New York Law Review

Tag: Deeds

  • Knapp v. Hughes, 19 N.Y.3d 672 (2012): Conveyance of Land Bordering Water Includes Submerged Land Absent Clear Intent Otherwise

    Knapp v. Hughes, 19 N.Y.3d 672 (2012)

    A conveyance of land on a pond or stream includes the land under the pond or stream to the center of the water, unless a contrary intention is made clear in the deed.

    Summary

    This case addresses the question of whether a deed conveying waterfront property also conveys the land under the adjacent water. The plaintiffs and defendants both claimed ownership of the submerged land under Perch Pond adjacent to the defendant’s property. The dispute arose from the interpretation of two 1973 deeds. The Court of Appeals held that the conveyance of land along the edge of a pond includes the land under the water to the center of the pond, unless the deed contains a clear expression to the contrary. The Court emphasized the importance of clear and express language to reserve rights to underwater land, clarifying that using terms like “edge” or “shore” is insufficient.

    Facts

    The defendants owned land on the shore of Perch Pond. Plaintiffs and defendants both claimed ownership of the land under the pond adjacent to the defendants’ waterfront land, thus disputing the rights to use that part of the pond. The Furlanos previously owned both the waterfront and submerged land. In 1973, the Furlanos conveyed land “along the waters [sic] edge of Perch Pond” and “along the edge of Perch Pond” to the defendants’ predecessors in title. In 1993, the Furlanos conveyed their remaining waterfront property to the plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, including “all remaining lands of Grantors.” The plaintiffs argued the 1973 deeds only conveyed the land next to the water, not under it, and therefore the submerged land passed to them via the 1993 deed.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the defendants from using the underwater property. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the 1973 deeds set the boundaries at the “edge” of the pond, touching the land but not the water. The Court of Appeals granted defendants leave to appeal, bringing up for review the Appellate Division’s earlier order on summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a deed conveying land “along the edge” of a pond includes the land under the water to the center of the pond, absent an express reservation of rights to the underwater land in the deed.

    Holding

    Yes, because New York law presumes that a conveyance of land on a pond includes the land under the pond to the center of the water unless a contrary intention is clearly expressed in the deed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established New York law and policy considerations to support its holding. The court cited precedent, including Gouverneur v National Ice Co., Seneca Nation v Knight, Stewart v Turney, and White v Knickerbocker Ice Co., to highlight the longstanding rule that a purchase of waterfront property is presumed to include the adjacent underwater land. The Court emphasized that the value of small, non-navigable lakes and ponds is mainly in their relation to the adjacent lands, supporting the presumption that a grantor intends to convey ownership under the water. The Court stated, “If the grantor desires to retain his title to the land . . . underneath the water the presumption must be negatived by express words or by such a description as clearly excludes it from the land conveyed.”

    The Court addressed inconsistent dictum in prior cases that suggested small changes in the words of a deed could create a reservation of underwater rights. The Court explicitly rejected these dictums, stating that “The effect of a grant should not turn on such fine distinctions as that between ‘side’ and ‘edge.’” To make a plain and express reservation of rights to underwater land, a grantor must do more than use the word “edge” or “shore” in a deed; they must clearly state that the land under water is not conveyed. The Court found no intention to withhold underwater lands in the Furlanos’ 1973 conveyance. Therefore, the deeds were read as conveying such land to the center of the pond to the defendants’ predecessors.

  • People v. Levitan, 49 N.Y.2d 87 (1980): Forgery Requires False Making, Not Just False Statements

    People v. Levitan, 49 N.Y.2d 87 (1980)

    Forgery requires that the instrument be falsely made, completed, or altered by someone other than the ostensible maker or drawer, or their authorized agent; a false statement within a genuinely made instrument does not constitute forgery.

    Summary

    Molly Levitan and her co-defendants were convicted of forgery for signing and recording deeds transferring property they did not own, intending to purchase the land at a subsequent tax sale. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that Levitan’s actions did not constitute forgery because she signed her own name and made no pretense of being someone else. The court emphasized that forgery requires a false making of the instrument itself, not merely false statements within a genuinely executed document. The key distinction is between an instrument falsely made and one containing misrepresentations unrelated to the maker’s identity.

    Facts

    Molly Levitan signed three deeds purporting to transfer real property in Suffolk County to entities controlled by her co-defendants. She signed her own name to each deed, both as an individual grantor and as an officer of corporate grantors. Neither Levitan nor the corporate grantors held title to the property. The true owners were unknown, and the land was not on the tax assessment rolls. The defendants intended to record the deeds, have the land placed on the assessment rolls under their entities’ ownership, default on taxes, and then purchase the land at a tax sale.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of forgery in the second degree at the trial court level. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the indictments.

    Issue(s)

    Whether signing and recording deeds transferring property the signer does not own, under the signer’s own name and without pretense of being another, constitutes forgery in the second degree under New York Penal Law § 170.10?

    Holding

    No, because forgery requires a false making, completing, or altering of a written instrument, meaning the instrument is made by someone other than, or unauthorized by, the ostensible maker; merely including false information in a genuinely made instrument does not constitute forgery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the statutory definition of forgery in the second degree, requiring a “false making, completing, or altering” of a written instrument. The court then analyzed Penal Law § 170.00, which defines these terms. A person “falsely makes” an instrument when they create a document that appears to be authentic but is not, because the ostensible maker is fictitious or did not authorize the making. Similarly, one “falsely completes” or “falsely alters” an instrument only without the authority of the ostensible maker. The court noted that traditionally, and under the current penal law, forgery requires that the actual maker be someone other than the ostensible maker or be unauthorized to act for them. The court distinguished the present case from situations where one commits forgery by signing one’s own name but in a way that deceives others into believing the signer is a third party. The court rejected the People’s argument that the true owner of the land should be considered the ostensible drawer of the deeds. Instead, the court found that Molly Levitan was both the actual and ostensible drawer. The court stated, “Actually, the ostensible drawer is the person who, from the face of the instrument, would appear to be its drawer, and not the person who in fact has the power to create such an instrument.” The court concluded that while the deeds contained false information (i.e., regarding ownership), they were not falsely made. Because Levitan signed her own name and made no pretense of being anyone else, she did not commit forgery. The court concluded: “Although the deeds may have contained false information, they were not falsely made.”