7 N.Y.3d 65 (2006)
A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business within the state, even through electronic means, if the defendant’s activities are purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.
Summary
Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. (DBSI) sued the Montana Board of Investments (MBOI) for breach of contract after MBOI refused to honor a bond transaction. The transaction was negotiated electronically between DBSI in New York and MBOI in Montana. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts had personal jurisdiction over MBOI because MBOI purposefully transacted business in New York, and comity did not require deference to Montana’s laws limiting venue in contract disputes. The Court also upheld summary judgment for DBSI, finding no evidence to support MBOI’s claim of insider trading.
Facts
DBSI, a New York-based securities firm, and MBOI, a Montana state agency, engaged in a bond transaction on March 25, 2002. Negotiations occurred via Bloomberg Messaging System between DBSI’s employee in New York and MBOI’s employee in Montana. After initial reluctance, MBOI agreed to sell $15 million in Pennzoil-Quaker State Company bonds to DBSI at a quoted price. Later that day, Shell Oil announced it would acquire Pennzoil-Quaker State Company. MBOI then refused to honor the deal, claiming DBSI had inside information. DBSI bought the bonds elsewhere for $1.6 million more.
Procedural History
DBSI sued MBOI in New York Supreme Court for breach of contract. MBOI moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and comity. The Supreme Court granted MBOI’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing MBOI’s defenses and granting DBSI summary judgment on liability. MBOI appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue(s)
1. Whether New York courts have personal jurisdiction over MBOI, a Montana state agency, based on a single bond transaction negotiated electronically between the parties.
2. Whether principles of comity require New York courts to defer to Montana law, which limits venue for contract claims against the state to Montana courts.
3. Whether summary judgment was proper where MBOI claimed DBSI had inside information justifying its breach of contract.
Holding
1. Yes, because MBOI purposefully transacted business in New York by initiating and pursuing negotiations with DBSI, availing itself of the benefits of conducting business there.
2. No, because New York has a strong policy of providing a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions within the state, and the Montana statute limits venue rather than liability.
3. Yes, because MBOI offered no evidence to support its claim of insider trading beyond the timing of the transaction.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court reasoned that New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(1), allows jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in the state. The Court cited Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., stating that proof of one transaction is sufficient if the defendant’s activities were purposeful and related to the claim. The Court emphasized that MBOI was a sophisticated institutional trader who knowingly entered New York to negotiate a substantial transaction. The Court stated: “[S]o long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its actions there, due process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if not ‘present’ in that State.” Because MBOI had also engaged in other bond transactions with DBSI’s New York employee in the past, it had sufficient contacts with New York. Regarding comity, the Court followed Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, holding that New York’s interest in providing a forum for commercial transactions outweighed Montana’s interest in limiting venue. The Montana statute was viewed as an administrative convenience rather than a limitation on liability. The Court stated New York has “a very strong policy of assuring ready access to a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions spawned here.” As to summary judgment, the court found MBOI’s claim of insider trading was based solely on the timing of the transaction, which was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. The Court noted that “[t]he timing of the trade as ‘evidence’ of impropriety does not of itself create a triable issue of fact regarding illegal conduct by DBSI.”