New York Law Review

Tag: De Minimis

  • Eastside Exhibition Corp. v. 210 East 86th Street Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 617 (2012): De Minimis Exception to Actual Partial Eviction

    18 N.Y.3d 617 (2012)

    A minimal, inconsequential retaking of leased commercial space by a landlord does not constitute an actual partial eviction warranting total rent abatement if the interference is small and has no demonstrable effect on the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the space.

    Summary

    Eastside Exhibition Corp. leased space from 210 East 86th Street Corp. to operate a movie theater. Years into the lease, the landlord installed cross-bracing between support columns, taking up 12 square feet of a 15,000-19,000 square foot space, to prepare for adding floors to the building. Eastside stopped paying rent, claiming partial eviction, and sought an injunction and rent abatement. The trial court ruled the taking was de minimis and did not justify rent abatement. The Appellate Division found an actual partial eviction but ruled damages, not abatement, were the appropriate remedy, then found no damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that such a minor intrusion did not warrant the “draconian remedy” of total rent abatement.

    Facts

    Eastside Exhibition Corp. (tenant) leased two floors from 210 East 86th Street Corp. (landlord) for a movie theater. The lease ran from 1998 to 2016.
    In 2002, the landlord installed cross-bracing between existing support columns on both floors without notice to the tenant. The cross-bracing occupied approximately 12 square feet of a 15,000 to 19,000 square foot space. The tenant claimed this altered foot traffic on the first floor and slightly diminished the second-floor waiting area. The tenant ceased paying rent, claiming partial eviction.

    Procedural History

    The tenant sued for an injunction and rent abatement. The Supreme Court initially granted a temporary restraining order. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court dismissed the tenant’s claim, finding the taking de minimis and entering judgment for the landlord for unpaid rent.
    The Appellate Division modified, holding that any unauthorized taking constituted eviction but awarded damages instead of abatement and remanded for a damages hearing. On remand, the Supreme Court found no damages. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing law of the case. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a minimal and inconsequential retaking of space that has been leased to a commercial tenant constitutes an actual partial eviction relieving the tenant from all obligation to pay rent.

    Holding

    No, because for an intrusion to be considered an actual partial eviction it must interfere in some, more than trivial, manner with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the premises; a taking of less than one-tenth of one percent of the space, so located that its absence has no measurable effect on the tenant’s use, is de minimis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the established rule that withholding rent is the proper remedy for partial eviction but distinguished cases where the intrusion is so minimal that total rent abatement is unjustified. It cited Lounsbery v. Snyder for the proposition that not every intrusion warrants full rent abatement, and damages are appropriate when there has been no substantial interference. “If it were necessary, [one] might properly invoke the application of the familiar maxim, `de minimis non curat lex’” (id. at 516). The Court reasoned that applying a full rent abatement rule to a trivial taking is inequitable, especially given modern commercial lease negotiation realities. The Court noted that the intrusion must interfere more than trivially with the tenant’s use. Because the tenant failed to demonstrate any actual damages or loss of enjoyment due to the cross-bracing, the intrusion was de minimis, and neither injunctive nor monetary relief was warranted. The court emphasized that “So far as we know, no cases actually granted a 100% rent abatement for a so called “eviction” as trivial as this one—a taking of less than one-tenth of one percent of the space, so located that its absence has no measurable effect on the tenant’s use.”

  • Wing Ming Properties (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Mott Operating Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 1021 (1992): Trespass on Air Rights and De Minimis Encroachments

    Wing Ming Properties (U.S.A.) Ltd. v. Mott Operating Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 1021 (1992)

    Encroachments on conveyed airspace are actionable as trespass, but de minimis variations and the lack of demonstrable harm can preclude injunctive or monetary relief.

    Summary

    Wing Ming Properties sued Mott Operating Corp. for trespass, alleging that new rooftop air-conditioning equipment and parapets erected by a sublessee encroached on airspace Wing Ming acquired in a 1973 conveyance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the suit, holding that while development rights were conveyed, the new structures were excluded from Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculations, thus not affecting those rights. Further, any physical encroachment on the conveyed airspace was considered de minimis, and Wing Ming failed to demonstrate any actual harm or diminution in property value resulting from the slight variations. Therefore, neither injunctive nor monetary relief was warranted.

    Facts

    In 1973, Mott, Kaplan, Chu, and Tam conveyed the airspace above a building at 5 Chatham Square in Manhattan to Wing Ming’s predecessor. Mott et al. retained the right to maintain an existing rooftop air-conditioning unit and room. Wing Ming’s predecessor intended to transfer unused development rights (FAR) to a contiguous building. In 1985, Kaplan subleased the property to the Bank of Central Asia (BCA), allowing BCA to use the roof for HVAC equipment and alter the facade. BCA removed the old equipment, installed new equipment, and built parapet walls extending over the rooftop.

    Procedural History

    Wing Ming, as successor in interest, sued for trespass. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the new rooftop air-conditioning equipment and parapets erected by BCA constituted a trespass on Wing Ming’s conveyed rooftop airspace, entitling Wing Ming to injunctive or monetary relief.

    Holding

    No, because the new rooftop structures did not affect Wing Ming’s development rights (FAR), and any physical encroachment was de minimis with no demonstrable harm. Therefore, neither injunctive nor monetary relief is warranted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts that no trespass occurred that warranted relief. The new structures were excluded from FAR calculations under New York City Zoning Resolution § 12-10, meaning Wing Ming’s development rights were unaffected. More importantly, the court found that any physical intrusion into the conveyed airspace was minimal. The court stated, “The variations between the air-conditioning unit and room existing at the time of the 1973 conveyance and the replacement unit and ducts subsequently erected by BCA, and the extent to which the newly constructed parapets rise above the elevation plane of the conveyed airspace, are de minimis at best.” The court emphasized that Wing Ming had not demonstrated that these slight variations negatively impacted its property value. This lack of demonstrated harm was crucial to the decision. Even if a technical trespass occurred, the principle of de minimis non curat lex (the law does not concern itself with trifles) applied, precluding the need for injunctive or monetary relief. The court implicitly acknowledged the conveyance of the airspace property right, but focused on the lack of substantial interference and provable damages. The court emphasized a practical approach, requiring demonstrable harm to justify legal intervention in property disputes.

  • Matter of Green v. Blum, 44 N.Y.2d 856 (1978): De Minimis Bank Accounts and Eligibility for Public Assistance

    Matter of Green v. Blum, 44 N.Y.2d 856 (1978)

    Public assistance eligibility determinations must be made in a reasonable and humane manner, considering the purpose of the Social Services Law; trivial accumulations of funds, such as small gifts or earnings deposited in children’s accounts, should not automatically disqualify an applicant.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether small sums of money in children’s bank accounts, derived from gifts and casual earnings, constitute ‘available resources’ that must be exhausted before a family can receive public assistance. The Court of Appeals held that such trivial accumulations should not be considered disqualifying resources, emphasizing the need for a reasonable and humane interpretation of the Social Services Law. The court reasoned that requiring families to deplete these nominal savings would be absurd and contrary to the law’s intent.

    Facts

    The case involves families applying for public assistance. The applicants had small sums of money deposited in their children’s bank accounts. These funds primarily consisted of small deposits, generally $5 or $10, representing birthday and holiday gifts from relatives, and earnings from the children’s casual employment.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts determined that these funds constituted available resources that had to be exhausted before public assistance could be granted. The Court of Appeals reversed that determination, holding that the funds were not available resources within the meaning of the statute or implementing regulations.

    Issue(s)

    Whether small sums of money deposited in children’s bank accounts, derived from gifts and casual earnings, constitute ‘available resources’ that must be exhausted before public assistance can be made available to the family.

    Holding

    No, because the Social Services Law’s broad humanitarian purpose does not contemplate that a person must be stripped bare of small sums representing birthday and holiday gifts or children’s earnings before applying for public assistance. Such an interpretation would be absurd and cruel and therefore unintended by the statute or regulation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Social Services Law should be interpreted and enforced in a reasonable and humane manner, aligning with its manifest intent and purpose. The court reasoned that requiring families to exhaust trivial savings before receiving assistance would be absurd. The court explicitly noted that it would be an unreasonable interpretation to require families to sell “grandfathers’ watches, family pictures, family heirlooms of nominal value, toys, bicycles and small gifts to children” before qualifying for assistance. The court found no express language in the statute or regulations suggesting such an extreme requirement was intended. The court stated that “Somewhere the line must be drawn.” The court cited prior precedent, including Matter of Dowling, Matter of Rouss, and Williams v. Williams, to support the principle that statutes should not be given unreasonable and absurd interpretations.