New York Law Review

Tag: Depraved Indifference Murder

  • People v. Gallagher, 83 N.Y.2d 98 (1994): Jury Instruction Error During Deliberations Requires Reversal

    People v. Gallagher, 83 N.Y.2d 98 (1994)

    When a trial court provides an erroneous jury instruction on a material point of law, and the error is corrected only after deliberations have begun, a reversal is required if it is impossible to determine whether the jury was influenced by the initial erroneous instruction.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that an erroneous jury instruction regarding inconsistent counts, corrected only after deliberations had begun, warranted a new trial. The initial misinstruction, coupled with the jury’s specific question indicating confusion about the charges, created uncertainty about whether the jury’s verdict was based on a correct understanding of the law. The Court emphasized that correcting an error after deliberations requires explicit withdrawal of the incorrect instruction to ensure the jury isn’t still influenced by it.

    Facts

    Following a shooting at a party, the defendant was charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder under a theory of acting in concert, as well as weapons possession charges. The verdict sheet instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter (a lesser included offense of intentional murder) before considering depraved indifference murder. During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification of the charges and whether they could convict on both manslaughter and depraved indifference murder. The court initially incorrectly stated that they could, then later provided a corrected verdict sheet without explicitly retracting the earlier misstatement. After further deliberations and reinstruction, the jury convicted the defendant of depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defense appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were flawed and confusing, particularly regarding the inconsistent counts of intentional manslaughter and depraved indifference murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an erroneous jury instruction on inconsistent counts, corrected after deliberations have begun, requires reversal when it is impossible to determine if the jury was influenced by the initial error.

    Holding

    Yes, because there is no way to determine if the jury continued to be influenced by an erroneous instruction on a material point after deliberations had begun. The correction of the charge after deliberation began did not ensure the jury deliberated with a complete and accurate understanding of the applicable law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that CPL 300.40(5) requires the court to instruct the jury that if it renders a verdict of guilty on one inconsistent count, it must render a verdict of not guilty on the other. While the trial court eventually provided a corrected verdict sheet, the initial misinstruction, compounded by the jury’s explicit question indicating confusion, created doubt. The Court reasoned that correcting an error after deliberations requires an explicit withdrawal of the incorrect instruction. Citing Smulczeski v City Ctr. of Music & Drama, 3 NY2d 498, the Court stated: ” ‘[t]o obviate an erroneous instruction upon a material point, it must be withdrawn in such explicit terms as to preclude the inference that the jury might have been influenced by it’ ” (quoting Chapman v Erie Ry. Co., 55 NY 579, 587). Because the jury’s question suggested they may have already decided the defendant was guilty of intentional manslaughter under the original verdict sheet, the Court found it impossible to determine the basis for the jury’s verdict, thus necessitating a reversal.

  • People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638 (1993): Extreme Emotional Disturbance and Depraved Indifference Murder

    82 N.Y.2d 638 (1993)

    The affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance cannot be used to mitigate a charge of depraved indifference murder in New York.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder for killing his acquaintance. He argued that the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance should apply to mitigate the charge, similar to intentional murder. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plain language of the Penal Law does not allow for this defense in cases of depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that while historically, “heat of passion” could mitigate both intentional and depraved mind murder, the modern statute explicitly limits the extreme emotional disturbance defense to intentional murder charges. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no basis to extend the defense beyond the statute’s clear language.

    Facts

    Delphi Cox was found murdered in her apartment. The defendant, after spending the afternoon and evening smoking crack cocaine and drinking beer with Cox, stabbed and strangled her. He then stole and sold her belongings for more drugs. He was charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried in a New York State court. The trial court instructed the jury that extreme emotional disturbance could mitigate intentional murder to manslaughter but refused to extend the instruction to the depraved indifference murder charge. The jury acquitted the defendant of intentional murder and manslaughter but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance can be used to mitigate a charge of depraved indifference murder under Penal Law § 125.25(2).

    Holding

    No, because the plain language of Penal Law § 125.25 only allows the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance to mitigate a charge of intentional murder, not depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the explicit wording of Penal Law § 125.25, which defines different types of murder but only includes the extreme emotional disturbance defense in the section concerning intentional murder. The court rejected the defendant’s historical argument that “heat of passion” had always been a mitigating defense to depraved indifference murder, clarifying that under prior New York statutes, heat of passion was an element of manslaughter, not a defense to murder. The court also distinguished between “heat of passion” and “extreme emotional disturbance,” noting that the latter embodies a more sophisticated understanding of mental trauma and does not negate intent, unlike the former. The court stated, “The opportunity opened for mitigation [by the extreme emotional disturbance defense] differs significantly from the traditional heat of passion defense.” The court emphasized that extending the defense to depraved indifference murder would require a policy choice by the Legislature, which had not been made. Finally, the court found that not including the affirmative defense in the depraved mind murder statute did not raise concerns about due process, because the People remain responsible for proving the fundamental elements of mens rea and actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt.

  • People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989): Defining “Depraved Indifference” in Homicide

    People v. Roe, 74 N.Y.2d 20 (1989)

    “Depraved indifference to human life,” as an element of murder, requires conduct that is so wanton, deficient in a moral sense of concern, and devoid of regard for the life or lives of others as to equal in blameworthiness intentional murder.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of a 15-year-old juvenile offender for depraved indifference murder. The defendant, while playing a game of “Polish roulette,” shot and killed his best friend’s 13-year-old brother with a shotgun he loaded, despite knowing some shells were live ammunition. The court found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s reckless conduct evinced a depraved indifference to human life, meeting the standard for murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2). The dissent argued that the evidence only supported a conviction for manslaughter, as the defendant’s actions, while reckless, did not demonstrate the extreme callousness required for depraved indifference murder.

    Facts

    The 15-year-old defendant invited two younger boys, including the 13-year-old brother of his best friend, to his home. The boys examined the defendant’s weapons collection. The defendant then retrieved a 12-gauge shotgun and asked the victim to retrieve shells, some live and some dummy rounds, from his bedroom. The defendant loaded the shotgun with four shells, knowing that two were live. Standing 10 feet away from the other boys, the defendant exclaimed, “Let’s play Polish roulette. Who’s first?” He pointed the shotgun, pulled the trigger, and shot the victim in the chest, killing him. Immediately after the shooting, the defendant expressed remorse and directed one of the boys to call an ambulance.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney presented the evidence to a Grand Jury, seeking a depraved indifference murder charge. The Grand Jury complied, and the defendant was tried without a jury, convicted of depraved indifference murder as a juvenile offender. The defendant appealed the conviction arguing insufficient evidence to support the depraved indifference element.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s conduct in playing “Polish roulette” with a loaded shotgun, resulting in the death of the victim, constituted conduct “evincing a depraved indifference to human life” sufficient to support a conviction for murder under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2)?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s reckless actions, in the context of the circumstances, demonstrated a sufficiently wanton disregard for human life to be considered equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder and, thus, constituted depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that to satisfy the element of “depraved indifference to human life”, the defendant’s conduct must be “so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to render him as culpable as one whose conscious objective is to kill.” The court emphasized that the focus should be on the objective circumstances of the act, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The court cited prior cases where depraved indifference was found, such as firing a gun multiple times in a crowded bar or continuously beating a young child. The court distinguished this case from simple recklessness, stating that it involved a higher level of culpability. The fact that the defendant loaded a shotgun with live ammunition, pointed it at another person, and pulled the trigger during a game of “Polish roulette” demonstrated the required depraved indifference. The Court dismissed the dissent’s argument that the defendant’s post-shooting remorse negated depraved indifference, stating that the focus must remain on the defendant’s actions immediately surrounding the shooting. The court found no reason to disturb the trial court’s findings. The dissent argued that the defendant’s conduct, while reckless, did not demonstrate the extreme callousness required for depraved indifference murder, especially considering his age and immediate remorse following the shooting. The dissent further criticized the admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s prior handling of firearms, arguing that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

  • People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541 (1986): Justification as a Defense to Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. McManus, 67 N.Y.2d 541 (1986)

    Justification is a defense to depraved indifference murder, and when evidence supports the defense, the prosecution must disprove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    McManus was convicted of depraved indifference murder for firing a rifle into a group, fatally wounding one. He argued he shot to scare them off as they were robbing his companion. At trial, he requested a justification charge for the depraved indifference murder count, but the court refused, stating justification requires intent, incompatible with depraved indifference. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding justification is a valid defense to depraved indifference murder, and the prosecution must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt when the defense is raised.

    Facts

    McManus and a friend were approached by five males, one of whom put a gun to the friend’s stomach. McManus ran, and upon looking back, saw his friend being robbed and beaten. The group chased McManus to his home where he retrieved a rifle. The group then began assaulting McManus’ friend again. McManus fired the rifle, hitting one of the group members.

    Procedural History

    McManus was indicted for intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on justification for both counts. The court instructed on justification for intentional murder but refused for depraved indifference murder. The jury acquitted McManus of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether justification is a legally cognizable defense to the charge of depraved indifference murder, and whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on justification with respect to the depraved indifference murder count.

    Holding

    Yes, because justification does not make a criminal act lawful, but rather, renders the use of force lawful under certain circumstances, negating criminality altogether. The People have the burden of disproving justification beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that justification, under Penal Law Article 35, affirmatively permits the use of force under certain circumstances, rendering the conduct lawful, not merely excusing it. The defense applies to any offense involving the use of force, regardless of the defendant’s mental state. The court stated, “[i]n any prosecution for an offense, justification is available” (Penal Law § 35.00). The court rejected the argument that depraved indifference murder, by definition, cannot be justified, stating that this begs the question by assuming the criminality of the use of force. If the conduct is justified, it cannot be the basis of any crime. The court noted that “[i]f the conduct is justified, it simply cannot be the basis of depraved indifference murder or any other crime.” The court emphasized that if any reasonable view of the evidence would permit a fact finder to decide the conduct was justified, an instruction on the defense must be given. “Under such circumstances, refusal to charge that the People must disprove the alleged justification is reversible error.”

  • People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839 (1984): Depraved Indifference Murder and Accessorial Liability

    People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839 (1984)

    A defendant can be convicted of depraved indifference murder as an accomplice under Penal Law § 20.00, even if they did not fire the fatal shot, provided they acted with the required mental culpability and in concert with the shooter.

    Summary

    Brathwaite was convicted of depraved indifference murder and felony murder for his role in a grocery store robbery where three people, including one of his accomplices, died in a shootout. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating Brathwaite’s conviction for depraved indifference murder and consecutive sentences for felony murder. The court held that the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Brathwaite acted with depraved indifference, even though it wasn’t proven he fired the fatal shot, and that the felony murder sentences could run consecutively because they resulted from separate acts.

    Facts

    Brathwaite and three others robbed a grocery store. Brathwaite held a gun to a clerk’s head while another accomplice held a gun to a second clerk. Two other men pointed guns at the owner and a third clerk. As Brathwaite took money from the register, the owner yelled, “Call the police.” A shootout ensued, with Brathwaite firing shots toward the owner and a clerk. The owner, a clerk, and one of Brathwaite’s accomplices (Gray) died from gunshot wounds. Brathwaite claimed he was at a bar with his girlfriend during the incident.

    Procedural History

    Brathwaite was convicted in the trial court of depraved indifference murder and two counts of felony murder. He received consecutive sentences for the felony murder convictions and a concurrent sentence for the depraved indifference murder conviction. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the conviction for depraved indifference murder and ordering the felony murder sentences to run concurrently. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the original convictions and sentences, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant can be convicted of depraved indifference murder when a co-perpetrator is killed during the commission of an armed robbery, even if the defendant did not fire the fatal shot.

    2. Whether, under Penal Law § 70.25, sentences for two felony murder convictions must run concurrently when the deaths occurred during a single transaction but resulted from separate acts.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because if the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to find that a defendant acted “with the mental culpability” required for depraved indifference murder, he may be found guilty of such a charge under Penal Law § 20.00, even if he didn’t fire the fatal shot.

    2. No, because although the deaths occurred during a single transaction (the robbery), they resulted from separate “acts,” and neither death was a material element of the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a defendant can be held liable for depraved indifference murder as an accomplice if they acted with the required mental culpability, regardless of whether they fired the fatal shot. The court found sufficient evidence of Brathwaite’s prior planning and active participation in the “furious and wanton shoot-out” to support the jury’s finding of guilt. The jury instructions stated that the People had to prove that either Brathwaite or his accomplice knew of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death and consciously disregarded that risk, showing a great deviation from reasonable conduct. The circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct had to “evince a depraved indifference to human life” and be “so wanton, so deficient in moral sense and concern, so devoid of regard for the life or the lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal responsibility… as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.” Because the defense did not object to this charge, the conviction was proper.

    Regarding the felony murder sentences, the Court held that Penal Law § 70.25(2) did not require concurrent sentences because the deaths of the owner and the clerk resulted from separate acts. The Court emphasized that the deaths were not caused by the same shot and that neither death was a material element of the other.

  • People v. Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d 971 (1984): Sufficiency of Evidence for Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. Fenner, 61 N.Y.2d 971 (1984)

    Evidence of multiple shots fired at a group of people running away is sufficient to present a question for the jury as to whether the defendant evinced a depraved indifference to human life.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, upholding the defendant’s conviction for depraved indifference murder. The court held that the evidence presented—the number of shots fired, the number of people targeted, and their attempts to flee—sufficiently established a question for the jury regarding the defendant’s depraved indifference to human life. The court also found that the jury was properly charged on the definition of “depraved indifference”. An argument concerning the reliability of information from a citizen informant was deemed unpreserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant fired multiple shots at a group of people who were running towards the door of a poolroom, attempting to escape from him. The defendant was subsequently charged and convicted of depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish a question for the jury concerning whether the defendant evinced a depraved indifference to human life.

    2. Whether the argument that the defendant’s statements should have been suppressed due to the unestablished reliability of a citizen informant was preserved for review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the number of shots fired, the number of persons fired at, and the fact that they were running away were sufficient to present a question for the jury concerning whether the defendant evinced “a depraved indifference to human life”.

    2. No, because the issue of reliability was not properly raised in the defendant’s motion papers or during the hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the circumstances of the shooting, while perhaps not as egregious as in other cases (e.g., People v. Register), were sufficient to allow a jury to determine whether the defendant demonstrated a depraved indifference to human life. The court emphasized that the jury was instructed to find the defendant’s conduct “beyond being reckless * * * so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.” The court emphasized that because there was enough evidence, and the jury was properly instructed, the conviction had to stand.

    Regarding the defendant’s argument about suppressing his statements, the court found it unpreserved because the reliability of the citizen informant was not properly challenged in the initial motion or during the hearing. The court cited People v. Weston and People v. Jenkins to support its position that a peripheral reference during argument is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.

  • People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407 (1974): Establishing Proximate Cause in Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407 (1974)

    In criminal law, a defendant’s actions are a sufficiently direct cause of death if the ultimate harm is reasonably foreseeable as being related to those actions, even if an intervening act contributes to the death.

    Summary

    Kibbe and Krall robbed an intoxicated man, Stafford, and abandoned him on a rural roadside in near-zero temperatures, without his glasses, shoes, or coat. Stafford was subsequently struck and killed by a passing truck. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendants’ murder conviction, holding that their actions were a sufficiently direct cause of Stafford’s death because it was reasonably foreseeable that abandoning him in such a state would lead to his death, regardless of the intervening act of the truck driver.

    Facts

    Defendants Kibbe and Krall were drinking with George Stafford at a bar where Stafford was visibly intoxicated and displaying large sums of money. The defendants decided to rob Stafford. They offered him a ride, drove him to a remote location, robbed him, and forced him out of the car, taking his money, shoes, coat and eyeglasses. Stafford was left on the side of a dark, rural highway in near-zero temperatures, wearing only his shirt and trousers, which were pulled down around his ankles. About 30 minutes later, a passing truck struck and killed Stafford. The truck driver testified he had little time to react to Stafford who was sitting or lying in the road.

    Procedural History

    Kibbe and Krall were convicted of murder, robbery, and grand larceny. They appealed their murder convictions, arguing that the truck driver’s actions were an intervening cause that relieved them of responsibility for Stafford’s death. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the actions of the defendants in abandoning an intoxicated and partially unclothed man on a dark, rural road in freezing temperatures were a sufficiently direct cause of his death when he was subsequently struck by a motor vehicle, such that the defendants could be held liable for murder.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendants’ actions were a sufficiently direct cause of Stafford’s death. The ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable, and no supervening wrongful act occurred to relieve the defendants from the directly foreseeable consequences of their actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the standard for causation in criminal cases is higher than in civil cases. The court stated that the defendants’ conduct must be a cause of death sufficiently direct to meet the requirements of criminal law. However, the court clarified that the ultimate harm does not need to be intended by the actor to establish criminal liability. Rather, it suffices if the ultimate harm should have been foreseen as reasonably related to the accused’s actions. The court found that the defendants engaged in a despicable course of action by leaving a helplessly intoxicated man without his eyeglasses in a position from which he could not extricate himself, especially given his state of undress and the sub-zero temperatures. The court reasoned that Stafford’s only alternative was the highway, which, given his condition, clearly foreboded the probability of his death. The court noted that under the conditions surrounding the truck driver’s operation of his vehicle, no supervening wrongful act occurred to relieve the defendants from the directly foreseeable consequences of their actions. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury’s determination that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants’ actions caused the death of another person, satisfying the requirements of Penal Law § 125.25(2). The court cited People v. Kane, 213 N.Y. 260, underscoring that negligent or improper medical treatment does not necessarily sever the causal connection between the initial wound and death. In conclusion, the court emphasized that the defendants’ actions put Stafford in a position of extreme danger, making his death a foreseeable consequence. As the court stated, the issue is whether the defendants’ conduct “was a cause of death sufficiently direct as to meet the requirements of the criminal, and not the tort, law.” The court ultimately answered in the affirmative.