New York Law Review

Tag: DES Exposure

  • Wetherill v. Eli Lilly & Co., 89 N.Y.2d 506 (1997): Discovery of Injury Under CPLR 214-c

    89 N.Y.2d 506 (1997)

    Under CPLR 214-c (2), the statute of limitations in a toxic tort case begins to run when the plaintiff discovers the primary condition on which the claim is based, not when the plaintiff connects the condition to a specific cause.

    Summary

    Susan Wetherill sued DES manufacturers, claiming injuries from her mother’s DES use during pregnancy. Her action, filed in 1992, followed years of reproductive issues, including miscarriages and a diagnosis of a T-shaped uterus. The key issue was whether the statute of limitations began when she knew of her conditions or later, when she suspected a DES link. The Court of Appeals held that the statute began when Wetherill knew of her injuries, regardless of when she linked them to DES. The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(4) specifically addresses delays in discovering the cause, and the legislative intent was to address the discovery of the injury itself, not its cause. Thus, the action was time-barred.

    Facts

    Susan Wetherill experienced several reproductive health issues, including dysplasia (diagnosed in 1978/1979), multiple miscarriages (1980/1981, 1984, 1986), a T-shaped uterus (diagnosed in 1987), and an incompetent cervix (diagnosed after a preterm delivery in 1988). She first learned of DES and its potential impact on daughters of users around March 1988 through a conversation with her sister. She overheard a physician mention that her medical history revealed “classic symptoms of DES” in late 1989.

    Procedural History

    Wetherill commenced action in August 1992. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding it time-barred. The Appellate Division reversed, stating the statute of limitations began when the plaintiff discovered her symptoms were attributable to a third party. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, dismissing the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “discovery of the injury” under CPLR 214-c (2) occurs when the plaintiff discovers the symptoms or when the plaintiff connects those symptoms to a non-biological cause (i.e., exposure to a harmful substance)?

    Holding

    No, the “discovery of the injury” under CPLR 214-c(2) occurs when the plaintiff discovers the symptoms or manifestations of the injury itself, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the cause of the injury because CPLR 214-c(4) provides a specific mechanism for extending the statute of limitations when the cause of the injury is discovered later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR 214-c(4) anticipates situations where a plaintiff is aware of the injury but not its cause, providing an extension under certain conditions. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that CPLR 214-c(4) only applies when the precise toxic substance is unknown, but not when the very fact of a non-natural cause is unknown, stating, “discovery that a plaintiff’s symptoms were attributable to an injury inflicted by an outside force is the same as ‘discovery of the cause of the injury’ within the meaning of CPLR 214-c (4), and the plaintiff’s proposed distinction is illusory.” The court emphasized that CPLR 214-c was enacted to address the harshness of prior case law where claims were barred before the harm was even discovered. The legislature intended to focus on the discovery of the physical condition, not its non-organic etiology. The Court stated, “The goal of the Legislature in adopting CPLR 214-c was to ‘provide relief to injured New Yorkers whose claims would otherwise be dismissed for untimeliness simply because they were unaware of the latent injuries until after the limitations period had expired.’” The dissent argued the majority’s interpretation removed the factual inquiry into the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence, replacing it with an objective standard. The dissent also pointed out that the majority effectively required plaintiffs to sue before potential defendants were identified. The court countered that “if the interpretation and rationale advanced by the dissent were to prevail, the date for commencing an action under CPLR 214-c (2) would depend on such fortuitous circumstances as the medical sophistication of the individual plaintiff and the diagnostic acuity of his or her chosen physician.”

  • Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 797 (1991): Pre-Marital Injury Bars Loss of Consortium Claim

    Anderson v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 N.Y.2d 797 (1991)

    A cause of action for loss of consortium does not exist if the tortious conduct and resulting injury to the spouse occurred before the marriage.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued several manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES), asserting a derivative claim for loss of consortium based on injuries allegedly suffered by his wife due to her in utero exposure to the drug before their marriage. The defendants were granted summary judgment because the wife’s exposure and resultant injuries occurred before the marriage. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a claim for loss of consortium requires the injury to occur during the marriage, not before. The court rejected arguments that the discovery statute of limitations (CPLR 214-c) or the revival statute altered this fundamental requirement.

    Facts

    Plaintiff’s wife was allegedly injured in utero by exposure to diethylstilbestrol (DES), a drug manufactured by the defendants. The wife’s exposure to DES and the resultant injuries to her reproductive system occurred before she married the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently commenced an action against the DES manufacturers, asserting a derivative cause of action for loss of consortium, claiming that his wife’s injuries negatively impacted their marital relationship.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not recover for loss of consortium because the wife’s injuries predated the marriage. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a cause of action for loss of consortium exists where the tortious conduct and resulting injury to the spouse occurred prior to the marriage.

    Holding

    No, because consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception, not upon some guarantee that the marital partners are free of any preexisting latent injuries.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent, stating that “a cause of action for loss of consortium does not lie if the alleged tortious conduct and resultant injuries occurred prior to the marriage.” The court reasoned that the rationale underlying this rule is not limited to situations where the injuries to the spouse are manifest at the time of the marriage. The court emphasized that consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuation of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception, and not a guarantee that marital partners are free of preexisting latent injuries. The court quoted the Appellate Division: “Consortium represents the marital partners’ interest in the continuance of the marital relationship as it existed at its inception (see, Millington v Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 NY2d 498, 504-505), not upon some guarantee that the marital partners are free of any preexisting latent injuries” (158 AD2d 91, 94). The court dismissed the plaintiff’s arguments that the enactment of CPLR 214-c (the new discovery Statute of Limitations) dictated a different result, noting that CPLR 214-c was aimed at removing procedural barriers to recovery for DES injuries, not at expanding the basis for liability. Similarly, the court rejected reliance on the revival statute (L 1986, ch 682, §4), stating that the provision merely revived certain time-barred claims without creating any new causes of action. The court highlighted the distinction between expanding access to recovery versus expanding the basis for liability, maintaining the established principle that loss of consortium claims are predicated on injuries sustained during the marital relationship.