New York Law Review

Tag: Custodial Interrogation

  • People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969): Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements Made During Warrant Execution

    People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19 (1969)

    A voluntary statement made by a suspect, even after a search warrant is executed but before any interrogation begins, is admissible as evidence and is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.

    Summary

    McKie was convicted of possessing policy slips. Police officers executed a search warrant at his apartment. Before the officers initiated any questioning, McKie volunteered the location of the contraband. McKie argued his statement was inadmissible because he was in custody and had not received Miranda warnings. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that McKie’s statement was admissible because it was voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation. The court emphasized the distinction between voluntary statements and those obtained through interrogation, asserting that Miranda protections are triggered by interrogation, not mere custody.

    Facts

    On May 26, 1966, Officer Marfisi arrived at McKie’s apartment with a warrant to search both McKie and the premises.

    The officer identified himself and displayed the warrant.

    Before Officer Marfisi could ask any questions, McKie stated, “The booklets are in the closet in the room, on top. You are going to find them anyway.”

    The officer then located paper bags containing mutuel horse race policy booklets in the designated closet.

    Procedural History

    McKie was convicted in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Bronx County, for violating section 975 of the former Penal Law.

    The Appellate Term, First Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction.

    McKie appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the admissibility of his statement and the sufficiency of evidence.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether McKie’s statement to the police officer, made after a search warrant was exhibited but before any questioning, was admissible under Miranda v. Arizona.

    2. Whether the possession of unplayed boli-pol constitutes a violation of section 975 of the former Penal Law.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because McKie volunteered the information before any interrogation took place, making the statement admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings. The court emphasized the distinction between voluntary statements and those obtained through interrogation.

    2. Yes, because the statute encompasses all paraphernalia commonly used for “policy,” and possession of such items, whether or not they record a placed bet, is presumptive evidence of a violation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key issue was whether McKie was subjected to “custodial interrogation” when he made the statement. While acknowledging arguments that the execution of a search warrant could create a coercive environment, the court emphasized that McKie volunteered the information before any questions were asked. Referencing Miranda v. Arizona, the court reiterated that “[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.” The court distinguished between statements obtained through interrogation and truly voluntary statements, holding that the Miranda rule only applies to the former.

    The court further supported its reasoning by citing post-Miranda cases where spontaneous statements made by suspects in custody were deemed admissible. It declined to extend Miranda to situations where statements are volunteered, even in the context of a search warrant execution.

    Regarding the possession of “unplayed” policy slips, the court found that the statute’s language was broad enough to encompass all paraphernalia used in the policy game, not just slips representing actual bets. The court stated the omnibus phrase of the statute, “or any paper, print, writing, policy slip, or article of any kind” used in policy, has a broader sweep. It embraces all the paraphernalia commonly used for “policy”; and possession of such items, whether or not they record the fact that a bet has been placed, is presumptive evidence of violation of the statute (see People v. Kravitz, 287 N. Y. 475, 477-478, revg. 262 App. Div. 911, 912 [violation of § 975 grounded on possession of unsold lottery slips]; Ann. Possession of Gambling Device as Crime, 162 ALR 1188, 1189-1191; cf. People v. Lalli, 5 Y 2d 536, 539; but see, contra, People v. Rodriguez, 49 Misc 2d 324).

  • People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y.2d 242 (1965): Admissibility of Statements Made Outside Counsel’s Presence

    16 N.Y.2d 242 (1965)

    Once a suspect has retained counsel and that counsel has requested arraignment, any statements elicited from the suspect in the absence of counsel are inadmissible, even if the suspect has not been formally arraigned.

    Summary

    Friedlander was arrested, and her attorney requested that she be arraigned. The police did not arraign her but instead interrogated her without her attorney present, eliciting incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that these statements were inadmissible. The court reasoned that once a suspect is represented by counsel, and the authorities are aware of this representation, they cannot interrogate the suspect in the absence of counsel after counsel has requested arraignment. This rule protects the defendant’s right to counsel, ensuring that any waiver of this right is made knowingly and intelligently.

    Facts

    On January 3, 1962, police searched the business premises of Tele-A-Flash, Inc., and Friedlander’s apartment pursuant to a valid warrant, seizing documentary evidence related to alleged bookmaking activities.

    Friedlander was taken to the District Attorney’s office for questioning.

    Later that evening, Friedlander’s attorney arrived and consulted with her privately for over half an hour.

    After the consultation, the attorney requested the officer to arrest and arraign Friedlander, but the officer did not respond.

    The attorney then left the District Attorney’s office.

    At approximately 1:00 a.m., the same officer interrogated Friedlander in the absence of her counsel, during which she admitted ownership of some of the seized material.

    Friedlander was not warned of her right to counsel or her right to remain silent.

    Procedural History

    The trial court admitted Friedlander’s inculpatory admissions into evidence over her attorney’s objection.

    Friedlander was convicted. She appealed.

    The appellate division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory admissions obtained from a defendant after her attorney has requested arraignment, but before the arraignment occurs and in the absence of her attorney, are admissible in evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the authorities, knowing the defendant was represented by counsel who had requested them to arrest and arraign his client, nonetheless, after counsel left, took occasion to elicit damaging admissions from her.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental right to counsel, citing Escobedo v. Illinois and People v. Donovan.

    The court stated that statements obtained after arraignment not in the presence of counsel are inadmissible, as are statements obtained where access to counsel has been denied, citing People v. Meyer, People v. Failla, and People v. Sanchez.

    The court extended this principle to situations where counsel cannot obtain access due to physical circumstances, as in People v. Gunner.

    The court reasoned that the police, knowing Friedlander was represented by counsel who had requested her arraignment, improperly elicited damaging admissions from her after her counsel had left.

    The court distinguished this situation from permissible investigatory conduct, emphasizing that the focus shifted once counsel was retained and had requested arraignment. The court highlighted the importance of protecting the attorney-client relationship and preventing the state from undermining it through interrogation in the attorney’s absence.

    The court concluded that while the search warrants were properly issued and executed, the admission of Friedlander’s statements was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 226 (1968): Right to Counsel Attaches When Attorney Contacts Police

    People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 293 N.Y.S.2d 155, 239 N.E.2d 895 (1968)

    Once a retained attorney informs the police that they represent a suspect and do not want any statements taken, the police are precluded from questioning the suspect in the absence of counsel, and any statements obtained thereafter are inadmissible.

    Summary

    Arthur was convicted of felony murder. While in custody in California, an attorney retained by Arthur’s parents contacted the Nassau County Police and told them not to take any statements from Arthur. Despite this, the police continued to question Arthur, obtaining several incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that any statements taken after the attorney contacted the police were inadmissible, even if the attorney was not physically present and did not formally request to see Arthur. The court reasoned that the critical point is whether the police were aware that the suspect had legal representation and that the attorney did not want questioning to proceed.

    Facts

    Arthur was arrested in Los Angeles for a murder committed in Nassau County, New York. The Nassau County police suspected Arthur of shooting a store proprietor with a 12-gauge shotgun on July 16, 1962. Upon arrest, a search of the rented car Arthur used revealed two pistols stolen from the murdered man’s store. Arthur made several incriminating statements to the police both before and after an attorney, Wallace, retained by his parents, contacted the police. Wallace specifically instructed the police not to take any statements from Arthur.

    Procedural History

    Arthur was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding that several pretrial statements were improperly admitted into evidence. The People appealed, arguing that only the statements taken after the attorney was denied access to the defendant should have been excluded. The defendant argued that even more statements should have been excluded.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory statements made by a suspect to law enforcement officers are admissible when the statements are made after a retained attorney has informed the police that they represent the suspect and do not want any statements taken from him, but before the attorney has had the opportunity to consult with the suspect.

    Holding

    Yes, because once a retained attorney informs the police that they represent a suspect and do not want any statements taken, the police are precluded from questioning the suspect in the absence of counsel, and any statements obtained thereafter are inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that its prior decision in People v. Donovan sought to prohibit the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel after an attorney has been retained to represent them and has informed the police of their retention. The court emphasized that the focus should not be on whether the attorney physically presented themself or requested to consult with the client. Instead, the critical factor is whether the police were aware of the attorney’s representation and their explicit instruction that no statements be taken. The court stated: “As is manifest, our decision in Donovan sought to prohibit the police from questioning a suspect, in the absence of counsel, after an attorney has been retained to represent him and has apprised the police of his retention.”

    The court distinguished the situation from cases where the suspect had not yet retained counsel, even if they were a prime suspect. In those circumstances, the majority held that police were not obligated to advise the suspect of their right to remain silent or their right to a lawyer.

    Chief Judge Fuld and another judge dissented on this point, arguing that the additional statements made after arrest but before the lawyer contacted police should also be excluded.