New York Law Review

Tag: Darden Hearing

  • People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993): Probable Cause Based on Independent Police Observation

    People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993)

    Probable cause for an arrest can be established through an officer’s independent observations, even if the initial information leading to the observation came from a confidential informant; a Darden hearing is not required if probable cause exists independently of the informant’s tip.

    Summary

    Adrion was arrested after a confidential informant provided information to the police about stolen luggage at a specific location. An officer went to the location and arrested Adrion after finding boxes. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the People could not establish probable cause without the informant’s testimony, the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the prosecution was reversed. This case stands in contrast to cases where police make independent observations that establish probable cause separate from informant information.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told the police that stolen luggage could be found in a specific location.

    A police officer went to that location and saw boxes.

    The police officer arrested Adrion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court’s decision is not included.

    The Appellate Division reinstated the prosecution.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether probable cause to arrest Adrion existed independently of the confidential informant’s information.

    Holding

    No, because the People could not establish probable cause without the testimony of the confidential informant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations where probable cause can be established by the independent observations of a police officer. The court emphasized that in this case, the officer’s actions (going to the location and seeing boxes) were directly based on the informant’s tip, and without the informant’s information, there was no independent basis for probable cause. The court compared the instant case to People v. Darden, stating that, similarly, the testimony of the confidential informant was necessary to establish probable cause. Because the People could not establish probable cause without the testimony of the confidential informant, this Court reversed the reinstatement of the prosecution by the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000): Establishes Mandatory Darden Hearing for Confidential Informants

    People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000)

    When a confidential informant’s information is essential to establishing probable cause for an arrest, a Darden hearing (an in camera examination of the informant) is mandatory unless specific exceptions apply, ensuring the informant’s existence and reliability while protecting their identity.

    Summary

    The case clarifies that a Darden hearing is a mandatory requirement, not a discretionary procedure, when a confidential informant’s information is crucial to establishing probable cause. Johnson Edwards was convicted of murder and attempted murder. His motion to suppress lineup identifications was denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying Edwards’ request for an in-camera examination of a confidential informant whose information was pivotal in establishing probable cause for his arrest. The Court emphasized the importance of verifying the informant’s existence and reliability through a Darden hearing, balancing the need to protect informant confidentiality with the defendant’s right to challenge the basis of probable cause.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told Detective Neenan that “Tony” confessed to shootings. The informant described “Tony” and provided details about the shootings, including a separate shooting of John Thomas. Subsequently, Thomas identified Johnson Edwards (the defendant) from a photo as the person who shot him. Chester Martin and other witnesses identified Edwards in a lineup as the shooter in the initial incident. Edwards was arrested based on this information and subsequently identified in a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Edwards was charged with murder, attempted murder, and weapons offenses. He moved to suppress the lineup identifications. The trial court denied the motion, finding probable cause for the arrest based on the informant’s information and the lineup results. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Edwards’ motion for an in-camera examination of the informant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Darden hearing was required.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court is required to conduct an in camera examination of a confidential informant (a Darden hearing) when the informant’s information is necessary to establish probable cause for an arrest, or whether such a hearing is discretionary.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the informant’s testimony is necessary to establish probable cause, the court must grant the defendant’s request for a Darden hearing to verify the informant’s existence and the basis of their knowledge while protecting their identity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Darden hearing requirement balances the need to protect confidential informants with the defendant’s right to challenge the basis for probable cause. The court emphasized that without a Darden hearing, a defendant’s ability to test the officer’s claim of probable cause is significantly limited, potentially thwarting efforts to challenge the officer’s credibility. The Court explicitly stated that a Darden hearing “is required ‘where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as to communications received from an informer.’ ” The Court also clarified exceptions to the Darden rule, such as when the informant cannot be located or refuses to appear due to fear of personal injury, in which case the People may establish the informant’s existence through extrinsic evidence. The Court dismissed the argument that satisfying the Aguilar-Spinelli test obviates the need for a Darden hearing, noting that the Darden rule’s primary purpose is to verify the informant’s existence, not merely the reliability of the tip. The court emphasized that, “the People are required to produce the police informant for an in camera inquiry unless they can demonstrate that the informant is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence.”

  • People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999): Necessity of Examining Informant Testimony for Probable Cause in Sealed Warrant Cases

    People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999)

    When a search warrant is based on a confidential informant’s testimony, and the warrant affidavit alone is insufficient to establish probable cause, the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the issuing magistrate to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Summary

    Serrano was convicted of robbery and homicide. Evidence against him, including photographs, was seized via a search warrant. The warrant was based on a police officer’s affidavit and a confidential informant’s testimony before the issuing judge. Because the prosecution sought to keep the informant’s identity secret, the defense was denied access to the warrant application. The suppression court denied Serrano’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the warrant affidavit alone established probable cause. The Court of Appeals held that when the warrant affidavit is insufficient on its own, the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed. The case was remitted for a new suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of killing the occupant of an apartment while robbing him. The prosecution introduced photographs showing the defendant with another suspect and holding a handgun resembling the weapon used in the crime. These photographs were seized from the defendant’s mother’s home pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant was based on a police officer’s affidavit and the testimony of a confidential informant before the issuing Justice.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The People requested a protective order sealing the warrant and affidavit to protect the informant’s identity. The suppression court held an ex parte in camera hearing and granted the protective order. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding the warrant affidavit itself established probable cause. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the suppression court erred in failing to hold a Darden-type hearing where the confidential informant would have been produced for in camera examination.
    2. Whether the suppression court erred in failing to examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the issuing Justice to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Holding

    1. No, because when the informant had appeared and testified before the magistrate who issued the search warrant, verification of the existence of the informant, and of what was told to the police, will have already been achieved and need not be duplicated before the suppression court.
    2. Yes, because the search warrant and supporting affidavit did not, by themselves, establish probable cause, and the suppression court needed the transcript of the examination of the informant in order to properly determine that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, and that CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a Darden hearing is not always required when search warrant papers are sealed, especially when the informant has already testified before the issuing magistrate. The purpose of a Darden hearing is to verify the informant’s existence and credibility, which is already achieved when the informant testifies before the magistrate. However, the Court emphasized that the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony to ensure probable cause and compliance with CPL 690.40(1), which requires the examination to be under oath and either recorded or summarized. The Court found that the warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause on its own because it lacked factual averments to determine the informant’s reliability as required by the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Court quoted People v. Griminger, stating that a warrant application must demonstrate “(i) the veracity or reliability of the source of the information, and (ii) the basis of the informant’s knowledge.” Since the affidavit did not establish the informant’s reliability, the warrant papers did not alone establish probable cause. The failure to examine the transcript and ensure compliance with CPL 690.40(1) frustrated the statute’s objectives of assuring the regularity of the application process and preserving the grounds for appellate review. The Court remitted the case for a new suppression hearing, allowing the People to present the transcript or reconstruct the informant’s testimony. If the warrant was not supported by probable cause or CPL 690.40(1) was not substantially complied with, the judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the motion to suppress granted.

  • People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993): Enforcing Darden When Informant Information is Crucial for Probable Cause

    People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993)

    When a confidential informant’s tip is essential to establishing probable cause, the prosecution must produce the informant for a Darden inquiry, even if the arresting officer observes suspicious circumstances; failure to produce the informant requires suppression of the evidence.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested after an FBI agent, acting on a confidential informant’s tip, observed them unloading stolen merchandise. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution could refuse to produce the informant for a Darden inquiry, arguing that the agent’s observations independently established probable cause. The Court held that the prosecution was obligated to produce the informant or forfeit the evidence because the informant’s tip was crucial for establishing probable cause. The Court reasoned that Darden addresses verifying the truthfulness of police testimony about a known informant, a distinct issue from assessing an anonymous tip’s reliability.

    Facts

    The Samsonite Corporation reported the theft of luggage. An FBI agent in New York was informed by the Newark office that a confidential informant stated the stolen luggage was in a Ryder truck at a specific Brooklyn address. The agent found the truck, observed defendant Grado arrive in another Ryder truck, and saw defendants unloading cartons into a garage. The agent noticed the markings on the cartons matched those of the stolen luggage. Grado provided implausible explanations regarding the goods and their destination.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted for criminal possession of stolen property and moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court ordered the People to produce the confidential informant for a potential Darden hearing. The People refused, stating the FBI would not make the informant available. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding no probable cause without the informant’s information. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People may refuse to comply with a trial court’s order to produce a confidential informant for a Darden inquiry when the arresting officer obtained confirmatory information through their own observations.

    Holding

    No, because the Darden procedure addresses the distinct problem of verifying the truthfulness of the police witness’s testimony about dealings with a known informant, ensuring the informant is not “wholly imaginary” or the communication “entirely fabricated.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between verifying an anonymous tip and verifying police testimony about a confidential informant. People v. Elwell (50 N.Y.2d 231) allows independent police observations to validate an anonymous tip by establishing its reliability and accuracy. However, Darden (34 N.Y.2d 177) addresses a different concern: ensuring the police are truthful about the existence and role of the informant. The Court emphasized that “[w]hat is at stake in Darden situations is the integrity of the proceeding itself.” The Court reasoned that even though the agent observed suspicious activity, he wouldn’t have been at that location without the informant’s tip. Therefore, the tip was crucial to establishing probable cause, necessitating a Darden inquiry. The Court rejected the argument that cross-examination was sufficient to test the officer’s credibility, reaffirming the trial court’s authority to require the informant’s production to ensure a fair proceeding. The Court stated, “[T]here is no satisfactory substitute for the production of the informant — or at least the production of extrinsic proof of the informant’s existence when the informant is demonstrably unavailable.”

  • People v. Carpenito, 80 N.Y.2d 65 (1992): Establishing Informant Existence When Informant is Unavailable Due to Fear

    People v. Carpenito, 80 N.Y.2d 65 (1992)

    When a confidential informant is legitimately unavailable due to fear, the prosecution may establish the informant’s existence through extrinsic evidence; however, the trial court retains discretion to require production of the informant if the prosecution fails to adequately demonstrate unavailability.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted on drug and weapons charges after a search warrant was executed based on information from confidential informants. The trial court ordered an in camera hearing to examine the existence of one informant (a *Darden* hearing). The prosecution failed to produce the informant, claiming fear for the informant’s safety, and offered alternative evidence to establish the informant’s existence. The trial court suppressed the evidence, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that the prosecution could use extrinsic evidence to prove the informant’s existence if the informant was genuinely unavailable due to fear, but the trial court had discretion on whether to accept that evidence.

    Facts

    Detective Burns investigated cocaine trafficking based on information from a confidential informant starting in January 1988.

    A second informant and police surveillance linked the defendant to the alleged drug network.

    On July 26, 1988, a search warrant was issued for the defendant, his wife, their residence, and vehicles.

    On July 27, 1988, the warrant was executed, and drugs, weapons, and drug paraphernalia were seized.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including drug and weapon possession.

    Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the statements of the second informant.

    The trial court ordered a *Darden* hearing to examine the informant’s existence.

    The prosecution failed to produce the informant, claiming the informant feared for their safety, and offered alternative evidence.

    The trial court granted the motion to suppress.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court should have considered alternative evidence of the informant’s existence.

    The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy when the prosecution cannot produce a confidential informant for a *Darden* hearing because the informant allegedly fears personal injury?

    Holding

    No, because it is consistent with *Darden* to permit the People to establish the existence of confidential informants through extrinsic evidence once the People have demonstrated that the informant is legitimately unavailable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a blanket exception for informants unavailable due to fear would incentivize defendants to intimidate suspected informants. The Court emphasized that the trial judge has discretion to determine if the informant’s unavailability is genuine and due to fear. If satisfied, the court can allow the prosecution to prove the informant’s existence through alternative means. However, if the prosecution fails to meet this initial threshold, the court retains the discretion to require the informant’s production.

    The Court stated, “Where, as here, the Court is convinced that the informant’s unavailability is, in fact, the result of actual fear of death or injury to the informant or his family, there is no practical reason for the exception.”

    The Court further explained the policy consideration: “Moreover, adoption of defendant’s argument would provide criminal defendants with an incentive to intimidate suspected informants in an effort to secure suppression of damaging physical evidence.”

    The Court explicitly overruled *People v. Johnson* (39 NY2d 364) to the extent that it suggested the Court of Appeals had the power to grant affirmative relief to a non-appealing party.

  • People v. Williamson, 51 N.Y.2d 762 (1980): Limits on Informant Disclosure in Criminal Cases

    People v. Williamson, 51 N.Y.2d 762 (1980)

    A defendant is not entitled to disclosure of an informant’s identity unless they make an extremely strong showing of relevance, especially when the informant’s information is marginal.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extent to which a criminal defendant is entitled to the disclosure of an informant’s identity. The Court of Appeals held that because the informant’s information identifying the defendant was marginal, and the defendant failed to properly preserve objections, there was no error in denying disclosure. The Court further addressed and dismissed the defendant’s arguments regarding merger and the jury charge on motive. The decision underscores the high bar for compelling informant disclosure and the importance of preserving legal arguments at trial.

    Facts

    An informant observed the defendant walking with a child and provided the defendant’s name and address to the police. The defendant was subsequently charged with kidnapping. Prior to trial, the defendant sought disclosure of the informant’s identity, but the request was denied. At a Darden hearing (a proceeding to determine the reliability of an informant), the defendant submitted questions to be asked of the informant, potentially seeking exculpatory information. The Trial Judge’s memorandum after the Darden hearing did not explicitly refer to those questions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of kidnapping at trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity, that the kidnapping charge should have merged with another crime, and that the jury charge regarding motive was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity, given the marginal nature of the information provided and the lack of a strong showing of relevance.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on merger.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury regarding the necessity of proving motive for the abduction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the informant’s information was marginal, and the defendant failed to make an extremely strong showing of relevance or properly object to the lack of explicit reference to his questions in the Darden hearing memorandum.

    2. No, because no crime other than kidnapping was charged.

    3. No, because although a charge that the jury could consider motive on the issues of intent and knowledge would not have been improper if requested, the defendant’s attorney simply excepted to the charge as given and made no such request, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant was not entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity because the information provided—observing the defendant walking with the child and providing his name and address—was of a marginal nature. The Court cited People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 170, stating that disclosure is not required “absent an extremely strong showing of relevance.” The Court also emphasized that the defendant did not move for disclosure or object to the Trial Judge’s memorandum, failing to preserve the issue for appeal. Regarding the merger argument, the Court noted that since no other crime was charged besides kidnapping, the motion to dismiss based on merger was properly denied, citing People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763. Finally, the Court addressed the jury charge on motive, stating that while it would not have been improper to charge that the jury could consider the defendant’s motive on the issues of his intent and knowledge that restraint of the child was unlawful, the defendant’s attorney did not request such a charge and thus did not preserve the issue for review, citing People v. Sangamino, 258 N.Y. 85 and People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of preserving objections and adhering to established legal standards regarding informant disclosure.