New York Law Review

Tag: disability benefits

  • Seiferheld v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 565 (2011): Agency Authority to Revoke Disability Benefits

    Seiferheld v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 565 (2011)

    An administrative agency’s decision to revoke disability benefits must be based on its own independent determination and not solely on the recommendation of another agency.

    Summary

    This case concerns the revocation of a police officer’s disability retirement benefits after he failed a drug test. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees improperly revoked the officer’s benefits based solely on the recommendation of the Law Department, without making an independent determination of his disability status. The court emphasized that the Board of Trustees had the ultimate authority and responsibility to determine whether the officer was still disabled and eligible for benefits, and it could not delegate that authority to the Law Department. The dissent argued that the Board had already made the determination to revoke benefits prior to the Law Department’s memo.

    Facts

    Petitioner Seiferheld, a former police officer, was initially granted accident disability retirement benefits. He was later directed to return to work. Subsequently, he failed a drug test. The New York City Law Department then issued a memorandum recommending that Seiferheld’s disability benefits be terminated. The Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees then formally revoked Seiferheld’s benefits.

    Procedural History

    Seiferheld initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the revocation of his disability benefits. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision. The City of New York appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees properly revoked Seiferheld’s accident disability retirement benefits based on its own independent determination, or whether the revocation was improperly based solely on the recommendation of the New York City Law Department.

    Holding

    No, because the Police Pension Fund Board of Trustees acted solely on the recommendation of the Law Department without making its own independent determination regarding Seiferheld’s disability status.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the Board of Trustees had the exclusive authority to determine whether Seiferheld remained disabled and eligible for benefits. The court found that the Board’s decision to revoke Seiferheld’s benefits was based entirely on the Law Department’s recommendation following the failed drug test, and the Board failed to conduct its own independent evaluation of Seiferheld’s medical condition. The court stated: “The Board could not surrender its authority to the Law Department… The Board, and the Board alone, had the power to decide whether Seiferheld should continue to receive accident disability retirement benefits.” The court also highlighted that the relevant statute required the Board to make an independent determination based on medical evidence and other relevant factors, which it did not do in this case. The dissent argued that the Board had already made the decision to revoke benefits on April 11, 2007, prior to the Law Department’s memo, and that the Law Department was merely interpreting the effect of the drug test failure on that prior determination. The dissent also noted that Seiferheld’s real issue was with DCAS’s decision not to recommend him for other civil service positions after the failed drug test, an argument he chose not to make.

  • City of Watertown v. State of New York Public Employment Relations Board, 95 N.Y.2d 73 (2000): Bargaining Procedures for GML § 207-c Benefits

    City of Watertown v. State of New York Public Employment Relations Board, 95 N.Y.2d 73 (2000)

    Procedures for implementing General Municipal Law § 207-c, concerning disability benefits for police officers, are subject to mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law, provided that the bargaining does not diminish the municipality’s authority to make initial eligibility determinations.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a proposal by a Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to submit disputes regarding eligibility for General Municipal Law (GML) § 207-c benefits to binding arbitration is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The Court of Appeals held that negotiating the procedures for resolving such disputes is mandatory, as long as the municipality retains the right to make the initial eligibility determination. The Court reasoned that this approach balances the Taylor Law’s broad bargaining requirements with the municipality’s statutory authority under GML § 207-c. This case clarifies the scope of mandatory bargaining in the context of public sector labor relations and disability benefits for police officers.

    Facts

    The Police Benevolent Association (PBA) proposed negotiating the forum and procedures for resolving disputes related to a police officer’s eligibility for General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits. The proposal sought to submit disagreements over the city’s initial eligibility determinations to final and binding arbitration. The City of Watertown argued that the proposal was not subject to mandatory bargaining, as it infringed upon the City’s statutory authority to determine eligibility for disability benefits.

    Procedural History

    The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) determined that the PBA’s proposal was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. The City filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging PERB’s determination. The Appellate Division confirmed PERB’s decision. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a proposal to submit disputes regarding eligibility for GML § 207-c benefits to binding arbitration constitutes a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because negotiating the procedures for resolving disputes over GML § 207-c benefits is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, provided that the municipality retains the right to make initial eligibility determinations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Taylor Law establishes a “strong and sweeping policy” favoring collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment. This requirement is not absolute but gives way when it is “antithetical to statutory requirements”. While GML § 207-c grants municipalities the authority to make initial eligibility determinations, it is silent as to the procedures for contesting those determinations. Therefore, the procedures for implementing the requirements of GML § 207-c are subject to bargaining. The Court emphasized that its holding “in no way diminishes the City’s right to make initial determinations under section 207-c” and that municipalities retain the power to issue “final” and “binding” orders. The Court also noted that arbitration would provide an officer the right to have an opinion of a personal physician considered. “[T]he procedures for implementation of the requirements of General Municipal Law § 207-c [are] subject to bargaining”.

    Judge Bellacosa concurred, emphasizing the narrowness of the holding and cautioning against an overly broad interpretation of prior precedents. He underscored the importance of arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.

    The dissent, authored by Judge Rosenblatt, argued that the majority’s decision effectively undermines the municipality’s authority to make eligibility determinations under GML § 207-c. The dissent contended that the proposal effectively allows an arbitrator to overturn the municipality’s determination. The dissent also argued that GML § 207-c reflects a legislative intent to grant municipalities unrestricted authority, any challenge to which should be resolved judicially. The dissent highlighted the municipality’s fiscal concerns and stated the payment of benefits is not “a form of wages,” benefits under the statutes are statutory entitlements. The dissenting opinion suggested the majority’s holding uncouples prior Court of Appeals syllogisms to the proper operations of section 207-c.

  • Borenstein v. New York City Employees’ Retirement System, 88 N.Y.2d 756 (1996): Standard of Review for NYCERS Disability Determinations

    88 N.Y.2d 756 (1996)

    A Medical Board’s disability determination in a NYCERS case will be sustained unless it lacks a rational basis or is arbitrary and capricious, and the determination will not be disturbed if it is based on some credible evidence.

    Summary

    Borenstein, an Assistant Deputy Warden, sought accidental disability retirement benefits from the New York City Employees’ Retirement System (NYCERS) after allegedly slipping and falling at work. The Medical Board of NYCERS denied her application, finding she was not medically disabled for city service. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Borenstein’s Article 78 proceeding, granting her application. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Medical Board’s determination had a rational basis and was supported by some credible evidence, and the Appellate Division improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Medical Board. This case clarifies the deferential standard of review applied to NYCERS Medical Board determinations.

    Facts

    Borenstein allegedly slipped on loose carpeting at Rikers Island, injuring her neck, shoulder, back, and right hand/wrist. She was examined by Department of Correction physicians, who diagnosed a sprained right hand and noted neck discomfort. An MRI later revealed a herniated disc. Borenstein’s physician concluded she was unfit for duty. NYCERS Medical Board physicians examined her and found limited motion in her cervical spine, weak left hand grip, and pain in her left paracervical and trapezius muscles, but concluded her complaints did not substantiate a disability claim. Conflicting medical opinions arose regarding the extent of Borenstein’s disability.

    Procedural History

    The NYCERS Medical Board initially denied Borenstein’s application. After reconsideration, including additional medical reports, the Medical Board reaffirmed its denial. The NYCERS Board of Trustees denied Borenstein’s request. Borenstein commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to annul the determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, granting Borenstein an accident disability pension. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Medical Board’s determination that Borenstein was not medically disabled for the performance of city service lacked a rational basis or was arbitrary and capricious, warranting judicial intervention.

    Holding

    No, because the Medical Board’s determination was based on some credible evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The Appellate Division erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Medical Board.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the award of accidental disability retirement benefits is a two-step process: first, the Medical Board determines if the applicant is medically disabled; second, the Board of Trustees evaluates causation. The Medical Board’s finding will be sustained unless it lacks rational basis or is arbitrary or capricious. Ordinarily, the Medical Board’s determination will not be disturbed if it is based on substantial evidence, which, in disability cases, is construed as requiring “some credible evidence.” The Court found that the Medical Board’s determination was based on “some credible evidence.” The Court noted that while the Medical Board considered Borenstein’s subjective complaints, the record showed it went beyond those complaints. The medical evidence, including the MRI, was subject to conflicting interpretations, and the Board had the authority to resolve such conflicts. The Court stated, “[i]n the end, the Appellate Division here did what it should not do: ‘substitute [its] own judgment for that of the Medical Board’.” Because the Appellate Division improperly overturned the Medical Board’s finding regarding disability, it also erred in granting an accident disability pension, which is dependent on a finding of causation as well as disability.

  • Harzinski v. Village of Endicott & Russo v. City of Binghamton, 60 N.Y.2d 617 (1983): Entitlement of Disabled Firefighters to Salary Increases

    Harzinski v. Village of Endicott, 60 N.Y.2d 617 (1983); Russo v. City of Binghamton, 60 N.Y.2d 617 (1983)

    Disabled firefighters are entitled to salary increases negotiated after the award of their disability allowance, but the benefit is computed using the “zero option” retirement allowance.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether disabled firefighters are entitled to salary increases given to active firefighters after the disabled firefighters began receiving disability allowances. The Court of Appeals held that the disabled firefighters were indeed entitled to these increases, citing Matter of Mashnouk v. Miles. However, the court also agreed with the Appellate Division that the benefits should be calculated using the “zero option” retirement allowance because “amounts received” includes the entire benefits package received upon retirement. The court rejected the firefighters’ constitutional arguments.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs in both Harzinski and Russo are disabled firefighters. After the firefighters were awarded disability allowances, salary increases were negotiated for active firefighters in their respective municipalities. The disabled firefighters then sought to receive these salary increases as part of their disability benefits.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court in Broome County initially ruled that the plaintiffs in Harzinski were entitled to salary increases, but the Appellate Division modified this decision. Similarly, in Russo, the Appellate Division ruled against the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Both cases were then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reviewed the submissions and modified the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether disabled firefighters are entitled to salary increases given to active firefighters after the award of the disability allowance.
    2. Whether the benefit should be computed using the “zero option” retirement allowance.
    3. Whether the appellants’ constitutional arguments have merit.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because disabled firefighters are entitled to salary increases where such increases were negotiated after the award of the disability allowance, as established in Matter of Mashnouk v. Miles.
    2. Yes, because “amounts received” includes the entire package of benefits received by the firemen upon retirement; therefore, the “zero option” retirement allowance should be used.
    3. No, because the appellants’ constitutional arguments are unavailing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its previous decision in Matter of Mashnouk v. Miles, which established the principle that disabled firefighters are entitled to salary increases negotiated after the award of their disability allowance. This ensures that disabled firefighters receive benefits that reflect the current compensation levels for their active counterparts. However, the court also clarified that the calculation of these benefits should consider the complete retirement package, including the “zero option” retirement allowance. This approach provides a comprehensive and consistent method for determining the appropriate benefit amount. The court did not elaborate on the constitutional arguments, simply stating they were unavailing, suggesting they lacked merit or were not properly presented.

  • Milan v. Trico Products Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 867 (1981): Employer Reimbursement for Holiday Pay During Disability

    53 N.Y.2d 867 (1981)

    An employer may be entitled to reimbursement under Workers’ Compensation Law § 25(4)(a) for holiday pay provided to an employee during a period of disability, and the Workers’ Compensation Board has jurisdiction to resolve such claims.

    Summary

    Clarence Milan, an employee of Trico Products Corp., was awarded workers’ compensation benefits for a period of disability. Trico paid Milan his regular wage for the July 4th holiday, which fell within this period, but did not pay disability for that day. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the compensation award and denied Trico’s request to credit the holiday pay against the award, asserting it lacked jurisdiction over the issue. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Board had jurisdiction to determine whether Trico was entitled to reimbursement under Workers’ Compensation Law § 25(4)(a) for the holiday pay, and remitted the matter to the Board for resolution.

    Facts

    Clarence Milan was totally disabled from June 7 to July 7, 1977, while employed by Trico Products Corp. Trico, a self-insured employer, paid Milan his regular wage for the July 4th holiday. Trico did not pay Milan disability benefits for July 4th. Milan was awarded worker’s compensation benefits for his period of disability, inclusive of the July 4th holiday.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the compensation award and denied Trico’s request to credit the holiday pay against the award, stating it lacked jurisdiction over the holiday pay issue. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision. Trico appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Workers’ Compensation Board erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Trico’s claim for credit for the holiday pay against the worker’s compensation award, pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 25(4)(a)?

    Holding

    Yes, because Workers’ Compensation Law § 25(4)(a) provides for reimbursement to the employer for “payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability,” and the Workers’ Compensation Board therefore erroneously declined jurisdiction of Trico’s claim.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Workers’ Compensation Board incorrectly determined it lacked jurisdiction over Trico’s claim for credit for the holiday pay. The Court cited Workers’ Compensation Law § 25(4)(a), which allows for reimbursement to the employer for “payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability.” The Court stated, “On this record, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Trico’s claim for credit for the holiday pay does not come within the purview of section 25 (subd 4, par [a]) of the Workers’ Compensation Law.” The Court emphasized that the Board had a duty to resolve the claim under the applicable statute. The Court remitted the matter to the Appellate Division with instructions to remand to the Workers’ Compensation Board for further proceedings to determine whether Trico was entitled to a credit for the holiday pay. The decision underscores the principle that employers may be entitled to reimbursement for wage-like payments made during periods of disability under the Workers’ Compensation Law, and the Board is the proper forum for resolving such disputes.