New York Law Review

Tag: Designated Felony Act

  • Matter of Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 533 (1999): Limits on Family Court Jurisdiction over Juvenile Offenders

    Matter of Raymond G., 93 N.Y.2d 533 (1999)

    Family Court’s jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible is limited to cases transferred from criminal court; it does not have original jurisdiction over such cases.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of Family Court jurisdiction over juvenile offenders in New York. Raymond G., a 15-year-old, was charged with delinquency in Family Court for acts that would constitute first-degree assault if committed by an adult. The Court of Appeals held that Family Court lacks original jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile could be held criminally responsible unless the case is removed from a criminal court. The decision reinforces the legislative intent to treat serious juvenile offenses within the adult criminal justice system, reserving Family Court jurisdiction for cases where criminal court deems removal appropriate. This ensures a consistent approach to prosecuting serious juvenile crimes.

    Facts

    Raymond G., a 15-year-old, allegedly participated in an attack at a subway station.

    He was charged with multiple counts of assault, including two counts of first-degree assault, in a designated felony act petition filed in Family Court.

    Raymond G. moved to dismiss the first-degree assault counts, arguing that Family Court lacked jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile could be subject to criminal prosecution.

    Procedural History

    Family Court denied Raymond G.’s motion and asserted jurisdiction.

    Raymond G. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed in a limited secure facility.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Family Court lacked jurisdiction absent an order of removal from a criminal court.

    The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court has original jurisdiction over offenses for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible, absent an order of removal from a criminal court pursuant to CPL article 725.

    Holding

    No, because Family Court’s jurisdiction over acts for which a juvenile can be held criminally responsible is limited to transferrals from criminal court where prosecution was commenced there and subsequently removed to Family Court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing that the 1978 amendments to the Family Court Act and Penal Law divested Family Court of original jurisdiction over certain serious crimes committed by juveniles. These amendments “criminalized” specific acts committed by 13-, 14-, and 15-year-olds. The Court noted that the legislature intended to subject certain juveniles to criminal prosecution to control violent juvenile crime, which was considered a failure of traditional means. The Court reasoned that the definition of “juvenile delinquent” in the Family Court Act excludes those who are criminally responsible for their conduct by reason of infancy unless the case is removed from a criminal court. The Court rejected the presentment agency’s argument for concurrent jurisdiction, clarifying that while Penal Law § 30.00(3) mentions infancy as a defense, § 30.00(2) expressly eliminates this defense for juvenile offenders. Regarding the designated felony act provisions, the Court explained that these provisions remain relevant for cases transferred from criminal court and for offenses that are designated felonies but do not give rise to juvenile offender status (where infancy defense is still available). Allowing the District Attorney to initially charge a juvenile offender in Family Court would circumvent the legislative directive to have juvenile offenses criminally prosecuted except where a court finds removal appropriate. The Court quoted from Matter of Vega v Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 543, 551, stating that youngsters accused of certain criminal activities are now “automatically prosecuted within the adult criminal justice system unless there exist certain special circumstances warranting more lenient treatment and transfer to the Family Court.”

  • In re Luis R., 89 N.Y.2d 1043 (1997): Prior Felony Findings for Designated Felony Act Determinations

    In re Luis R., 89 N.Y.2d 1043 (1997)

    Family Court Act § 301.2(8)(vi) requires only two prior felony findings by the court to classify an act as a designated felony act, and does not impose a sequentiality requirement demanding separate sentencing on each earlier conviction before commission of the latest offense.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether two prior felony findings, consolidated in a single Family Court order with sentencing on the same day, satisfy the requirements of Family Court Act § 301.2 (8)(vi) for determining a designated felony act. The Court of Appeals held that the statute requires only two prior findings, not sequential sentencing. The court distinguished the Family Court Act from Penal Law provisions requiring sequentiality for enhanced punishment, emphasizing the remedial and rehabilitative purposes of the Family Court Act and the discretion afforded to Family Court.

    Facts

    A 15-year-old appellant committed drug-related transactions on February 5, 1995, which, if committed by an adult, would constitute felonies. Prior to this, on April 27 and July 20, 1994, the appellant had committed acts that would also constitute felonies if committed by an adult. Both 1994 felony findings were consolidated in a single Family Court order, and the appellant was sentenced for both offenses on the same day, August 18, 1994.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court found that the appellant committed acts constituting felonies based on the February 5, 1995 transactions. The Family Court further found that, based on the two prior felony findings from 1994, the appellant had committed a “designated felony act” and sentenced him accordingly. The Appellate Division affirmed the Family Court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Family Court Act § 301.2 (8)(vi) requires sequential sentencing on two prior felony findings, meaning that a juvenile must be separately sentenced on each earlier conviction before commission of the latest offense, in order for an act to be classified as a designated felony act.

    Holding

    No, because unlike Penal Law § 70.08, Family Court Act § 301.2 (8)(vi) explicitly requires only two findings of prior felonies, a requirement that was fully satisfied in this case, and the Family Court Act’s remedial and rehabilitative purpose would be undermined by requiring full disposition of prior findings before they could count toward a designated felony act.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Morse, which read a sequentiality requirement into Penal Law § 70.08 for enhanced punishment of persistent violent felony offenders. The Court reasoned that unlike the Penal Law provision, Family Court Act § 301.2 (8)(vi) explicitly requires only two findings of prior felonies. The Court emphasized that the Family Court Act is not part of a single system of related general provisions indicative of a settled policy like the Penal Law provisions considered in Morse.

    The Court also highlighted the discretion afforded to Family Court to determine whether a restrictive placement is necessary for a designated felony offender under Family Ct Act § 353.5, a discretion not available under the Penal Law recidivist statutes. Furthermore, the Court considered the remedial and rehabilitative purposes of the Family Court Act, noting that requiring full disposition of prior findings before they could count toward a designated felony act would undermine these purposes, especially given the limited time juveniles are subject to the Family Court Act (until age 16).

    The court stated, “Unlike Penal Law § 70.08, Family Court Act § 301.2 (8) (vi) explicitly requires only two findings of prior felonies, a requirement that was fully satisfied here.” It further explained the purpose of the Act, stating, “As evidenced by the present case, the time it would take for a juvenile to have such findings reach disposition could limit the effectiveness of any recidivist measures.”