Bonacorsa v. Van Lindt, 71 N.Y.2d 605 (1988)

A certificate of good conduct creates a presumption of rehabilitation under New York Correction Law Article 23-A, which the licensing agency must consider even when a direct relationship exists between the applicant’s prior crime and the license sought; however, the agency retains discretion to deny the license after considering all relevant factors, including public safety.

Summary

Joseph Bonacorsa, whose harness racing license was revoked following federal convictions for perjury and obstruction of justice related to race fixing, applied for a new license after receiving a certificate of good conduct. The New York Racing and Wagering Board denied his application, citing the direct relationship between his crimes and the racing industry. Bonacorsa challenged the denial, arguing the certificate entitled him to a presumption of rehabilitation. The Court of Appeals held that the certificate creates a presumption that the Board must consider, but the Board retains the discretion to deny the license after evaluating all relevant factors under Correction Law § 753(1). The Court found the Board’s denial was not arbitrary or capricious.

Facts

Bonacorsa was previously licensed as a harness racehorse owner, trainer, and driver. In 1973, he testified before a federal grand jury investigating corruption in harness racing. As a result of his testimony, he was convicted of making a false declaration to a grand jury and obstructing justice. These charges stemmed from his concealing the true ownership of a racehorse connected to an individual previously barred from racing for race-fixing allegations. His license was revoked in 1974 following these convictions. After completing his sentence, Bonacorsa obtained a certificate of good conduct from the New York State Board of Parole. In 1985, he reapplied for a racing license.

Procedural History

The Racing and Wagering Board denied Bonacorsa’s application after a hearing. Bonacorsa filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the Board’s decision and remitting the matter for further consideration. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals granted Bonacorsa leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether the presumption of rehabilitation accorded by a certificate of good conduct under Correction Law § 753(2) applies when a public agency denies a license due to a direct relationship between the applicant’s criminal conviction and the license sought.

Whether, notwithstanding the presumption of rehabilitation, the public agency retains the discretion to deny the application after examining the factors listed in Correction Law § 753(1).

Holding

Yes, because the presumption of rehabilitation created by the certificate of good conduct applies even when the statutory definition of a direct relationship has been satisfied. The agency must consider the factors mentioned in section 753(1) to determine if the direct relationship is sufficiently attenuated to warrant issuing the license.

Yes, because even with the presumption of rehabilitation, the agency retains discretion to deny the license after considering the factors in Correction Law § 753(1) and determining that the public interest and safety outweigh the presumption of rehabilitation.

Court’s Reasoning

Article 23-A of the Correction Law aims to eliminate bias against ex-offenders by requiring employers and public agencies to deal equitably with them, while also protecting public safety. While the statute generally prohibits denying a license based solely on an applicant’s status as an ex-offender, it recognizes exceptions for direct relationships between the crime and the license sought or where the license would pose an unreasonable risk.

The court reasoned that the presumption of rehabilitation applies even when a direct relationship exists. Section 752 states a conviction cannot be considered a basis for denial when the applicant has a certificate, unless one of the two exceptions apply. The Court noted the need to give meaning to the provisions, determining that consideration must be given to the certificate where a direct relationship applies, though the public agency retains the discretion to deny.

The Court differentiated between the direct relationship exception and the unreasonable risk exception. In both cases, the certificate creates a presumption of rehabilitation but does not establish a prima facie entitlement to the license. It’s only one of eight factors to consider under §753(1). The Board’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious. The Hearing Officer considered the factors in § 753(1), including the public policy of encouraging licensure of ex-offenders, the time elapsed since the conviction, Bonacorsa’s age and experience, and the seriousness of the offenses. Most importantly, the Hearing Officer considered the Board’s legitimate interest in protecting public safety. The court cited Matter of Tappis v. New York State Racing & Wagering Bd., stating that denying a license to someone involved in covering up for another who was barred from horse racing is a legitimate way to prevent the appearance of impropriety. The Court held that the Board did not discriminate against Bonacorsa solely because he had been convicted of criminal offenses.