People v. Anderson, 86 N.Y.2d 437 (1995)

For speedy trial purposes under CPL 30.30, a criminal action commences when a defendant appears in court in response to a desk appearance ticket (DAT), regardless of whether an accusatory instrument has been filed; however, a subsequent statement of readiness can toll the speedy trial clock during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

Summary

Anderson was arrested and issued a DAT. He appeared in court as directed, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. It was eventually filed months later. After delays, Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment based on a violation of speedy trial rules. The New York Court of Appeals held that the speedy trial clock begins to run when the defendant first appears in court in response to the DAT. However, the Court also clarified that a subsequent statement of readiness by the prosecution can halt the running of the speedy trial clock during an adjournment, even if the adjournment was initially caused by the prosecution’s unreadiness.

Facts

Anderson was arrested on December 23, 1992, for fraudulently endorsing a check and was issued a DAT directing him to appear in court on January 22, 1993.
He appeared on January 22, 1993, but no accusatory instrument had been filed. He was instructed to return on March 4. Anderson returned on that date, and again on April 16, when the police detective signed the felony complaint. It was not filed until May 4, 1993, when Anderson was arraigned.

Procedural History

The People announced readiness on July 19, but post-readiness delays occurred. Anderson moved to dismiss the indictment 15 months later, on October 31, 1994.
Supreme Court granted the motion, finding 214 days chargeable to the People.
The Appellate Division affirmed, finding 219 days chargeable to the People.
The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

1. Whether, under CPL 30.30 (5)(b), a criminal action commences for speedy trial purposes when a defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, even if an accusatory instrument has not been filed.
2. Whether a subsequent statement of readiness by the People can stop the speedy trial clock from running during an adjournment period, even if the initial adjournment was due to the People’s lack of readiness.

Holding

1. Yes, because CPL 30.30(5)(b) specifically states that a criminal action is “deemed” to have commenced when the defendant appears in court in response to a DAT, regardless of the filing of an accusatory instrument.
2. Yes, because a notice of readiness constitutes a commitment to proceed, satisfying the People’s duty and tolling the speedy trial clock, even if the adjournment was initially due to the People’s lack of readiness.

Court’s Reasoning

Regarding the commencement of the action, the Court reasoned that CPL 30.30(5)(b) creates an exception to the general rule that a criminal action commences upon the filing of the accusatory instrument. The legislative history of CPL 30.30(5)(b) demonstrates that the Legislature intended the speedy trial clock to begin running upon the defendant’s physical appearance in court in response to the DAT.

The Court stated, “[T]he logical sanction for delay in filing a criminal complaint is simply to deem the criminal action commenced once the defendant has appeared in the local criminal court in compliance with the instructions contained in the DAT, solely for the purpose of calculating the time from which the prosecutor must become ready for trial.”

Regarding the 48-day period of adjournment, the Court acknowledged that the People bear the burden of explaining adjournments. However, the Court found that the People’s notice of readiness, served during the adjournment, served to toll the speedy trial clock from running. The court distinguished between court congestion and delays caused by the People’s own laxity. Since the defendant did not contest the People’s actual readiness as reflected in the notice, only the time before the notice of readiness was chargeable to the People.

The court emphasized that “a notice of readiness is the kind of record commitment to proceed which satisfies the People’s duty to be ready for trial, and serves to toll the ‘speedy trial clock’ from running for the remainder of that adjournment period.”