New York Law Review

Tag: Diligent Efforts

  • In re Dashawn W., 21 N.Y.3d 38 (2013): Depraved Indifference Standard in Child Abuse Cases

    In re Dashawn W., 21 N.Y.3d 38 (2013)

    In child protective proceedings, the standard for “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” under Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i) differs from the Penal Law standard, focusing on the risk posed to the child by the parent’s abusive conduct; also, diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship are not always required before a severe abuse finding.

    Summary

    This case addresses the definition of “depraved indifference to human life” in the context of child abuse under New York Social Services Law and whether diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship are always necessary before a finding of severe abuse. The Court of Appeals held that the depraved indifference standard in child protective proceedings differs from the Penal Law standard and that diligent efforts are not required if they would be detrimental to the child’s best interests. This decision clarifies the legal framework for determining severe abuse in child welfare cases and prioritizes the child’s safety and well-being.

    Facts

    Antoine N. brought his five-month-old son, Jayquan N., to the hospital with a fractured collarbone. Doctors discovered four partially healed fractured ribs. Antoine claimed the collarbone injury occurred when a two-year-old pulled Jayquan’s arms. Medical experts found this explanation implausible. An ACS caseworker found “black linear marks” on Justin N., Antoine’s other child, revealing excessive corporal punishment with an electrical cord. Antoine had a prior child abuse adjudication from 1994 involving similar injuries to another infant son.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect. Family Court determined abuse and neglect but dismissed the severe abuse claim against Antoine, interpreting People v. Suarez as requiring eyewitness testimony. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Antoine’s conduct demonstrated depraved indifference and remanded for a determination on diligent efforts. On remand, Family Court excused diligent efforts, finding them detrimental to the child’s best interests. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the standard for “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” in Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i) is the same as the standard under the Penal Law.
    2. Whether diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship are a prerequisite to a finding of severe abuse under Family Court Act § 1051(e).

    Holding

    1. No, because the depraved indifference standard in child protective proceedings focuses on the risk intentionally or recklessly posed to the child by the parent’s abusive conduct, unlike the Penal Law standard, which requires a more wanton disregard for human life in general.
    2. No, because Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(iv) allows the court to excuse diligent efforts if they are found to be detrimental to the best interests of the child.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Penal Law requires a more extreme form of recklessness demonstrating “wickedness, evil or inhumanity” (quoting Suarez). Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a)(i) allows for a finding of severe abuse based on either reckless or intentional acts, whereas the Penal Law distinguishes between intentional and depraved indifference crimes. The court emphasized that child abuse inherently involves one-on-one violence, distinguishing it from the Penal Law’s rare circumstances where a single person is endangered. For diligent efforts, the Court found that Family Court Act §§ 1051(e) and 1012(j) import Social Services Law § 384-b(8)(a) in its entirety, including subparagraph (iv), which allows for excusal of diligent efforts when detrimental to the child. The Court noted Antoine’s history of child abuse, his failure to seek prompt medical care for Jayquan, and his unbelievable explanations for the injuries. Family Court properly considered the prior abuse adjudication when determining that efforts to strengthen the parental relationship would be detrimental to Jayquan’s best interests.

  • In re Adam HH., 4 N.Y.3d 550 (2005): Parental Rights Termination and Abandonment

    In re Adam HH., 4 N.Y.3d 550 (2005)

    A parent’s rights can be terminated for abandonment if they fail to contact the child or the relevant agency for six months prior to the filing of an abandonment petition, demonstrating an intent to forego parental rights, and the agency is not required to demonstrate diligent efforts to encourage the parent’s relationship with the child in such abandonment cases.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of a father’s parental rights based on abandonment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, finding clear and convincing evidence that the father, Adam HH., abandoned his child by failing to contact either the child or the Department of Social Services (DSS) for six months before the abandonment petition was filed. The Court emphasized that in abandonment cases, DSS isn’t required to prove it made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship. The Court also noted the father’s history of disregarding parental obligations and that the protective order did not prevent him from contacting DSS.

    Facts

    Adam HH. is the biological father of the child in question. He had a history of abusing the biological mother and violating orders of protection. He also refused to submit to a court-ordered mental health evaluation. Crucially, he had no contact with either the child or the DSS for the six months leading up to the filing of the abandonment petition.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court initially terminated Adam HH.’s parental rights based on abandonment. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. Adam HH. then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the lower courts’ rulings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the lower courts erred in terminating Adam HH.’s parental rights based on abandonment, given his claim that a protective order prevented him from contacting the child and the agency, and whether the Department of Social Services was required to demonstrate diligent efforts to encourage his relationship with the child.

    Holding

    No, because there was clear and convincing evidence of abandonment based on Adam HH.’s failure to contact the child or the agency for six months, demonstrating intent to forego parental rights, and the protective order did not prevent him from contacting DSS. No, because in abandonment cases, the Social Services Law does not require a showing of diligent efforts by the authorized agency to encourage the parent to maintain contact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on Social Services Law § 384-b [5] [a], which states that a lack of contact with the child or the agency for six months prior to filing the abandonment petition evinces an intent to forego parental rights. The Court also cited Social Services Law § 384-b [5] [b], noting that diligent efforts by DSS are not required in abandonment cases. The court found that the father’s claim that the order of protection prevented him from contacting DSS was not supported by evidence in the record. The Court emphasized that “the burden rests on the parent to maintain contact” (Matter of Julius P., 63 NY2d at 481). The court further reasoned that the father’s consistent disregard for his parental obligations, including abuse of the mother and refusal to undergo a mental health evaluation, supported the finding of abandonment. The agency, by clear and convincing evidence, demonstrated abandonment which sufficed for termination of parental rights. In short, the court affirmed the Family Court and Appellate Division rulings since there was sufficient evidence supporting abandonment and no legal requirement that the agency needed to show diligent effort.

  • In re Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d 388 (1984): Agency’s Duty to Assist Parents Before Terminating Parental Rights

    In re Jamie M., 63 N.Y.2d 388 (1984)

    Before terminating parental rights for permanent neglect based on a failure to plan for a child’s future, a child services agency must demonstrate diligent efforts to assist the parents in addressing the specific problems preventing the child’s return, particularly concerning housing and employment when financial instability is a barrier.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of parental rights of Jamie M.’s parents due to permanent neglect. Jamie, born prematurely with serious health issues, was placed in foster care. The agency alleged the parents failed to plan for Jamie’s future, citing their unstable housing, unemployment, and sporadic cooperation with counseling. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the agency failed to demonstrate diligent efforts to assist the parents in overcoming their financial instability, a crucial factor hindering their ability to provide a suitable home for Jamie. The court emphasized that while parents bear responsibility, the agency must first attempt to address the underlying issues separating families.

    Facts

    Jamie M. was born prematurely in September 1977 and suffered from severe health problems, including intestinal issues and susceptibility to infections. In September 1978, Jamie’s parents voluntarily placed her in foster care due to her health needs. Between October 1979 and January 1981, the parents experienced instability, moving frequently, facing unemployment, and lacking transportation and other resources. The agency arranged visits, which were often missed due to the parents’ circumstances.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court granted the petition to terminate parental rights. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the agency had not made diligent efforts to assist the parents. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order dismissing the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the agency discharged its statutory obligation to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, specifically concerning assistance with housing and employment, before seeking to terminate parental rights based on the parents’ failure to plan for the child’s future.

    Holding

    No, because the agency failed to demonstrate diligent efforts to assist the parents in overcoming their financial instability and securing suitable housing, which were significant barriers to planning for Jamie’s future.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while parents have a duty to plan for their child’s future, the agency has a statutory obligation to make diligent efforts to assist the parents in overcoming the problems that separate them from their children. The court found a critical void in the record: the agency’s failure to adequately address the parents’ unemployment and financial instability, which directly impacted their ability to secure stable housing. The agency’s plan, which required the parents to have a suitable home and means of support, was deemed insufficient without active assistance in these areas. The court quoted Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 1, par [a], cl [iii], stating that “the state’s first obligation is to help the family with services * * * to reunite it.” The court clarified that diligent efforts do not require the agency to be a “24-hour babysitter,” but they do necessitate providing meaningful assistance with fundamental needs like housing and employment when those needs directly impede the parents’ ability to care for their child. The court cited Matter of Sheila G., 61 NY2d 368, 385, noting that an agency must show it has embarked on a diligent course before a parent can be deemed uncooperative. The court concluded that severing parental rights is a drastic step that can only be taken when there has been compliance with the statute, which includes a genuine attempt to assist parents with counseling, planning, visitation, and the procurement of housing and employment when necessary.

  • In Re Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136 (1984): Establishing Permanent Neglect in Parental Rights Termination

    In Re Star Leslie W., 63 N.Y.2d 136 (1984)

    To terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, an agency must demonstrate diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, and the parent must fail to maintain contact with or plan for the child’s future for at least one year after the child enters agency custody.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights due to permanent neglect of her child. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the agency demonstrated diligent efforts to assist the mother, and the mother failed to adequately plan for the child’s future. The court clarified that a temporary transfer of the child to the parent for a trial period does not automatically terminate the agency’s custody and that the one-year period of neglect need not be the year immediately preceding the commencement of the termination proceeding.

    Facts

    The respondent, who herself was a former foster child, gave birth to Star Leslie W. in 1979. After one week, she voluntarily placed the child in the care of her former foster parents, who were then given foster parent status. The child was then placed under the care of Leake & Watts Children’s Home. The mother had visitation rights but moved frequently and was often out of contact with the agency. In December 1981, the child lived with the mother for one month but then returned to foster care. In February 1982, the agency initiated proceedings to terminate the mother’s parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court granted the petition to terminate parental rights, finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite the agency’s diligent efforts. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two judges dissenting on the grounds that the agency did not make sufficient diligent efforts. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency exercised diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship as required by Social Services Law § 384-b.

    2. Whether the child was in the care of an authorized agency at the time the termination proceeding was commenced, as required by Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a).

    3. Whether the one-year period of neglect must be the year immediately preceding the institution of the termination proceedings.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the agency provided counseling, arranged visitation, and attempted to resolve the mother’s housing issues.

    2. Yes, because the temporary transfer of the child to the mother for a trial period did not terminate the agency’s custody.

    3. No, because the statute contemplates a continuous period of one year at any time after the child’s placement with the agency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the agency made diligent efforts by providing counseling, making visitation arrangements, and assisting the mother with housing. The court noted that the agency is required to make only reasonable efforts, and the mother was uncooperative. The court also held that the temporary transfer of the child to the mother did not terminate the agency’s custody because it was a trial arrangement. The court stated that the statute mandates “diligent efforts, defining them as ‘reasonable attempts… to assist, develop and encourage a meaningful relationship between the parent and child’ (Social Services Law, § 384-b, subd 7, par [f]).” The court further clarified that the one-year period of neglect need not be the year immediately preceding the commencement of the termination proceeding; it can be any continuous one-year period after the child’s placement with the agency. The court stated that requiring the neglect to occur immediately before the proceeding would frustrate the purpose of the statute, as agencies may need time to consider termination or attempt further reunification efforts. Finally, the court emphasized that at the dispositional hearing, the sole concern is the best interests of the child.

  • Matter of Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368 (1984): Agency’s Duty to Strengthen Parent-Child Relationship

    Matter of Sheila G., 61 N.Y.2d 368 (1984)

    When a child-care agency seeks to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, it must first affirmatively plead and prove by clear and convincing evidence that it diligently attempted to strengthen the parent-child relationship.

    Summary

    This case addresses the paramount duty of child-care agencies in New York to actively work towards reuniting parents with their children before seeking to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the Brookwood Child Care Agency failed to demonstrate diligent efforts to foster a relationship between the father, Dennis H., and his daughter, Sheila G. The court emphasized that the agency’s indifference to the father’s rights and its failure to provide meaningful assistance precluded a finding of permanent neglect, highlighting the State’s obligation to help families stay together.

    Facts

    Sheila G. was born out of wedlock in 1977 and placed in the care of the Brookwood Child Care Agency shortly after birth. The father, Dennis H., contacted Brookwood, acknowledged paternity, and expressed his desire to visit and support Sheila. Brookwood informed him that the mother had refused to permit him access. Over the next year, Dennis regularly contacted Brookwood, inquiring about Sheila and reporting his efforts to establish paternity, which were hindered by the mother’s non-cooperation. Brookwood focused on the mother and later decided to seek Sheila’s surrender for adoption. Sheila was placed with foster parents who were informed she would be available for adoption within six months. Dennis eventually established paternity in 1979 and proposed plans for Sheila’s custody. Brookwood then initiated proceedings to terminate parental rights.

    Procedural History

    Brookwood filed a petition in Family Court to terminate the parental rights of both parents based on permanent neglect. The Family Court found the mother had permanently neglected Sheila, a determination not appealed. The Family Court dismissed the petition against the father, finding Brookwood failed to make diligent efforts to unite Sheila and Dennis. The Appellate Division reversed, holding Sheila was permanently neglected by both parents and terminating Dennis’s visitation rights. Dennis appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Brookwood Child Care Agency exercised diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship between Dennis H. and Sheila G. prior to initiating proceedings to terminate Dennis’s parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Holding

    No, because Brookwood failed to demonstrate that it made reasonable attempts to assist, develop, and encourage a meaningful relationship between Dennis and Sheila. The agency’s indifference to Dennis’s rights and its failure to provide meaningful assistance precluded a finding of permanent neglect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that when a child-care agency seeks to terminate parental rights based on permanent neglect, the agency must first demonstrate that it has made diligent efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship. Citing Social Services Law § 384-b(7)(a), the Court stated that a “permanently neglected child” is one whose parent has failed to maintain contact or plan for the child’s future, “notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts.” The Court highlighted the agency’s superior position and the potential for agency indifference to impede reunification attempts. The Court relied on legislative intent, underscoring that “the state’s first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its break-up or to reunite it if the child has already left home.” The Court found that Brookwood’s efforts were inadequate, citing a lack of consultation with Dennis in developing a service plan, a failure to assist him in gaining custody, and scheduling visitation at inconvenient times. The Court emphasized that “proof by the child-care agency that it has satisfied its statutory obligation is a threshold consideration and a necessary prerequisite to any determination of permanent neglect.” The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter to Family Court for a custody determination based on Sheila’s best interests, while underscoring Dennis’s right to meaningful assistance in gaining custody, if custody with the foster parents was continued. The Court concluded: “Once a child has been voluntarily placed with an authorized child-care agency, and is under foster care, the Family Court is vested with continuing jurisdiction over the child until there has been a final disposition of custody.”

  • Matter of Star A., 59 N.Y.2d 565 (1983): Agency’s Duty to Facilitate Psychiatric Treatment in Parental Rights Cases

    Matter of Star A., 59 N.Y.2d 565 (1983)

    When a parent’s mental health is a barrier to reunification with their children, a child welfare agency’s duty to make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship may include directing the parent toward appropriate psychiatric treatment.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights due to permanent neglect. The New York Court of Appeals held that a child welfare agency might have a duty to direct a parent toward psychiatric treatment as part of its diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, especially when mental illness is a barrier to reunification. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, finding the agency failed to fulfill its statutory duty because it did not adequately assist the mother in obtaining appropriate psychiatric care. The agency could not excuse its inaction by claiming that such efforts would have been futile.

    Facts

    The respondent, a mother of two, was found wandering the streets of New York City with her children in 1972 and was hospitalized. The Bureau of Child Welfare assumed care of the children, who were eventually placed with Talbot Perkins Children’s Services. The agency knew the mother suffered from mental illness and was briefly hospitalized in 1975. The mother moved to New Jersey and received some independent psychiatric care. The agency made some attempts to keep informed of the mother’s treatment but did little to actively direct her towards appropriate psychiatric care or assist with her treatment plan.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court dismissed the petition to terminate the mother’s custody and guardianship rights, finding that the agency failed to make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, despite the mother’s failure to plan for the children’s future. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a child welfare agency’s duty to make diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship includes directing the parent toward psychiatric treatment when the parent suffers from mental illness that hinders reunification.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory language requiring diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship may encompass a duty on the part of the agency to direct the natural parent toward psychiatric treatment designed to remedy the obstacles barring family reunification. This duty is activated and fulfilled based on the specific facts of each case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of the agency’s duty to make diligent efforts to foster the parental relationship, citing the cultural judgment that society should try to strengthen the relationship before terminating it. The Court stated that “diligent efforts” includes consultation and cooperation with the parent and providing services to resolve or ameliorate problems preventing the child’s discharge from care. The Court rejected the agency’s argument that its failure to secure appropriate psychiatric care for the respondent should be excused because any efforts would have been futile. The Court noted the agency’s “ ‘neglect in fulfilling its express statutory duty cannot be excused or justified because it would have been difficult or burdensome for it to undertake [diligent] efforts due to [respondent’s] predicaments’ ”. The court found no acceptable evidence that the mother received appropriate psychiatric care for the goal of family reunification from independent sources. Because the lower courts made affirmed findings of fact that the legislative standard of “diligent efforts” was not met, the Court of Appeals deferred to that finding.

  • In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282 (1981): Parental Rights Termination for Failure to Plan

    In re Hime Y., 54 N.Y.2d 282 (1981)

    A parent’s rights may be terminated due to permanent neglect if they fail to substantially and continuously maintain contact with or plan for the child’s future for more than one year after the child enters foster care, despite the agency’s diligent efforts and the parent’s physical and financial ability to do so.

    Summary

    This case concerns the termination of parental rights based on permanent neglect. Hime was placed in foster care shortly after birth. The agency initiated proceedings to terminate the mother’s rights, alleging both mental illness and permanent neglect. The Family Court initially found no failure to plan, but the Appellate Division terminated rights based on mental illness. The Court of Appeals reversed the mental illness finding. On remand, the Appellate Division found permanent neglect. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so, and that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship.

    Facts

    Hime was born on March 10, 1975.
    She was temporarily placed with the Jewish Child Care Association on April 9, 1975.
    On July 8, 1975, the Family Court determined Hime was a neglected child and placed her with the agency for one year.
    The mother was hospitalized from April 1, 1975, to June 26, 1975.
    The termination proceeding was initiated on July 22, 1976, alleging mental illness and permanent neglect.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found no failure to plan but awarded custody to foster parents based on the child’s best interests.
    The Appellate Division modified, terminating parental rights based on mental illness and remanding for further proceedings.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the mental illness finding.
    On remand, the Appellate Division found permanent neglect.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order terminating parental rights based on permanent neglect.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the respondent’s child, Hime, was shown to be a “permanently neglected child” within the meaning of Social Services Law § 384-b(7), because respondent failed for a period of more than one year following the date the child came into the care of an authorized agency to substantially and continuously maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency’s diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship.

    Holding

    Yes, because the weight of the evidence supported the finding that the mother failed to plan for the child’s future despite being physically and financially able to do so, and that the agency made diligent efforts to encourage the parental relationship.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the record to determine which findings conformed to the weight of the evidence, given the disagreement between the lower courts. The court noted that Social Services Law § 384-b balances the child’s interest in not experiencing a protracted stay in foster care with the parents’ interest in continuing the parent-child relationship.
    The court found that the mother refused to provide details about her financial situation, giving rise to an unfavorable inference, and testified that she had always supported herself, demonstrating financial ability. The court also found that she had the physical ability to plan for Hime’s future.
    The court determined that the agency caseworker’s testimony sufficiently established both the mother’s failure to plan and the agency’s diligent efforts. The court also noted the mother’s hostility toward the caseworkers and her refusal to furnish information concerning treatment or employment, despite being advised that it was important for her right to regain custody of the child.
    The court concluded that the weight of the evidence supported the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the mother permanently neglected Hime. The court considered evidence of the mother’s hostility toward caseworkers and refusal to provide information relevant to her ability to care for the child. The court quoted from *Matter of Leon RR*, 48 NY2d 117, 126, noting that duties to work with both natural and foster parents are “by no means contradictory; indeed, they are complementary.”