New York Law Review

Tag: disability

  • New York Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Rights, 55 N.Y.2d 122 (1982): Legality of Foot-Only Race Requirements

    New York Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Rights, 55 N.Y.2d 122 (1982)

    A private organization’s decision to conduct a marathon footrace, requiring participants to use only their feet, does not constitute unlawful discrimination against the disabled under the Human Rights Law.

    Summary

    The New York Roadrunners Club organized the 1978 New York City Marathon, requiring participants to use only their feet. A complaint was filed alleging discrimination against the disabled. The New York Court of Appeals held that the club’s decision to conduct a footrace does not constitute unlawful discrimination under the Human Rights Law. The court reasoned that the club, as a private organization, had the right to set standards for its race, and requiring participants to use their feet was a valid consideration to equalize competition and objectively evaluate performance. The court emphasized that choosing a conventional method of locomotion for a footrace wasn’t blameworthy discriminatory conduct.

    Facts

    The New York Roadrunners Club (the Club), a private not-for-profit organization, organized and promoted the 1978 New York City Marathon. The Club required all participants to use only their feet for locomotion during the race. A complaint was filed alleging that this rule discriminated against disabled individuals who could not participate using only their feet. The Human Rights Division found the Club guilty of discrimination.

    Procedural History

    The Human Rights Division ruled against the New York Roadrunners Club. The Appellate Division reversed the Human Rights Division’s decision. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the New York Roadrunners Club’s requirement that marathon participants use only their feet constitutes unlawful discrimination against the disabled under section 296 (subd 2, par [a]) of the Executive Law (Human Rights Law).

    Holding

    No, because the New York Roadrunners Club, as a private organization, had the right to set standards for its race, and requiring participants to use their feet was a valid consideration to equalize competition and objectively evaluate performance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court held that the Club’s decision to conduct a marathon footrace, requiring participants to use only their feet, did not constitute unlawful discrimination. The court emphasized that the Club was a private organization and had the right to set standards for the race. Requiring participants to use their feet was a valid consideration for the club to take into account the fact that a uniform requirement that the race be run on foot would tend to equalize competition. Equally valid was its concern that, without a uniform rule, it would make it difficult, if not impossible, to objectively evaluate the relative performances of the competitors.

    The court stated: “Standing alone, its election to adhere to the method of locomotion most intrinsic and conventional to what, at all odds, is planned as a foot racing event cannot be catalogued as blameworthy in a Human Rights Law discriminatory sense.”

    The court also acknowledged the importance of athletic activity in the lives of the handicapped and the Human Rights Division’s role in combating discrimination. However, it concluded that the specific acts complained of in this case did not constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice.

    The court explicitly declined to address issues of safety or whether the marathon course constituted a “place of public accommodation,” as those issues were not necessary to the decision.

  • Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 N.Y.2d 120 (1980): Due Process and Termination of Disabled Public Employees

    Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 N.Y.2d 120 (1980)

    A tenured public employee can be terminated without a pre-termination hearing under Civil Service Law § 73 when the operative facts triggering the statute (continuous absence for one year or more due to non-service-related disability) are undisputed.

    Summary

    Economico, a tenured police officer, was terminated after being absent for over 18 months due to a non-service-related injury. He claimed a violation of due process because he wasn’t given a hearing before termination and that the collective bargaining agreement granted him unlimited sick leave. The court held that a pre-termination hearing wasn’t required because the operative facts of his prolonged absence and the nature of his disability were undisputed. The court also found that the collective bargaining agreement did not prevent the village from terminating employment under Civil Service Law § 73.

    Facts

    Economico, a police officer for the Village of Pelham since 1971, was injured in a non-work-related car accident in January 1976. He was initially placed on paid sick leave. In October 1976, he was ordered to return to work but refused, claiming he was unfit. The village then stopped his sick leave pay, but an arbitrator ordered the village to resume payments. After 18 months of absence, the village terminated Economico’s employment in August 1977 under Civil Service Law § 73.

    Procedural History

    Economico filed an Article 78 proceeding, arguing his termination violated due process and the collective bargaining agreement. Special Term granted him relief, but the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tenured public employee is entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the Due Process Clause before being terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 for a continuous absence of one year or more due to a non-service-related disability.

    2. Whether a collective bargaining agreement provision granting “unlimited sick leave with pay” prohibits a municipality from terminating an employee under Civil Service Law § 73.

    Holding

    1. No, because when the operative facts triggering the statute (continuous absence for one year or more due to non-service-related disability) are undisputed, a pre-termination hearing is not required to satisfy due process.

    2. No, because the collective bargaining agreement provision, even if construed as a perpetual job security clause, cannot prevent an employer from exercising its right to terminate employees under the clear statutory requisites of Civil Service Law § 73.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Economico, as a tenured civil servant, had a property interest in his position, which is protected by due process. However, this interest is not absolute and can be limited by statute. The court emphasized the state’s interest in maintaining an efficient civil service. Section 73 of the Civil Service Law allows for termination after a year’s absence due to disability. The court reasoned that “[o]nce it was demonstrated that petitioner’s condition satisfied the objective criteria triggering application of section 73, his property interest in the position could be extinguished in the sound discretion of the appointing authority.”

    The court stated that a hearing is required when the operative facts are in dispute. Quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, the court noted that “where the facts underlying operation of the statute are in dispute the affected employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard before that interest is finally extinguished.” However, in Economico’s case, the operative facts—his prolonged absence and the non-service-related nature of his disability—were undisputed. Economico even maintained he was still disabled.

    Regarding the collective bargaining agreement, the court found it did not explicitly prohibit termination under § 73. Moreover, even if it did, the court stated that “public policy prohibits an employer from bargaining away its right to remove those employees satisfying the plain and clear statutory requisites for termination.” The court cited Matter of Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 774, 778 for the principle that a municipality may not surrender its ultimate appointing authority.

  • Matter of Smith v. O’Shea, 55 N.Y.2d 774 (1981): Termination of Disabled Employee Under Civil Service Law

    Matter of Smith v. O’Shea, 55 N.Y.2d 774 (1981)

    An employee continuously absent from and unable to perform their duties for one year or more due to a disability may be terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 without a pre-termination hearing unless there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the petitioner’s termination under Civil Service Law § 73 was valid. The petitioner, an employee continuously disabled for over a year, was terminated without a hearing. The Court found that the petitioner failed to raise the veteran status argument in lower courts and that § 73 is constitutional. The Court reasoned that a hearing is only required when there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge, and the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians obviated any such dispute. The Court also held that the petitioner’s application for reinstatement was insufficient to mandate reinstatement on his preferred date.

    Facts

    The petitioner was an employee who was continuously absent from his position for more than one year due to a disability. The Department terminated his employment pursuant to Civil Service Law § 73. The Department called to his attention in its termination letter of his right to reinstatement depended on making application for a medical examination by a doctor selected by the department. The petitioner sent letters to the department on January 28, 1978 and May 22, 1978.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner challenged his termination, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing before termination and that he was entitled to be reinstated on June 6, 1978 rather than August 1, 1978. The lower courts rejected his arguments. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the termination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner, as a veteran, was protected by Civil Service Law § 75 from termination without a hearing.

    2. Whether Civil Service Law § 73 is unconstitutional because it permits termination without a hearing of an employee continuously absent from and unable to perform the duties of his position for one year or more by reason of a disability.

    3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated on June 6, 1978, rather than August 1, 1978.

    Holding

    1. No, because the argument regarding veteran status was not raised in the lower courts and the record lacked evidence to support it.

    2. No, because a hearing is only required under § 73 when there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge, and in this case, the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians obviated any such dispute.

    3. No, because the petitioner’s application for a medical examination was insufficient to require reinstatement on June 6, 1978; the statute did not give the petitioner the right to fix the date of the examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the petitioner’s argument regarding veteran status was not properly before the court because it was not raised in the lower courts. Regarding the constitutionality of § 73, the Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Economico v. Village of Pelham, stating that “only when there is ‘some factual dispute impacting upon the employer’s right to discharge’ is a hearing required by that section and that hearing may, in the absence of demonstrated serious hardship, be held posttermination.” The Court determined that no such factual dispute existed in this case, as the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians established his continuous disability. The court also found that “by the many written statements by petitioner and his physicians filed with the department petitioner has obviated any question that he was continuously disabled for the requisite period.”

    Regarding the reinstatement date, the Court found that the petitioner’s letters were insufficient to constitute a proper application for a medical examination, as required by § 73. The first letter assumed the right to continued sick leave and the second simply stated his availability for an examination on a specific date. The Court emphasized that “[t]he statute did not give petitioner the right to fix the date of the examination.” Because of this, the petitioner failed to show what caused the department’s failure to reinstate him prior to August 1, 1978, or whether or when he was in fact examined by a department doctor.