New York Law Review

Tag: curative instruction

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 118 (1995): Unauthorized Jury Room Demonstration and Preservation of Error

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 118 (1995)

    When a court officer’s unauthorized conduct in a jury room does not usurp the court’s authority and the court takes corrective action, a defendant must object to preserve any error for appeal; absent a timely objection, the error is considered curable and cured.

    Summary

    Starling was convicted of second-degree murder. During jury deliberations, a court officer, at the jury’s request, demonstrated how the murder weapon (a bayonet) fit into its sheath, without the court’s authorization. The trial court informed both sides and, with the defendant’s consent, instructed the jury to disregard the demonstration. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s failure to object to the demonstration, instead agreeing to a curative instruction, meant the issue was not preserved for appeal. The court distinguished this case from instances where a judge delegates essential judicial functions, emphasizing that the trial court retained control and addressed the impropriety.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend’s father by stabbing him with a bayonet.

    Conflicting accounts were presented at trial: the prosecution argued the stabbing was deliberate, while the defendant claimed self-defense, stating the deceased seized the bayonet first.

    During deliberations, the jury requested the bayonet and its sheath.

    A court officer allowed the jury to handle the bayonet, and demonstrated how it could be drawn from the sheath while it was in his waistband, but the court officer refused to allow the jurors to experiment with the bayonet themselves.

    The court officer told the court about the demonstration, and the court informed both sides.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, finding the defense waived any issue by agreeing to a curative instruction, and rejecting the argument that a mode of proceedings error occurred.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and the order denying CPL 440.10 relief, determining the court officer’s conduct was ministerial and did not usurp the trial court’s authority.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the court officer’s unauthorized demonstration in the jury room constituted a “mode of proceedings” error that need not be preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court took appropriate action to address the unauthorized demonstration and the defendant consented to a curative instruction instead of objecting or moving for a mistrial, the issue was not preserved for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from People v. Ahmed, where a judge improperly delegated judicial functions. In this case, the trial court retained control of the proceedings and addressed the court officer’s impropriety by informing both sides and offering a curative instruction.

    The Court relied on People v. Bonaparte, where a court officer’s communication with the jury was deemed ministerial and any error was unpreserved because of the failure to object. The court found the present case even stronger for affirmance because the court officer’s actions were unauthorized.

    The Court emphasized that the defendant had the opportunity to object to the demonstration but instead agreed to the curative instruction. The court stated, “[I]n all, the impropriety was protestable but unprotested, curable and cured.”

    The Court found that the court officer’s actions did not usurp the court’s authority, distinguishing this case from People v. Khalek, where a court officer improperly instructed the jury leading them to change their verdict. The Court emphasized the trial court retained control of the trial.

    The Court reiterated that preservation is essential for appellate review, unless the error goes to the essential validity of the trial.

  • People v. Carey, 73 N.Y.2d 820 (1988): Evaluating Prosecutorial Misconduct in Summation

    People v. Carey, 73 N.Y.2d 820 (1988)

    A prosecutor’s remarks during summation warrant a new trial only if they demonstrate a decided tendency to prejudice the jury, and even then, they must be evaluated in the context of the entire trial, including the defense’s summation.

    Summary

    Defendant Carey was convicted of multiple counts of sodomy and endangering the welfare of a child based on testimony from teenage boys. He appealed, alleging prosecutorial misconduct during summation and inappropriate consideration of community sentiment during sentencing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s remarks did not demonstrate a decided tendency to prejudice the jury, especially considering the defense’s own summation, and that the sentencing statement, read in context, was unobjectionable. The court also rejected the defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the age of consent.

    Facts

    Carey was accused of showing pornographic films to teenage boys in his home. The teenagers testified that Carey masturbated before them, solicited sex from them, and engaged in sodomy with two of them. Based on this testimony, Carey was convicted on five counts of sodomy in the third degree and three counts of endangering the welfare of a child. He was subsequently sentenced to five consecutive prison terms.

    Procedural History

    Following his conviction in Chemung County Court, Carey appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing prosecutorial misconduct during summation and inappropriate sentencing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Carey then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation had a decided tendency to prejudice the jury, thus warranting a new trial.
    2. Whether the sentencing judge inappropriately considered community sentiment and religious beliefs in imposing the sentence.
    3. Whether the age of consent established by the Legislature is unconstitutional.

    Holding

    1. No, because the prosecutor’s remarks, viewed in the context of the entire trial and the defense summation, fell within the latitude afforded to attorneys in advocating their cause, and any potential prejudice was cured by a curative instruction.
    2. No, because the sentencing statement, when read in context, was unobjectionable.
    3. No, the court found no merit to the defendant’s contention that the age of consent established by the Legislature is unconstitutional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard set forth in People v. Ashwal, requiring the defendant to show that the prosecutor’s remarks had “a decided tendency to prejudice the jury.” The court emphasized that the prosecutor’s closing statement must be evaluated in light of the defense summation, which had put into issue the complainants’ character and credibility. The court found that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s failure to testify was followed by a curative instruction, mitigating any potential prejudice. The court quoted Williams v. Brooklyn El. R.R. Co., noting that attorneys are afforded latitude in advocating their cause. Regarding the sentencing, the court found no evidence that the judge inappropriately considered community sentiment or religious beliefs, distinguishing the case from United States v. Bakker. The court summarily dismissed the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the age of consent. The court stated that the prosecutor’s portrayal of the complainants in the closing statement, when viewed in the context of the entire trial, fell within the latitude afforded to attorneys in advocating their cause. “Moreover, the prosecutor’s closing statement must be evaluated in light of the defense summation, which put into issue the complainants’ character and credibility and justified the People’s response.”

  • People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984): Use of Post-Arrest Silence When Defendant Testifies to It

    People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984)

    A prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s post-arrest silence are permissible when the defendant testifies about that silence and contradicts prosecution witnesses regarding statements made at the time of arrest.

    Summary

    Davis was convicted of attempted murder and weapons charges. At trial, police testified that Davis made inculpatory statements upon arrest, while Davis testified he remained silent. The prosecutor, during summation, challenged Davis’s credibility based on this alleged silence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because Davis testified about his silence, contradicting the prosecution’s witnesses, the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and did not violate the rule against using post-arrest silence for impeachment established in People v. Conyers. A curative instruction, though not given due to the defendant’s objection, could have further mitigated any potential prejudice.

    Facts

    Police were called to an apartment building after John Puig reported that Davis was carrying a revolver. There was an outstanding warrant for Davis’s arrest. When Davis emerged, Puig alerted the police, and Davis fled. After a chase and an exchange of gunfire, Davis was wounded and arrested. At trial, police testified that Davis stated, “I should have killed you when I had the chance,” and spat on an officer’s shoe. Davis testified that he believed his pursuers were Puig’s friends, not police, and he fired out of fear. He claimed he said nothing to the police at the time of his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Davis was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, attempted assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing that the prosecutor improperly used his post-arrest silence against him during summation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Davis then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s comments during summation regarding Davis’s post-arrest silence constituted reversible error, given that Davis testified about his silence and contradicted the prosecution’s witnesses regarding statements made at the time of his arrest.

    Holding

    No, because Davis testified about his post-arrest silence, contradicting the prosecution’s witnesses, and the prosecutor’s comments concerned a key issue of fact: whether Davis made the incriminating statements attributed to him by the police.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Conyers, where it was undisputed that the defendant remained silent. In Conyers, the Court held that the defendant’s silence at the time of arrest was ambiguous and inadmissible to impeach later exculpatory testimony. Here, the Court emphasized that Davis himself testified about his silence, directly contradicting the officers’ testimony that he made inculpatory statements. Therefore, the prosecutor’s comments were not an attempt to use the *fact* of Davis’s silence against him, but rather to challenge the *veracity* of his testimony regarding his silence. The Court noted that while the prosecutor’s comments improperly invited the jury to draw an inference of guilt from Davis’s testimony, a curative instruction could have mitigated the prejudice. However, Davis objected to such an instruction, precluding him from using its absence as grounds for appeal. The Court stated, “[T]his is not a case, like Conyers, where the prosecution tried to use evidence of the fact of a defendant’s postarrest silence against him by contending that such silence itself renders a later exculpatory version of events incredible.” The key distinction is that Davis opened the door by testifying about his silence, making it a contested issue of fact. The court concluded that, “Given these circumstances, the mistrial demanded by defendant was in no event required.”

  • People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294 (1983): Calling a Witness Who Intends to Refuse to Testify

    People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294 (1983)

    A trial court has discretion to permit the prosecution to call a witness who has indicated an intent to refuse to testify, provided the State’s interest in calling the witness outweighs the potential prejudice to the defendant, and curative instructions are given to the jury.

    Summary

    Defendants Berg and Lovacco were convicted of assault and weapons possession. A key witness, Iovino (the victim), initially agreed to testify but later refused. The prosecution called Iovino to the stand, where he refused to answer questions, despite the court’s orders. The trial court then gave a curative instruction to the jury, telling them not to speculate about Iovino’s refusal to testify. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecution to call Iovino, given the circumstances and the curative instruction. The Court of Appeals emphasized the strong evidence against the defendants and the prosecutor’s good faith in attempting to elicit Iovino’s testimony.

    Facts

    A police officer witnessed three men assaulting Iovino. The assailants fled in a car, and after a brief chase, Lovacco was apprehended. Berg was arrested nearby and identified as one of the assailants. Iovino was found with his mouth taped and hands cuffed behind his back. Iovino initially agreed to testify but later became reluctant.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions, finding that calling Iovino as a witness after he stated he would not testify was prejudicial error. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the original convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution to call a witness (Iovino) who had already indicated he would refuse to testify, thereby potentially prejudicing the defendants.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the People to call Iovino as a witness, considering the State’s interest in attempting to induce the witness to testify and the curative instructions given to the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the decision to permit the People to call a reticent witness is within the trial court’s sound discretion. The court must balance the State’s interest in calling the witness against the possible prejudice to the defendant. The Court noted two factors that could indicate reversible error: (1) the prosecutor’s motive in calling the witness was to have the jury draw unwarranted inferences, and (2) the inferences from the refusal to testify added critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination.

    Here, the court found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor made a good-faith effort to elicit Iovino’s testimony, even offering immunity. The court emphasized that Iovino had been cooperative until the last minute and never explicitly stated he would refuse to answer questions. Furthermore, the People’s case was strong, based on the testimony of the police officer who witnessed the assault. The prosecutor did not exploit Iovino’s refusal to testify.

    The Court also found that any unfavorable inferences drawn from Iovino’s refusal would have little bearing on the jury’s decision, given the strength of the other evidence. The court’s curative instruction, directing the jury not to speculate about Iovino’s reasons for refusing to testify, was deemed sufficient to dispel any unwarranted inferences. The Court explicitly stated: “The importance, as well as the effect, of curative instructions in such a case cannot be underestimated, as we depend, for the integrity of the jury system itself, upon the willingness of jurors to follow the court’s instructions in such matters.”

    Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the People to call Iovino as a witness, given the circumstances, the strong evidence against the defendants, and the curative instruction provided to the jury.

  • People v. Brown, 46 N.Y.2d 953 (1979): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Brown, 46 N.Y.2d 953 (1979)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must obtain a definitive ruling from the trial court, either by requesting a curative instruction or moving for a mistrial after an objection is sustained.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of a crime related to a cocaine sale. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in preventing him from learning the identity of a confidential informant and that the prosecutor made improper remarks during summation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve these issues for appellate review. Because the defendant did not seek a judicial ruling after the prosecution objected to revealing the informant’s identity and did not request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial after the prosecutor’s comments, the appellate court was precluded from considering these alleged errors.

    Facts

    An informant arranged a cocaine sale and subsequently provided information to the police that led to the defendant’s arrest.

    During the trial, defense counsel attempted to elicit the identity of the informant from a People’s witness.

    The District Attorney objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection, preventing the witness from revealing the informant’s name.

    During summation, the prosecutor made comments to which defense counsel objected. The trial judge sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor to refrain from making similar statements.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant properly preserved for appellate review the issue of the trial court’s refusal to compel disclosure of the informant’s identity.

    2. Whether the defendant properly preserved for appellate review the issue of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper summation remarks.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to seek a judicial ruling on the question after the District Attorney’s objection was sustained.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial after the trial judge sustained the objection to the prosecutor’s remarks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that when the District Attorney objected to revealing the informant’s identity, it was the defendant’s responsibility to seek a judicial ruling if he believed the disclosure would be helpful to his case. Failing to do so precluded him from raising the issue on appeal. The court cited CPL 470.35, subd 1 and 470.05, subd 2 in support of this conclusion.

    Regarding the prosecutor’s summation remarks, the court noted that the trial judge sustained the defense counsel’s objection and directed the prosecutor to stop making similar statements. However, the defense counsel did not request a curative instruction or move for a mistrial. The Court of Appeals emphasized that, without such a request, no error of law was preserved for appellate review.

    The court implicitly relied on the principle that a trial court must be given the opportunity to correct any alleged errors before they can be raised on appeal. A simple objection is insufficient; the party must seek further action by the court to remedy the perceived error.

    The court’s decision highlights the importance of contemporaneous objections and the need to seek definitive rulings from the trial court to preserve issues for appeal. As the court suggested, a defendant must do more than simply object; they must actively seek a remedy from the trial court, such as a curative instruction or a mistrial, to preserve the issue for appellate review.

  • People v. Walker, 55 N.Y.2d 239 (1982): Admissibility of Witness Silence Before Trial

    People v. Walker, 55 N.Y.2d 239 (1982)

    A witness’s prior silence may be used to impeach their testimony, provided the questioning does not imply a duty to come forward and no curative instruction is requested.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the court addressed whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant’s alibi witness about why he had not previously informed the police or the District Attorney of his version of events. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that it was permissible to cross-examine the witness regarding his prior silence, as the questioning did not imply any duty to come forward and the defendant did not request a curative instruction. The court also found no error in the denial of the defendant’s motion to preclude cross-examination regarding a prior misdemeanor conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant, Walker, was on trial. During the trial, an alibi witness, Archie Miller, testified on Walker’s behalf. The prosecutor cross-examined Miller regarding his failure to come forward to law enforcement (police or District Attorney) prior to the trial to share the alibi he presented in court. Before trial, Walker moved to preclude the prosecution from cross-examining him about a 1973 misdemeanor conviction for illegal possession of a pistol, but this motion was denied.

    Procedural History

    The trial court permitted the cross-examination of the alibi witness and denied the motion to preclude cross-examination of the defendant regarding his prior conviction. The Appellate Division affirmed these decisions. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to preclude cross-examination about his prior misdemeanor conviction if he chose to testify.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant’s alibi witness about his failure to come forward to law enforcement before the trial.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no error of law in the ruling denying the motion to preclude cross-examination about the prior conviction.
    2. No, because the cross-examination did not imply that the witness had a duty to come forward, and the defendant did not request a curative instruction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the cross-examination of the alibi witness, the court relied on People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311 (1980). The Court of Appeals emphasized that the manner and content of the cross-examination did not suggest or imply that the witness had any duty to report to the police or the District Attorney. The court also noted the absence of a request for curative instructions by the defendant, which could have mitigated any potential prejudice. The court stated, “Nothing in the content or manner of cross-examination suggested or implied that the witness was under any duty to go to the police or the District Attorney, and in any event appellant requested no curative instruction.” The court found no error in the trial court’s handling of the cross-examination, emphasizing that without an implied duty or a request for curative instructions, the questioning was permissible for impeachment purposes. The Court summarily dismissed the first issue relying on People v. Mackey, 49 NY2d 274.

  • People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011 (1976): Preserving Issues for Appellate Review

    People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011 (1976)

    An appellate court will generally not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal if it was not properly preserved at the trial level.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order, holding that the defendant’s claim regarding the failure to provide Miranda warnings was not properly preserved for appellate review because it was not the basis of the motion to suppress the gun at trial. The Court distinguished this case from others where the issue could be reviewed despite the failure to timely raise it. Additionally, the Court found that the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard a witness’s testimony, due to her inability to withstand cross-examination, was sufficient to protect the defendant’s right of confrontation.

    Facts

    During the trial, the defendant moved to suppress a gun. The basis for the motion was not related to Miranda warnings. At some point during trial, a witness for the prosecution became unable to withstand intensive cross-examination due to her physical condition. The defendant moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion but instructed the jury to disregard the witness’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed the lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claim regarding the failure to provide Miranda warnings is reviewable on appeal, despite not being the basis for the motion to suppress the gun at trial.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in not granting the defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a prosecution witness could not be subjected to intensive cross-examination.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s failure to preserve this issue for review precludes his reliance upon it upon this appeal.

    2. No, because the court’s instruction to the jury to disregard her testimony altogether sufficed in the circumstances to avoid any violation of defendant’s right of confrontation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun was not based on the failure to provide Miranda warnings. The Court distinguished this case from cases where the issue could be reviewed despite the failure to timely raise it, citing People v. Michael, 48 N.Y.2d 1. Because the issue was not properly raised at the trial level, the Court of Appeals declined to review it. Regarding the motion for a mistrial, the Court held that the trial court’s instruction to the jury to disregard the witness’s testimony was sufficient to protect the defendant’s right of confrontation. The court determined this instruction was adequate in the circumstances, implying that the witness’s testimony was not so prejudicial that it could not be cured by the instruction. The court considered the specific facts and circumstances when evaluating the potential prejudice and the efficacy of the curative instruction. The Court emphasizes the importance of raising legal arguments at the trial level to allow for proper fact-finding and legal analysis. Failure to do so generally waives the right to raise the issue on appeal. The case also demonstrates that curative instructions can be an effective tool to mitigate potential prejudice from inadmissible evidence or a witness’s inability to complete their testimony.

  • People v. Roman, 46 N.Y.2d 857 (1979): Inadvertent Juror Viewing of Defendant in Handcuffs

    People v. Roman, 46 N.Y.2d 857 (1979)

    A brief and inadvertent viewing of a defendant in handcuffs by jurors is not, by itself, sufficient to warrant a mistrial and deny the defendant a fair trial.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that a brief and inadvertent viewing of the defendant in handcuffs by two jurors while returning from a lunch recess did not warrant a mistrial. The court reasoned that the viewing, by itself, was insufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial. Furthermore, the defense counsel declined the trial judge’s offer to deliver a curative instruction or to substitute alternate jurors, thus waiving any potential prejudice.

    Facts

    The defendant was on trial and during a lunch recess, two jurors inadvertently saw him in handcuffs. The defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the incident prejudiced the jury against him.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The defendant was subsequently convicted. The defendant appealed the denial of the motion for a mistrial claiming a denial of due process. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after two jurors inadvertently viewed him in handcuffs.

    2. Whether the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and his accomplices caused physical injury to their victim while “effecting entry” into his dwelling, as required for a conviction of burglary in the first degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because the brief and inadvertent viewing of the defendant in handcuffs by the jurors was, by itself, insufficient to deny the defendant a fair trial.

    2. Yes, because the People met their burden of proof on this point based on the trial record.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the brief and inadvertent viewing of the defendant in handcuffs was not inherently prejudicial enough to warrant a mistrial. The court distinguished the case from situations involving more egregious or prolonged exposure. The Court emphasized that defense counsel declined the Trial Judge’s express invitation to deliver a curative instruction, and did not request the substitution of alternate jurors or an examination into the effect of the encounter. The court found this inaction to be significant. Regarding the burglary conviction, the Court of Appeals stated, “Our examination of the trial record persuades us that the People did indeed meet their burden of proof on this point,” indicating that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s finding that the defendant caused physical injury while effecting entry into the dwelling. The Court did not elaborate further on the evidence, but the finding suggests a fact-specific inquiry was made and resolved in favor of the prosecution.

  • People v. Williams, 40 N.Y.2d 800 (1976): Improper Cross-Examination of Witness Violates Preclusion Order

    People v. Williams, 40 N.Y.2d 800 (1976)

    When a preclusion order bars the prosecution from questioning a defendant about a prior arrest, that prohibition extends to questioning other witnesses about the same arrest, and violating this order through improper cross-examination warrants a new trial when curative instructions are insufficient to remedy the error.

    Summary

    Gill Williams was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Prior to trial, the court precluded the prosecutor from questioning Williams about a prior arrest for criminal possession. During the trial, the prosecutor asked a defense witness about an arrest of Williams, initially misdating the arrest. After the witness denied knowledge, the prosecutor pressed the issue. It was later revealed the prosecutor was referring to the precluded arrest. The court issued a curative instruction, but the defense moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s questioning violated the spirit of the preclusion order, and the curative instruction was insufficient to remedy the error, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    Gill Williams was arrested and charged with multiple counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance. Prior to trial, the defense moved to preclude the prosecutor from questioning Williams regarding a prior arrest on August 8, 1974, for criminal possession. The trial court granted the motion. At trial, the defense called Deborah Davis, who resided in Williams’ apartment, as a witness. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Davis about whether anything unusual occurred on August 8, 1975 (a date that was initially incorrect). When Davis denied any knowledge, the prosecutor specifically asked if she recalled Williams’ arrest on that date. This line of questioning prompted an immediate objection and motion for a mistrial by the defense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, allowing the prosecutor’s questions and answers to stand, with a cautionary instruction to the jury that the testimony was solely for the purpose of assessing Miss Davis’ credibility. The defendant was convicted based on a jury verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of a defense witness regarding a prior arrest of the defendant, when the defendant was precluded from being questioned about that arrest himself, constitutes reversible error.

    Holding

    Yes, because the preclusion order extended to inquiry about the precluded arrest of the defendant on interrogation of a witness as well, and the prosecutor’s questioning undermined the preclusion order, and the curative instruction was insufficient to remedy the error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the preclusion order, while expressly related to the examination of the defendant, foreclosed inquiry regarding the August 8, 1974, arrest during the interrogation of a witness as well. The court found the prosecutor’s initial confusion about the date and subsequent persistence in the questioning, even after being cautioned by the trial court, unacceptable. The court stated, “The carelessness of the prosecutor in initially confusing dates and then persisting in such confusion when specifically alerted by the trial court may scarcely be advanced in justification.” The Court determined that the curative instructions were insufficient to eliminate the prejudice to the defendant, necessitating a new trial. The court noted, “In the circumstances we conclude that it was error to have permitted the question and that the curative instructions were insufficient to remedy the error.” The Court explicitly limited its holding to situations where the prior arrest resulted in a conviction, reserving judgment on whether questioning about arrests not resulting in convictions constitutes reversible error.