Tag: Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.

  • Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980): Intervening Negligence and Foreseeability in Proximate Cause

    Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980)

    When the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence; if the intervening act is extraordinary, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of the defendant’s negligence, it may be a superseding cause which breaks the causal nexus.

    Summary

    Felix Contracting Corp. was installing a gas main, and Derdiarian, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured when a driver who had an epileptic seizure crashed into the worksite, causing boiling enamel to spill on him. Derdiarian sued Felix, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety measures. The New York Court of Appeals held that the issue of proximate cause was properly submitted to the jury because the driver’s negligence was a foreseeable consequence of the unsafe work site. The court emphasized that the precise manner of the accident need not be foreseen, only the general risk of injury resulting from the negligence.

    Facts

    Felix Contracting Corp. was hired to install a gas main. Bayside Pipe Coaters, Derdiarian’s employer, was a subcontractor. Derdiarian was working at the site when James Dickens, who had epilepsy and failed to take his medication, suffered a seizure while driving. Dickens’ car crashed through a single wooden barricade at the worksite and struck Derdiarian, causing him to be covered in boiling hot enamel. Plaintiff’s expert testified that accepted safety methods were not used and that a proper barrier would have prevented the car from entering the excavation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Queens County, entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Derdiarian. The Appellate Division affirmed. Felix Contracting Corp. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission, on a certified question from the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s negligent failure to provide adequate safety precautions at a construction site was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, when an intervening act of a third party (a driver having a seizure) directly caused the injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the intervening act of Dickens losing control of his vehicle was a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by Felix’s negligent failure to maintain a safe work site. An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated, “Depending upon the nature of the case, a variety of factors may be relevant in assessing legal cause. Given the unique nature of the inquiry in each case, it is for the finder of fact to determine legal cause, once the court has been satisfied that a prima facie case has been established.” The court reasoned that the failure to safeguard the excavation site created a risk that a driver might negligently enter the worksite and injure a worker. It stated that the fact that the driver’s negligence contributed to the accident does not automatically absolve Felix from liability. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449, the court noted that the precise manner of the accident need not be foreseen, as long as the general risk and character of the injuries are foreseeable. The court distinguished the case from situations where the intervening act is independent and divorced from the original negligence, providing *Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car* as an example where the defective trunk of a rental car was merely the occasion for a subsequent, unrelated act of negligence. The court concluded that the jury could have found that a foreseeable, normal, and natural result of Felix’s negligence was the injury of a worker by a car entering the improperly protected work area.

  • Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980): Establishing Proximate Cause When an Intervening Act is Foreseeable

    Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980)

    An intervening act will not serve as a superseding cause, relieving a defendant of liability, where the intervening act is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.

    Summary

    Derdiarian, a construction worker, suffered severe injuries when struck by a car after the driver, Schmidt, experienced an epileptic seizure and lost control of the vehicle at a construction site. Derdiarian sued Felix Contracting, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety measures at the work site. The New York Court of Appeals held that Felix Contracting was liable because Schmidt’s loss of control, while an intervening act, was a foreseeable consequence of the negligent failure to provide adequate barriers. The court emphasized that the key question for proximate cause is the foreseeability of the *type* of harm, not the specific mechanism by which it occurs.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Derdiarian was employed as a construction worker by a company other than Felix Contracting. Felix Contracting was responsible for a highway excavation. Derdiarian was working at the site when a car driven by Schmidt, who was known to have epilepsy, crashed into the work site after Schmidt suffered a seizure. There were minimal safety barriers at the construction site, consisting of only a single flagman and several traffic cones. Derdiarian sustained severe injuries as a result of the accident.

    Procedural History

    Derdiarian sued Felix Contracting. At the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the trial court reserved decision on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court granted both the motion to dismiss and a motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of evidence. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the trial court erred in both dismissing the complaint and setting aside the verdict. Felix Contracting appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the intervening act of Schmidt losing control of his vehicle due to an epileptic seizure was a superseding cause that relieved Felix Contracting of liability for its negligence in failing to provide adequate safety measures at the construction site.

    Holding

    No, because the risk that a vehicle would enter the work site and cause injury was foreseeable given the inadequate safety measures; therefore, the intervening act did not break the chain of causation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the distinction between an intervening act and a superseding cause. An intervening act is a cause that comes into play after the defendant’s initial negligence. However, the defendant is not relieved of liability if the intervening act is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. The court stated, “Where the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence.”

    The court found that it was foreseeable that a vehicle could enter the construction site if inadequate barriers were in place. While Schmidt’s specific medical condition was not necessarily foreseeable, the general risk of a driver losing control of a vehicle was. The court stated, “That the driver was negligent, or even reckless, does not change the fact that the contractor’s negligence in failing to provide adequate safety measures was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s injuries.” The court reasoned that the precise manner of the accident need not be foreseen; it is sufficient that the general type of harm was foreseeable. The court concluded that the issue of proximate cause was properly submitted to the jury, and the jury’s finding that Felix Contracting’s negligence was a proximate cause of Derdiarian’s injuries was supported by the evidence.