New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Sale of Controlled Substance

  • People v. Butts, 84 N.Y.2d 585 (1994): Knowledge of Drug Weight Required for Criminal Sale Conviction

    People v. Butts, 84 N.Y.2d 585 (1994)

    To convict a defendant of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree under Penal Law § 220.41 (1), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly sold at least one-half ounce of a substance containing a narcotic drug; this knowledge requirement applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal when People v. Ryan was decided.

    Summary

    Butts was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. The prosecution’s evidence included statistical sampling to estimate the drug’s weight. Butts argued the evidence failed to prove he knew the contraband weighed at least one-half ounce and that the jury should have been instructed on this knowledge requirement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the knowledge requirement of People v. Ryan applies retroactively to cases on direct appeal. While the evidence was sufficient to establish the weight of the drugs, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the knowledge element warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    An undercover detective purchased heroin from Butts on multiple occasions. On two occasions, Butts contacted a third party who delivered the drugs. During one transaction, Butts directed the undercover agent into a shop where another individual dropped the drugs. The undercover agent paid Butts, who counted the money and passed it on. The prosecution presented expert testimony using statistical sampling to estimate the weight of the drugs sold on June 30 and September 26, 1988, exceeded one-half ounce.

    Procedural History

    Butts was convicted in Supreme Court of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree and two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, rejecting Butts’s argument regarding the weight of the contraband and the expert’s qualifications. A dissenting Justice granted Butts leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the weight of the contraband to support a conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.
    2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the prosecution was required to prove Butts’s knowledge of the weight of the contraband.
    3. Whether the ruling in People v. Ryan, requiring proof of knowledge of drug weight, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jury was entitled to credit the statistical testimony of the witness as sufficient evidence of the weight of the controlled substance.

    2. Yes, because the knowledge requirement established in People v. Ryan applies to the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.

    3. Yes, because People v. Ryan is retroactive to cases pending on direct appeal at the time of that decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the expert’s testimony on statistical sampling was admissible because it helped clarify a technical issue beyond the ken of the typical juror. Citing People v. Argro, the Court held that it was for the jury to decide whether the expert had adequately analyzed the contents and whether his opinion was entitled to be credited.

    Regarding the knowledge requirement, the Court relied on People v. Ryan, which held that the term “knowingly” in Penal Law § 220.18 applies not only to the possession of the illicit substance itself but also to the weight of the substance. The Court stated that “a judicial decision construing the words of a statute * * * does not constitute the creation of a new legal principle” (quoting Gurnee v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 55 NY2d 184, 192). Therefore, Ryan should be applied retroactively.

    The Court also applied the three-part test from People v. Pepper (purpose of the new rule, reliance on the old rule, and effect of the new rule on the administration of justice) and concluded that retroactive application was appropriate. The Court stated, “The knowledge of the weight requirement is determinative of whether a particular accused has actually committed the crime charged.”

    The Court found sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that Butts knew he was participating in the sale of at least one-half ounce of a substance containing heroin, citing the price negotiations and Butts’s handling of the drugs. Because the jury was not instructed on this knowledge requirement a new trial was warranted.

  • People v. Kaplan, 76 N.Y.2d 140 (1990): Accomplice Liability and the Mental State for Criminal Sale

    People v. Kaplan, 76 N.Y.2d 140 (1990)

    To be liable as an accomplice, a defendant must act with the mental culpability required for the commission of the substantive crime and intentionally aid the principal, but does not necessarily need to share the specific intent of the principal if the underlying crime only requires knowledge.

    Summary

    Murray Kaplan was convicted of first-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance for his role in a cocaine distribution network. On appeal, Kaplan argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that he could only be convicted as an accomplice if he had the specific intent to sell the drugs. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the underlying crime only required “knowledge” that the substance was a controlled substance, the prosecution was not required to prove Kaplan acted with the specific intent to sell, only that he knew what he was doing and intentionally aided in the sale.

    Facts

    Detective Grasso, posing as a drug courier, engaged in a series of drug transactions with Mike Kaplan, operating out of an office in the Empire State Building. On October 15, 1986, Grasso went to Kaplan’s office to purchase cocaine. Upon arrival, Mike Kaplan introduced Grasso to the defendant Murray Kaplan and another man. Mike Kaplan instructed Murray to “take care of the young lady.” Murray Kaplan retrieved a manila envelope containing cocaine from a file cabinet and placed it on the desk in front of Grasso, who paid $15,000 for it. Murray Kaplan counted the money.

    Procedural History

    Murray Kaplan was charged with, inter alia, criminal sale of a controlled substance. The defense requested a jury instruction requiring a finding of “specific intent” to sell. The trial court denied the request, stating that the mental culpability required was “knowledge” and that the standard charge for accomplice liability requires proof that the defendant “intentionally aided” the other participants. The jury found Kaplan guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, to be convicted as an accomplice to criminal sale of a controlled substance, the defendant must have acted with the specific intent to sell the controlled substance, or whether it is sufficient that the defendant acted with the knowledge that the substance was a controlled substance and intentionally aided the principal in the sale.

    Holding

    No, because Penal Law § 20.00 requires that an accomplice act with the mental culpability required for the commission of the substantive crime (here, knowledge) and intentionally aid the principal. Specific intent to sell is not required where the underlying crime does not require such intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the modern Penal Law § 20.00 eliminates the need to prove specific intent when the substantive crime requires a lesser mental state like knowledge. The court distinguished the case from prior case law under the old Penal Law that required an accomplice to “share the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” The court stated that the ‘shared intent or purpose’ test merely establishes that acts undertaken in relative innocence and without a conscious design to advance the principal’s crime will not support a conviction for accomplice liability. The court noted, “[T]he ‘shared intent or purpose’ test set forth in the case law merely establishes that acts undertaken in relative innocence and without a conscious design to advance the principal’s crime will not support a conviction for accomplice liability.” The court further elaborated that the requirement in Penal Law § 20.00 that the accomplice “intentionally aid” implies goal-directed conduct. The court found sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Kaplan, knowing the substance was cocaine, intentionally aided Mike Kaplan by delivering it to Detective Grasso. The court pointed out that it was not necessary for Kaplan to negotiate or arrange the transactions; his actions in retrieving and handing over the cocaine, while knowing it was cocaine, were enough to establish accomplice liability. The court stated that the elements were adequately conveyed when the court told the jury that it must find both that defendant acted with the specific intent required for the substantive offense, i.e., knowledge that the substance was cocaine, and that he “intentionally aided” the sale.

  • People v. Lipton, 54 N.Y.2d 340 (1981): Criminal Sale of Controlled Substance Requires More Than Writing an Illegal Prescription

    People v. Lipton, 54 N.Y.2d 340 (1981)

    Under New York law, a physician’s act of unlawfully issuing prescriptions, even with knowledge they will be used for illicit drug trafficking, does not by itself constitute a criminal sale of a controlled substance under Penal Law Article 220 unless the physician has a specific interest in the subsequent sale of the drugs.

    Summary

    Dr. Lipton, a licensed physician, was convicted of multiple counts, including criminal sale of a controlled substance, for writing false prescriptions that were used to obtain drugs for illegal sale and use. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the convictions for criminal sale, holding that merely writing illegal prescriptions, even with knowledge of their intended illicit use, does not constitute a criminal sale under Penal Law Article 220. The Court emphasized that the separate definitions of “prescribe” and “sell” in the Public Health Law indicate a distinct meaning, and that to be liable for criminal sale, the physician must have a specific intent or interest in the actual sale of the drugs to a third party. The Court upheld the remaining convictions.

    Facts

    Dr. Lipton, a practicing physician, conspired with Stephen Raia to write prescriptions for controlled substances like Demerol and Quaalude. Raia and others filled these prescriptions (often using names of non-patients or a deceased patient) and sold the drugs. Lipton received half of the proceeds. The scheme led to abuse, including a fatal overdose. Raia, granted immunity, assisted police in investigating Lipton. Raia obtained prescriptions from Lipton while wearing a wire, and later, at Lipton’s office, using names provided by police. On another occasion, Lipton wrote a prescription for Patrick Ryder, who sold it to John Gory, who filled it and distributed the drugs.

    Procedural History

    An Onondaga Grand Jury indicted Lipton on 480 counts. The trial court submitted 37 representative counts to the jury and denied Lipton’s motion to dismiss the counts charging criminal sale. The jury convicted Lipton on multiple counts, including criminal sale. The Appellate Division affirmed. Lipton appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging his conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a physician who unlawfully issues prescriptions, knowing they will be used for illicit drug trafficking, can be found guilty of criminal “sale” of a controlled substance under Article 220 of the Penal Law.

    Holding

    No, because merely writing a false prescription, even with the knowledge that it is to be used for illegal purposes, does not constitute the criminal “sale” of a controlled substance unless the physician also has a specific interest in the actual sale of those drugs to a third party.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court analyzed the Penal Law and Public Health Law, noting that while the Penal Law defines “sell” broadly, the Public Health Law separately defines “prescribe” and “sell,” indicating distinct meanings. Citing Matter of Tonis v. Board of Regents, the court reiterated that prescribing drugs, even outside regular practice, does not equate to “selling” them. The Court rejected the argument that a rule by the Commissioner of Health altered this result. The court found that the act of prescribing, even illegally, is distinct from the act of selling. The court clarified that a physician could be liable as an accomplice to a sale if they intentionally aided in the sale and acted with the required mental culpability, meaning they had a specific interest in the drugs being sold to a third party. The court found insufficient evidence that Lipton had such intent in the instances underlying the criminal sale convictions. Specifically, prescriptions issued on August 11 were confiscated before being filled, prescriptions issued on August 24 were similarly seized and a prescription issued for Ryder on August 30 lacked evidence that Lipton had knowledge of or interest in Gory’s subsequent distribution of drugs to his friends. Despite reversing the criminal sale convictions, the Court emphasized that physicians who engage in such activities are not immune from prosecution and may be convicted of other crimes like criminal solicitation, conspiracy, and criminal facilitation. The court noted that issues regarding the accomplice status of certain witnesses and the burden of proof were not properly preserved for appeal.