Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263 (1967)

A zoning ordinance that prohibits all non-accessory signs (signs not related to a business on the same lot) throughout a town is constitutional because aesthetic considerations can be a valid basis for such ordinances, provided they substantially relate to the community’s economic, social, and cultural patterns.

Summary

Cromwell challenged a town zoning ordinance that effectively prohibited all non-accessory signs, arguing it was an unconstitutional deprivation of property. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance, explicitly overruling its prior decision in Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond. The Court reasoned that aesthetic considerations, when substantially related to the economic and cultural welfare of the community, are a valid basis for zoning regulations. The court found that the ordinance’s distinction between accessory and non-accessory signs was reasonable, and the prohibition of non-accessory signs served a legitimate public purpose by preventing visual blight.

Facts

Cromwell owned a 200-acre parcel of land bisected by Route 17. He operated a service station and diner on one side of the highway. After a zoning ordinance was adopted in 1963, Cromwell contracted to have two signs erected on the other side of the highway, advertising his businesses. The town’s Building Inspector issued a stop order, citing the ordinance, which regulated accessory signs (those related to businesses on the same lot) but implicitly prohibited non-accessory signs throughout the township.

Procedural History

Cromwell appealed the Building Inspector’s stop order to the Zoning Board of Appeals, which affirmed the inspector’s decision. Cromwell then filed an Article 78 proceeding in Special Term, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance. Special Term denied the application. The Appellate Division affirmed, with two justices dissenting. Cromwell then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a town zoning ordinance that prohibits all non-accessory signs throughout the township is an unconstitutional deprivation of property, particularly when primarily based on aesthetic considerations.

Holding

No, because aesthetic considerations can be a valid basis for zoning ordinances when they substantially relate to the economic, social, and cultural patterns of a community, and the ordinance’s distinction between accessory and non-accessory signs is a reasonable means of implementing community policy.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holding in Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, which had struck down a similar ordinance. However, the court explicitly overruled Bond, stating that its underlying rationale was no longer valid in light of changing societal attitudes and legal precedents. The court noted the growing acceptance of aesthetic considerations as a legitimate basis for zoning regulations, citing People v. Stover. The court reasoned that “once it be conceded that aesthetics is a valid subject of legislative concern, the conclusion seems inescapable that reasonable legislation designed to promote that end is a valid and permissible exercise of the police power.” The court further held that the distinction between accessory and non-accessory signs was reasonable, as business signs are integral to the business itself, while non-accessory signs are part of the business of outdoor advertising, which can be reasonably regulated. The court emphasized that not every aesthetic consideration justifies prohibition, but only those that “bear substantially on the economic, social, and cultural patterns of a community or district.” The court stated, “Advertising signs and billboards, if misplaced, often are egregious examples of ugliness, distraction, and deterioration. They are just as much subject to reasonable controls, including prohibition, as enterprises which emit offensive noises, odors, or debris. The eye is entitled to as much recognition as the other senses, but, of course, the offense to the eye must be substantial and be deemed to have material effect on the community or district pattern.” The court also dismissed the argument that a town lacked the power to adopt such an ordinance, citing Koffman v. Town of Vestal.