New York Law Review

Tag: Criminally Negligent Homicide

  • People v. Bongiorno, 85 N.Y.2d 923 (1995): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    85 N.Y.2d 923 (1995)

    To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection during trial.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and driving while ability impaired after a motorcycle accident that resulted in his wife’s death. He was acquitted of vehicular manslaughter and driving under the influence. On appeal, he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the criminally negligent homicide conviction and that the relation-back testimony regarding his blood alcohol level was inadmissible. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant failed to preserve these issues for review because he did not make timely and specific objections at trial. The Court also found no merit to the defendant’s other claims.

    Facts

    The defendant was involved in a motorcycle accident resulting in his wife’s death. The defendant was subsequently indicted for vehicular manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and driving under the influence of alcohol. Following the accident, the defendant’s blood alcohol level was tested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried before a jury. The jury acquitted him of vehicular manslaughter and driving under the influence but convicted him of criminally negligent homicide and driving while ability impaired. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction and sentence. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the criminally negligent homicide conviction were preserved for appellate review.

    2. Whether the defendant’s claim regarding the admissibility of relation-back testimony concerning his blood alcohol level was preserved for appellate review.

    3. Whether the defendant was denied a fair trial due to certain evidentiary rulings.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to make a timely and specific objection at trial regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to make a timely and specific objection at trial regarding the admissibility of the relation-back testimony.

    3. No, the Court found no merit to defendant’s contention that he was denied a fair trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant failed to make a timely specific objection at trial to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for criminally negligent homicide and to the admissibility of relation-back testimony regarding the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident, these points were not preserved for the Court’s review. The court cited People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19-21, and People v. Gonzalez, 55 N.Y.2d 720, 722, to support this holding. The court emphasized the importance of raising objections at trial to give the lower court an opportunity to address the issues. Regarding the other evidentiary rulings, the Court found no merit to the defendant’s contention that he was denied a fair trial. The Court noted that testimony regarding the defendant’s attempts to avoid giving an adequate breath sample was properly admitted as evidence of consciousness of guilt, especially considering the trial court’s limiting instructions. Furthermore, any error in reporting the defendant’s blood alcohol level beyond the second decimal point was deemed harmless because the defendant was convicted of driving while ability impaired, which does not require a specific blood alcohol level. The court cited Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1195 (2)(c). Finally, the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that he was not given an individualized sentence. The court in People v. Gray stated, “The main purposes of the preservation requirement, informing the court of the objection as well as affording the opportunity to cure the error, and of the contemporaneous objection rule, are advanced by requiring that the basis of the objection be apparent, either from its face, or from the context.”

  • People v. Grogan, 88 N.Y.2d 819 (1996): Jury Instructions on Criminal Negligence Must Accurately State Elements

    People v. Grogan, 88 N.Y.2d 819 (1996)

    Jury instructions in a criminally negligent homicide case must accurately convey that a series of careless acts, taken in combination, are required to establish the “serious blameworthiness” or gross deviation from reasonable care necessary for a conviction, and an instruction suggesting that any single act is sufficient is erroneous.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. The Court of Appeals reviewed whether the trial court’s jury instructions accurately conveyed the elements of criminally negligent homicide, particularly regarding the defendant’s actions leading to the victim’s death. The court found that the trial court’s disjunctive charge, which suggested that the jury could convict if the defendant committed any one of several alleged acts, was erroneous. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The dissent argued the jury charge was prejudicial and lowered the burden of proof.

    Facts

    The defendant was driving a motor vehicle and was involved in a collision that resulted in the death of Floyd Shepard. The prosecution alleged that the defendant was operating the vehicle after consuming alcohol, operating without sufficient rest, and/or operating without due regard to adverse weather conditions. The trial court instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty if she was operating a motor vehicle after consuming alcohol and/or operating without sufficient rest, and/or without due regard to adverse weather conditions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the trial court. The defendant appealed. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s jury instructions accurately conveyed the elements of criminally negligent homicide, specifically whether the disjunctive charge suggesting that any single act by the defendant was sufficient for conviction was erroneous.

    Holding

    No, because the charge as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the correct principles of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the disjunctive charge should have been avoided, the charge as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the correct principles of law. The court emphasized that criminal negligence requires a high degree of culpability, more than ordinary civil negligence. It cited People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (1990), stating that “criminal liability cannot be predicated on every act of carelessness resulting in death [T]he carelessness required for criminal negligence is appreciably more serious than that for ordinary civil negligence.” The dissent argued that the instruction was prejudicial because it allowed the jury to convict if it found that the defendant committed any one of the alleged acts, which, standing alone, might not have been sufficient to establish criminal negligence. The dissent believed the jury charge lowered the burden of proof on the prosecution.

  • People v. Faulkner, 76 N.Y.2d 580 (1990): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses and Risk Perception

    People v. Faulkner, 76 N.Y.2d 580 (1990)

    A jury is entitled to a charge on a lesser-included offense only if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Faulkner was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and weapons charges after fatally shooting a bystander during a fight. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense, which the court denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that no reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that Faulkner committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree. The court emphasized that the defendant’s actions of pulling out a loaded gun, aiming into a crowd, and disregarding a warning not to shoot demonstrated recklessness, negating any reasonable basis for a finding of mere failure to perceive risk.

    Facts

    Defendant Faulkner was involved in a fight at a block party.
    During the altercation, Faulkner pulled out a loaded handgun.
    He aimed the gun at a fleeing man he had been fighting with in a crowded area.
    A companion warned Faulkner not to shoot because of the presence of a crowd.
    The gun discharged when Faulkner’s arm was bumped, fatally wounding a bystander.

    Procedural History

    Faulkner was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree and weapons charges in the trial court.
    Faulkner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.
    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because no reasonable view of the evidence supported a finding that Faulkner committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense charge only if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that he committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense. While recklessness (required for manslaughter in the second degree) encompasses criminal negligence, the evidence did not support a finding of the latter without the former.

    The court emphasized that Faulkner’s actions demonstrated a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk (recklessness), rather than a mere failure to perceive such a risk (criminal negligence). The court noted that Faulkner pulled out a loaded weapon, aimed it into a crowded area, and ignored a warning not to shoot. “Nothing in the evidence presented could reasonably suggest that defendant failed to perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk.”

    Therefore, the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide, as no reasonable jury could have found that Faulkner was merely negligent rather than reckless.

  • People v. Kenny, 76 N.Y.2d 1026 (1990): Establishing Causation and Criminal Negligence in Drug Overdose Cases

    People v. Kenny, 76 N.Y.2d 1026 (1990)

    A defendant can be convicted of criminally negligent homicide for administering drugs to a person who subsequently dies from a drug overdose, if the defendant’s actions are a sufficiently direct cause of death and constitute a gross deviation from reasonable care.

    Summary

    Defendant Kenny was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and criminal injection of a narcotic drug after his girlfriend died of a cocaine overdose. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Kenny’s act of injecting the victim with cocaine was a direct cause of her death. The court reasoned that Kenny knew the victim intended to continue using cocaine, and his actions created a substantial and unjustifiable risk that grossly deviated from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe.

    Facts

    On the night of her death, Kenny injected his girlfriend with her first two doses of cocaine. Kenny knew that she planned to continue taking injections until their supply was exhausted. Although the girlfriend later administered her own injections, including the one immediately preceding her death, the prosecution’s expert witness testified that each injection, including those given by Kenny, contributed to her death.

    Procedural History

    Kenny was convicted in the trial court of criminally negligent homicide and criminal injection of a narcotic drug. He appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Kenny appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s actions were a sufficiently direct cause of the victim’s death to subject him to criminal liability for criminally negligent homicide.

    2. Whether the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with criminal negligence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury could have reasonably found that defendant’s actions were a “sufficiently direct cause” of death, as the ultimate harm was foreseeable.

    2. Yes, because the jury could have rationally found that the defendant created “a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that his actions would contribute to the victim’s death, and that this risk constituted “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could reasonably conclude that Kenny’s actions were a “sufficiently direct cause” of his girlfriend’s death. The court cited People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 307, and People v. Kibbe, 35 N.Y.2d 407, 412, emphasizing that the ultimate harm should have been foreseen as reasonably related to Kenny’s acts.

    Regarding criminal negligence, the court referenced Penal Law § 15.05 (4) and § 125.10, stating that the jury could have found Kenny created a substantial and unjustifiable risk by injecting the victim with cocaine when he knew she intended to continue taking injections. The court noted that this risk was of such nature and degree that Kenny’s failure to perceive it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable person would observe. The court reasoned that the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s intent to continue drug use throughout the night made his actions a gross deviation from reasonable care, leading to criminal negligence.

    The court found no merit in the defendant’s remaining contentions and affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Loughlin, 76 N.Y.2d 804 (1990): Addressing Inconsistent Verdicts Under New York Criminal Procedure Law

    People v. Loughlin, 76 N.Y.2d 804 (1990)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, when a jury renders an inconsistent verdict, resubmission to the jury is required only if there’s evidence of confusion regarding an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

    Summary

    In People v. Loughlin, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court erred in failing to resubmit an inconsistent verdict to the jury. The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular assault but acquitted of vehicular manslaughter. A dissenting judge argued that the inconsistency in the verdict, specifically regarding intoxication, necessitated resubmission to the jury under CPL 310.50(2). The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that resubmission is only required when the jury’s confusion pertains to an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with multiple offenses, including criminally negligent homicide, vehicular manslaughter, and vehicular assault, stemming from an incident involving the operation of a motor vehicle. The jury returned a verdict convicting the defendant of criminally negligent homicide and vehicular assault but acquitted him of vehicular manslaughter. The defendant argued the verdict was inconsistent, as the conviction for vehicular assault seemed to contradict the acquittal on vehicular manslaughter, particularly concerning the element of intoxication.

    Procedural History

    The trial court did not resubmit the verdict to the jury, and the defendant was sentenced. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court violated CPL 310.50(2) by failing to direct the jury to reconsider its inconsistent verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the inconsistency did not necessitate resubmission.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by failing to resubmit the jury’s verdict for reconsideration under CPL 310.50(2) due to an alleged inconsistency between the convictions for criminally negligent homicide and vehicular assault and the acquittal for vehicular manslaughter.

    Holding

    No, because resubmission is only required if the jury’s confusion relates to an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and in this case, the inconsistency did not demonstrate such confusion.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its precedent in People v. Robinson, clarifying that CPL 310.50(2) does not mandate resubmission for every instance of a jury failing to comply with instructions. The court reasoned that unless “the jury held the defendant guilty of a crime on which it had found he did not commit an essential element,” there is no evidence of confusion requiring resubmission. The court distinguished the case from situations where the jury’s confusion is evident in returning an inherently inconsistent verdict concerning essential elements. Here, the court found no such confusion that would mandate resubmission. The dissenting judge argued that the jury’s verdict was indeed inconsistent, as the conviction for vehicular assault seemed to contradict the acquittal on vehicular manslaughter, particularly concerning the element of intoxication. The dissent emphasized that the mandatory language of CPL 310.50(2) requires resubmission when the verdict is legally defective or inconsistent. The dissent also noted that the new rule is at odds with the court’s insistence that a claim of repugnancy in a verdict be raised before the jury is discharged in order to preserve the error for appellate review, designed to permit the court to resubmit the matter to the jury to obtain a consistent verdict. The majority rejected this view, finding no reversible error in the trial court’s handling of the verdict.

  • People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (1990): Criminally Negligent Homicide Requires Blameworthy Risk-Creating Conduct

    People v. Boutin, 75 N.Y.2d 692 (1990)

    Criminally negligent homicide requires not only a failure to perceive a risk of death, but also some serious blameworthiness in the conduct that caused it; a mere failure to perceive a risk, without underlying culpable conduct, is insufficient for a conviction.

    Summary

    Boutin was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after his truck collided with a police car stopped on the interstate, resulting in two deaths. The prosecution argued that Boutin’s failure to see the flashing emergency lights constituted criminal negligence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence only proved Boutin’s failure to perceive the risk, not any blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to that risk. The court emphasized that criminal negligence requires a gross deviation from reasonable care and some culpable risk creation, not just an unexplained failure to perceive danger.

    Facts

    On a dark, rainy night, Boutin was driving his truck on Interstate 87. A marked police car with flashing lights was stopped in the right-hand lane behind a disabled tractor-trailer. Boutin’s truck collided with the police car, killing the State Trooper and the driver of the disabled vehicle. Boutin stated at the scene that he did not see the flashing lights. The passenger in Boutin’s truck confirmed this at trial. The prosecution’s expert testified that Boutin did not apply the brakes before the collision and was traveling between 60 and 65 mph. Boutin’s passenger testified that the truck’s speed was between 40 and 50 mph and that Boutin applied the brakes approximately 200 feet before impact, after neither of them had seen the police car.

    Procedural History

    Boutin was convicted of two counts of criminally negligent homicide in County Court, and his motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no excuse for Boutin’s failure to observe the emergency lights. Boutin appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the unexplained failure of a driver to see a vehicle and its flashing lights ahead, resulting in a fatal collision, is sufficient to establish criminally negligent homicide under New York Penal Law § 125.10 and § 15.05(4), absent evidence of other culpable, risk-creating conduct.

    Holding

    No, because criminally negligent homicide requires not only a failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk, but also some serious blameworthiness in the conduct that caused the death, and Boutin’s unexplained failure to see the vehicle ahead, without more, does not satisfy this standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that criminal negligence requires a gross deviation from the standard of care and that the carelessness must be such that its seriousness would be apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong. The court distinguished this case from others where convictions for criminally negligent homicide were upheld, noting that in those cases, the defendants had engaged in additional blameworthy conduct, such as speeding, racing, or disobeying traffic signals. As the court stated, “criminally negligent homicide requires not only a failure to perceive a risk of death, but also some serious blameworthiness in the conduct that caused it.” In this case, the court found that the evidence only showed Boutin’s unexplained failure to see the vehicle ahead, which, while potentially civil negligence, did not rise to the level of criminal negligence. The court highlighted that “unless a defendant has engaged in some blameworthy conduct creating or contributing to a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, he has not committed the crime of criminally negligent homicide; his ‘nonperception’ of a risk, even if death results, is not enough.” The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.

  • People v. Flayhart, 72 N.Y.2d 737 (1988): Accomplice Liability for Criminally Negligent Homicide

    People v. Flayhart, 72 N.Y.2d 737 (1988)

    A defendant can be held accessorially liable for criminally negligent homicide under Penal Law § 20.00, not for aiding another to reach a particular mental state, but for intentionally aiding another to engage in conduct constituting the charged offense, while himself acting with the mental culpability required for the commission of that offense.

    Summary

    Richard and Beatrice Flayhart were convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the death of Richard’s brother, Terry Flayhart, who had cerebral palsy, epilepsy and was mentally retarded. The prosecution argued that Terry died of neglect while living with and dependent on the Flayharts. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that accomplice liability can be applied to criminally negligent homicide when the defendant intentionally aids another in conduct that constitutes the offense, while failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death. The court also found no error in the admission of evidence regarding a trust fund for Terry’s care, or in the handling of photographic evidence.

    Facts

    Terry Flayhart, who was mentally retarded and suffered from cerebral palsy and epilepsy, lived with his brother Richard and Richard’s wife, Beatrice. Terry was dependent on the Flayharts for care. He died from malnutrition and lung inflammation, exacerbated by pneumonia, and evidence suggested that he had aspirated food. He weighed approximately 75 pounds at the time of his death. A $122,000 trust fund had been established to pay for Terry’s care, and Terry had not seen his regular doctor in two years.

    Procedural History

    Richard and Beatrice Flayhart were charged with reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice liability. The jury found them guilty of criminally negligent homicide, and they were sentenced to imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgments of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission for appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether it is logically possible to “aid and abet” criminally negligent homicide, given that it is an unintentional crime, specifically, whether one can intentionally aid another to fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death?

    2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by admitting evidence that Richard Flayhart was in line to inherit the trust fund established for Terry’s care?

    3. Whether the trial court erred in the manner in which it handled photographs of Terry’s body during the trial?

    Holding

    1. No, because Penal Law § 20.00 imposes accessorial liability for intentionally aiding conduct that constitutes the charged offense, acting with the required mental culpability, not for aiding another to reach a particular mental state.

    2. No, because the trust fund evidence was relevant to the charge of reckless manslaughter, which includes an element of deliberate conduct, providing a possible motive for disregarding the risk to Terry’s life.

    3. No, because the trial court has discretionary power to manage courtroom proceedings and determine how the jury is exposed to photographic evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Penal Law § 20.00 imposes liability for intentionally aiding conduct constituting the offense, while the accomplice acts with the mental culpability required for that offense. The defendants were convicted because the jury found that each of them, while failing to perceive a substantial risk of death, intentionally aided the other to engage in conduct, such as failing to provide food and medical care, that brought about Terry Flayhart’s death. The court cited People v. Abbott, 84 A.D.2d 11 in its analysis.

    Regarding the trust fund, the court noted that while the defendants were convicted of criminally negligent homicide, they were also charged with reckless manslaughter. Because reckless manslaughter includes an element of deliberate conduct (conscious disregard for a known risk), evidence of a motive may be relevant. The court stated, “Because reckless manslaughter includes an element of deliberate conduct, the admission of evidence of a motive may be justified in a proper case.” The jury could have considered the trust fund as evidence of Richard Flayhart’s incentive to disregard the risk to his brother.

    Finally, the court determined that the trial court’s handling of the photographs was within its discretionary power to manage courtroom proceedings. The trial court was concerned that the jury would be distracted by the graphic evidence during cross-examination and summations, potentially forming an opinion prematurely. The court cited People v. Pobliner, 32 NY2d 356, affirming the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in managing evidence presentation.

  • People v. Goodell, 68 N.Y.2d 392 (1986): Admissibility of Blood Test Results in Criminally Negligent Homicide Cases

    People v. Goodell, 68 N.Y.2d 392 (1986)

    Blood samples taken pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194, even without a separate court order, are admissible in prosecutions for criminally negligent homicide under the Penal Law, provided the statutory requirements for taking the sample are met.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide after a single-car accident in which his passenger died. A blood sample taken while the unconscious defendant was at the hospital revealed intoxication. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the blood test results were admissible. The Court found that the defendant failed to properly preserve the argument that a separate court order was required under People v. Moselle. The Court further reasoned that the blood sample was taken in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194, as it was taken within two hours of arrest by a registered nurse at the request of a police officer with reasonable grounds to believe the defendant violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192. The Court relied on the implied consent provision of the statute, even though the defendant was unconscious.

    Facts

    On November 3, 1979, the defendant was involved in a single-car accident where he was the driver, and his passenger was killed.

    After the accident, the unconscious defendant was taken to a hospital.

    While still unconscious at the hospital, the defendant was arrested, and a blood sample was taken.

    The blood sample revealed that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide (Penal Law § 125.10) after a jury trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether blood sample results taken pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194, without a separate court order, may be used in prosecutions brought under the Penal Law.

    2. Whether the results of a blood test are admissible if the blood sample was not taken in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to raise that specific argument at the suppression hearing.

    2. No, because the sample was taken within two hours of the arrest by a registered nurse at the request of a police officer, who had reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had been operating a vehicle in violation of section 1192 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and the defendant’s consent to provide a blood sample was implied under section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, notwithstanding that he was unconscious at the time of the blood withdrawal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals first addressed the defendant’s argument that the blood test results should have been suppressed under People v. Moselle, which concerned the use of blood samples taken under the Vehicle and Traffic Law in Penal Law prosecutions. The Court found that this argument was not properly preserved for review because the defendant failed to raise this specific objection at the suppression hearing, citing People v. Colon and People v. Thomas.

    Turning to the defendant’s second claim, the Court reasoned that the blood sample was taken in compliance with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194. The Court emphasized that the sample was taken within two hours of the arrest by a registered nurse at the request of a police officer who had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant had violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, which prohibits operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

    The Court relied on the implied consent provision of § 1194, stating, “Defendant’s consent to provide a blood sample was implied under section 1194 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, notwithstanding that he was unconscious at the time of the blood withdrawal” (citing People v. Kates). Because the statute’s requirements were met, there was no basis for suppressing the blood test results.

    The Court concluded that because the requirements of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 were satisfied, the blood sample was properly admitted as evidence and the conviction was affirmed.

  • People v. Rooney, 57 N.Y.2d 822 (1982): Sufficiency of Proof for Criminally Negligent Homicide

    57 N.Y.2d 822 (1982)

    A defendant can be convicted of criminally negligent homicide even if the jury does not find them guilty of every act alleged in the indictment, provided the remaining proven acts are sufficient to establish criminal negligence.

    Summary

    Michael Rooney was charged with criminally negligent homicide for causing a death while driving intoxicated, speeding, and driving on the wrong side of the road. The jury acquitted him of driving under the influence but convicted him of criminally negligent homicide. Rooney argued that the jury had to find him guilty of all the acts mentioned in the indictment to convict him of criminally negligent homicide. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution did not need to prove every act alleged in the indictment, as long as the remaining proven acts sufficiently established criminal negligence. This case clarifies that not all factual allegations in an indictment are essential for conviction.

    Facts

    Michael Rooney was driving a motor vehicle. He drove at an excessive rate of speed. He drove on the wrong side of the road. Rooney struck another vehicle. The collision resulted in the death of another person. Rooney was alleged to have been intoxicated while driving. The indictment charged Rooney with criminally negligent homicide based on the above actions.

    Procedural History

    Rooney was tried in the trial court on an indictment for criminally negligent homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol. Rooney requested a jury instruction that required proof of all acts alleged in the indictment to convict him of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court refused the instruction. The jury found Rooney not guilty of driving under the influence but guilty of criminally negligent homicide. Rooney appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rooney appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be found guilty of criminally negligent homicide if the jury does not find them guilty of all the acts mentioned in the indictment related to the charge.

    Holding

    No, because not every fact mentioned in an indictment is essential to establish the defendant’s guilt of the crime charged; it is not necessary that the People prove all acts alleged when the remaining acts are sufficient to sustain a conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that not every fact mentioned in an indictment is essential to establish the defendant’s guilt. The court stated that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove all the acts alleged in the indictment, as long as the remaining acts are sufficient to sustain a conviction. In this case, the jury could find that Rooney was criminally negligent when he drove on the wrong side of the road while speeding, even if he was not intoxicated at the time. The court emphasized that the essential element was whether Rooney’s conduct, considered as a whole or in part, constituted criminal negligence. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury as requested by Rooney, affirming the lower court’s decision. The court, in essence, found that the jury could reasonably conclude that driving on the wrong side of the road at an excessive speed, even without intoxication, constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care and therefore, criminal negligence.

  • People v. Fitzgerald, 45 N.Y.2d 574 (1978): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations in Indictment for Criminally Negligent Homicide

    People v. Fitzgerald, 45 N.Y.2d 574 (1978)

    An indictment charging criminally negligent homicide or assault must contain factual allegations supporting the element of criminal negligence, but these facts can be provided in a bill of particulars if not fully detailed in the indictment itself.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for criminally negligent homicide and assault after hitting two teenage girls with his car, resulting in one death and one severe injury. The indictment stated the defendant caused the death and injury through criminal negligence while operating his vehicle. The defendant argued the indictment lacked sufficient factual detail regarding the alleged criminal negligence. The New York Court of Appeals held that while the indictment must assert facts supporting every element of the offense, including criminal negligence, a bill of particulars can provide the necessary details if the indictment itself is not sufficiently specific, ensuring the defendant is adequately informed to prepare a defense.

    Facts

    On December 22, 1975, two teenage girls were struck by a hit-and-run driver in Westchester County. Cara Pollini died from a broken neck, and Susan Bassett was severely injured. Several days later, the defendant surrendered himself and his car to the police. A grand jury indicted the defendant on four counts: criminally negligent homicide, third-degree assault, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to dismiss the first two counts (criminally negligent homicide and assault) for failing to comply with CPL 200.50(7), arguing they lacked factual indication of acts constituting criminal negligence. The trial court dismissed these counts, citing insufficient evidence and inadequate factual allegations. The Appellate Division affirmed solely on the grounds of insufficient factual allegations. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment charging criminally negligent homicide and third-degree assault is sufficient under CPL 200.50(7) when it alleges criminal negligence in the language of the statute, without specifying the underlying facts constituting the negligence, provided a bill of particulars is available to supply those facts.

    Holding

    Yes, because while an indictment must contain a factual statement supporting every element of the offense, the required details concerning the conduct constituting criminal negligence can be provided in a bill of particulars, ensuring the defendant is adequately informed to prepare a defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that criminal negligence, unlike intent, encompasses both a culpable mental state and underlying conduct involving a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and a gross deviation from reasonable care. While the mental element may generally be alleged in the words of the statute, the underlying conduct creating the risk varies and may involve complex circumstances. CPL 200.50(7) requires a plain and concise factual statement supporting every element of the offense. However, a complete itemization of all circumstances in the indictment could be overly complex. The court emphasized the defendant’s right to be informed of the conduct forming the basis of the accusation to prepare a defense. The court noted: “Thus a person accused of causing death or injury by acting with ‘criminal negligence’ is entitled to know specifically what conduct on his part involved a ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ of death or injury and ‘a gross deviation’ from the standard of reasonable care (Penal Law, § 15.05, subd 4).” The availability of a bill of particulars to provide these details ensures adequate notice to the defendant. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for consideration of the sufficiency of the Grand Jury evidence.