New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Propensity

  • People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Sexual Misconduct Evidence

    People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged crimes and offenses is inadmissible when offered solely to demonstrate criminal propensity, and is unnecessary to prove intent when intent can be easily inferred from the charged act itself.

    Summary

    Badr was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and attempted robbery. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to demonstrate intent, particularly given the complainant’s admitted consensual sex with Badr after the alleged attack. The trial court allowed the evidence, leading Badr to abandon his consent defense. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the prior misconduct evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts, and the evidence served only to show Badr’s propensity to commit such crimes, which is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The complainant alleged that Badr, in her apartment building, threatened her, blindfolded her, and sexually assaulted her on the roof. Following the alleged attack, she exchanged phone numbers with Badr and arranged a subsequent meeting, during which they had consensual sex. Badr claimed the sexual encounter on the roof was consensual, and the later encounter occurred at his apartment. Badr was charged with rape, sodomy, attempted robbery, sexual abuse, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that the prosecution could present testimony from four women regarding Badr’s prior sexual misconduct. Badr abandoned his consent defense as a result of this ruling. Badr was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution could introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to prove intent, when intent was readily inferable from the charged acts and the evidence primarily served to show Badr’s criminal propensity.

    Holding

    No, because the prior misconduct evidence was relevant only to suggest that because Badr had engaged in sexual misconduct with others, he was likely to have committed the charged acts. The evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts themselves.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to suggest the defendant has a criminal disposition. While intent is a valid basis for admitting prior misconduct evidence, it’s unnecessary when intent is easily inferred from the commission of the act. The court distinguished this case from situations where intent is genuinely in question. Here, the court reasoned that if the jury believed the complainant’s account, Badr’s intent to commit the charged crimes was clear from the violent acts themselves. The prior misconduct evidence, therefore, served only to bolster the complainant’s credibility by portraying Badr as a person likely to commit such acts, which is impermissible character evidence. Quoting People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56, the court noted the evidence tended to show only that “‘if defendant did it once * * * he would do it again; therefore, he probably abused the other children.’” The Court found that presenting two starkly different scenarios where credibility was the only issue made the prior misconduct evidence irrelevant to any issue other than criminal propensity. The Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling, which led Badr to abandon his consent defense, denied him a fair trial. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concurred.

  • People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901): Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes to Prove Identity

    168 N.Y. 264 (1901)

    Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible if its primary purpose is to demonstrate a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, but it may be admissible to prove a specific element of the crime charged, such as identity, motive, intent, absence of mistake, or a common scheme or plan, provided its probative value outweighs the potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Molineux was convicted of murder by poisoning. The prosecution introduced evidence that Molineux had previously poisoned another individual, Adams, to prove his identity as the murderer of Mrs. Young. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence of the prior poisoning was inadmissible because it primarily served to show Molineux’s criminal propensity, and the circumstances surrounding the two poisonings were not sufficiently unique to establish identity. The Court articulated the general rule that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the crime charged unless it falls within a recognized exception.

    Facts

    Mrs. Young died after consuming bromo seltzer laced with cyanide. Suspicion fell on Molineux. The prosecution presented evidence that Molineux had a motive to harm Mrs. Young’s friend, Harry Cornish. The prosecution also introduced evidence that a package containing cyanide had been sent to Cornish. Over objection, the prosecution presented evidence that Molineux had previously poisoned a man named Adams with cyanide.

    Procedural History

    Molineux was convicted of first-degree murder in the trial court. He appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial because of the improper admission of evidence of the prior poisoning of Adams.

    Issue(s)

    Whether evidence of a prior, uncharged crime (the poisoning of Adams) is admissible to prove the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime (the poisoning of Mrs. Young).

    Holding

    No, because the evidence of the prior poisoning primarily served to show the defendant’s criminal propensity, and the circumstances of the two poisonings were not sufficiently unique to establish the defendant’s identity. The Court held that “It is a principle of the common law that evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to prove the crime charged.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that evidence of other crimes is sometimes admissible to prove a specific element of the crime charged, such as motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, or identity. However, the Court emphasized that the exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility must be carefully applied. The Court stated that “The exceptions to the rule cannot be stated with categorical precision.” The Court found that the evidence of the prior poisoning of Adams did not fall within the identity exception because the circumstances of the two poisonings were not sufficiently unique. The Court reasoned that the primary purpose of the evidence was to show that Molineux had a propensity to commit poisoning, which is an improper basis for a conviction. The court further noted, “The very fact that it is much easier to believe in the guilt of an accused person when it is known or suspected that he has previously committed a similar crime proves the dangerous tendency of such evidence to convict, not upon the evidence of the crime charged, but upon the super-added evidence of the previous crime.” Evidence is inadmissible where “the only connection between the two crimes is a similar modus operandi.”