Tag: Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co.

  • Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 N.Y.2d 349 (1988): Limits on Advisory Opinions

    Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., 71 N.Y.2d 349 (1988)

    New York courts do not issue advisory opinions, particularly on matters contingent upon future events or decisions by non-party federal agencies.

    Summary

    This case addresses the justiciability of a dispute concerning the Long Island Lighting Company’s (LILCO) emergency response plan for its Shoreham nuclear facility. The New York Court of Appeals held that the action brought by the Governor of New York and local governments, seeking a declaration that LILCO lacked the authority to implement its emergency plan, was nonjusticiable. The court reasoned that the controversy was contingent on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) approval of the plan, a decision not yet made and subject to change. The court emphasized that state courts do not issue advisory opinions, especially when a ruling would merely advise a federal agency.

    Facts

    Following the Three Mile Island accident, Congress mandated adequate Emergency Response Plans for nuclear facilities. LILCO’s Shoreham nuclear facility lacked state or local government-approved emergency plans due to opposition. LILCO devised its own plan involving a private local emergency response organization (LERO). The plan outlined LERO’s responsibilities, including accident assessment, public notification, and recommendations for protective measures. The plan stipulated that government actions would supersede LERO actions. The NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board requested that the parties seek a determination from New York State courts regarding LILCO’s authority to implement the plan under state law.

    Procedural History

    The Governor of New York, Suffolk County, and the Town of Southampton sued LILCO in New York Supreme Court, arguing LILCO lacked the authority to implement the emergency plan. The Supreme Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was properly made. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board initially rejected LILCO’s plan, but the NRC reversed and remanded, instructing the board to consider the “realism doctrine”. Upon remand, the Board again rejected the plan, a decision that was not yet appealed when the Court of Appeals heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the action brought by the State of New York and local governments, seeking a declaration that LILCO lacked authority to implement its emergency plan, presented a justiciable controversy.

    Holding

    No, because the dispute was contingent on uncertain future actions by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and would amount to an impermissible advisory opinion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the case nonjusticiable because the potential encroachment on governmental authority was contingent upon the NRC’s approval of the plan, which was not assured and subject to revisions. The court stated, “[A]n action ‘may not be maintained if the issue presented for adjudication involves a future event beyond control of the parties which may never occur.’” The court distinguished the case from situations where courts rule on matters directly affecting ballot access, emphasizing that a ruling in this case would not bind the NRC. The court emphasized the principle that New York courts do not issue advisory opinions to other governmental agencies. Quoting Matter of Richardson, the court stated that the judiciary’s role is to “‘give the rule or sentence,’” not to offer advice that may be accepted or rejected. The court reasoned that any decision would ultimately bind no one and settle nothing, making it an impermissible advisory opinion for the NRC. The court noted that the NRC was not a party to the action and thus would not be bound by its decision. The court stated, “[T]he court held that it was without jurisdiction to resolve a dispute within the State Industrial Commission… stating that it was outside the judicial function to ‘tender… advice which may be accepted or rejected’.”