New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Marilla, 46 N.Y.2d 1025 (1979): Jury Poll Sufficiency After Dismissal of Inclusory Count

    People v. Marilla, 46 N.Y.2d 1025 (1979)

    A single jury poll is sufficient when the jury clearly manifests a unanimous verdict, even if the trial court subsequently dismisses an inclusory concurrent count.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. After the jury rendered its verdict, each member confirmed their assent during a poll. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the possession charge as an inclusory concurrent count. The defendant argued that the court should have polled the jury again after dismissing the possession charge. The New York Court of Appeals held that the initial poll, which demonstrated a unanimous verdict, satisfied the statutory requirement, and the subsequent dismissal did not necessitate a second poll.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree stemming from a single transaction.

    Following the jury’s verdict of guilty on both counts, the trial court conducted a poll of the jury, during which each juror affirmed their agreement with the verdict.

    After the jury poll, the trial court dismissed the criminal possession charge because it was an inclusory concurrent count of the criminal sale charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was required to conduct a second jury poll after dismissing the inclusory concurrent count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, when the jury had already unanimously assented to the verdict during the initial poll.

    Holding

    No, because the initial jury poll clearly demonstrated that the verdict was unanimous, satisfying the requirement of CPL 310.80. The subsequent dismissal of the inclusory concurrent count did not vitiate this expression of unanimity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the purpose of a jury poll, as outlined in CPL 310.80, is to ensure that each juror individually assents to the verdict. Once this unanimity is established, the statutory requirement is satisfied. The court emphasized that the initial poll clearly manifested the jury’s unanimous agreement with the verdict on both counts.

    The subsequent dismissal of the possession charge, based on the principle that a defendant cannot be convicted of both the sale and possession of the same controlled substance in a single transaction (inclusory concurrent counts), did not undermine the validity of the initial unanimous verdict. The court stated, “During the initial poll, the jury clearly manifested that the verdict was unanimous, thus satisfying the statutory requirement set forth in CPL 310.80. The subsequent colloquy between counsel and the court concerning the People’s motion to dismiss an inclusory concurrent count did not vitiate that expression of unanimity. Therefore, the trial court’s acceptance of the verdict was proper.”

    The court distinguished the situation from cases where a juror expresses doubt or uncertainty during the poll, which would necessitate further inquiry. Here, there was no ambiguity in the jurors’ assent to the verdict when it was initially rendered. Therefore, the trial court’s decision to accept the verdict without a second poll was deemed proper.

  • People v. Bark, 66 N.Y.2d 170 (1985): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Plead Guilty

    People v. Bark, 66 N.Y.2d 170 (1985)

    A defendant does not have an unconditional right to plead guilty to a misdemeanor complaint in local criminal court when the prosecution requests an adjournment to present the charge to a Grand Jury.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to plead guilty under CPL 220.10(2) is not absolute when the prosecution seeks to present the charge to a Grand Jury. The defendant attempted to plead guilty to a misdemeanor complaint before the District Attorney could present the case to a Grand Jury. The Court reasoned that CPL 340.20(1), which applies article 220 to non-indictment accusatory instruments, does so only “to the extent that they can be so applied.” The Court found that applying CPL 220.10(2) in this instance would nullify CPL 170.20(2), which allows the District Attorney to present the charge to a Grand Jury before a guilty plea is entered. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to allow the adjournment.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged via a misdemeanor complaint in local criminal court. Prior to any indictment, the defendant attempted to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge. The prosecution requested an adjournment under CPL 170.20(2) to present the charge against the defendant to a Grand Jury, seeking a potential indictment for a higher charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that CPL 220.10 does not supersede CPL 170.20 and granted the adjournment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 220.10(2) affords a defendant an unconditional right to plead guilty in a local criminal court to a charge lodged in a misdemeanor complaint, even when the prosecution has requested an adjournment under CPL 170.20(2) to present the charge to a Grand Jury.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 340.20(1) applies the plea provisions of article 220 only to the extent that they do not override other specific provisions of law, such as CPL 170.20(2), which grants the District Attorney the right to present the charge to a Grand Jury before a guilty plea is entered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 340.20(1), which makes the plea provisions of article 220 applicable to instruments other than indictments, does so only “to the extent that they can be so applied.” The court emphasized that CPL 170.20(2) unequivocally allows the District Attorney to adjourn proceedings to present the charge to a Grand Jury before the entry of a plea of guilty. The court stated, “where, as here, the application of article 220 would nullify the effect of another express provision of law specifically relating to the prosecution of crimes in local criminal courts, the specific provision, such as that embodied in CPL 170.20 (subd 2), must be read as one of the exceptions contemplated by CPL 340.20 (subd 1).”

    The Court further explained the purpose of CPL 220.10(2), stating that “[t]he purpose of CPL 220.10 (subd 2) is to afford an indicted defendant an opportunity, as a matter of right, to plead guilty to all charges in an indictment so that he might avoid the expense and ordeal of a trial.” The Court clarified that the statute was not designed to allow a defendant to preempt the accusatory process before it is complete, especially when the initial assessment of the defendant’s wrongdoing was inadequate. The court concluded that the timing of the defendant’s offer to plead guilty, preceding the prosecution’s adjournment request, was insufficient to alter this outcome.

  • People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1 (1980): Admissibility of Voice Stress Test Results and Confessions

    People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1 (1980)

    A defendant’s confession is not per se involuntary solely because it followed a voice stress evaluation test, and the admission of testimony and recordings related to the test is permissible when the defense strategy opens the door to such evidence.

    Summary

    Joseph Tarsia was convicted of attempted murder. His appeal centered on the admissibility of a voice stress evaluation test and subsequent confessions. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Tarsia’s defense strategy focused on the alleged coercion of the test, the trial court did not err in admitting testimony and recordings related to it. The Court also found that the confessions were not involuntary as a matter of law simply because they followed the test, absent evidence of coercion beyond the test itself. This case clarifies the circumstances under which evidence related to a voice stress test can be admitted and the standard for determining the voluntariness of confessions following such a test.

    Facts

    Tarsia’s estranged wife was shot. Tarsia, found in the woods behind the house, claimed he was hunting. He denied involvement but agreed to a voice stress evaluation to dispel suspicion. After the test, the examiner questioned Tarsia further, leading to Tarsia confessing to shooting his wife. Tarsia then made multiple oral and written confessions.

    Procedural History

    Tarsia was convicted of attempted murder after a jury trial. He unsuccessfully sought to suppress his confessions at a pretrial hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Tarsia appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the voice stress test coerced his confessions and the introduction of test-related evidence was reversible error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony concerning the defendant’s submission to a voice stress evaluation test and a tape recording of the test questions and answers.
    2. Whether the defendant’s oral and written inculpatory statements were rendered involuntary as a matter of law because they followed his participation in the voice stress evaluation test.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s trial strategy focused on the alleged coerciveness of the test, opening the door to the admission of such evidence.
    2. No, because the confessions were not coerced as a matter of law solely due to their temporal proximity to the voice stress evaluation test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant’s trial strategy, which emphasized the coercive nature of the voice stress test, justified the admission of the test-related evidence. Defense counsel made it his “business to expose, rather than to suppress, the circumstances surrounding the testing of his client.” The Court noted that to allow the defendant to now claim the evidence should have been excluded would be to “countenance his eating his cake and having it too.”

    Regarding the voluntariness of the confessions, the Court acknowledged the potential for abuse in using psychological tests like voice stress evaluations but found no evidence of coercion beyond the test itself. The Court emphasized that Tarsia voluntarily consented to the test, was informed of his Miranda rights, and was not subjected to physical abuse or mistreatment. The Court distinguished this case from others where confessions were deemed coerced due to misrepresentations about the test’s accuracy or admissibility. Here, “no impression that the voice stress test was omniscient was foisted upon defendant. To the contrary, he was informed that the test could not determine whether he was lying.” The Court concluded that the “police, their investigatory ardor not having been stilled by the test results, continued their inquiry in a manner calculated to undermine defendant’s free will.” The Court emphasized that absent coercion exceeding the test itself, the confession was voluntary.

  • People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286 (1980): Authentication of Telephone Conversations and Spontaneous Statements

    People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286 (1980)

    A telephone conversation is admissible as evidence even if the witness cannot identify the caller’s voice if surrounding circumstances provide sufficient corroboration of the caller’s identity, and a statement is considered spontaneous and admissible if it is not the product of police interrogation or its functional equivalent.

    Summary

    Julius Lynes was convicted of rape, sodomy, robbery, and burglary. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a phone conversation where the detective didn’t recognize the caller’s voice, and oral statements made by Lynes without Miranda warnings. The Court held that the phone conversation was admissible because of corroborating circumstances, and Lynes’s statement to the officer was spontaneous and not the result of interrogation. This case clarifies the evidentiary standards for authenticating phone conversations and determining the spontaneity of statements in criminal proceedings.

    Facts

    The complainant identified Lynes as her assailant after seeing him on the street. Lynes fled into a building, and witnesses identified him by his nickname, “Speedy.” Detective Longo, investigating the incident, spoke with a man claiming to be Lynes’s brother and left his contact information, requesting that “Speedy” call him regarding an old warrant. Later, Longo received a call from an unidentified male voice claiming to be “Speedy—Julius Lynes” asking why he was being sought. Longo mentioned the knife found at the apartment, and the caller reacted with dismay and refused to come in for questioning. Subsequently, while in custody on an unrelated charge, Lynes made an incriminating statement to Officer Czfwzyk without prior Miranda warnings.

    Procedural History

    Lynes was convicted at trial, and the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Lynes then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the telephone conversation and his statements to Officer Czfwzyk were improperly admitted as evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a telephone conversation is admissible when the police detective cannot identify the caller’s voice.

    2. Whether the oral statements Lynes made to a police officer were admissible, given that he had not been advised of his Miranda rights.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because other circumstances provided sufficient corroboration of the identity of the caller.

    2. Yes, because the statement was made voluntarily and spontaneously, and not as the product of any police interrogation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the authentication of the telephone conversation didn’t solely rely on voice recognition but on surrounding circumstances. The detective specifically requested Lynes to call, leaving his information with someone claiming to be Lynes’s brother. The call occurred shortly after, and the caller identified himself using both his nickname and formal name. The caller also demonstrated knowledge of facts not publicly known, such as the knife found at the crime scene. Citing Van Riper v. United States, the court stated that “The chance that these circumstances should unite in the case of some one [other than the defendant] seems * * * so improbable that the speaker was sufficiently identified”.

    Regarding the statements made to Officer Czfwzyk, the Court determined that the statements were spontaneous. Lynes initiated the conversation by asking about the warrant. The officer’s response was not designed to elicit further information. The court distinguished between statements precipitated by subtle forms of interrogation and truly spontaneous utterances. It emphasized that the test is “whether the defendant’s statement can be said to have been triggered by police conduct which should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from the defendant.” Because Lynes initiated the conversation and the officer’s response was neutral, the Court found no violation of Lynes’s right to remain silent or right to counsel. The court noted, “The defendant himself initiated the conversation and the officer’s response need not have been viewed as one designed to elicit some further reply by the defendant.”

  • People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218 (1980): Waiver of Right to Counsel After Felony Complaint

    People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218 (1980)

    Once a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is issued, a defendant’s right to counsel attaches, and any waiver of that right obtained in the absence of counsel is invalid, rendering any subsequent statements inadmissible.

    Summary

    Samuels was arrested and questioned about a robbery after a felony complaint was filed against him. He waived his Miranda rights outside the presence of counsel and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the felony complaint initiated formal adversarial proceedings, Samuels’s right to counsel had indelibly attached. Therefore, his waiver of counsel in the absence of an attorney was invalid, and his statements were inadmissible. The court emphasized that once a formal accusation is made, the matter becomes a legal controversy requiring the presence of counsel to safeguard the defendant’s rights.

    Facts

    On September 4, 1975, a store robbery occurred in Nassau County. Several days later, an investigating officer filed a felony complaint in the District Court, charging Samuels with the crime. An arrest warrant was issued based on the complaint. On October 5, 1975, police arrested Samuels at his mother’s home. Before arraignment, Samuels was taken to the local precinct for “processing.” At the police station, he was advised of his Miranda rights and questioned about the robbery without counsel present. He made oral and written statements admitting involvement, but claimed coercion.

    Procedural History

    Samuels moved to suppress his statements, arguing he wasn’t properly advised of his rights and was coerced. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing. He was subsequently convicted of robbery. On appeal, Samuels argued that the confession should have been suppressed because it was obtained without counsel after the felony complaint was filed. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can validly waive their right to counsel in the absence of an attorney after a felony complaint has been filed in court and an arrest warrant has been issued.

    Holding

    No, because once a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is issued, the right to counsel attaches, and any waiver of that right in the absence of counsel is invalid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution and commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument, including a felony complaint. The court distinguished this case from situations where the police were merely investigating a crime. It stated, “The sole function of a warrant of arrest is to achieve a defendant’s court appearance in a criminal action for the purpose of arraignment upon the accusatory instrument by which such action was commenced.” Once a formal accusation is made, the matter is no longer simply an investigation but a legal controversy. Quoting People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 163-164, the court noted, “Once a matter is the subject of a legal controversy any discussions relating thereto should be conducted by counsel: at that point the parties are in no position to safeguard their rights.” The court emphasized that the defendant has a right to counsel at all preliminary proceedings, including arraignment on a felony complaint. Since “all that stands between the entry of counsel into the proceedings and nonrepresentation is the ministerial act of arraignment, there may be no waiver of the right to counsel unless an attorney is present.” Therefore, Samuels’ statements obtained in the absence of counsel after the felony complaint was filed should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980): Impeachment by Silence at Arrest After Miranda Warnings

    People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980)

    Impeachment of a defendant’s trial testimony by questioning about their silence at the time of arrest is generally prohibited if Miranda warnings were given, as such silence is ambiguous and may be an exercise of their constitutional right to remain silent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest could be used to impeach their trial testimony. Conyers was arrested for robbery, possession of a weapon, assault, and attempted murder. At trial, he presented a different version of events, claiming he was the victim. The prosecution questioned him about his failure to mention this version to the arresting officers. The court held that using Conyers’ silence for impeachment was improper because it was ambiguous and potentially an exercise of his right to remain silent, especially if Miranda warnings were given. The court emphasized the potential prejudice to the defendant and the importance of ensuring a fair trial.

    Facts

    Dantzler and Johnson were allegedly robbed at gunpoint. Dantzler chased the defendant, Conyers, who was apprehended by police. At the time of the arrest, Conyers had a gun. He was told he was being arrested for robbery, possession of a weapon, assault and attempted murder. Conyers remained silent. At trial, Conyers testified to a different version of events, claiming that Dantzler had tried to rob him after a numbers bet dispute and Conyers was merely defending himself.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed the prosecution to cross-examine Conyers regarding his silence at the time of arrest. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed but, upon reargument, reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution could use the defendant’s silence at the time of arrest to impeach his trial testimony, given that he was in custody and potentially aware of his right to remain silent.

    Holding

    No, because using Conyers’ silence for impeachment was improper. The court reasoned that such silence is inherently ambiguous and could be an exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent, especially considering he was in custody. It was deemed to violate the principles of due process and the privilege against self-incrimination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that using a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest for impeachment purposes is problematic. It emphasized that silence is inherently ambiguous; it could be due to the defendant exercising their right to remain silent, confusion, or fear. The court highlighted that permitting such impeachment could unfairly prejudice the defendant by implying guilt from their silence, thereby undermining the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the court noted the unfairness of using post-Miranda silence against a defendant, as the warnings themselves imply that silence will not be penalized. The court distinguished situations where silence might be more probative, but found that in this case, the potential for prejudice outweighed any probative value. The dissent argued that the majority’s ruling unduly restricted the prosecution’s ability to test the defendant’s credibility and that the defendant’s silence was inconsistent with his later exculpatory testimony. Judge Meyer, in dissent, stated: “To refuse to permit the jury to consider defendant’s silence at arrest under those circumstances is to fly in the face of human experience and of the public interest in truthful testimony embodied in the impeachment rule. It is, to put it bluntly, to provide defendants with a license to lie, not required by Constitution, statute or precedent.” However, the majority found that allowing the impeachment would create an unacceptable burden on the exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent.

  • People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995 (1980): Voluntariness of Confession and Mistrial Standard

    People v. Young, 48 N.Y.2d 995 (1980)

    A defendant’s inculpatory statements are admissible if they were voluntarily made following a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent; a mistrial is not warranted for peripheral references to other criminal acts if less drastic means can alleviate potential prejudice.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the defendant’s confession was admissible because it was voluntarily made after a valid waiver of his rights. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s requests for a mistrial, which were based on peripheral references to another alleged criminal act, because less drastic means of addressing any potential prejudice were available and, in one instance, actively pursued through a jury instruction.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jerry Young, made inculpatory statements. Prior to trial, Young moved to suppress these statements, arguing that they were not voluntarily made. During the trial, peripheral references were made to another criminal act allegedly committed by the defendant. The defendant requested a mistrial based on these references.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court found that the defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntary and admissible. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s inculpatory statements were voluntarily made following an effective waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s requests for a mistrial based on peripheral references to another criminal act allegedly performed by the defendant.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record supports the finding that the inculpatory statements were voluntarily made after a valid waiver of rights.

    2. No, because less drastic means of alleviating whatever prejudice may have resulted from the references were available.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals deferred to the factual finding of the Supreme Court, as affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the defendant’s statements were voluntarily made following an effective waiver of his rights. The Court emphasized that it found no basis for disturbing this finding.

    Regarding the mistrial requests, the Court stated that a mistrial was not mandated because less drastic means were available to alleviate any potential prejudice. In one instance, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the testimony. In another, the court indicated a willingness to consider a request to address the issue. The Court noted that the defendant insisted on a mistrial instead of pursuing these less drastic alternatives.

    The court stated, “Our examination of the record persuades us that there exists no basis for disturbing the factual finding made by Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division that the inculpatory statements had been voluntarily made by defendant following an effective waiver of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.”

  • People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10 (1974): Upholding a Defendant’s Right to Self-Representation and Jury Waiver

    People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10 (1974)

    A defendant has a constitutional right to represent themselves and waive a jury trial, provided the assertion of these rights is knowing, voluntary, and not made for purposes of delay or obstruction.

    Summary

    McIntyre was convicted of robbery. Before trial, he repeatedly sought to represent himself and waive a jury trial. The trial court denied these requests, finding him not “capable” or “qualified” due to his lack of legal knowledge. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that denying McIntyre’s requests violated his constitutional rights. The court emphasized that a defendant’s lack of legal expertise is not a sufficient basis to deny self-representation, as long as the decision is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The court found no evidence the defendant sought to delay the proceedings.

    Facts

    McIntyre was indicted on multiple charges stemming from the armed robbery of an off-duty police officer. He cycled through three assigned attorneys, expressing dissatisfaction with each. Prior to trial, McIntyre repeatedly stated his desire to represent himself and waive his right to a jury trial. The trial court acknowledged these requests but repeatedly discouraged them, emphasizing the seriousness of the charges and the benefits of legal counsel. The court ultimately denied McIntyre’s motions, citing his lack of legal knowledge and experience as demonstrating an inability to adequately represent himself.

    Procedural History

    McIntyre was convicted of robbery in the second degree and sentenced as a persistent felony offender. He appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his requests for self-representation and jury waiver. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. McIntyre then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a trial court can deny a defendant’s request to represent himself based solely on the defendant’s lack of legal knowledge or courtroom experience.

    2. Whether a trial court can deny a defendant’s request to waive a jury trial when the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently makes the request.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because accepting a defendant’s lack of legal knowledge as a ground for concluding that he is not qualified to represent himself would eviscerate the constitutional right to self-representation.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s waiver was timely, unequivocal, and not made for purposes of delay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the constitutional rights to self-representation (Faretta v. California) and waiver of jury trial. The court found that McIntyre had knowingly and intelligently asserted these rights. His repeated requests, coupled with his dissatisfaction with assigned counsel, demonstrated a clear intention to represent himself. The court rejected the trial court’s rationale that McIntyre’s lack of legal knowledge justified denying his request. The court stated, “To accept a defendant’s lack of knowledge of legal principles and rules of law or his unfamiliarity with courtroom procedures as the ground for concluding that he is not qualified to represent himself would in effect be to eviscerate the constitutional right of self-representation.” The court further noted that McIntyre’s requests were not made for purposes of delay or obstruction. The court found the trial court substituted its own judgment for the defendant’s regarding what was in his best interest, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The court found, “in its rulings the court assumed to itself authority and responsibility for determining that it would not be in defendant’s interest for him either to waive a jury trial or to represent himself. In so doing the court arrogated to itself and denied to defendant the exercise of rights constitutionally guaranteed to him.”

  • People v. Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834 (1979): Admissibility of In-Court Identification and Speedy Trial Rights

    People v. Whisby, 48 N.Y.2d 834 (1979)

    An in-court identification is admissible if it is based on an independent source of recollection or if no police identification procedure took place, and a claim of denial of a speedy trial must be raised at trial to be preserved for appellate review.

    Summary

    Defendants Whisby and Price appealed their convictions, arguing that they were denied a speedy trial and that the in-court identification by the victim should have been suppressed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the speedy trial issue was not preserved for review because it was not raised at trial. The Court also found that the in-court identification of Price was based on an independent source and that no police identification procedure occurred with respect to Whisby, making the identification admissible. The Court found no merit in the defendants’ remaining contentions.

    Facts

    The victim identified Price in court. Prior to trial, the victim identified Whisby on a public street in White Plains without any police involvement. The defendants were convicted, and on appeal, they argued that their right to a speedy trial had been violated and that the in-court identification by the victim should have been suppressed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendants. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the convictions. The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendants’ contention that they were denied their right to a speedy trial may be considered on appeal when the issue was not raised at trial.

    2. Whether the in-court identification of defendant Price by the victim ought to have been suppressed.

    3. Whether the in-court identification of defendant Whisby by the victim ought to have been suppressed.

    Holding

    1. No, because defendants failed to raise the issue at trial.

    2. No, because the in-court identification was based upon an independent source of recollection.

    3. No, because the complaining witness identified Whisby on a public street, and no police identification procedures took place.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a claim of denial of a speedy trial must be raised at trial to be preserved for appellate review, citing People v. Primmer and People v. Adams. The Court stated that it could not consider the defendants’ speedy trial claim because they failed to raise it at trial.

    Regarding Price’s in-court identification, the Court found that there was evidence in the record to support the trial court’s factual finding, affirmed by the Appellate Division, that the identification was based upon an independent source of recollection. The Court emphasized that it cannot disturb such findings of fact, citing People v. Burrows and People v. Peterson.

    As for Whisby’s in-court identification, the Court relied on the affirmed finding of fact that he was identified by the complaining witness on a public street and that “there were no police identification procedures necessary and none, in fact, took place.” The court cited People v. Logan, noting that under such circumstances, the identification was proper. The Court suggested that the lack of police involvement distinguished this case from situations involving potentially suggestive police identification procedures.

    The Court summarily dismissed the defendants’ remaining contentions, finding them to be without merit.

  • People v. Gilmore, 66 N.Y.2d 742 (1985): Confidential Informant Production at Trial

    People v. Gilmore, 66 N.Y.2d 742 (1985)

    A trial court need not compel the prosecution to produce a confidential informant if the defendant’s request appears to be a trial strategy ploy rather than a genuine effort to present relevant, helpful testimony, and the informant’s role in the crime was minor.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to compel the prosecution to produce a confidential informant. The informant was known to the defendant, and the defense learned early in the trial that the prosecution wouldn’t call her. The defendant then absented himself from the trial. The Court of Appeals emphasized that requests for informant production must be evaluated to determine if it’s a genuine need or a trial strategy. Here, the timing of the request and the defendant’s absence suggested the latter. Furthermore, the defendant failed to specify the exculpatory testimony expected from the informant, and her role in the drug sales was minor.

    Facts

    A confidential informant, Avis Burns, introduced the defendant, Gilmore, to an undercover officer, leading to a $250 cocaine sale in Burns’ apartment on December 18, 1973. Burns was present during the transaction but in an adjoining room. A second sale occurred on January 22, 1974, at Burns’ workplace. The sale took place in the men’s room, outside Burns’ presence, though Gilmore placed a bag behind Burns’ purse before the sale. Burns had a prior narcotics arrest and faced a potential life sentence, giving her a possible motive to falsify testimony.

    Procedural History

    Gilmore was convicted of drug charges. Prior to the close of the People’s case, Gilmore’s attorney requested the production of the confidential informant, Avis Burns. The trial court denied the request. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and Gilmore appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for the prosecution to produce a confidential informant, Avis Burns, for potential testimony.

    Holding

    No, because the timing and circumstances of the request suggested a trial strategy, the defendant failed to articulate the specific exculpatory testimony he expected, and the informant’s role in the drug sales was minor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals considered the timing of the defense’s request for production, which occurred shortly before the close of the People’s case and after the defendant had absented himself from the trial. This timing, coupled with the failure to specify the relevant exculpatory testimony Burns could provide, suggested the request was a trial ploy. The court cited People v. Jenkins, 41 N.Y.2d 307 and People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, emphasizing the need to weigh whether the demand for the informant is a genuine attempt to elicit relevant testimony or merely a strategic maneuver. The court also noted that Burns’ involvement in the sales was minor. Regarding the first sale, while Gilmore argued Burns could testify about whether he knew the contents of the package, he did not present this argument to the trial court. The court stated her “testimony was hardly essential to a fair trial” (citing United States v. Turbide). The court also found that there was no real issue as to identification in this case. The court reasoned that the jury was aware of the possible sentences that Burns could have faced had she not cooperated with law enforcement.