Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98 (1982)

Evidence of custom and usage within a particular industry, while not dispositive, is admissible and relevant to establish the standard of reasonable care in a negligence action.

Summary

In a negligence suit, the plaintiff, Vincent Trimarco, sought damages for injuries sustained when he fell through a glass shower door in his apartment building. Trimarco argued the landlord was negligent for failing to replace the ordinary glass with shatterproof glass, a practice allegedly customary in the industry at the time of the accident. The New York Court of Appeals held that while custom and usage evidence is admissible to demonstrate the standard of care, it is not conclusive. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the complaint and ordered a new trial due to the improper admission of a statute that did not apply to the existing installation, while acknowledging the admissibility of custom and usage evidence.

Facts

Vincent Trimarco, a tenant in a multiple dwelling, was injured when he fell through the glass enclosure door of his bathtub in July 1976. The door was made of ordinary, non-shatterproof glass. Trimarco presented evidence that since the early 1950s, shatterproof glazing materials for bathroom enclosures had become a common practice. He also showed bulletins from safety organizations warning against plain glass in “hazardous locations” like bathtub enclosures. The landlord’s managing agent admitted that since 1965, it was customary to use safety glass or plastic for shower enclosures when replacing or installing new doors.

Procedural History

The trial court entered judgment for Trimarco. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, finding no duty to replace the glass without prior notice of danger. Justice Sandler dissented, finding a question of fact for the jury. Justice Fein concurred in part and dissented in part, finding ample evidence of custom and usage but believing the admission of a statute regarding safety glazing was misleading. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial.

Issue(s)

1. Whether evidence of custom and usage is admissible to establish the standard of care in a negligence action.
2. Whether the admission of sections of the General Business Law regarding safety glazing, which were not applicable to the existing installation, was reversible error.

Holding

1. Yes, because evidence of custom and usage within a particular industry can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct fell below the required standard of reasonable care.
2. Yes, because the statute applied only to new installations, and its admission into evidence prejudiced the defendant.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that evidence of custom and usage is admissible to establish the standard of care in a negligence action. The court cited Garthe v. Ruppert, 264 N.Y. 290, 296, stating that “when certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that [the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen below the required standard.” The court noted that custom and usage reflects the judgment, experience, and conduct of many and bears directly on feasibility and practicality of precautions. The court emphasized, however, that custom and usage is not a conclusive test of negligence; the jury must be satisfied with its reasonableness. As stated in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470, “[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.” The court found that the trial court erred in admitting sections of the General Business Law requiring safety glazing because the statute applied only to new installations after its effective date and did not apply to the existing glass door in Trimarco’s apartment. The court concluded that introducing the statute prejudiced the defendant. While the court acknowledged the relevance of the statute in supporting the existence of a developing custom to use safety glass, it determined that the prejudice to the defendants outweighed its probative value. Therefore, the court ordered a new trial, excluding the improperly admitted statutory evidence, but upheld the admissibility of other evidence pertaining to custom and usage.