New York Law Review

Tag: critical stage

  • People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999): Right to Counsel at TASC Program Appearances

    People v. Garcia, 93 N.Y.2d 42 (1999)

    A defendant does not have the right to counsel at court appearances related to participation in a Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) program when those appearances are primarily administrative and do not involve accusatory proceedings or factual determinations affecting the defendant’s liberty.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to counsel was not violated when he appeared in court without counsel for TASC-related proceedings. Garcia pleaded guilty to a drug offense with the understanding that he would enter a TASC program. He was later ejected from the program for a rules violation. At a subsequent court appearance to discuss his status, the TASC representative suggested the court proceed to sentencing. The court agreed and discharged TASC from the case. The Court of Appeals reasoned that this appearance was not a “critical stage” requiring counsel because it was an administrative matter, not an accusatory proceeding involving new factual or legal determinations.

    Facts

    In 1994, Garcia sold heroin and crack cocaine to an undercover officer and was indicted. In 1995, he pleaded guilty to criminal sale of a controlled substance, the top count of the indictment, with the understanding that he would be admitted into a TASC program. The court warned him that if he failed to complete the program or committed another crime, he could face a sentence of 4½ to 9 years. After participating in the program for 18 months, Garcia was ejected for violating rules and remained at large for three months. He was brought back to court on a bench warrant.

    Procedural History

    After being ejected from the TASC program, Garcia appeared in court several times without counsel. At one such appearance, the TASC representative suggested that the court sentence Garcia. The court discharged TASC from the case and scheduled sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, with counsel present, Garcia was sentenced to 4½ to 9 years. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, and Garcia appealed, arguing a violation of his right to counsel.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the February 20th court appearance, where the court determined Garcia would be sentenced to jail after his ejection from the TASC program, constituted a “critical stage” of the proceedings requiring the presence of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because the February 20th appearance was an administrative proceeding and not an accusatory one requiring factual or legal determinations affecting Garcia’s liberty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished TASC appearances from parole or probation revocation hearings, where the right to counsel is required because the outcome (liberty or imprisonment) depends on factual determinations of misconduct. In revocation hearings, counsel is needed to marshal facts, introduce mitigating evidence, and assist the defendant. In contrast, Garcia’s February 20th appearance was not accusatory. The court emphasized that it was undisputed that Garcia had violated the TASC program rules. The court stated that “No factual or legal questions were at issue, and defendant’s views were not relevant to TASC’s decision to readmit him or its ability — given the circumstances created by defendant’s conduct — to find a new program for him.” The court’s decision was driven by administrative concerns and TASC’s assessment, not by any new allegations or factual disputes requiring legal representation. The Court concluded that the presence of counsel was not required to protect Garcia’s due process rights in this context. The court noted, “At the core of that right, which we have long recognized as inviolable and fundamental to our form of justice, is the recognition that defendants, confronted with both the intricacies of the criminal law and the experienced advocacy of the public prosecutor, require the ‘guiding hand of counsel’ to aid their defense.”

  • People v. Colon, 76 N.Y.2d 903 (1990): Right to Counsel at Execution of Sentence After Sentencing In Absentia

    People v. Colon, 76 N.Y.2d 903 (1990)

    When a defendant is sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel, the subsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, and the defendant is not entitled to counsel at that time.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel is not entitled to counsel at the subsequent execution of that sentence. Colon pleaded guilty to attempted burglary and was warned that failure to appear for sentencing could result in a harsher prison sentence imposed in his absence. After failing to appear twice, he was sentenced in absentia. Several months later, Colon was arrested and the sentence was summarily executed without his counsel present, and without providing him an opportunity to explain his absence. The court reasoned that the critical stage of sentencing concluded when the sentence was imposed in absentia, thus negating any right to counsel at the later execution of that sentence.

    Facts

    The defendant, Colon, pleaded guilty to attempted burglary in the second degree. This plea satisfied an indictment charging him with second-degree burglary and criminal mischief. At the plea allocution, while represented by counsel, Colon was promised a conditional probationary sentence. He was explicitly warned that if he failed to appear for sentencing, he could be sentenced in absentia to a prison term of 2 1/2 to 7 years. Colon failed to appear for the scheduled sentencing, which was then adjourned. He again failed to appear at the rescheduled sentencing. The sentencing court, after a hearing, determined that Colon’s absence was voluntary and sentenced him to 2 to 6 years in prison.

    Procedural History

    Several months after being sentenced in absentia, Colon was arrested on a bench warrant and returned to court. The sentence was summarily executed. Colon’s counsel was not present during the execution of the sentence. Colon was not given an opportunity to explain his absence at the original sentencing hearing, nor did he request one. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. Colon then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who was sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel is entitled to counsel at the subsequent execution of that sentence.

    Holding

    No, because where a defendant is sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel, the critical stage of the sentencing process terminates upon the imposition of sentence, and the subsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage entitling the defendant to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding that implicates the right to counsel, citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 and People v. Perry, 36 N.Y.2d 114. However, the court distinguished the present case by emphasizing that Colon was sentenced in absentia while represented by counsel. According to the court, this fact was crucial, since “the critical stage of the sentencing process and, hence, the criminal proceeding itself for all nisi prius court purposes, terminates upon the imposition of sentence.” The court explicitly stated that “[s]ubsequent execution of the sentence is not a critical stage of the defendant’s criminal proceeding.” The court cited People v. Scott, 158 A.D.2d 725, 726, and People v. Villegas, 146 A.D.2d 228, 232, in support of this proposition. The court reasoned that because the critical stage had already passed, Colon was not entitled to counsel at the execution of his sentence. The court also stated that Colon’s remaining argument was not properly preserved for appellate review, thus declining to address it.

  • People v. Hodge, 53 N.Y.2d 313 (1981): Right to Counsel at Preliminary Hearings

    People v. Hodge, 53 N.Y.2d 313 (1981)

    A defendant is entitled to counsel at a pre-indictment preliminary hearing, and denial of that right requires a new trial if the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    Gabriel Hodge was convicted of burglary and escape. The Court of Appeals addressed whether Hodge was entitled to reversal of his escape conviction because his pre-indictment preliminary hearing was conducted without retained counsel. The court held that Hodge was entitled to a new trial because a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, and denial of counsel cannot be considered harmless error if it is impossible to determine the adverse consequences of the deprivation. The court emphasized the importance of counsel at preliminary hearings for discovery and cross-examination.

    Facts

    Gabriel Hodge, already in jail on a multi-count indictment, was charged with escape and arraigned in town court. The case was adjourned for a week to allow him to retain counsel. On the adjourned date, Hodge appeared alone, stating he had retained counsel but could not explain their absence. The court proceeded with the hearing despite Hodge’s objection.

    Procedural History

    The town court found reasonable grounds to believe the crime of escape was committed and bound Hodge over to the Grand Jury, which indicted him for escape in the first degree. He was subsequently convicted after a trial with counsel. He separately pleaded guilty to burglary in the third degree.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a reversal of an escape conviction when a pre-indictment preliminary hearing on that charge was conducted in the absence of retained counsel?

    Holding

    Yes, because a preliminary hearing is a critical stage in criminal proceedings, and the denial of counsel at such a hearing is not harmless error if the consequences of the deprivation cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, stating, “the right to counsel may be the most basic of all.” Citing Coleman v. Alabama, the court recognized a preliminary hearing as a “critical stage” triggering the constitutional right to counsel. The court reasoned that preliminary hearings serve important functions beyond formal requirements, including early screening of unjustifiable charges.

    The court stated, “[T]he prosecutor must present proof of every element of the crime claimed to have been committed, no matter how skeletally, the preliminary hearing conceptually and pragmatically may serve as a virtual minitrial of the prima facie case.” The court highlighted the value of preliminary hearings for discovery, particularly in jurisdictions with limited criminal discovery rules. It emphasized opportunities for witness appraisal, subpoena power, and cross-examination. The court rejected the argument that a subsequent Grand Jury indictment cured the defect of a counselless hearing. It reasoned that a Grand Jury proceeding does not offer the same opportunities for subpoena, cross-examination, or witness confrontation.

    While acknowledging that harmless error analysis may apply to denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing (unlike at trial), the court found that it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation of counsel produced no adverse consequences. The court stated that “the test must be not what the hearing did not produce, but what it might have produced if the defendant’s right to counsel had not been ignored.”

    The court ordered a new trial, stating, “On a new trial, the defendant will then be in a position comparable to the one he would have occupied had his right to counsel not been compromised.”