Matter of Estate of Collins, 26 N.Y.2d 46 (1970)

When interpreting a will devising “my residence,” the court will consider the testator’s intent based on surrounding circumstances and the use of the property, and the devise will typically be limited to the dwelling house and land used in connection therewith, not including separate, actively farmed acreage unless evidence demonstrates the testator treated it as a single residential unit.

Summary

This case concerns the interpretation of a will provision devising “my residence.” The testatrix bequeathed her residence to a church, and the question arose whether this devise included a large farm acreage leased to a tenant. The court held that it did not, as the farm was separately maintained and not used in connection with the dwelling. The court emphasized that the testatrix’s intent and the actual use of the property are critical in determining the scope of such a devise, and absent evidence that she treated the residence and farm as a single unit, they would be considered separate. The court reinstated the Surrogate Court’s decree, limiting the devise to the dwelling plot.

Facts

The testatrix’s will devised “my residence and its contents” to a church. The property in question consisted of a dwelling plot and a large farm acreage that had been leased to a tenant for approximately 30 years. The tenant and his family occupied the farm dwelling, maintained farm animals, and housed farm equipment on the land. There was no evidence that the testatrix used the farm acreage in connection with the dwelling plot or treated them as a single unit.

Procedural History

The Surrogate’s Court initially ruled that the devise of “my residence” did not include the farm acreage. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the devise of “my residence and its contents” in the testatrix’s will includes a separately maintained farm acreage leased to a tenant, where there is no evidence the testatrix treated the residence and farm as a single residential unit.

Holding

No, because there was no evidence whatsoever that the farm acreage was used in connection with the dwelling plot or that the testatrix ever regarded it as part of her residence or appurtenant to it.

Court’s Reasoning

The court emphasized the importance of ascertaining the testatrix’s intent based on the surrounding circumstances. Citing Matter of Phipps, the court stated that a latent ambiguity in the devise required proof to explain what particular pieces of land the will referred to. The court distinguished this case from others where the term “homestead farm” or similar terms might include adjacent areas, noting the absence of proof that the farm was used in connection with the dwelling plot. The fact that the farm was leased to a tenant who maintained a separate dwelling and farm operations was significant. The court pointed out that the tenant’s family occupied the farm dwelling and maintained farm animals and equipment on the farmlands. Thus, the farm was not the testatrix’s place of abode but that of the tenant and his family. The court stated, “In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever that the farm acreage was used in connection with the dwelling plot or that testatrix ever regarded as part of her ‘residence’, or as appurtenant to it, the acreage which her lessee had farmed for some 30 years.” The court concluded that the petitioner’s proof did not meet the required tests and that the Appellate Division incorrectly expanded the definition of “residence.” The court also found it interesting that the will’s scrivener, who became the executor and attorney for the estate, initially drafted an estate tax return treating the farm property as exempt, which was later adopted. Ultimately, the court modified the order of the Appellate Division and reinstated the decree of the Surrogate’s Court, thus limiting the devise to the dwelling plot.