Matter of Bath and Hammondsport R.R. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 73 N.Y.2d 434 (1989)
The Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) possesses broad statutory authority under ECL 3-0305(1) to acquire land via eminent domain for any of the department’s purposes or functions, even when a specific statute relating to a particular function (like fish and wildlife management under ECL 11-2103) does not explicitly mention eminent domain.
Summary
The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the DEC Commissioner could use eminent domain to acquire land for a public fishing access site when the statute governing fish and wildlife acquisitions didn’t explicitly authorize condemnation. The Court held that ECL 3-0305(1) grants the Commissioner broad power to condemn land for any departmental purpose, including fish and wildlife management, and that the absence of specific eminent domain language in ECL 11-2103 doesn’t negate this general authority. This decision underscores the comprehensive nature of the Commissioner’s power to acquire land necessary for DEC’s functions.
Facts
The DEC proposed a fishing access site, including a boat launch and parking lot, on Keuka Lake. The proposed site was located on 3.2 acres of land owned by the Bath and Hammondsport Railroad Company. The Commissioner approved the proposal, which included condemning the railroad company’s land to establish the fishing access.
Procedural History
The Village of Hammondsport and the railroad company separately challenged DEC’s authority to condemn the land in EDPL 207 proceedings before the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division sided with the petitioners, annulling DEC’s determination, reasoning that ECL 11-2103 lacked specific authorization for acquisitions via eminent domain for public hunting and fishing grounds. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the absence of an explicit reference to eminent domain in ECL 11-2103 precludes the DEC Commissioner from exercising the eminent domain power, granted generally in ECL 3-0305, to condemn land for a public fishing purpose.
Holding
Yes, because the plain language and legislative history of ECL 3-0305(1) demonstrate that the Legislature intended to provide the Commissioner with broad condemnation power, exercisable for each of the proper functions of the Department, including fish and wildlife management.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court emphasized that statutory interpretation hinges on legislative intent. It found that ECL 3-0305(1) clearly authorizes the Commissioner to acquire “any” land for “any” departmental purpose using condemnation procedures. The Court highlighted the statute’s legislative history, noting that a 1960 amendment broadened the Commissioner’s condemnation power beyond lands and forests to encompass all departmental functions. The Court stated, “Giving the statutory language its natural and obvious meaning (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94) and the unqualified word ‘any’ its full significance as a general term… the conclusion is inescapable that ECL 3-0305 (1) is intended to be a general authorization to employ eminent domain within the full scope of the Department’s responsibilities.”
The Court rejected the argument that ECL 11-2103(1)’s omission of eminent domain implied its exclusion. It reasoned that applying rules of construction like *ejusdem generis* and *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* to restrict the Commissioner’s power would contradict the evident purpose of ECL 3-0305(1). The Court also dismissed the argument that specific eminent domain grants in other ECL provisions implied a lack of such power for fish and wildlife acquisitions, noting that such an interpretation would frustrate the Legislature’s purpose in granting the general eminent domain power in ECL 3-0305 (1). The Court concluded that the specific provisions were historical artifacts and did not limit the general power.