulent due to an inaccurate estimate of rock excavation by the state engineer, leading to an unbalanced bid. The court held that the comptroller possesses the authority to audit claims against the state and cannot be compelled by mandamus to make a specific determination, as auditing involves discretionary judgment.

    Facts

    Grannis and O’Connor entered into a contract to perform work on the Erie Canal. The State Engineer’s estimate for rock excavation was significantly lower (100 yards) than the actual amount (over 30,000 yards). The contractors bid $3 per yard for rock excavation. The Comptroller refused to fully pay the contractors’ drafts, arguing that the rock excavation was only worth $1 per yard. The Comptroller further contended that the contractors knew the actual amount of rock excavation before signing the contract. A referee found no collusion or fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Procedural History

    The relators sought a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to compel the Comptroller to pay the drafts. The Comptroller opposed, alleging fraud. The case was referred to a referee who found no fraud. The Appellate Division affirmed the referee’s finding. The Comptroller appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Comptroller can be compelled by mandamus to audit a claim in a specific manner, given the Comptroller’s authority to audit claims against the state.

    Holding

    No, because the comptroller’s auditing function involves a judicial function requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion, and mandamus cannot substitute the court’s judgment for that of the comptroller.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history of auditing authority in New York, noting that the Constitution requires an audit before state funds are disbursed. While the legislature appropriates funds, it is the responsibility of an auditing officer to examine and approve claims. The Court traced the evolution of auditing power, eventually settling with the Comptroller. The Court emphasized that the Comptroller’s role involves more than just a ministerial calculation; it requires the Comptroller to “hear, to examine, to pass upon, to settle and adjust.” The court cited People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners, 149 N.Y. 26, stating, “That would substitute the judgment or discretion of the court issuing the writ for that of the person or persons against whom the writ was issued.” The court found no legislative intent to remove the Comptroller’s audit authority and vest it solely in the State Engineer. Therefore, because the Comptroller’s audit function requires the exercise of discretion, mandamus cannot compel a particular outcome.