New York Law Review

Tag: Dangerous Mental Disorder

  • In re Francis S., 87 N.Y.2d 554 (1996): Recommitment of Insanity Acquittees & Due Process

    In re Francis S., 87 N.Y.2d 554 (1996)

    An insanity acquittee can be recommitted to a mental institution if the state proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee currently suffers from a dangerous mental disorder, even if the acquittee’s condition has temporarily stabilized due to hospitalization.

    Summary

    Francis S. was found not responsible for attempted assault and weapons possession due to mental disease. After several years of treatment and non-compliance with an order of conditions, the Commissioner of Mental Health sought a recommitment order. The Supreme Court denied the application, believing that temporary stabilization precluded a finding of dangerousness. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a dangerous mental disorder. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that temporary stabilization does not preclude a finding of current dangerousness based on the acquittee’s history, and that the recommitment procedures of CPL 330.20 satisfy due process and equal protection requirements.

    Facts

    In 1987, Francis S. pleaded not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect to charges of attempted assault and weapons possession. The court found each element of the offenses would be established beyond a reasonable doubt. He was classified as a “track 2” insanity acquittee (mentally ill but not dangerous) and civilly committed. An order of conditions required him to comply with a treatment plan. In 1991, he changed treatment centers without authorization, violating the order. On August 4, 1992, shortly before the order’s expiration, the Commissioner applied for a recommitment order, arguing S. was a danger to himself or others due to his mental condition, non-compliance, and arrests.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Mental Health applied for a recommitment order prior to the expiration of the original order of conditions. The Supreme Court denied the recommitment, citing Matter of Torres. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a dangerous mental disorder despite temporary stabilization. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in finding that S. suffered from a dangerous mental disorder despite his temporary stabilization in the hospital.

    2. Whether the hearing court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the recommitment application because notice was served after the original order of conditions had expired and because the supporting psychiatric affidavit was legally insufficient.

    3. Whether the recommitment procedures of CPL 330.20 (14), as applied in this case, violate S.’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection.

    Holding

    1. No, because S.’s history of relapses into violent behavior, substance abuse, and noncompliance with treatment programs adequately demonstrated a present danger.

    2. No, because the application was made before the expiration of the order of conditions and because the psychiatric affidavit satisfied the statutory criteria.

    3. No, because insanity acquittees may validly be regarded as a separate class, and the recommitment procedures bear a reasonable relationship to the state’s legitimate concerns regarding public safety and the potential for deterioration of the acquittee’s mental condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division correctly determined that S. had a dangerous mental disorder based on his history of prior relapses into violent behavior, recurrent substance abuse, and noncompliance with treatment programs upon release. The court distinguished *Matter of Torres*, explaining that temporary stabilization in the hospital does not preclude a finding of current dangerousness. The court also rejected S.’s jurisdictional arguments, finding that the application was timely filed and supported by a sufficient psychiatric affidavit.

    Regarding the constitutional challenges, the court emphasized that insanity acquittees constitute a distinct class from other civilly committed individuals due to their prior criminal conduct resulting from mental illness. The court cited *People v. Stone*, stating that the recommitment order serves to keep acquittees within the CPL’s continued oversight due to the “potentiality of a dangerous mental disorder”.

    The court relied on *Jones v. United States*, noting that the imprecision of psychiatry warrants deference to legislative judgments. “the lesson we have drawn [from the uncertainty of diagnoses in the field of the psychiatry of violent behavior] is not that government may not act in the face of this uncertainty, but rather that courts should pay particular deference to reasonable legislative judgments”. Because of this the court found the state’s apprehension of significant risk rationally based and surmounts due process concerns.

    The court held that CPL 330.20 provides sufficient procedural safeguards and bears a reasonable relation to the purpose of recommitment, which is “to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness”. The court also noted that recommitment requires findings of both mental illness and dangerousness, aligning with *Foucha v. Louisiana*.

  • People v. Stone, 89 N.Y.2d 360 (1996): Determining Present Dangerousness for Insanity Acquittees

    People v. Stone, 89 N.Y.2d 360 (1996)

    When determining whether an insanity acquittee currently poses a physical danger, courts can consider the nature and recency of the prior criminal act, along with the statistical probability of relapse and the circumstances surrounding any prior relapses, to assess future dangerousness.

    Summary

    This case addresses how to determine if a mentally ill individual, found not responsible for a violent crime due to mental disease, still poses a physical danger, warranting continued confinement in a secure psychiatric hospital. The court held that “currently” dangerous doesn’t mean only at the moment of the hearing. It includes assessing the likelihood of relapse. The court considered Stone’s history of violence, the short time between release and re-offense, and expert testimony on relapse probability. This justified his continued confinement in a secure facility, despite his medicated state at the hearing. The court emphasized the need to protect society while respecting individual liberty.

    Facts

    Stone, suffering from acute paranoid schizophrenia, attacked his father with a hunting knife shortly after being released from a psychiatric unit. His release occurred after doctors believed he was medication-compliant. However, he stopped taking medication and attacked his father again within ten days. He believed he was the Messiah fighting against evil. Stone was then indicted on attempted murder and assault charges. Psychiatric evaluations followed, resulting in a plea of not responsible due to mental disease or defect.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially found Stone unfit to proceed and ordered him committed. After multiple evaluations and periods of hospitalization, Stone was eventually deemed fit to proceed. He then entered a plea of not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. The trial court, after considering psychiatric reports and testimony, found that Stone posed a current danger and should remain confined to a secure facility. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “currently” in CPL 330.20(1)(c)(ii) requires a determination of dangerousness solely at the moment of the hearing, or whether it permits consideration of the defendant’s history, potential for relapse, and other relevant factors in assessing future dangerousness.

    Holding

    No, because the term “currently” as used in CPL 330.20(1)(c)(ii) does not constrain a court to determining dangerousness only at the moment the defendant is before it. Courts can consider the history, potential for relapse, and other relevant factors to determine if a defendant poses a future threat.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a strict interpretation of “currently” would lead to absurd results, as individuals under supervision in a controlled environment might appear non-threatening at the moment of the hearing, despite an underlying potential for relapse. The court emphasized the legislative intent behind CPL 330.20, which is to protect society from individuals who have committed violent acts and have a demonstrated history of mental illness. The court rejected the argument that it could not consider the nature of Stone’s criminal act (attempted murder) in determining dangerousness. While the criminal act alone is insufficient, it is a relevant factor. The court also acknowledged the limitations of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness. It emphasized that a determination of current dangerousness must be based on more than speculation. However, it is permissible to consider a history of prior relapses, substance abuse, non-compliance with medication, and other factors that indicate a continued threat to society. The court found that the circumstances of Stone’s relapse after his initial release from St. Francis Hospital, combined with the violent nature of his crime and the statistical probability of relapse, supported the trial court’s determination that Stone posed a current danger.