New York Law Review

Tag: Depraved Indifference Murder

  • People v. Maldonado, 24 N.Y.3d 48 (2014): Depraved Indifference and High-Speed Chases

    People v. Maldonado, 24 N.Y.3d 48 (2014)

    Evidence of a defendant’s attempt to avoid collisions during a high-speed chase negates the element of depraved indifference required for a murder conviction, even if the conduct is reckless and results in a fatality.

    Summary

    Jose Maldonado was convicted of depraved indifference murder after a high-speed police chase resulted in the death of a pedestrian. Maldonado stole a minivan and led police on a five-minute chase through Brooklyn, during which he ran red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road, and sped through traffic. He struck and killed a pedestrian. At trial, Maldonado argued that his actions, while reckless, did not demonstrate the depraved indifference to human life required for a murder conviction. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree, holding that Maldonado’s attempts to avoid collisions indicated he did not possess the required mental state for depraved indifference murder.

    Facts

    Maldonado stole a minivan and led police on a high-speed chase through a mixed commercial-residential area in Brooklyn. During the chase, Maldonado ran multiple red lights, drove on the wrong side of the road, and weaved through traffic at speeds well above the speed limit. He narrowly avoided hitting a pedestrian at one point. Maldonado then struck and killed a woman in a crosswalk. After hitting the pedestrian, Maldonado continued to flee, again driving on the wrong side of the road, until he crashed into a parked car. After his arrest, Maldonado admitted to stealing the minivan and driving recklessly but stated he tried to avoid hitting people and cars and expressed remorse.

    Procedural History

    Maldonado was charged with depraved indifference murder, manslaughter, and other related crimes. At trial, he moved to dismiss the depraved indifference murder charge, arguing that the evidence only supported a charge of recklessness. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted Maldonado of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Maldonado acted with depraved indifference to human life, as required for a conviction of murder in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 125.25(2), given his attempts to avoid collisions during the high-speed chase.

    Holding

    No, because Maldonado’s attempts to avoid hitting other vehicles indicated that he did not possess the utter disregard for human life necessary for a depraved indifference murder conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that depraved indifference requires an utter disregard for the value of human life, a mental state distinct from recklessness. The court stated that “[a] person who is depravedly indifferent is not just willing to take a grossly unreasonable risk to human life—that person does not care how the risk turns out.” The court found that Maldonado’s actions of swerving to avoid collisions demonstrated a concern for the safety of others, which is inconsistent with depraved indifference. The court distinguished this case from People v. Heidgen, where defendants drove long distances in the wrong direction without attempting to avoid collisions. The court noted that Maldonado’s driving, although reckless, was characterized by attempts to mitigate the risk to others, bringing it closer to the facts in People v. Prindle, where the court reduced a depraved indifference murder conviction to manslaughter. The court rejected the argument that Maldonado’s looking in the rearview mirror before hitting the victim demonstrated depraved indifference, stating it was a manifestation of his desire to evade police, not a total disregard for human life. The court concluded that allowing the depraved indifference charge in this case would risk that such a charge be brought in every high-speed chase case, which is not the intent of the law. The court ruled that the evidence only supported a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree, which requires recklessness but not the higher mental state of depraved indifference.

  • People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Depraved Indifference Murder Requires Proof of Culpable Mental State

    People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires proof of a culpable mental state, and is not established where the evidence points to an intentional killing.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of depraved indifference murder for fatally shooting Lee after an altercation. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, vacating the depraved indifference murder conviction and dismissing that count of the indictment. The Court held that the evidence presented, which indicated Martinez obtained a gun and fired multiple shots at close range after chasing Lee, was inconsistent with depraved indifference murder, which requires a culpable mental state distinct from intent to kill. The court remitted for resentencing and granted the People leave to present a charge of manslaughter to a new grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant Martinez, a drug dealer, argued with Lee, a prospective drug buyer. The argument escalated into a physical fight. Martinez retrieved a gun, chased Lee into a building, and fired four or five shots at him. Lee died from a gunshot wound to the chest, and a bystander was also wounded when Lee attempted to use him as a shield.

    Procedural History

    Martinez was indicted on charges of intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, assault, and weapons offenses in 1991. He was a fugitive until 1995, was tried, and the trial court denied Martinez’s motion to dismiss the depraved indifference murder count. The jury acquitted Martinez of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Appellate Division Justice granted Martinez leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish Martinez’s guilt of depraved indifference murder.
    2. Whether the defendant adequately preserved the argument that a blatantly intentional killing cannot constitute depraved indifference murder.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the evidence was insufficient.
    2. Yes, the defendant adequately preserved his argument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that its jurisprudence on depraved indifference murder had evolved, shifting from an objective degree-of-risk standard to requiring a culpable mental state. The court noted its prior holding in People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006), which explicitly overruled People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983) and People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373 (2002), clarifying that “depraved indifference to human life” is a culpable mental state. The court emphasized that intent to kill and depraved indifference are incompatible states of mind. A point-blank shooting, the court stated, is ordinarily not considered depraved indifference murder. The court found Martinez’s actions inconsistent with depraved indifference, which requires indifference to the result. The court also found that Martinez adequately preserved his argument by moving to dismiss the depraved indifference murder count at trial, arguing that the evidence pointed to intentional conduct rather than reckless disregard.

  • People v. Gause, 18 N.Y.3d 386 (2012): Double Jeopardy and Implied Acquittal in Inconsistent Verdicts

    People v. Gause, 18 N.Y.3d 386 (2012)

    When a jury is presented with inconsistent charges (intentional murder and depraved indifference murder) and convicts on one, that verdict implies an acquittal on the other, barring retrial on the latter under double jeopardy principles, even without an explicit acquittal.

    Summary

    Gause was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed this conviction due to insufficient evidence and ordered a new trial for intentional murder. Gause was then convicted of intentional murder. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second trial violated double jeopardy. Because the first jury had the opportunity to convict on either intentional or depraved indifference murder, its conviction on the latter implied an acquittal on the former. Since these crimes are inconsistent, a guilty verdict on one necessitates a not-guilty verdict on the other.

    Facts

    Following a dispute, Gause and an accomplice followed the victim. The accomplice shot the victim, and Gause struck the victim with a metal pole. The victim died from his injuries. Gause was charged with intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, and intentional assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that they could only convict Gause of one of the murder charges. The jury convicted Gause of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence for depraved indifference murder, dismissed that charge, and ordered a new trial on the intentional murder charge. Gause was convicted of intentional murder in the second trial, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing the law of the case. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether double jeopardy bars retrial on an intentional murder charge after the defendant was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder, where the jury was instructed to consider the charges in the alternative and could only convict on one.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the first jury had a full opportunity to return a verdict on both inconsistent charges, and its conviction on depraved indifference murder impliedly acquitted Gause of intentional murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions protect against being tried twice for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Quoting In re Nielsen, the court noted the principle of “implied acquittal,” where a failure to convict when conviction was possible suggests acquittal. The court found that the first jury had the opportunity to convict on intentional murder but convicted on depraved indifference murder instead. It emphasized that intentional murder and depraved indifference murder are inconsistent charges under New York law: “guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other” (citing People v. Gallagher, 69 NY2d 525, 529 [1987]). The court reasoned that because the jury sought clarification on both charges and then convicted on depraved indifference murder, they necessarily rejected the intentional murder theory. Therefore, the retrial on the intentional murder charge was barred by double jeopardy. The court distinguished People v. Jackson, 20 NY2d 440 (1967), noting that it didn’t involve inconsistent counts where guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other. The court concluded that the indictment must be dismissed because no charges remain unconsidered.

  • People v. Matos, 19 N.Y.3d 471 (2012): Depraved Indifference Requires Utter Disregard for Human Life

    People v. Matos, 19 N.Y.3d 471 (2012)

    To be convicted of depraved indifference murder, the defendant must have exhibited an utter disregard for the value of human life, demonstrating a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not.

    Summary

    Matos was convicted of depraved indifference murder of her 23-month-old son after he died from severe abuse inflicted by her partner. She delayed seeking medical attention for approximately seven hours, during which time she attempted to treat him with home remedies and conceal evidence of the abuse. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Matos possessed the culpable mental state of depraved indifference because she took some actions to help the child, albeit inadequately, and eventually called for help. The Court emphasized that depraved indifference requires an utter disregard for human life, which was not demonstrated here.

    Facts

    Carmen Molina severely beat Matos’s 23-month-old son, breaking his leg and ribs, and injuring his liver and lungs, causing severe internal bleeding.

    When Matos returned home, Molina told her the child was injured.

    Matos knew her son was “hurt bad” but claimed she didn’t think he was seriously injured or would die.

    Instead of calling for help, Matos bought ACE bandages at Molina’s urging and created a makeshift splint.

    She gave her son ibuprofen and put him to bed.

    Approximately seven hours later, after finding the child bleeding, Matos called the police from a neighbor’s phone.

    The child was pronounced dead at the hospital.

    Matos initially gave false accounts to the police before admitting Molina had beaten the child and that she helped hide evidence.

    Procedural History

    Matos and Molina were indicted on murder and child endangerment charges.

    Molina pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.

    Matos was tried before a jury and acquitted of traditional depraved indifference murder but convicted of depraved indifference murder of a child and child endangerment.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that Matos possessed the culpable mental state of depraved indifference to human life to warrant a conviction for depraved indifference murder of a child under Penal Law § 125.25(4).

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate that Matos acted with an utter disregard for her son’s life. Her actions, while insufficient, indicated some concern for his well-being, negating the required mental state for depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that depraved indifference requires an utter disregard for human life, a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not, quoting People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006).

    The Court distinguished this case from situations where the defendant’s actions demonstrated a complete lack of concern for the victim’s life.

    While Matos’s behavior was egregious and fell far short of expected parental conduct, it did not rise to the level of “wickedness, evil or inhumanity” required for depraved indifference murder, quoting People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202 (2005).

    The Court noted that Matos’s actions, such as splinting her son’s leg and giving him ibuprofen, however inadequate, indicated some level of care, contrasting this with a complete failure to act.

    The Court stated that while the evidence clearly shows that defendant “cared much too little about her child’s safety, it cannot support a finding that she did not care at all”, quoting People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348 (2011).

    The Court also clarified that attempting to conceal the crime does not prove indifference to it, quoting People v. Lewie, 17 N.Y.3d 348 (2011).

    The Court acknowledged that the legislative intent behind Penal Law § 125.25(4) when first enacted was to define the factual setting in which the risk-creating conduct occurred, rather than to define “depraved indifference” as a culpable mental state.

    However, the Court noted that in the wake of People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006), the court is constrained to interpret “depraved indifference” as a culpable mental state which must be proven by the People.

  • People v. France, 12 N.Y.3d 769 (2009): Depraved Indifference Murder Requires Culpable Mental State

    People v. France, 12 N.Y.3d 769 (2009)

    Depraved indifference murder requires the defendant to possess a culpable mental state, demonstrating a wanton disregard for human life that equates to intentional conduct, and the objective circumstances alone are insufficient to establish the crime.

    Summary

    France was convicted of depraved indifference murder after a high-speed chase resulted in a fatal collision. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the conviction to second-degree manslaughter, finding the evidence insufficient to prove depraved indifference. The court clarified that depraved indifference murder requires a culpable mental state, not just objectively reckless conduct, and the evidence only supported a finding of recklessness sufficient for manslaughter.

    Facts

    Defendant France and another individual were stealing snowplows when police arrived. France sped away in a van, leading to a police chase. The chase ended when France crashed the van into another vehicle, killing a passenger. At trial, France moved for a trial order of dismissal, arguing insufficient evidence of depraved indifference.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied France’s motion for a trial order of dismissal. The jury was instructed on both depraved indifference murder and second-degree manslaughter. France was convicted of depraved indifference murder. On appeal, France conceded the evidence supported second-degree manslaughter but challenged the depraved indifference murder conviction. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order by reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder, or whether it only supported a conviction for second-degree manslaughter.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence was insufficient to prove that France acted with depraved indifference to human life, a culpable mental state that equates to intentional conduct. The evidence, at most, supported a finding of recklessness, which is sufficient for manslaughter.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Feingold, which established that depraved indifference murder requires a culpable mental state. The court distinguished this case from People v. Gomez, where the defendant’s actions demonstrated a total disregard for human life. In this case, the court found that France’s actions, while reckless, did not demonstrate the wanton, morally deficient, and inhuman attitude necessary to prove depraved indifference. The court stated that, “depraved [indifference] murder is distinguishable from manslaughter, not by the mental element involved but by the objective circumstances in which the act occurs” (People v. Register, 60 NY2d at 278), however, was explicitly overruled by People v Feingold (7 NY3d 288 [2006]), where we held for the first time that “depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state” (7 NY3d at 294). The court held that the evidence was only sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of second-degree manslaughter, which requires only a showing of recklessness. At most, “the evidence adduced was legally sufficient to support a finding of reckless manslaughter.”

  • People v. Swinton, 17 N.Y.3d 520 (2011): Depraved Indifference Requires Utter Disregard, Not Intent to Harm

    People v. Swinton, 17 N.Y.3d 520 (2011)

    A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires proof of the defendant’s utter disregard for the value of human life, demonstrating a willingness to act not with the intent to harm, but simply not caring whether grievous harm results.

    Summary

    Swinton was convicted of depraved indifference murder for the death of a woman he struck in the head, covered with a plastic bag, and left on a roof. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the evidence legally insufficient to support the conviction. The Court clarified that depraved indifference murder, in one-on-one killings, requires evidence of utter depravity, uncommon brutality, inhuman cruelty, and indifference to the victim’s plight. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s actions, while culpable, did not demonstrate the required mental state for depraved indifference murder, as the evidence suggested intentional actions rather than a reckless disregard for human life.

    Facts

    The victim was found dead on the roof of an apartment building, partially clothed, with a plastic bag knotted around her neck. An autopsy revealed blunt impact to the head and compression of the neck and chest. Swinton, a building resident, was seen on video entering his apartment with the victim. Later, he was seen carrying her body to the roof. Beads matching the victim’s necklace were found in Swinton’s apartment, along with bloodstains. Swinton admitted to smoking crack with the victim and hitting her in self-defense during an altercation. He gave conflicting statements about whether she was alive when he put the bag over her head to stop the bleeding and moved her body.

    Procedural History

    Swinton was indicted for second-degree depraved indifference murder and first-degree manslaughter. At trial, he moved to dismiss the depraved indifference murder charge based on legal insufficiency, citing People v. Suarez. The trial court denied the motion. The jury convicted Swinton of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Swinton acted with the mental state required for depraved indifference murder.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate the required “utter disregard for the value of human life” necessary for a depraved indifference murder conviction; rather, the evidence pointed towards intentional, albeit potentially reckless, conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that depraved indifference murder should rarely be charged in one-on-one killings, as most killings are better addressed by statutes defining intentional murder or manslaughter. The Court cited People v. Suarez, noting that depraved indifference applies where intent to harm or kill is absent, but acts are marked by uncommon brutality coupled with indifference to the victim’s plight. The Court explained that in People v. Feingold, they explicitly stated that “depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state.” The Court stated, “Under both Suarez and Feingold, the decisive question is whether defendant acted with the state of mind required by the depraved indifference murder statute—‘an utter disregard for the value of human life—a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not’”. The Court found the evidence legally insufficient to establish depraved indifference murder because the facts did not establish “torture or a brutal, prolonged” course of conduct. The defendant’s actions, the Court concluded, did not rise to the level of “utter depravity, uncommon brutality and inhuman cruelty” and “indifference to the victim’s plight” required for a depraved indifference murder conviction. The court found that Swinton’s actions, while culpable, lacked the necessary mental state of complete indifference to human life, warranting reversal of the depraved indifference murder conviction.

  • People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266 (2010): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Jury Instructions on Homicide Counts

    People v. Baker, 14 N.Y.3d 266 (2010)

    A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that their attorney’s actions were not based on strategic decisions and prejudiced their right to a fair trial; furthermore, depraved indifference murder of a child and first-degree manslaughter are not inherently inconsistent charges, allowing a jury to consider both.

    Summary

    Avery Baker was convicted of depraved indifference murder of a child, manslaughter, and endangering the welfare of a child after the death of his girlfriend’s 20-month-old son. Baker appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney agreed to allow the jury to consider all three homicide counts simultaneously, rather than in the alternative, and that the prosecutor improperly used visual aids during summation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that defense counsel’s actions were not unreasonable or prejudicial, and the use of demonstrative aids during summation did not violate Baker’s right to a fair trial.

    Facts

    Baker lived with his girlfriend and her son, Jordan. On September 12, 2006, Baker slammed Jordan into his crib. On September 15, 2006, upset over crayon markings, Baker spanked, shook, and threw Jordan to the floor headfirst. Jordan became limp and stopped breathing. Baker delayed calling 911. Jordan died from severe head trauma. Baker initially gave inconsistent statements to the police but eventually admitted to the abuse.

    Procedural History

    Baker was indicted on multiple charges, including depraved indifference murder, manslaughter, and endangering the welfare of a child. The trial court dismissed one count of endangering the welfare of a child. A jury convicted Baker on the remaining charges. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether defense counsel’s agreement to allow the jury to consider all three homicide offenses (depraved indifference murder of a child, manslaughter in the first degree, and manslaughter in the second degree) simultaneously, rather than in the alternative, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

    2. Whether the prosecutor’s use of a projector to display the legal definitions of depraved indifference and recklessness during summation denied Baker a fair trial.

    3. Whether Baker’s right to a public trial was violated when the court excluded the mother of Baker’s children from the trial because she was a potential witness.

    Holding

    1. No, because depraved indifference murder of a child and first-degree manslaughter are not inconsistent counts, and defense counsel may have had a strategic reason for allowing the jury to consider second-degree manslaughter simultaneously.

    2. No, because the trial judge sufficiently instructed the jury that the judge was responsible for setting forth the law, and the content of the slides accurately described the legal definitions.

    3. No, because the court has discretion to exclude potential witnesses from the courtroom, and it was reasonable to believe that the witness might be called as a rebuttal witness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The court noted that a single error can constitute ineffective assistance, but only if it is egregious and prejudicial. The court distinguished between inconsistent counts (which must be charged in the alternative) and counts that can be considered simultaneously. The court relied on People v. Trappier, stating that “[a] defendant could certainly intend one result—serious physical injury—while recklessly creating a grave risk that a different, more serious result—death—would ensue from his actions.” The Court found that depraved indifference murder of a child and first-degree manslaughter were not inconsistent because the former requires recklessly creating a grave risk of serious physical injury or death, while the latter requires an intent to cause physical injury. The court also suggested a tactical reason for defense counsel’s decision regarding second-degree manslaughter: it may have provided the jury with an option for leniency. The Court found that the trial judge’s instructions were sufficient to dispel any possibility that the jury would give precedence to or place undue emphasis on the prosecutor’s use of the demonstrative slides during summation. Finally, the Court held that excluding a potential witness from the courtroom was within the trial court’s discretion.

  • People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008): Retroactivity of Feingold’s Depraved Indifference Standard on Direct Appeal

    People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008)

    When a defendant’s conviction for depraved indifference murder is pending on direct appeal and the defendant has adequately challenged the sufficiency of the proof, the appellate court must apply the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference established in People v. Feingold.

    Summary

    Jean-Baptiste was convicted of depraved indifference murder under the then-prevailing objective standard. While his appeal was pending, People v. Feingold redefined depraved indifference murder to require a culpable, subjective mental state. Jean-Baptiste argued that his conviction should be overturned because the evidence did not establish the mental state required under Feingold. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Feingold standard applies to cases on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, distinguishing direct appeals from collateral attacks on final convictions. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to reduce the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree.

    Facts

    Michael Weekes attended a party and had a confrontation with a man nicknamed “Back-shot,” striking him with a bottle. Jean-Baptiste, Back-shot’s cousin, then pulled a handgun and shot Weekes in the chest at close range, killing him.

    Procedural History

    Jean-Baptiste was initially charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. The first trial resulted in an acquittal on the intentional murder charge but a hung jury on the depraved indifference charge. A superseding indictment added manslaughter in the first degree. At the second trial, the jury convicted Jean-Baptiste of depraved indifference murder under the objective standard established in People v. Register. The Appellate Division reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction, finding insufficient evidence of the mental state required under the new standard established in People v. Feingold, and reduced the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference murder articulated in People v. Feingold applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a depraved indifference murder conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because cases on direct appeal are generally decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made, and a failure to apply the new standard would result in a conviction even though one of the elements of the crime had not been established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on common-law principles that cases on direct appeal should be decided based on the current state of the law. The Court cited People v. Hill, which held that a new definition of “knowingly” applied to cases pending on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that failing to apply the new, more demanding standard for depraved indifference murder would result in a person being found guilty even if an essential element of the crime (depraved indifference mental state) was not proven.

    The Court distinguished Policano v. Herbert, which held that the new depraved indifference standard did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court emphasized the critical difference between cases on direct appeal and those where the appellate process had concluded. Applying the new standard to cases on direct appeal is consistent with ensuring convictions are based on legally sufficient evidence, while retroactive application to final convictions would create a flood of collateral attacks, disrupting the finality of judgments.

    The Court also addressed the People’s argument that the legal sufficiency should be measured by the jury charge given at trial. The Court noted that defense counsel made a specific motion for a trial order of dismissal based on legal insufficiency, anticipating the change in law brought by Feingold, therefore preserving the issue for appeal.

    Ultimately, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division, stating that, in applying the Feingold standard, “the evidence failed to establish that defendant acted with the requisite mental state of depraved indifference to human life.” The Court further concurred that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

  • Suarez v. Byrne, 10 N.Y.3d 523 (2008): Double Jeopardy and Retrial After Reversal of Depraved Indifference Murder

    10 N.Y.3d 523 (2008)

    A defendant can be retried for intentional manslaughter after the reversal of a conviction for depraved indifference murder, even if the jury in the first trial was instructed on intentional manslaughter but did not reach a verdict on that charge due to an “acquit-first” instruction and a guilty verdict on the depraved indifference murder charge.

    Summary

    Santos Suarez was convicted of depraved indifference murder, but acquitted of intentional murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction for legal insufficiency. The key issue was whether Suarez could be retried for first-degree (intentional) manslaughter, a charge presented to, but not decided by, the jury in the first trial. The Court of Appeals held that retrial was permissible. Because the jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the intentional manslaughter charge due to an erroneous “acquit first” instruction, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on that charge.

    Facts

    Suarez stabbed his girlfriend, Jovanna Gonzalez, resulting in her death. He was charged with second-degree murder (intentional and depraved indifference), first-degree manslaughter (intentional), and weapon possession. At trial, he claimed self-defense and extreme emotional disturbance, denying intent. The judge instructed the jury to consider intentional murder first, then depraved indifference murder. He told them not to consider intentional manslaughter unless they acquitted Suarez of depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The jury acquitted Suarez of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The trial court did not record a verdict on the manslaughter charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Suarez’s actions did not constitute depraved indifference murder as a matter of law, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to address the appropriate remedy. On remittitur, the Appellate Division held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial for intentional manslaughter. Suarez appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions bar Suarez from being retried for intentional manslaughter after his acquittal of intentional murder and the reversal of his conviction for depraved indifference murder on legal insufficiency grounds.

    Holding

    1. No, because the jury did not have a full opportunity to consider the intentional manslaughter charge in the first trial due to the trial court’s instructions and the jury’s verdict on the depraved indifference murder charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clauses prevent a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction. However, retrial is permissible after a successful appeal, except when the reversal is based on legal insufficiency of the evidence for that specific charge. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Biggs, where retrial was barred because the jury was never given an opportunity to consider the charge in question. Here, the jury was instructed on intentional manslaughter, but because of the trial court’s “acquit-first” instruction regarding the depraved indifference murder charge, the jury never reached it. The Court analogized the situation to a mistrial, where retrial is typically permissible. The Court also emphasized that its reversal was based on legal insufficiency of the evidence for depraved indifference murder, but not for intentional manslaughter. Therefore, retrial for intentional manslaughter did not violate double jeopardy principles. The Court also determined that depraved indifference murder and intentional manslaughter are not inconsistent counts, as a defendant can recklessly cause a grave risk of death while intentionally inflicting serious physical injury, citing People v. Trappier. The court stated, “While different theories have been advanced to support the permissibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the implications of that principle for the sound administration of justice.”

  • People v. Johnson, 10 N.Y.3d 875 (2008): Appellate Division’s Duty to Assess Evidence Elements in Weight Review

    10 N.Y.3d 875 (2008)

    When conducting a weight of the evidence review, the Appellate Division must assess the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury.

    Summary

    Fatin Johnson was convicted of depraved indifference murder for shooting his brother. The Appellate Division affirmed, rejecting his challenge to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that while the Appellate Division considered witness credibility (essential for weight of evidence review), it failed to explicitly assess the evidence in light of the elements of depraved indifference murder as charged to the jury. The Court emphasized the importance of the Appellate Division demonstrating that it properly considered the elements of the crime when conducting a weight of the evidence review.

    Facts

    Fatin Johnson and his brother, Amir, argued over money. Amir advanced towards Fatin, who then shot Amir in the back from approximately 30 feet away, resulting in Amir’s death. Two eyewitnesses observed the altercation and identified Fatin as the shooter in a lineup and at trial. One eyewitness pleaded with Johnson not to shoot as children were nearby. Johnson was later indicted for intentional and depraved indifference murder, as well as weapon possession charges.

    Procedural History

    A jury acquitted Johnson of intentional murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon but convicted him of depraved indifference murder and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting. The dissenting justices argued that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence, suggesting a reduction to second-degree manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division, in performing a weight of the evidence review, adequately assessed the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division’s opinion did not demonstrate it assessed the evidence in light of the elements of depraved indifference murder as charged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that sufficiency and weight of the evidence reviews are distinct analyses. While the Appellate Division considered witness credibility, a factor essential for weight of the evidence review, its opinion did not explicitly state that it assessed the evidence in light of the elements of the crime, and did not otherwise offer confirmation that it did so. The Court cited People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007), where it explored the requisites for sufficiency and weight of the evidence review. The Court stated that the Appellate Division must manifest its weight of the evidence review power in a writing. Because the Appellate Division’s opinion did not explicitly state that it assessed the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury, the Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division for such an assessment. The court stated, “Here, the court considered the credibility of witnesses…as is essential for a weight of the evidence review. But having chosen to manifest its weight of the evidence review power in a writing, the Appellate Division does not say that it assessed the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury, and the opinion does not otherwise offer confirmation that, in fact, it did.”