New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 201 (2010): Admissibility of Photographic Identification After Defendant Obstructs Lineup

    People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 201 (2010)

    A defendant forfeits the right to exclude photographic identification evidence when the defendant’s own misconduct, such as refusing to participate in a lineup, makes a corporeal identification impossible.

    Summary

    This case addresses the admissibility of a photographic identification when a defendant obstructs a police lineup. The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant forfeits the right to exclude photographic identification evidence if their own misconduct thwarts a corporeal lineup. In this case, the defendant refused to cooperate with a lineup, leading the police to show the victim a photographic array, from which the victim identified the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant should not benefit from their own wrongdoing, and the photographic identification was admissible to ensure a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was suspected of involvement in an armed robbery where the victim was shot. Based on information received, police created a photographic array including the defendant’s picture. The victim identified the defendant from the array. When the defendant was arrested and a lineup was scheduled, the defendant refused to participate, kicking, spitting, and cursing. As a result, a traditional lineup was impossible. The detective took a photograph of the defendant and photos of the proposed fillers and showed the victim the array of photos; the victim identified the defendant’s picture.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court held a Wade hearing and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s lineup identification made months later, as well as the victim’s prospective in-court identification. The court deferred ruling on the admissibility of the photographic identification. At trial, the trial court ruled the photographic identification admissible. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and robbery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who obstructs a corporeal lineup, forfeits the right to exclude evidence of a photographic identification made necessary by that obstruction?

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant should not be able to benefit from their own misconduct by preventing a corporeal lineup and then objecting to the introduction of a photographic identification that resulted from their actions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while New York law generally excludes pretrial photographic identifications due to concerns about distortion and potential prejudice (jury inferring prior arrests), this rule does not apply when a defendant’s misconduct prevents a corporeal lineup. Citing the principle that “the law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong,” the court held that the defendant forfeited the right to rely on the exclusionary rule. The court emphasized that the detective’s testimony clarified that the photograph shown to the victim was taken on the day of the aborted lineup, mitigating any potential prejudice. The trial court also reasonably concluded that a later lineup identification might be viewed as less reliable than an identification closer to the crime. This ruling balances the need to protect defendants from unfair identification procedures with the need to ensure that they do not benefit from obstructing justice. As the Court stated in People v. Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366 (1995), “the maxim that the law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong…creat[es] a forfeiture dictated by sound public policy”.

  • People v. Frederick, 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011): Reinstatement of Original Indictment After Superseding Indictment Dismissal

    People v. Frederick, 17 N.Y.3d 912 (2011)

    When a superseding indictment is deemed a nullity, the original indictment can be reinstated, and a sentence for a crime in the reinstated indictment can run consecutively to sentences from a prior, separate criminal act.

    Summary

    Trevor Frederick attacked his former girlfriend and her date. He was initially indicted on multiple charges related to both victims, but the jury deadlocked on felony murder. The prosecution obtained a superseding indictment charging felony murder and manslaughter, but the trial court dismissed it. The court then reinstated the original indictment’s felony murder charge. Frederick was convicted of felony murder and sentenced consecutively to his prior sentences. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the reinstatement was proper since the superseding indictment was a nullity and the consecutive sentence was justified due to the separate nature of the crimes.

    Facts

    Trevor Frederick, enraged that his former girlfriend went on a date with the victim, forced his way into her dorm room. He stabbed the girlfriend in the neck, causing paralysis. Frederick then made a statement suggesting he was moving towards the victim who was standing near a window. The victim was later found dead in the courtyard below, having suffered blunt impact trauma and multiple stab wounds, including one to the neck.

    Procedural History

    Frederick was initially indicted on multiple charges related to both the girlfriend and the victim. At the first trial, the depraved indifference murder count was dismissed, and a mistrial was declared after a juror was unable to continue deliberating. A second trial resulted in convictions on all counts except felony murder, on which the jury deadlocked, leading to a mistrial on that count. The People then obtained a superseding indictment charging Frederick with felony murder and first-degree manslaughter. The trial court dismissed the superseding indictment and reinstated the original indictment. Frederick was convicted of felony murder in a bench trial. The Appellate Division affirmed. He appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court had the authority to reinstate the original indictment’s felony murder charge after dismissing a superseding indictment.
    2. Whether the trial court could impose a sentence for felony murder that ran consecutively to sentences previously imposed for crimes against the girlfriend.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because if the superseding indictment is a nullity, any consequences flowing from it are also a nullity. The trial court possessed inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment in the absence of any constitutional or statutory double jeopardy bar.
    2. Yes, because the crimes against the girlfriend and the victim were separate and distinct acts in an extended criminal rampage.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that since Frederick himself argued that the superseding indictment was a nullity, the dismissal of the original indictment, which was a consequence of the superseding indictment, was also a nullity. The court emphasized that the Criminal Procedure Law does not expressly preclude the reinstatement of an indictment in such circumstances. The court cited Matter of Lionel E., 76 NY2d 747, 749 (1990), indicating the trial court’s inherent authority to reinstate the original indictment. The court stated that “logically, if the superseding indictment is a nullity—as defendant himself argued and Supreme Court held to be the case—then any action or consequence that flowed from its filing—here, the dismissal of the original indictment—was necessarily a nullity as well.”

    Regarding the consecutive sentence, the court relied on People v. Ramirez, 89 NY2d 444, 451 (1996), which allows for consecutive sentences for separate and distinct acts. The court found that the attack on the girlfriend and the subsequent killing of the victim were separate acts, justifying the consecutive sentence. Distinguishing People v. Parks, 95 NY2d 811 (2000) and People v. Alford, 14 NY3d 846 (2010), the court emphasized that because this was a bench trial, the judge, as factfinder, knew the facts and could determine whether they supported a consecutive sentence without any uncertainty arising from a lack of specificity in a jury charge.

  • People v. Correa, 15 N.Y.3d 213 (2010): Upholding Supreme Court Jurisdiction over Misdemeanor Cases Transferred from Criminal Court

    People v. Correa, 15 N.Y.3d 213 (2010)

    New York’s Supreme Court, as a court of general and concurrent jurisdiction, has the authority to adjudicate misdemeanor cases, even those initiated by information rather than indictment, when administrative rules properly authorize the transfer of such cases from lower courts.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the Supreme Court of New York has subject matter jurisdiction over misdemeanor cases transferred from the New York City Criminal Court under administrative rules designed to alleviate court congestion and consolidate domestic violence cases. The Court of Appeals held that the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge were authorized to promulgate rules allowing for such transfers and that the Supreme Court, possessing general and concurrent jurisdiction, could adjudicate these misdemeanor cases regardless of whether they were initiated by indictment or information. The court emphasized the importance of efficient judicial administration and the constitutional grant of broad jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.

    Facts

    Joao Fernandez was charged with aggravated harassment in Criminal Court after repeated threatening phone calls to his former partner. His case was transferred to the Integrated Domestic Violence (IDV) Part of the Supreme Court due to prior Family Court cases involving the same parties and their children. Edgar Correa and Allen Mack were charged with misdemeanors in Criminal Court. Their cases were transferred to the Bronx Criminal Division (BCD) of the Supreme Court, a division created to address backlogs in the Criminal Court. All three defendants were convicted after non-jury trials in the Supreme Court.

    Procedural History

    Fernandez appealed his conviction, arguing the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed his conviction. Correa and Mack appealed, and the Appellate Division, First Department, sua sponte raised the issue of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, ultimately reversing their convictions. The People appealed Correa and Mack, and Fernandez’s appeal was also heard by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge exceeded their authority by establishing the Bronx Criminal Division and Integrated Domestic Violence Parts, thereby transferring misdemeanor cases from local criminal courts to the Supreme Court?

    2. Whether the Supreme Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over misdemeanor criminal cases initiated by information, absent an indictment or waiver of indictment?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the administrators of the Unified Court System were empowered by the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law to adopt rules facilitating the transfer of cases for efficient administration of justice.

    2. Yes, because the Supreme Court, as a court of general and concurrent jurisdiction, has the power to adjudicate misdemeanor cases, regardless of whether the charges are contained in an information, indictment, or superior court information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Article VI of the New York Constitution grants the Chief Judge authority to administer the court system and establish standards and administrative policies, including the transfer of cases. Judiciary Law § 211(1)(a) explicitly authorizes the Chief Judge to establish policies for the transfer of cases. The court found that the creation of the BCD and IDV parts was a valid exercise of this administrative authority, designed to improve judicial efficiency and access to services. The court emphasized that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is constitutionally defined as “general original jurisdiction in law and equity” (NY Const, art VI, § 7 [a]), meaning it can hear all causes unless specifically proscribed. The court rejected the argument that CPL 210.05 limits Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, interpreting it instead as a restriction on prosecutorial power, dictating how offenses can be prosecuted in superior courts but not limiting the court’s inherent jurisdiction. The court reasoned that interpreting CPL 210.05 as jurisdictional would raise constitutional concerns, as the Legislature cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its constitutionally-granted jurisdiction. The court also noted the historical context, emphasizing the need for a unified court system to efficiently manage judicial resources and alleviate congestion. The court emphasized the practical reality that the NYC Criminal Court continues to function and handles a large volume of cases, performing arraignments and resolving cases without transfer. Referencing *People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 365 (2000)*, the court reiterated its ability to consider subject matter jurisdiction arguments even if unpreserved. The court directly quoted NY Const, art VI, § 19 (a): “As may be provided by law, the supreme court may transfer to itself any action or proceeding originated or pending in another court within the judicial department…upon a finding that such a transfer will promote the administration of justice.”

  • People v. Correa, 15 N.Y.3d 213 (2010): Supreme Court’s Concurrent Jurisdiction Over Misdemeanor Offenses

    15 N.Y.3d 213 (2010)

    The Supreme Court of New York possesses concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor offenses.

    Summary

    Defendant appealed her conviction for attempted aggravated harassment, arguing the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction because she was prosecuted via misdemeanor information instead of an indictment or superior court information (SCI). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that even if the case was tried in Supreme Court, that court possesses concurrent jurisdiction over misdemeanor offenses. The Court also found that the defendant’s claim regarding the transfer of her case to Supreme Court was akin to an improper venue claim, which was waived by failing to raise it at trial, and that the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally sufficient.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated harassment in the second degree after a nonjury trial. She appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the case was prosecuted via a misdemeanor information, not an indictment or superior court information (SCI).

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction in a divided decision. One of the Appellate Division dissenters granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a misdemeanor case prosecuted on a misdemeanor information, absent an indictment or superior court information?
    2. Whether the transfer of the defendant’s case from the New York City Criminal Court to the Supreme Court was impermissible because court rules were not in effect on the date of her conviction?
    3. Whether the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally sufficient?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Supreme Court possesses concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor offenses.
    2. No, because the alleged transfer error is the equivalent of an improper venue claim, which is waived if not timely raised.
    3. No, because the defendant’s challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the accusatory instrument lacks merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that even assuming the defendant’s case was tried in Supreme Court, she was not entitled to reversal on jurisdictional grounds. The Court relied on the principle that Supreme Court possesses concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the trial of unindicted misdemeanor offenses. The court reasoned that the transfer of the case, even if improper, was analogous to a venue issue, not a jurisdictional one, and therefore was waived because the defendant did not object at trial.

    The Court emphasized that “venue issues—which relate only to the proper place of trial, rather than to the power of the court to hear and determine the case—are waivable.” Because the defendant failed to object to the transfer in the trial court, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the claim. Finally, the Court briefly dismissed the defendant’s challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, finding it without merit.

  • People v. Buchanan, 13 N.Y.3d 1 (2009): Stun Belt Use Requires Specific Justification

    13 N.Y.3d 1 (2009)

    A stun belt may not be used to restrain a defendant in a criminal case without a finding of specific facts justifying the use of such a restraint based on the particular defendant’s circumstances.

    Summary

    Ingvue Buchanan was convicted of second-degree murder. Before trial, the judge implemented a policy of using leg shackles or a stun belt on defendants in serious cases, including Buchanan, citing general security concerns regardless of the defendant’s behavior. Buchanan objected, but the judge required him to wear a stun belt throughout the trial. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that stun belts cannot be routinely used without specific findings justifying their use for the individual defendant, based on their history, the nature of the charges, and other factors. The court emphasized that a defendant’s rights are compromised when such restraints are applied without particularized justification.

    Facts

    Ingvue Buchanan was charged with strangling a 14-year-old girl.

    Prior to opening statements, the trial judge declared a policy of requiring defendants in serious cases to wear leg shackles or a stun belt.

    The judge stated this policy applied to all defendants charged with murder, regardless of individual risk factors.

    Buchanan and his counsel objected to the stun belt, arguing he had done nothing to warrant such a measure.

    The judge acknowledged Buchanan’s lack of prior problematic behavior but insisted on the stun belt for security, deferring to the Sheriff’s Department’s preference.

    Buchanan wore the stun belt throughout the trial, and his complaints of discomfort were medically evaluated but not deemed a contraindication for continued use.

    Procedural History

    Buchanan was convicted of second-degree murder in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting.

    An Appellate Division Justice granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court can require a defendant to wear a stun belt during trial as a routine security measure without making specific findings that the individual defendant poses a security risk.

    Holding

    No, because a stun belt may not be required unless the trial court makes findings on the record showing that the particular defendant before him needs such a restraint. A formal hearing may not be necessary, but the trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to satisfy itself of the facts that warrant the restraint.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while stun belts may be necessary in certain cases, their use cannot be a routine practice without specific justification related to the individual defendant. The court explicitly rejected the argument that because the belt was not visible, it did not raise the same due process concerns as visible shackles, as addressed in Deck v. Missouri. Instead, the court established a rule under New York law requiring trial courts to make findings on the record that demonstrate the need for such a restraint based on the defendant’s history, the nature of the charges, and other relevant factors. The court acknowledged that a formal hearing may not be required, but that there must be sufficient inquiry for the court to be satisfied of the facts warranting the restraint.

    The court emphasized that trial courts retain broad discretion in deciding whether a restraint is necessary for courtroom security, but that discretion must be informed by a case-specific analysis. By implementing a blanket policy, the trial court failed to engage in this necessary individualized assessment. The court did not rule out the possibility of using a stun belt but emphasized the necessity of a factual basis supporting such a decision: “We have no doubt that there are cases in which a court may properly find, considering the nature of the charged offense, the defendant’s history and other relevant factors, that a stun belt is necessary, but those factors must be considered before that finding is made.”

    Judge Read dissented, arguing that the defendant failed to show any actual prejudice from wearing the stun belt and that the conviction should be affirmed. The dissent emphasized that the defendant’s complaints were about discomfort and that there was no demonstration that the belt was visible to the jury or impaired his ability to participate in his defense.

  • People v. Almeter, 13 N.Y.3d 585 (2009): Notice Required When Judge Acts as Factfinder on Related Violation

    People v. Almeter, 13 N.Y.3d 585 (2009)

    When a defendant faces a jury trial on a misdemeanor charge and a bench trial on a related violation arising from the same incident, the court must provide clear and timely notice to the defendant that the charges will be tried separately by different factfinders.

    Summary

    Defendant Almeter was charged with assault (misdemeanor) and trespass (violation) arising from the same incident. Although charged in separate instruments, the case proceeded as a single prosecution. After jury selection and near the end of the defense case, the trial court revealed its intention to have the jury decide the assault charge while the court would decide the trespass charge. The defense objected, arguing lack of notice. The jury acquitted Almeter of assault, but the court convicted him of trespass. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to notice that the charges would be decided by different factfinders.

    Facts

    Almeter was charged with assault and trespass based on an incident at the complainant’s home. The assault charge stemmed from Almeter allegedly striking the complainant with a bottle, and the trespass charge stemmed from Almeter’s refusal to leave the property. The charges were documented together in police reports, appearance tickets, and an order of protection. The case proceeded under a single docket number, giving the appearance of a consolidated prosecution.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial with jury selection. Near the end of the defense’s case, the trial court informed the parties that the jury would decide the assault charge while the court would decide the trespass charge. The defense objected, arguing that they were unaware of this procedure. The jury acquitted Almeter of assault. The court convicted him of trespass. County Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in conducting a joint bench and jury trial without providing the defendant with timely notice that the misdemeanor and violation charges would be decided by different factfinders.

    Holding

    Yes, because a defendant is entitled to notice when their charges are to be tried by separate factfinders, especially when the case has proceeded as if it were a single prosecution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that it was “evident that if, contrary to reasonable expectation, two trials were to be simultaneously held before different factfinders, the court was obliged to inform defendant and his counsel of this unique mode of proceeding from the outset.” The Court emphasized that the charges were treated as consolidated throughout the proceedings, and the defendant was not informed otherwise until the trial was nearly over. This lack of notice prejudiced the defendant because “counsel may well determine that a different trial strategy is warranted based upon whether a particular charge is being presented to a judge or to a jury.” The court noted, “As there was every indication that both charges were being tried by the jury, defendant should have been given notice that that in fact would not be the case, and, since there would be more than one factfinder, of which factfinder would be deciding which charge.” The Court concluded that while the procedure may have been intended to be economical, “the economy was a false one where the defendant was not timely advised that his charges were to be tried by separate factfinders.”

  • People v. Bauman, 13 N.Y.3d 152 (2009): Indictment Duplicity When Charging Multiple Acts in a Single Count of Depraved Indifference Assault

    People v. Bauman, 13 N.Y.3d 152 (2009)

    An indictment is duplicitous when a single count alleges multiple distinct acts, each of which could constitute a separate offense, making it impossible to determine the specific act upon which the jury reached a unanimous verdict.

    Summary

    Defendants were charged with one count of intentional assault and one count of depraved indifference assault. The depraved indifference assault count alleged 11 distinct acts occurring over an eight-month period. The New York Court of Appeals held that the depraved indifference assault count was duplicitous because it encompassed multiple offenses within a single count, violating Criminal Procedure Law § 200.30 (1). The court reasoned that the use of “and/or” between each act made it impossible to determine which specific act the jury unanimously agreed upon for conviction, thus threatening the reliability of the verdict. This decision emphasizes the importance of separately charging distinct criminal acts in an indictment to ensure a unanimous jury verdict on each specific offense.

    Facts

    The indictment against the defendants included two counts: (1) intentional assault for causing injury with various instruments like a baseball bat and (2) depraved indifference assault. The second count alleged the defendants committed 11 different acts over an eight-month period, including striking the victim, burning the victim, and providing inadequate living conditions. Emergency personnel found the victim in a hypothermic condition and near death on April 7, 2005.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss both counts of the indictment, citing duplicity. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment charging depraved indifference assault under Penal Law § 120.10 (3), which alleges 11 acts over an eight-month period in a single count, violates Criminal Procedure Law § 200.30 (1), which prohibits duplicitous counts?

    Holding

    Yes, because the indictment’s second count, alleging 11 incidents over an eight-month period, encompassed such a multiplicity of acts as to make it virtually impossible to determine the particular act of assault as to which a jury could reach a unanimous verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, emphasizing that CPL 200.30 (1) mandates that each count of an indictment may charge only one offense. The court reasoned that the second count of the indictment, which alleged 11 separate incidents of assault over an eight-month period, was duplicitous because it made it impossible to determine which specific act the jury unanimously agreed upon to convict the defendants. Quoting People v. Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410 (1986), the court stated that an indictment should not encompass “such a multiplicity of acts … as to make it virtually impossible to determine the particular act of [assault] … as to which [a] jury [could] reach[] a unanimous verdict.” The court also noted the People’s use of “and/or” between each act allowed a jury to potentially convict on only one of the alleged acts, which may not be sufficient to establish a course of conduct, and it would be unclear which act the defendants were convicted of. The dissenting opinion argued that the indictment sufficiently alleged that the defendants’ conduct on April 7, 2005, resulted in serious physical injury and a grave risk of death. However, the majority rejected this argument, stating that setting this date would amount to an improper amendment to the indictment.

  • People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438 (2007): Waiver of Right to a 12-Person Jury in Criminal Cases

    People v. Gajadhar, 9 N.Y.3d 438 (2007)

    A criminal defendant, in a non-capital case, can waive the right to a 12-person jury and consent to a deliberating jury of fewer than 12 individuals, provided the waiver is made in writing and in open court with the approval of the judge.

    Summary

    After jury deliberations commenced, a juror became ill and was hospitalized. The defendant, Winston Gajadhar, opposed a mistrial and requested that deliberations continue with the remaining 11 jurors. The trial court granted the request, and the defendant executed a written waiver of his right to a jury of 12 in open court. The New York Court of Appeals held that the waiver was valid, interpreting Article I, Section 2 of the New York Constitution to permit a defendant to consent to a deliberating jury of less than 12 under these circumstances. This decision modifies the rigid adherence to a 12-person jury established in prior case law, recognizing a defendant’s ability to waive this right under specific conditions.

    Facts

    Winston Gajadhar and his business associate, Tony Norng, believed that Sammi Fiki owed them $1,500. Gajadhar went to Fiki’s office to collect the money. An altercation ensued, during which Mosad, Hisham, and Fiki were shot. Mosad died, while Fiki and Hisham survived. Police suspected Gajadhar, but he fled to Trinidad. He eventually returned to the U.S. and made incriminating statements to a coworker who was cooperating with the FBI. Gajadhar again evaded capture, returning to Trinidad. He was eventually detained and extradited to New York.

    Procedural History

    Gajadhar was tried before a 12-member jury. After deliberations began, one juror became ill. The defendant, wanting to avoid a retrial, requested that deliberations continue with 11 jurors. The trial court granted the request after Gajadhar executed a written waiver. Gajadhar was acquitted of several charges but convicted of attempted robbery and felony murder. On appeal, Gajadhar argued that the state constitution does not allow a defendant to consent to a jury of less than 12 members. The Appellate Division rejected this argument, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Article I, Section 2 of the New York Constitution permits a defendant in a non-capital criminal case to waive the right to a 12-person jury and consent to continued deliberations by a jury of fewer than 12 members after deliberations have begun and a juror becomes unavailable.

    Holding

    Yes, because the 1938 amendments to Article I, Section 2 of the New York Constitution allow a defendant in a non-capital criminal case to waive the right to a jury trial, and this waiver extends to the size of the jury, provided the waiver is made in writing and in open court with the approval of the judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the common law traditionally required a 12-person jury, the 1938 amendments to the New York Constitution modified this requirement by allowing defendants in non-capital criminal cases to waive their right to a jury trial. The court distinguished its prior holding in Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858), which prohibited such waivers, noting that Cancemi was decided before the constitutional amendments that explicitly authorized jury trial waivers in criminal cases. Because a defendant can waive a jury trial entirely and have a judge act as the finder of fact, the Court reasoned that it logically follows that a defendant can also waive the right to a full 12-person jury and consent to deliberations by 11 jurors when one becomes unavailable. The Court emphasized that the waiver must be made in writing, signed by the defendant in open court, and approved by the judge, ensuring it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court noted that “the constitution now entrusts to a defendant the decision whether to allow a jury to continue deliberating with 11 members when a juror becomes unexpectedly unavailable. Therefore, the rights guaranteed by article I, section 2 are personal to the accused.” This decision aligns the right to a jury trial with other fundamental constitutional rights that a defendant can waive. The Court also noted that an 11-member jury does not violate the federal constitution, citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).

  • People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.3d 278 (2006): Evidence Admissible Despite Physician-Patient Privilege Violation

    People v. Berrios, 6 N.Y.3d 278 (2006)

    Evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the physician-patient privilege need not be suppressed at a criminal trial unless the statute’s primary purpose is to protect a constitutional right.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that evidence obtained following a hospital’s disclosure of a patient’s information to police, even if violating the physician-patient privilege, is admissible in a criminal trial. Anthony Berrios was killed. Detective Elliott learned the shooter was slashed in the face days before. A hospital administrator gave Elliott the defendant’s name and address. This led to an eyewitness identification of the defendant and his subsequent conviction for manslaughter. The Court reasoned that because the physician-patient privilege is statutory, not constitutional, and doesn’t primarily protect against government misconduct, suppression of evidence is not the appropriate remedy for its violation. The focus is on the doctor’s conduct, not the state’s, when the privilege is breached. Therefore, the evidence was admissible.

    Facts

    Anthony Berrios was fatally shot on October 16, 2001. Detective Michael Elliott investigated and learned the shooting stemmed from a fight on October 13 where a man was slashed in the face. Elliott inquired at a hospital about individuals treated for facial slash wounds on that date. The hospital administrator provided defendant Berrios’s name and address. Using this information, Elliott obtained Berrios’s arrest record and photo. A witness identified Berrios’s photo as the shooter, leading to further evidence and his conviction.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Berrios’s motion to suppress the evidence, holding that a violation of the physician-patient privilege does not require suppression. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning both that there was no breach of privilege and that, even if there was, suppression was not required. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed based on the second ground: suppression was not required even if a privilege was breached.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the hospital’s disclosure of Berrios’s name and address to Detective Elliott violated the physician-patient privilege under CPLR 4504(a)?
    2. Whether evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the physician-patient privilege must be suppressed in a criminal trial?

    Holding

    1. The Court did not decide whether the privilege was violated.
    2. No, because the physician-patient privilege is statutory, not constitutional, and its violation does not automatically warrant suppression of evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the suppression issue. It acknowledged that CPLR 4504(a) protects patient information disclosed to medical professionals. However, the Court emphasized that statutory violations do not automatically mandate evidence suppression, citing People v. Patterson. An exception exists when a statute’s primary purpose is to safeguard constitutional rights, as seen in People v. Taylor and People v. Gallina, which involved statutes protecting Fourth Amendment rights. The Court distinguished the present case, stating, “There is no constitutional right to privacy in physician-patient communications.” The Court noted the legislature has created exceptions to the privilege, such as mandatory reporting of gunshot wounds. The Court found the privilege primarily regulates a private relationship, not governmental conduct. It stated, “To suppress evidence resulting from a violation of section 4504 would be to punish the State for a doctor’s or hospital’s misconduct—a punishment unlikely to deter doctors and hospitals, who have little interest in whether criminal prosecutions succeed or not.” Therefore, suppression was not warranted.

  • People v. Porter, 9 N.Y.3d 966 (2007): Unequivocal Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Porter, 9 N.Y.3d 966, 878 N.E.2d 998, 848 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2007)

    When a suspect makes an unequivocal request for counsel during a custodial interrogation, further questioning by the police is prohibited.

    Summary

    Anthony Porter appealed his conviction, arguing that his confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained after he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Porter’s statement, “I think I need an attorney,” coupled with the interviewing officer’s notation that Porter was “asking for an attorney,” constituted an unequivocal request for counsel, thus requiring the police to cease questioning. The Court suppressed the confession but upheld the finding that police had consent to search the premises.

    Facts

    Anthony Porter was being interviewed by police officers. During the interview, Porter stated, “I think I need an attorney.” The interviewing officer made a notation that Porter was “asking for an attorney.” Despite this, the police continued to question Porter, and he subsequently made a confession. Porter moved to suppress the confession, arguing that it was obtained in violation of his right to counsel.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Porter’s motion to suppress. Porter was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding that Porter’s request for counsel was equivocal and that the police had consent to search the premises. Porter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Porter’s statement, “I think I need an attorney,” coupled with the interviewing officer’s notation, constituted an unequivocal request for counsel, thus requiring the police to cease questioning.

    2. Whether the Appellate Division’s finding that the police had consent to search the premises where defendant was located has support in the record and is thus beyond review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Porter’s statement, along with the officer’s notation, demonstrated an unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel, prohibiting further inquiry by the police.

    2. Yes, because the Appellate Division’s finding that the police had consent to search the premises has support in the record and is thus beyond the Court of Appeals’ review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that whether a request for counsel is equivocal is a mixed question of law and fact. While the Court normally defers to the Appellate Division’s determination of such mixed questions if there is support in the record, in this case, there was no support for the finding that Porter’s request was equivocal. The Court emphasized that the only evidence was Porter’s statement and the officer’s notation, both indicating a clear request for counsel. The Court clarified, “This is not to say that utterance of the words defendant used would unequivocally invoke the right to counsel in every instance. But on this record, where there were no additional facts upon which a contrary inference could be drawn, further inquiry by the police was not permitted.” The Court found that because the police continued to question Porter after he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, his subsequent confession should have been suppressed. The Court upheld the Appellate Division’s finding regarding consent to search, stating that it was supported by the record and therefore beyond their review. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granted defendant’s motion to suppress statements and ordered a new trial.