New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Trespass

  • People v. Devonish, 6 N.Y.3d 727 (2005): Entitlement to Lesser Included Offense Instruction

    6 N.Y.3d 727 (2005)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    James Devonish was convicted of second-degree burglary. At trial, the defense requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of second-degree criminal trespass, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to the lesser included offense instruction because a reasonable view of the evidence suggested he may have committed criminal trespass (entering unlawfully) without the intent to commit a crime therein, as required for burglary. The evidence showed he was found in a locked church with tools that might have belonged to someone else who stored them there, thus creating a question as to whether he possessed the tools (and criminal intent) upon entry.

    Facts

    Defendant James Devonish was found inside a locked church building. He had a bag containing tools commonly used by burglars.

    A witness, a general contractor for the church, testified that he stored his tools in the church basement.

    The contractor identified one of the tools found in Devonish’s possession as his “for sure,” and indicated the others might have been his as well.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree in the trial court.

    He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury with the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the second degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence would permit the jury to conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense (criminal trespass) but not the greater offense (burglary).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the jury could have inferred that the defendant did not bring the tools with him into the church.

    The court noted that the contractor’s testimony indicated the tools could have already been in the church. Thus, the evidence could have failed to establish that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent (to commit a crime inside) at the time of entry, a necessary element of burglary.

    The court cited People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364, 373 (1980), emphasizing that if “some reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater, it is error to refuse to submit such lesser offense.”

    Because the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant entered the church unlawfully (trespass) but without the intent to commit a crime therein (burglary), the defendant was entitled to the lesser included offense instruction.

    The Court stated that “the jury was entitled to infer that defendant did not bring the tools with him to the church, and thus that the evidence failed to show that he had criminal intent at the time of entry”.

  • People v. Moore, 5 N.Y.3d 725 (2005): Third-Degree Criminal Trespass Requires Fencing or Enclosure of Building

    5 N.Y.3d 725 (2005)

    To be convicted of third-degree criminal trespass under Penal Law § 140.10(a) for entering a building, the prosecution must prove the building was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.

    Summary

    Defendant Jerry Moore was charged with third-degree criminal trespass for entering a building on the SUNY Buffalo campus, violating a persona non grata letter. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the charge, holding that the information was jurisdictionally defective. The Court reasoned that to establish third-degree criminal trespass under Penal Law § 140.10(a) for entering a building, the prosecution must allege and prove that the building was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders. The information lacked such allegations, rendering it facially insufficient.

    Facts

    Jerry Moore was issued a “persona non grata” letter in 1999 and again in 2000, barring him from the SUNY Buffalo campus. On September 4, 2002, Moore entered a public building on the SUNY Buffalo campus. A verbal exchange occurred between Moore and a university employee.

    Procedural History

    The City Court granted Moore’s motion to dismiss the information, finding it jurisdictionally defective for failing to set forth every element of criminal trespass in the third degree. The County Court affirmed the City Court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an information charging a defendant with third-degree criminal trespass for entering a building is facially sufficient when it fails to allege that the building was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, as required by Penal Law § 140.10(a).

    Holding

    No, because the information failed to allege a necessary element of the crime, namely that the building entered was fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the plain language of Penal Law § 140.10(a), which states that a person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when they knowingly enter or remain unlawfully in a building or upon real property “which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders.” The Court emphasized that the 1987 amendment to the statute made this requirement explicit. Before the amendment, the statute had been interpreted as not requiring a building to be fenced or enclosed. The Court reasoned that if knowingly entering any building was sufficient, then the additional elements for trespass in specific buildings (schools, public housing) would be unnecessary, and the violation of trespass would be identical to criminal trespass in the third degree.

    The Court cited People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 136 (1987), stating that “an information which fails to contain nonhearsay allegations establishing `if true, every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof’ . . . is fatally defective.” Because the information and supporting deposition failed to allege that the campus building was fenced or enclosed, a required element of the crime, it was insufficient to establish criminal trespass in the third degree.

    The Court stated, “The plain language of the statute as amended, however, clearly requires that both buildings and real property be fenced or otherwise enclosed in order to increase the level of culpability from trespass (see Penal Law § 140.05) to criminal trespass in the third degree.”

  • Duffy v. Ward, 81 N.Y.2d 127 (1993): Defining ‘Violation of Oath of Office’ for Public Officer Removal

    Duffy v. Ward, 81 N.Y.2d 127 (1993)

    For a misdemeanor conviction outside the line of duty to trigger automatic removal of a public officer under Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), the crime’s elements, as defined in the Penal Law, must inherently demonstrate a lack of moral integrity.

    Summary

    A New York City police officer, Duffy, was summarily terminated after being convicted of criminal trespass in the second degree following an off-duty altercation. The Police Commissioner invoked Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), which mandates vacancy of public office upon conviction of a felony or a crime involving violation of the oath of office. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that for a misdemeanor conviction to trigger automatic removal, the crime’s elements must inherently demonstrate a lack of moral integrity, which criminal trespass does not facially imply. Duffy was entitled to a hearing before termination.

    Facts

    Duffy, an off-duty police officer, became involved in a dispute after another driver blocked his path while opening a garage door. The argument escalated when Duffy followed the driver into a vestibule, leading to a scuffle. Duffy drew his service weapon to restrain the individuals involved before summoning the police. Upon arrival, police arrested Duffy.

    Procedural History

    Duffy was acquitted of misdemeanor criminal mischief and menacing but convicted of criminal trespass in the second degree. The Police Commissioner summarily terminated Duffy’s employment. Duffy initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking reinstatement. The Supreme Court ruled that the trespass did not violate Duffy’s oath of office. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that Duffy’s actions violated his oath to protect property. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a court, when determining if a crime involves a violation of the oath of office under Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), should consider only the elements of the crime or also the underlying facts of the incident?

    2. What type of misdemeanor conviction constitutes a crime involving a violation of the oath of office under Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e), warranting summary termination?

    Holding

    1. No, because when determining if a misdemeanor conviction arising outside the line of duty violates the oath of office, the court should look solely to the elements of the crime as defined in the Penal Law.

    2. Only those misdemeanors that, as defined in the Penal Law, arise from knowing or intentional conduct indicative of a lack of moral integrity constitute a crime involving a violation of the oath of office under Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) because the purpose of the law is to assure citizens that their public officers are individuals of “moral integrity” worthy of confidence and trust.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) aims to ensure public trust in its officers. The statute’s directive is “clear and unqualified”. When termination is premised on a “crime involving a violation of [the] oath of office,” courts must determine the scope of the section. The court emphasized that summary dismissal or continued employment are not the only alternatives; dismissal may still occur after a hearing. The Court reasoned that the Legislature implicitly acknowledged that no factual showing by the officeholder was needed, for under no circumstances could facts unique to the incident mitigate the violation of the public trust confirmed by, and arising from, the criminal conviction when making convictions upon certain crimes grounds for immediate dismissal. To construe the law as giving the Commissioner unbridled discretion to make a fact-based determination about dismissal but foreclosing the opportunity to develop the facts, would risk the potential for arbitrary government action.

    Because the purpose of the statute is to assure citizens that their public officers are individuals of “moral integrity” worthy of confidence and trust, the Court found that for misdemeanor convictions arising outside the line of duty, Public Officers Law § 30(1)(e) applies to crimes that, as defined in the Penal Law, arise from knowing or intentional conduct indicative of a lack of moral integrity. More than intent or a criminal mens rea is needed for summary dismissal; there must be an intentional dishonesty or corruption of purpose inherent in the act prohibited by the Penal Law.

    The court concluded that criminal trespass in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.15) does not facially imply a lack of moral integrity because conviction for the offense may arise during the heat of argument. Because a lack of moral integrity is not implicit in the elements of criminal trespass, summary dismissal was not warranted.

  • People v. Blim, 63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984): When a Lesser Included Offense Instruction is Not Required

    63 N.Y.2d 718 (1984)

    A trial court is not required to charge a lesser included offense to the jury if there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Defendant Blim was convicted of burglary in the third degree. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree, which the trial court denied. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the lesser included offense should have been submitted to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The court reasoned that the key witness’s testimony could not be rationally dissected to accept the unlawful entry but reject the intent to commit a crime therein.

    Facts

    In the early morning hours, Sergeant Avery responded to a burglar alarm at the Moose Lodge. He saw two people running, one of whom he recognized as the defendant, Blim. James Lewis, the other individual, was apprehended. Avery found crowbars, a flashlight, and damage to the door, indicating forced entry. Lewis testified that he and Blim entered the lodge with the intent to open the safe and steal money. They left briefly after noticing a flashing red light but returned. Lewis took $12 from a metal box, while Blim went to the room containing the safe. They fled when they saw a Sheriff’s car and were ordered to halt. A barmaid testified that $11 was missing from the metal box. The lodge governor confirmed the money was present a day or two prior and missing after the incident.

    Procedural History

    The Schuyler County Court convicted Blim of burglary in the third degree. Blim appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the third degree. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal trespass in the third degree as a lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree.

    Holding

    No, because under no reasonable view of the evidence could the jury have found that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that criminal trespass in the third degree is a lesser included offense of burglary in the third degree because burglary requires all the elements of criminal trespass, plus an intent to commit a crime inside the premises. However, a lesser included offense instruction is only required if there is a “rational basis on which the jury could reject a portion of the prosecution’s case which is indispensable to establishment of the higher crime and yet accept so much of the proof as would establish the lesser crime” (citing People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364, 369-370). The court found no such rational basis here. The testimony of Lewis, the accomplice, established both the unlawful entry and the intent to commit a crime. Discrediting Lewis’s testimony due to his plea bargain would impact his entire testimony, not just the element of intent. The Court stated, “There is no rational basis for rejecting his testimony concerning their intent to commit a crime in the lodge while accepting his testimony with respect to their unlawful entry into the lodge.” Sergeant Avery’s testimony only established Blim’s presence near the lodge, not that he unlawfully entered or remained inside. Thus, the prosecution’s case established either burglary or nothing, making the lesser included offense instruction unnecessary.

  • People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404 (1984): Lawfulness of Exclusion Orders on Publicly Accessible University Campuses

    People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404 (1984)

    When prosecuting a trespass charge against an individual banned from a state university campus that is generally open to the public, the prosecution must prove that the banishment order was lawful, demonstrating a legitimate basis for the order that does not infringe upon the defendant’s statutory or constitutional rights.

    Summary

    Leonard, previously a student at SUNY-Binghamton, was issued a “persona non grata” letter by the university president, banning him from campus. He was arrested for criminal trespass after being found on campus and convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecution failed to prove the lawfulness of the banishment order. The Court emphasized that while universities have the power to maintain order, excluding someone from a publicly accessible campus requires demonstrating a legitimate basis for the exclusion that does not infringe upon the excluded individual’s rights. The prosecution cannot rely on a presumption of lawfulness; it must present evidence justifying the order.

    Facts

    Leonard had been a student at SUNY-Binghamton at various times over a 10 year period, but was not a student at the time of the incident. On February 23, 1981, the president of SUNY-Binghamton issued a “persona non grata” letter to Leonard, banning him from the campus and warning that he would be arrested if he returned. On October 23, 1981, Leonard was found at the Campus Pub, located in the University Union building on the SUNY-Binghamton campus, and was subsequently arrested.

    Procedural History

    Leonard was charged with criminal trespass in the third degree in Vestal Town Court. Prior to the non-jury trial, the parties stipulated that Leonard received the “persona non grata” letter, was not a student, faculty member, or employee at the time, was present on campus in October 1981, and that the campus and Campus Pub were “open to the public”. The trial court found the banishment order could be lawful even without any specific reason. The court declined to consider evidence on the order’s lawfulness. Leonard’s motion to dismiss was denied, and he was convicted. The County Court upheld the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a prosecution for criminal trespass on a university campus generally open to the public, the People must prove that an order banning the defendant from the campus was lawful.

    Holding

    Yes, because when prosecuting for criminal trespass on property “open to the public,” the People must prove that a lawful order excluding the defendant issued, and this includes demonstrating a legitimate basis for the order that does not infringe upon the defendant’s independent statutory or constitutional rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the university’s general power under Education Law § 6450 to maintain order and exclude individuals who violate campus rules. However, the Court emphasized that this power is not absolute and cannot be exercised in a way that violates protected rights. The court reasoned that because the campus was stipulated to be “open to the public”, the prosecution had the burden to prove a lawful order was issued. To do so, the People must demonstrate that the exclusion order had a legitimate basis and did not unlawfully inhibit the defendant from engaging in constitutionally or statutorily protected conduct. The court stated that the power to exclude does not permit orders based on discriminatory factors or that impermissibly inhibit constitutionally protected activity. The Court rejected the argument that the prosecution could rely on a presumption that the university president acted lawfully, stating that such a presumption would unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. As the prosecution presented no evidence of a legitimate basis for the banishment order, the Court found that the People failed to meet their burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court cited People v. Session, 34 N.Y.2d 254, 256, highlighting the impermissibility of presuming the lawfulness of official actions when it comes to proving elements of a crime.

  • People v. Lane, 60 N.Y.2d 748 (1983): Adequacy of “All-or-Nothing” Defense in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

    People v. Lane, 60 N.Y.2d 748 (1983)

    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that their attorney’s representation was not “meaningful” when viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, and that losing tactics should not be confused with true ineffectiveness.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction for second-degree burglary, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. His primary complaints were his attorney’s failure to request a charge of criminal trespass as a lesser included offense and failure to contest his predicate felony conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the attorney’s decision not to request the lesser included charge was a reasonable “all-or-nothing” defense tactic given the defendant’s testimony and the evidence presented. Furthermore, the court found that challenging the predicate felony would have been futile.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with second-degree burglary after entering a Bronx apartment at night. At trial, the defendant testified that he had consumed angel dust before the incident and entered the apartment to evade the police. The apartment’s occupants partially corroborated the defendant’s testimony, stating he claimed the police were after him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary in a jury trial and sentenced as a second felony offender. He appealed, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defense counsel’s failure to request a charge of the lesser included offense of criminal trespass constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
    2. Whether the defense counsel’s failure to challenge the defendant’s predicate felony conviction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    1. No, because the attorney’s decision was a reasonable trial tactic based on the defendant’s testimony and the presented evidence.
    2. No, because the challenges to the predicate felony conviction would have been futile.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the standard articulated in People v. Baldi, which requires courts to avoid confusing losing tactics with true ineffectiveness and to assess the attorney’s representation in its totality at the time of representation. The court found that the attorney’s failure to request a charge for criminal trespass was a deliberate “all-or-nothing” defense tactic, attempting to leverage the defendant’s testimony regarding intoxication and lack of intent to commit a crime. The court noted, “[s]o long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement…will have been met.”

    Regarding the predicate felony, the court found that the defendant’s arguments were meritless. The court stated that despite the defendant’s claim that he was promised youthful offender status, the record did not support such a promise. Furthermore, the court found that the failure to explicitly mention the “right to a jury trial” during the plea allocution in the prior felony case did not prejudice the defendant, citing People v. Nixon. The court reasoned that counsel could have reasonably concluded no prejudice resulted to his client at the plea allocution.

  • People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980): Criminal Trespass Requires Unlawful Entry Without License or Privilege

    People v. Munafo, 50 N.Y.2d 326 (1980)

    For a criminal trespass conviction, the prosecution must prove the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully on property without license or privilege to do so.

    Summary

    James Munafo, Sr., was convicted of trespass and disorderly conduct for protesting the State Power Authority’s construction on his land. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Munafo, as the landowner, had a privilege to be on his property, thus negating the trespass charge. The court also found the disorderly conduct charge insufficient because Munafo’s actions, though disruptive, did not create a public disturbance, given the secluded location and the lack of widespread impact.

    Facts

    The State Power Authority appropriated a right-of-way across Munafo’s farm. Disturbed by the construction of a transmission line, Munafo protested by firing a rifle at a target on his property near the construction site (but without endangering anyone). After police confiscated the rifle, he positioned himself in front of a backhoe, refusing to move, leading to his arrest. Approximately 8-10 people not associated with the power authority were present.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court of the Town of Russell convicted Munafo of trespass and disorderly conduct. The County Court of St. Lawrence County affirmed the convictions. Munafo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Munafo’s presence on his own property, subject to the Power Authority’s easement, constituted criminal trespass.

    2. Whether Munafo’s actions constituted disorderly conduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because Munafo, as the landowner, retained a privilege to be on his property, and the Power Authority’s easement did not negate that privilege.

    2. No, because Munafo’s actions did not create a public disturbance as required for a disorderly conduct conviction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the trespass charge, the court emphasized that criminal trespass requires knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully on property without license or privilege. While the Power Authority had an easement, Munafo retained ownership and possessory interest in the land. The court noted the incongruity of interpreting the law to prevent a landowner from traversing his own property. The court cited the Penal Law § 140.00(5) which discusses the power of an owner to convert lawful entries into unlawful ones. The court found no indication that the legislature intended to criminalize a landowner’s presence on his property subject to an easement.

    Regarding the disorderly conduct charge, the court explained that it aims to deter breaches of the peace, defined as “public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” The court focused on whether the disruptive behavior had public ramifications. Here, Munafo’s actions occurred in a secluded area of his property, away from public thoroughfares. The number of people present was small, and there was no evidence that Munafo incited or involved them. Therefore, the dispute remained between Munafo and the Power Authority, not a public disturbance. The court distinguished this case from situations involving obstruction of public passage or refusal to disperse from a congregated crowd. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, stating that “the differences between the authority and the defendant were confined to these two disputants rather than spread to the public.”

  • People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351 (1974): Warrantless Search Incident to Lawful Arrest Extends to Personal Effects

    People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351 (1974)

    A warrantless search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to personal effects of the arrestee that are “ready to hand,” regardless of a later judicial determination of the probability of finding weapons or evidence.

    Summary

    Weintraub was arrested for criminal trespass. A contemporaneous search of an attaché case he was carrying revealed stolen checks, airline tickets, and credit cards. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the warrantless search of the attaché case was constitutionally permissible as a search incident to a lawful arrest. The Court held that it was, reasoning that the authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to items within the arrestee’s immediate control, regardless of the likelihood of finding specific evidence related to the crime of arrest. This case clarifies the scope of searches incident to arrest in New York, particularly distinguishing it from traffic offense cases and aligning it with federal standards.

    Facts

    Police officers found Weintraub in a closed, vandalized parking garage, sitting in a car belonging to Sal Cirella. Weintraub claimed he had Cirella’s permission, but Cirella denied this. Nothing was missing from the car. Because Weintraub could not explain his presence, officers arrested him for criminal trespass. Incident to the arrest, officers searched a closed attaché case Weintraub had been carrying and discovered checks, airline tickets, and credit cards made out to different people.

    Procedural History

    Weintraub was charged with criminally possessing stolen property. He moved to suppress the contents of the attaché case, but the motion was denied, and he pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the warrantless search of the defendant’s attaché case, conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest for criminal trespass, was a constitutionally permissible search.

    Holding

    Yes, because the authority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to personal effects within the arrestee’s immediate control, and this authority does not depend on a later determination of the probability of finding specific evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the search was justified as incident to a lawful custodial arrest. The court distinguished this case from prior New York cases, such as People v. Marsh and People v. Adams, which limited searches incident to arrest for traffic offenses. The Court emphasized that those cases were based on the unique nature of traffic offenses and did not apply to a custodial arrest for criminal trespass. Relying on United States v. Robinson, the court stated that the justification for a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest stems from the arrest itself, based on the need to disarm the suspect and to discover or preserve evidence. The Court stated, “The lawful custodial arrest being a constitutionally reasonable intrusion upon the defendant’s privacy, the search incident requires no additional justification. (United States v. Robinson, supra, at p. 235.)” The Court further noted that the search could include personal effects of the arrestee that are “ready to hand”. The Court acknowledged that a less intrusive action—seizing the attaché case without searching it—was possible. However, it found no constitutional requirement for officers to choose the least intrusive method when conducting a search incident to arrest. The Court concluded that the search of the attaché case was a permissible search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, and the evidence found therein was admissible. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division for a determination of the facts.

  • People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453 (1972): Self-Help is Not a Defense to Criminal Trespass

    People v. Horelick, 30 N.Y.2d 453 (1972)

    The right to enter property, even when arguably justified, does not permit the use of force or illegal methods to gain entry; self-help is not a defense to criminal trespass or resisting arrest.

    Summary

    Horelick, a teacher, was convicted of criminal trespass and resisting arrest after he and others forcibly entered a locked high school during a teachers’ strike. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that regardless of whether the school should have been open, Horelick’s use of force to enter was unlawful. The court emphasized that disputes should be resolved through legal channels, not through self-help and force. The decision highlights the importance of maintaining order and resolving conflicts through established procedures, even when motivated by a sincere belief in a cause.

    Facts

    During a city-wide teachers’ strike, a high school principal ordered the school to remain closed and locked. Horelick, a teacher, disagreed with the closure and planned to enter the building. He gained access through a basement window and was confronted by a member of the custodial staff. A struggle ensued as Horelick attempted to unlock the doors to allow others to enter. Police were called, and Horelick resisted arrest, including physically resisting the officer. A crowd of supporters gathered during the arrest.

    Procedural History

    Horelick was convicted of criminal trespass in the second degree and resisting arrest. He appealed the conviction. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Horelick then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a person, believing they have a right or duty to be in a building, can use self-help, including force or illegal methods, to enter that building when it is locked and closed, and then resist arrest when police intervene.

    Holding

    No, because regardless of any perceived right or duty, the use of force or illegal methods to enter property, and resistance of arrest, is unlawful and cannot be justified by the belief in the righteousness of one’s cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the central issue was not the lawfulness of the school’s closure, but Horelick’s use of force to enter the building. The court stated, “Even such property rights, by still being subject to restrictions on the use of force, emphasize the policy against self-help by force or other illegal methods.” The court emphasized that established procedures must be followed, even if those procedures are inconvenient. The court highlighted the availability of remedies through superiors, police assistance, and ultimately the courts, rather than resorting to force. It noted that the Penal Law defines trespass in terms of a “license” or “privilege” to enter (Penal Law, § 140.00, subd. 5), and Horelick’s actions exceeded any such license. The court explicitly rejected the notion that controversies should be resolved in the streets or school corridors, stating that “it is not tolerable that the controversies be resolved in the streets or the school corridors, instead of under law, and in the courts, if necessary.” While acknowledging Horelick’s possible sincere motivation, the court held that condoning self-help force would be a grave consequence. The court implied that the appropriate course of action would have been to seek assistance from superiors or the police, and if necessary, to pursue legal action in the courts.

  • People v. Licata, 28 N.Y.2d 113 (1971): Validity of a Criminal Trespass Conviction Based on Violation of a Racetrack Exclusion Order

    People v. Licata, 28 N.Y.2d 113 (1971)

    A racetrack operator can exclude individuals from its premises, and the subsequent purchase of a ticket by an excluded person does not nullify a prior valid exclusion order, supporting a conviction for criminal trespass.

    Summary

    Licata was convicted of criminal trespass after entering Aqueduct Race Track despite a prior written notice barring him from the premises. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the racetrack operator had the right to exclude Licata and that the subsequent purchase of a ticket did not revoke the exclusion order. The court reasoned that there was no “meeting of the minds” for a valid contract and that allowing the ticket purchase to override the exclusion would undermine the Racing Commission’s regulations against undesirable persons on the premises. The court also noted that even if the initial entry was arguably permitted by the ticket, Licata remained unlawfully after being reminded of the exclusion order and refusing to leave.

    Facts

    The agent in charge of plainclothes detectives at Aqueduct Race Track gave Licata a written notice to leave the premises and not to return because of a prior bookmaking conviction. Licata threw the notice on the floor and stated, “I’ll be back.” Four months later, a detective saw Licata enter the track. The detective approached Licata to remind him of the exclusion order, but Licata responded with an obscenity and ran. The detective apprehended and arrested Licata for criminal trespass. At the time of arrest, Licata had purchased a ticket to enter the race track.

    Procedural History

    Licata was tried and convicted of criminal trespass in the trial court and sentenced to five days in jail. He appealed the judgment of conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the sale of an admission ticket to a person who has previously been served with a written order excluding them from the premises authorizes entry and nullifies the prior exclusion order.
    2. Whether a person can be convicted of criminal trespass for remaining on premises after being notified that their license to be there has been revoked.

    Holding

    1. No, because where a purchaser of an admission ticket is explicitly excluded as an undesirable person from the track by a lawful written order, the mere purchase of a ticket does not have the effect of nullifying the existing exclusion order since there is lacking the necessary contractual requirement of a “meeting of minds” at the time of the sale of the ticket.
    2. Yes, because criminal trespass is defined as knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in or upon the premises of another, and the word ‘remain’ applies to cases where a person enters with license or privilege but remains after the termination of such license or privilege.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the operator of a race track has the right to exclude a person from attending its races, as long as the exclusion is not based on race, creed, color, or national origin. The court noted the Racing Commission’s regulation that undesirable persons should not enter or remain upon the premises of any licensed association. The court stated that the responsibility to screen patrons and exclude any undesirable person lies exclusively with the track protective bureau who had issued the original “not to enter” order. The cashier selling tickets is not required nor authorized to bar prospective patrons.

    The court held that the purchase of a ticket does not revoke an existing lawful order “not to enter” because there was no “meeting of minds” at the time of the sale of the ticket. Citing Collister v. Hayman, 183 N.Y. 250, 253, the court determined that relevant policy considerations also weighed heavily in their result. To hold that the sale of a ticket revokes an existing lawful order “not to enter” would prevent effective enforcement of the commission’s regulation barring certain undesirable persons from race tracks.

    The court also noted that criminal trespass is defined as knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully in or upon the premises of another. The court emphasized that “[t]he word ‘remain’ in the phrase enter or remain’ is designed to be applicable to cases in which a person enters with ‘license or privilege’ but remains on the premises after the termination of such license or privilege.” In this case, the detective’s statement to Licata, reminding him of the exclusion order, effectively revoked any license Licata might have had to be on the premises. Licata’s subsequent refusal to leave and his attempt to flee further supported the criminal trespass charge.