New York Law Review

Tag: Death penalty

  • People v. Mower, 97 N.Y.2d 239 (2002): Upholding Life Without Parole Sentence After Invalidated Death Penalty Provisions

    97 N.Y.2d 239 (2002)

    When the prosecution declines to seek the death penalty in a first-degree murder case, the sentencing authority rests with the trial court, which is authorized to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, even after a guilty plea.

    Summary

    Gordon Mower pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He later argued that the sentence was illegal because provisions of New York’s death penalty statute had been invalidated in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei, arguing that this removed the statutory basis for his sentence. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that when the prosecution does not seek the death penalty, the sentencing authority remains with the trial court, which can impose life without parole. The Court also held that Mower’s challenge to his guilty plea was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Gordon Mower was charged with the first-degree murder of his parents. The prosecution never filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. On the last day such notice could have been filed, Mower pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, resolving all outstanding charges. During the plea colloquy, Mower admitted to intentionally shooting and killing both of his parents. He also withdrew his omnibus motion, which included constitutional challenges to the first-degree murder statute.

    Procedural History

    Mower was indicted in Otsego County, New York for first-degree murder. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After Matter of Hynes v. Tomei invalidated certain plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute, Mower filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division consolidated Mower’s direct appeal and CPL 440.10 appeal, affirming the conviction and sentence. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the invalidation of CPL 220.10 (5) (e) and 220.30 (3) (b) (vii) in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei eliminated the statutory authorization for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole upon a plea to murder in the first degree.
    2. Whether Mower’s first-degree murder conviction was affected by a mistake of law because he pleaded guilty pursuant to the statutory provisions later invalidated by this Court in Matter of Hynes v. Tomei.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court’s sentencing authority is not derived from the plea provisions struck in Hynes.
    2. No, because Mower did not raise the alleged constitutional infirmity before he pleaded guilty or was sentenced.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 60.06 and § 70.00 authorize the imposition of life imprisonment without parole for first-degree murder. CPL 400.27(1) states that nothing precludes the People from determining “at any time” that the death penalty should not be sought, in which case “the court may sentence such defendant to life imprisonment without parole.” The Court interpreted the statutes to mean that if the prosecution does not pursue the death penalty, the sentencing authority remains with the trial court, which is authorized to impose life imprisonment without parole, regardless of whether the conviction is by guilty plea or jury verdict.

    The Court found Mower’s argument that his guilty plea was invalid because it was based on statutes later invalidated in Hynes to be unpreserved. Mower did not raise this issue before pleading guilty or being sentenced, and it was not the proper subject of a CPL 440.10 motion. The Court also noted that Mower had abandoned or forfeited his remaining claims. He abandoned his challenges to the validity of the first-degree murder statute and the integrity of the Grand Jury proceeding when he withdrew all pending motions. He forfeited his right to appeal his request for “heightened due process” consideration by pleading guilty.

  • People v. Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d 445 (2001): Validity of Guilty Pleas Under Unconstitutional Death Penalty Statutes

    96 N.Y.2d 445 (2001)

    A guilty plea, if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent at the time it was entered, is not automatically invalidated simply because it was made under a statute later deemed unconstitutional under *United States v. Jackson*, even if the plea was motivated by a desire to avoid the potential of the death penalty.

    Summary

    Daniel Edwards was indicted for first-degree murder and other charges, and the prosecution filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Edwards entered a plea agreement where he would plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 25 years to life and cooperation with the prosecution. After Edwards’ allocution but before sentencing, the New York Court of Appeals decided *Matter of Hynes v. Tomei*, which struck down plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute as unconstitutional under *United States v. Jackson*. Edwards moved to withdraw his plea, arguing it was invalid under *Hynes*. The County Court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, leading to this appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Edwards’ plea was valid because it was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent at the time it was entered, and subsequent judicial decisions did not invalidate it.

    Facts

    • Daniel Edwards was indicted for first-degree murder, among other charges, on May 29, 1997.
    • The prosecution filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty on January 26, 1998.
    • Edwards and the prosecution entered into a plea agreement: Edwards would plead guilty to first-degree murder in exchange for a sentence of 25 years to life and cooperation with the prosecution.
    • The prosecution agreed to withdraw the notice of intent after Edwards’ allocution but before the court’s acceptance of the plea.
    • Edwards allocuted, waiving his right to appeal except for his suppression motion, and the People withdrew the notice of intent.
    • The County Court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation.
    • On December 22, 1998, after the plea but before sentencing, the New York Court of Appeals decided *Matter of Hynes v. Tomei*, which struck down plea provisions of New York’s death penalty statute.

    Procedural History

    • County Court denied Edwards’ motion to suppress oral and written statements.
    • Edwards moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was invalid under *Matter of Hynes v. Tomei*. The County Court denied the motion.
    • The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, vacated the plea and sentence, and reinstated the notice of intent.
    • The Court of Appeals granted both the People and Edwards leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Edwards’ guilty plea to first-degree murder was invalid under Federal constitutional law because it impermissibly burdened his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, considering that it was entered under a statute with plea provisions later deemed unconstitutional in *Matter of Hynes v. Tomei*.

    Holding

    No, because under binding Supreme Court precedent, Edwards’ plea was not rendered invalid by *Jackson-Hynes*. The plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent at the time it was made, and subsequent judicial decisions did not invalidate it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    • The Court relied on *Brady v. United States*, which addressed the validity of a guilty plea under the same Federal Kidnapping Act provisions declared unconstitutional in *United States v. Jackson*. The Supreme Court in *Brady* held that absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents, a voluntary guilty plea made intelligently under the applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate the plea rested on a faulty premise.
    • The Court emphasized that *Brady* cautioned against concluding that a *Jackson* defect in a death penalty statute necessarily required invalidation of an otherwise valid guilty plea. *Jackson* prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under the defective statute, but it does not create a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas.
    • The Court distinguished cases where death sentences were imposed *after trial* under statutes violating *Jackson*, noting that in those cases, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the death sentences, but left undisturbed convictions in which the risk of death was avoided by an otherwise valid guilty plea.
    • The Court stated: “Plainly, it seems to us, *Jackson* ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not. *Jackson* prohibits the imposition of the death penalty under [the defective statute], but that decision neither fashioned a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas nor mandated a new application of the test theretofore fashioned by courts and since reiterated that guilty pleas are valid if both `voluntary’ and `intelligent’” (*Brady v. United States*, 397 US 742, 747).
    • The Court found that Edwards’ plea, even if the exclusive means by which he avoided the death penalty, did not violate his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.

  • Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33 (2000): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Plead Guilty in Capital Cases

    Francois v. Dolan, 95 N.Y.2d 33 (2000)

    A defendant in a capital murder case does not have an unqualified right to plead guilty to the entire indictment before the prosecution has completed its statutorily provided deliberative process regarding whether to seek the death penalty.

    Summary

    Kendall Francois was indicted on multiple counts of murder. Before the District Attorney decided whether to seek the death penalty, Francois attempted to plead guilty to all counts. The District Attorney opposed the plea, and the trial court refused to accept it. Francois sought a writ of mandamus to compel the court to accept his plea. The New York Court of Appeals held that mandamus did not lie because a capital defendant does not have an unqualified right to plead guilty before the prosecution has concluded its deliberation period on whether to seek the death penalty. This decision protects the District Attorney’s statutory authority to decide whether to seek the death penalty.

    Facts

    Kendall Francois was indicted on eight counts of first-degree murder, eight counts of second-degree murder, and one count of attempted second-degree assault. Francois was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Before the District Attorney filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, Francois attempted to plead guilty to the entire indictment. The District Attorney opposed the plea, and the trial court reserved decision. The District Attorney then filed a death penalty notice, and the trial court ultimately refused to accept Francois’s guilty plea.

    Procedural History

    Francois initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding at the Appellate Division, seeking mandamus to compel the County Court to “entertain” his guilty plea. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition. Francois appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether mandamus lies to compel a County Court to entertain a defendant’s offer to plead guilty to all counts of an indictment charging capital murder before the District Attorney files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and before the expiration of the statutory period for filing such notice.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant does not have an unqualified statutory right to plead guilty under these circumstances, and thus, lacks the “clear legal right” necessary for mandamus.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing a defendant to plead guilty before the District Attorney’s decision would preempt two critical powers conferred on the District Attorney by the death penalty legislation. First, the defendant could prevent the prosecution from seeking the death penalty even after a notice of intent had been filed, because there is no provision for a jury sentencing stage after a guilty plea to capital murder. Second, the defendant could preclude the District Attorney from even considering whether to seek the death penalty. The court emphasized that the District Attorney’s role and statutory rights were central to the death penalty statute. The court also applied the canon of statutory interpretation that “what is special or particular in the later of two statutes supersedes as an exception whatever in the earlier statute is unlimited or general” (East End Trust Co. v. Otten, 255 N.Y. 283, 286). The specific death penalty provisions prevailed over the general plea provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law. The court further noted the potential for an “unseemly race to the courthouse” if defendants could preempt the District Attorney’s deliberative process. The court quoted CPL 250.40 (1) stating “A sentence of death may not be imposed * * * unless * * * the people file * * * and serve * * * a notice of intent to seek the death penalty”.

  • People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499 (1973): Inevitable Discovery Exception to Exclusionary Rule

    People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499 (1973)

    Evidence obtained as a result of illegal police conduct is admissible if the prosecution proves that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered through legal means.

    Summary

    Fitzpatrick was convicted of murdering two police officers. After being apprehended in a house, he made statements (later suppressed) that led police to a gun in a closet. The trial court admitted the gun into evidence, reasoning that it would have been discovered anyway. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the “inevitable discovery” exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The court also addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty in light of Furman v. Georgia, ultimately modifying the judgment to vacate the death sentence.

    Facts

    Following a gas station robbery and the shooting of two police officers, Fitzpatrick fled in a car later found abandoned. He then forced Marie DiLapi at gunpoint to drive him to Syracuse. DiLapi informed the police. The police traced the car to Fitzpatrick, surrounded his house, and, after receiving no response, entered without a warrant. Upon entering, Fitzpatrick surrendered from a closet. After being advised of his rights (though the adequacy of the warnings was later disputed), he told police the gun was in the closet. A search of the closet revealed the gun. The police officers died from their wounds.

    Procedural History

    Fitzpatrick was indicted for murder. At a suppression hearing, the trial court ruled his oral statements inadmissible due to insufficient Miranda warnings but admitted the gun and other items found in the closet, arguing they would have been inevitably discovered. A jury found Fitzpatrick guilty. He was sentenced to death. Fitzpatrick appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the gun and other items found in the closet were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree.
    2. Whether the search and seizure of the gun violated constitutional requirements.
    3. Whether the death sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted in Furman v. Georgia.

    Holding

    1. No, because the gun would have been inevitably discovered during a lawful search.
    2. No, because the search was incident to a lawful arrest and justified by exigent circumstances.
    3. Yes, because the New York statute left the imposition of the death penalty to the jury’s discretion, violating the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Furman v. Georgia.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, citing Wong Sun v. United States, stating that evidence is not automatically inadmissible simply because it would not have been discovered “but for” illegal police actions. The relevant question is whether the evidence was obtained by exploiting the illegality or by means sufficiently distinguishable to purge the primary taint. The court adopted the “inevitable discovery” exception, noting that “evidence obtained as a result of information derived from an unlawful search or other illegal police conduct is not inadmissible…where the normal course of police investigation would, in any case, even absent the illicit conduct, have inevitably led to such evidence.” The court reasoned that the gun, used in a robbery and the shooting of two police officers, was a “prime object of any investigation,” and the closet was the most reasonable place to look for it. Therefore, a search of the closet was inevitable, regardless of Fitzpatrick’s statements.

    The court then addressed the legality of the search and seizure, dismissing the argument that the search violated Chimel v. California. The court clarified that Chimel did not disapprove of searches of the area where the arrest occurs, only searches remote in time or place. The immediate search of the closet was permissible. The court found the warrantless entry, search, and arrest justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Given the shootings, the threat to DiLapi’s life, and Fitzpatrick’s armed status, the police reasonably believed he would conceal himself, necessitating a swift search to prevent escape and protect lives.

    Finally, regarding the death sentence, the court analyzed Furman v. Georgia. While some justices in Furman viewed the death penalty as inherently cruel and unusual, the court noted that the critical point was the arbitrary and discriminatory application of the death penalty when left to the discretion of judges or juries. The New York statute (Penal Law § 125.35, subd. 5) allowed the jury discretion in imposing the death penalty; therefore, the court held that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court modified the judgment by vacating the death sentence and remitting the case for resentencing.