New York Law Review

Tag: Defective Indictment

  • People v. D’Amico, 96 N.Y.2d 687 (2001): Validity of SCI After Dismissal of Defective Indictment

    People v. D’Amico, 96 N.Y.2d 687 (2001)

    A defendant may waive indictment and plead guilty to a superior court information (SCI) after the dismissal of a defective indictment covering the same charges, even without a formal order granting the People leave to re-present the case to a grand jury, provided the court’s intent to allow re-presentation is clear.

    Summary

    D’Amico was arrested for selling heroin. After indictment, plea negotiations began, but the court realized D’Amico’s name was missing from the indictment’s body. The court dismissed the indictment, and D’Amico then waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a superior court information (SCI) on the same terms. He failed to complete drug treatment, received the agreed-upon sentence, and appealed, arguing his SCI waiver was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the SCI was permissible because the original indictment was entirely defective and the court’s intent to allow re-presentation to a grand jury was evident, even without a formal order.

    Facts

    Defendant D’Amico and Evelyn Ramirez were arrested for selling heroin to an undercover officer.
    They were charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds and criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.
    After indictment, D’Amico and the prosecution negotiated a plea deal.
    The court realized that D’Amico’s name was in the caption but not in the body of the indictment itself, naming only Ramirez who acted “in concert with another.”

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment due to the defect.
    The defendant then pleaded guilty to a superior court information (SCI).
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s waiver of indictment and guilty plea to a superior court information (SCI) is invalid when entered after the court dismissed a defective indictment covering the same charges, but without explicitly granting the People leave to re-present the case to the grand jury?

    Holding

    No, because the indictment was defective and dismissed entirely, and the court’s intent to allow re-presentation was evident, making prosecution by SCI permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Boston and People v. Casdia, where a valid indictment (or part of one) was still pending when the defendant waived indictment and pleaded to an SCI. Here, the indictment was entirely defective and was dismissed. The Court noted that “Criminal Procedure Law § 195.10 (2) (b) provides that with the consent of the prosecutor, a defendant may waive indictment and be prosecuted by SCI in ‘the appropriate superior court, at any time prior to the filing of an indictment by the grand jury’” but found that this rule didn’t apply as the prior indictment was void.

    The court emphasized that it was clear to everyone that the omission of D’Amico’s name was a clerical error and that the case would have to be re-presented to a grand jury. The Court found that the trial court implicitly authorized re-presentation, noting that “[a]s the Appellate Division correctly noted, the court obviously authorized representation even though it did not formally order it, considering that both sides agreed to dispose of the case by SCI on the agreed terms. No magic words were required.” The Court found that requiring a formal order in this scenario would be an unnecessary formality.

  • People ex rel. Zakrzewski v. Fay, 18 N.Y.2d 403 (1966): Double Jeopardy and Defective Indictments

    People ex rel. Zakrzewski v. Fay, 18 N.Y.2d 403 (1966)

    A trial on an indictment that alleges all the elements of a lesser-included offense places the defendant in jeopardy, and a subsequent indictment for the same conduct, even with an added element to charge a higher offense, violates double jeopardy protections.

    Summary

    Zakrzewski sought habeas corpus relief, arguing his sentence as a multiple felony offender was based on a prior conviction obtained in violation of double jeopardy. He was initially tried for first-degree burglary under an indictment that was later dismissed due to a perceived defect. A new indictment, alleging the same conduct with a minor addition, led to a conviction for second-degree burglary. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial indictment, even if defective for first-degree burglary, was sufficient for second-degree burglary, thus the first trial placed him in jeopardy. The subsequent indictment and conviction were deemed unconstitutional, warranting his release.

    Facts

    In 1924, Zakrzewski was indicted for first-degree burglary, accused of breaking into an occupied dwelling at night with another person, Jaruszewski. The jury found him guilty as charged. The district attorney moved to dismiss the indictment before sentencing, claiming it lacked the essential allegation that Zakrzewski was “assisted by a confederate actually present,” a requirement for first-degree burglary under the applicable penal law. The court dismissed the indictment and resubmitted the case to the grand jury.

    Procedural History

    The grand jury issued a second indictment, adding the clause that each defendant had been “aided by the other actually present.” Zakrzewski pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary under this second indictment, which later served as the basis for his treatment as a second felony offender. In 1955, he was convicted of third-degree burglary and sentenced as a multiple felony offender. He then sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing the second indictment and conviction were void due to double jeopardy. The lower courts denied the writ, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial on an indictment, which may be defective in alleging all elements of the highest crime charged but does allege all elements of a lesser included offense, places a defendant in jeopardy, thus barring a subsequent trial on a new indictment alleging the same conduct with a slightly different element.

    Holding

    Yes, because the original indictment contained all the elements of second-degree burglary, the crime for which Zakrzewski was ultimately convicted, and the trial had progressed to a verdict. Therefore, double jeopardy applied, and the second indictment was unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevents a person from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Jeopardy attaches when a defendant is put on trial before a competent court with a sufficient indictment. However, if the initial indictment is so defective that it couldn’t support a conviction, a retrial is permissible. Here, the court reasoned that the original indictment contained all essential elements of second-degree burglary, even if it lacked a critical element of first-degree burglary. The court cited People v. Oliver, 3 N.Y.2d 684, where an indictment for first-degree burglary lacking the element of “nighttime” was deemed sufficient for second-degree burglary. The court stated, “The misnomer in describing the offense as in the first instead of the second degree is of no moment”. Since the initial trial progressed to a verdict on an indictment sufficient for second-degree burglary, Zakrzewski was in danger of a valid judgment. Permitting the district attorney to terminate proceedings after a verdict and procure a new indictment violated double jeopardy. The court concluded that the second indictment was unconstitutional, and the conviction based on it could not serve as a predicate for multiple felony offender status, entitling Zakrzewski to release.