New York Law Review

Tag: Determinate Sentencing

  • People v. Norris, 19 N.Y.3d 1070 (2012): Limits on Resentencing Authority Under the Drug Law Reform Act

    People v. Norris, 19 N.Y.3d 1070 (2012)

    When resentencing a defendant under the Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA), a court lacks the authority to alter previously imposed consecutive sentences to run concurrently.

    Summary

    Defendants Tyrell and Elbert Norris, convicted of multiple drug sale and conspiracy charges, sought resentencing under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA). The Supreme Court granted their motions but maintained the original consecutive sentences, arguing it lacked the authority to make them concurrent. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the DLRA’s purpose is to ameliorate harsh sentences by altering existing lengths, not to grant courts discretion to fashion entirely new sentences by changing the consecutive nature of existing sentences.

    Facts

    Tyrell Norris and Elbert Norris were convicted of multiple counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance and conspiracy. Both had significant criminal histories and were sentenced as second felony offenders. Tyrell received consecutive sentences totaling 20 to 40 years; Elbert received 25 to 50 years. On direct appeal, one sale conviction was vacated for each defendant, reducing their sentences. Elbert’s sentence was further reduced by operation of Penal Law § 70.30 (1) (e) (i). In 2010, both sought resentencing under the DLRA of 2009 to determinate sentences.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted resentencing motions but held it lacked authority to change the consecutive sentences to concurrent ones, offering determinate sentences based on the consecutive structure. Both defendants declined and appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a court is not authorized to alter multiple drug felony convictions that were originally imposed to run consecutively so that they now run concurrently. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when resentencing a defendant under CPL 440.46 pursuant to the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act, a court has the authority to alter multiple drug felony convictions that were originally imposed to run consecutively, so that they now run concurrently.

    Holding

    No, because the purpose of the DLRA is to ameliorate the harshness of existing sentences by altering their lengths, not to grant resentencing courts the discretion to fashion entirely new sentences with different structures.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Acevedo, which held that resentencing under the DLRA constitutes “alteration of the existing sentence as authorized by law” rather than the imposition of a new sentence. The Court reasoned that the DLRA’s purpose is to alleviate the harshness of the Rockefeller Drug Laws. Resentencing courts are therefore limited to making an existing sentence determinate as dictated by the DLRA, without the discretion to fashion entirely new sentences. The court stated, “[t]he purpose of the DLRA is to ameliorate the harsh sentences required by the original Rockefeller Drug Law.” The court distinguished the facts from Acevedo, where one charge was not subject to DLRA modification, finding this difference immaterial. The core principle remained: Penal Law § 70.25 (1), which governs concurrent vs. consecutive sentences, does not apply to DLRA resentencing. The legislative intent was to adjust sentence *lengths*, not to permit a reconsideration of the *manner* in which sentences run relative to each other.

  • People v. Boyd, 12 N.Y.3d 391 (2009): Consequences of Failing to Specify Post-Release Supervision Terms During Plea

    12 N.Y.3d 391 (2009)

    When a defendant pleads guilty to a determinate sentence, awareness of the post-release supervision (PRS) component is crucial for a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea; failure to advise on the specific PRS term requires resentencing, but not necessarily vacatur of the plea if the prosecution consents to removing PRS.

    Summary

    Defendant Boyd pleaded guilty to robbery with a promised 12-year sentence. The court mentioned mandatory post-release supervision (PRS) but didn’t specify the term. The Appellate Division reversed, vacated the plea, and reinstated the indictment, citing lack of understanding of the plea’s implications. The Court of Appeals modified the ruling. While reiterating the need for awareness of PRS, the court acknowledged a new statute allowing resentencing without PRS if the District Attorney consents. It remitted the case to the Supreme Court to consider the applicability and constitutionality of the new statute, potentially avoiding plea vacatur. The key is whether Boyd’s plea can be salvaged under the new law.

    Facts

    Boyd pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree robbery for four separate gunpoint robberies. During the plea allocution, the court mentioned post-release supervision (PRS) but did not specify the duration of the PRS term. At sentencing, the court did not pronounce the PRS terms.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s judgment, vacated Boyd’s plea and sentence, and reinstated the indictments. The Appellate Division held that Boyd did not have a complete understanding of the implications of the guilty plea. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case to the Supreme Court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court’s failure to specify the term of post-release supervision (PRS) during a plea allocution requires automatic vacatur of the plea and sentence.

    2. Whether Penal Law § 70.85, allowing resentencing to the original determinate term without PRS with the District Attorney’s consent, can be applied retroactively to rectify the omission of the PRS term during the initial sentencing and plea.

    Holding

    1. No, not necessarily because the case was remitted to determine applicability of Penal Law § 70.85.

    2. The court declined to determine the applicability or constitutionality of the statute without further development of the record at the trial court level.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holdings in People v. Catu and subsequent cases, emphasizing that a defendant must be aware of the PRS component of a determinate sentence to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent plea. The Court noted, quoting People v. Catu, “Because a defendant pleading guilty to a determinate sentence must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action, the failure of a court to advise of postrelease supervision requires reversal of the conviction.” However, the court then addressed the newly enacted Penal Law § 70.85, designed to address such situations. This statute allows the trial court, with the District Attorney’s consent, to resentence the defendant to the original determinate sentence without PRS. The Court chose not to rule on the constitutionality of this new statute or its applicability to Boyd’s case, stating that these issues should be addressed by the Supreme Court in the first instance. The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court should determine whether Boyd could be granted specific performance of the plea agreement – a determinate sentence without PRS. The dissenting opinions argued both for and against immediate vacatur, highlighting the constitutional implications of the Catu violation versus the potential for the new statute to remedy the defect. Judge Pigott argued that the new law was unconstitutional as applied to this case because the plea was unconstitutionally obtained and the defendant is entitled to vacatur. Judge Smith argued the defendant should have made a motion to withdraw his plea. Ultimately, the majority opted for a remand, emphasizing the need for a fully developed record on the new statute’s application and constitutionality before appellate review.