New York Law Review

Tag: Criminal Procedure

  • People v. Bennett, 56 N.Y.2d 837 (1982): Adequacy of Notice for Oral Statements

    56 N.Y.2d 837 (1982)

    A defendant forfeits the right to challenge the inadequacy of a notice regarding the intent to use an oral statement at trial if they fail to seek amplification or assert surprise/prejudice at trial when corrective action could have been taken.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed a conviction, arguing that the notice provided by the prosecution regarding the intent to use an oral statement made to a police officer was inadequate because it lacked the statement’s contents and the circumstances under which it was made. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant waived the objection by failing to seek clarification of the notice before trial, declining a hearing on admissibility, and failing to assert surprise or prejudice during the trial when the officer testified. The court reasoned that these failures prevented any possible corrective action.

    Facts

    The People served a notice on the defendant’s counsel indicating their intent to use an oral statement made by the defendant to a police officer at the time of arrest. The notice did not contain the contents of the statement or the circumstances under which it was made.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant argued that the notice regarding the oral statement was inadequate under CPL 710.30. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can challenge the adequacy of a notice regarding the intent to use an oral statement at trial when the defendant failed to seek amplification of the notice prior to trial, declined an opportunity for a hearing concerning the admissibility of the statement, and failed to assert surprise or prejudice at trial when the statement was introduced.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s failure to object at a time when corrective action was possible constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the adequacy of the notice on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the defendant had multiple opportunities to address the perceived inadequacy of the notice. The defendant could have sought more detailed information about the statement before trial or requested a hearing to determine its admissibility. Furthermore, when the police officer testified about the statement at trial, the defendant did not claim surprise or prejudice.

    The court reasoned that these omissions were critical because they prevented the trial court from taking corrective action, such as an adjournment or other measures to mitigate any potential unfairness to the defendant. By failing to raise these objections at the appropriate time, the defendant deprived the court of the opportunity to address the issue effectively. As the court noted in citing People v Martin, 50 NY2d 1029, failing to present an objection when corrective action is possible forfeits the matter for appellate review. The court implicitly applied principles of procedural fairness and judicial efficiency, suggesting that parties should raise objections promptly to allow for timely resolution and prevent unnecessary appeals based on easily correctable errors. This is especially true in a non-jury trial, where the judge can immediately address potential prejudice.

  • Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, Inc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 1 (1981): Mandamus Not Available to Disrupt Pending Criminal Actions

    Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, Inc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 1 (1981)

    Mandamus does not lie to compel a superior court to remove charges pending in a local criminal court to ensure a defendant’s trial before a lawyer-trained judge; such relief would disrupt the normal progress of a pending criminal action.

    Summary

    The Legal Aid Society sought a writ of mandamus to compel a county judge to remove misdemeanor charges against their client from a town justice court, where none of the justices were lawyers, to a court with a lawyer-trained judge. The motion was based on the argument that the client had a right to be tried before a judge who was a lawyer. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is inappropriate for interlocutory relief that disrupts the normal progress of a pending criminal action. The Court emphasized that the defendant could raise the constitutional issue on direct appeal if convicted.

    Facts

    John Housman was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest in the Town of Mamakating Justice Court in Sullivan County.

    None of the Justices of the local criminal court in the Town of Mamakating were admitted to practice law.

    Housman’s counsel, the Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, moved to have the charges prosecuted by indictment and presented to the Grand Jury, arguing for removal to a court with a lawyer-trained judge based on a constitutional right.

    The County Judge denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    After the County Judge denied the motion for removal, the Legal Aid Society initiated an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the County Judge to grant the requested relief.

    The Appellate Division dismissed the petition.

    The Legal Aid Society appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether mandamus lies to compel the removal by a superior court of charges pending in a local criminal court to ensure a defendant’s trial before a lawyer-trained Judge.

    Holding

    No, because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is inappropriate for interlocutory relief that disrupts the normal progress of a pending criminal action; the defendant can raise the constitutional issue on direct appeal if convicted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that mandamus is only available to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought, which was not the case here. The Court emphasized that mandamus, like prohibition, is an extraordinary remedy and should not be used for interlocutory relief that disrupts the normal progress of a pending criminal action. Allowing such collateral proceedings would lead to numerous disruptions and make speedy trials impossible. The court cited Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59 (1975), which held that courts should not entertain collateral proceedings to review errors of law in pending criminal actions. The Court noted that Housman could obtain full judicial review of his claim on direct appeal from any judgment of conviction, making the collateral action unnecessary and inappropriate. As the court stated in Matter of State of New York v. King, “No trial can be conducted while appellate courts by their own protracted proceedings review the alleged errors which may arise preliminary to the trial, during the trial, and before verdict and judgment. Such a system is neither civilized nor even rational. And most certainly it would make speedy trial a legal impossibility.”

  • People v. Fuentes, 53 N.Y.2d 892 (1981): Standard for Reopening a Wade Hearing

    53 N.Y.2d 892 (1981)

    A trial court may reopen a pretrial Wade hearing only if the defendant demonstrates that they have discovered additional pertinent facts that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the original determination.

    Summary

    Jesus Fuentes appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his requests to reopen the Wade hearing during trial. He claimed new facts warranted a re-examination of the identification procedures. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court emphasized that under CPL 710.40(4), reopening a pretrial hearing requires a showing by the defendant of newly discovered, pertinent facts that could not have been previously discovered with reasonable diligence. Fuentes failed to meet this burden, justifying the trial court’s denial.

    Facts

    During the trial, the defendant, Jesus Fuentes, sought to reopen a previously held Wade hearing concerning the admissibility of identification evidence. The specific nature of the underlying criminal charges or the identification evidence itself is not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the defendant argued that new facts had emerged that warranted a re-evaluation of the fairness and reliability of the identification procedures used.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to reopen the Wade hearing during the trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s request to reopen the Wade hearing during the trial, based on the defendant’s claim of newly discovered facts.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the alleged new facts were pertinent and could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the initial Wade hearing determination, as required by CPL 710.40(4).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on CPL 710.40(4), which governs the reopening of pretrial hearings. The statute explicitly states that a trial court may reopen a pretrial hearing if it “is satisfied, upon a showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination” of the pretrial application. The court emphasized that the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating both the pertinence of the new facts and the prior inability to discover them with reasonable diligence. Since Fuentes failed to establish these elements, the trial court’s refusal to reopen the Wade hearing was deemed a proper exercise of its discretion. The Court of Appeals found no merit in the defendant’s remaining arguments, reinforcing the affirmance of the lower court’s order. This case highlights the importance of diligently pursuing all relevant facts before a pretrial hearing concludes and underscores the limited circumstances under which a court will allow a reopening of such a hearing during trial. The decision also affirms a trial court’s discretion in managing the presentation of evidence and ensuring the orderly conduct of proceedings.

  • People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584 (1981): Sufficiency of Indictment After Guilty Plea

    People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584 (1981)

    A guilty plea waives any argument that an indictment fails to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or fails to give more detailed notice of the offense charged if the indictment is jurisdictionally sufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant Cohen pleaded guilty to failure to file New York State and local sales and use tax returns. On appeal, he argued that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege the element of willfulness. The Court of Appeals held that the indictment was jurisdictionally sufficient because it specifically alleged the failure to file a New York State tax form and the violation of a specific statute. The court further held that any argument that the indictment failed to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or failed to give more detailed notice of the offense was waived by the guilty plea.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jerry Cohen, was indicted for grand larceny and failure to file New York State and local sales and use tax returns. The indictment stated that Cohen failed to file a New York State and Local Sales and Use Tax Return (Form ST-100) covering the operation of Plaza Health Clubs, Inc. for a specific period. Cohen pleaded guilty to one count of failure to file a tax return.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after pleading guilty in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the indictment was fatally defective for failure to allege willfulness.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a guilty plea waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of an indictment under CPL 200.50 when the indictment is jurisdictionally sound but allegedly lacks specific details.

    Holding

    Yes, because a guilty plea waives any argument that the indictment failed to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or provide more detailed notice of the offense charged, provided the indictment is jurisdictionally sufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the indictment fulfilled the jurisdictional requirements because it specifically alleged the failure to file a New York State tax form and the violation of a designated statute (Tax Law § 1145(b)). The court noted that incorporating the statute by reference includes all elements of the crime, whether explicit in the statute or established by judicial interpretation. The court emphasized that the defendant could have moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or sought a bill of particulars. However, by pleading guilty, the defendant waived any arguments regarding the indictment’s deficiency in providing detailed notice. The court stated that “Any argument, however, that the indictment in this case was deficient as failing to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or as failing to give more detailed notice of the offense charged than that furnished by the jurisdictionally sufficient indictment was waived by defendant’s plea of guilty”. The court also pointed out that the multicount indictment indicated an intent to prove willfulness, further undermining the defendant’s claim of lack of notice. The defendant’s attempt to plead to “unwillful failure” which was rejected by the court further showed he was aware of the willfulness element. This case underscores the principle that a guilty plea generally admits all the elements of the crime and waives non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. It also highlights the importance of raising objections to the indictment’s form or content before entering a plea.

  • People v. Cabrera, 50 N.Y.2d 850 (1980): Duty to Inquire into Joint Representation Conflicts of Interest

    People v. Cabrera, 50 N.Y.2d 850 (1980)

    When codefendants are represented by the same attorney, the trial court must ascertain on the record whether each defendant is aware of their right to separate representation and the potential risks of joint representation; failure to do so requires reversal if there’s any significant possibility of a conflict of interest.

    Summary

    Cabrera and her husband were convicted of criminal possession of stolen property. They were both represented by the same retained attorney. The trial court did not inquire whether each defendant understood their right to separate counsel and the risks of joint representation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Cabrera’s conviction, finding a potential conflict of interest existed because there were indications that Cabrera may have been coerced by her husband into participating in the crime, suggesting different defense strategies for each defendant. Because Cabrera had already served her sentence, the court dismissed the charges.

    Facts

    Cabrera and her husband were jointly charged with two counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree.
    Both defendants were represented by the same retained attorney.
    At trial, evidence suggested Cabrera might have been coerced by her husband to participate in the crimes.

    Procedural History

    Cabrera and her husband were convicted after a jury trial.
    The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction.
    Cabrera appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to inquire into a potential conflict of interest arising from joint representation requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court failed to ascertain on the record whether each defendant was aware of the right to separate representation and the potential risks involved in being represented by the same attorney, and there was a significant possibility of a conflict of interest arising from the joint representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Macerola, People v. Gomberg, People v. Fioretti, and People v. Baffi, which established the requirement for trial courts to inquire into potential conflicts of interest when codefendants are jointly represented. The court emphasized that reversal is required if there’s “any significant possibility at all of a conflict of interest arising from the joint representation.” The court found a potential conflict because the evidence suggested differing levels of culpability between Cabrera and her husband, specifically the possibility of coercion. As the court stated, these differing levels “suggested different theories and tactics of defense for each”. This potential conflict meant that the interests of the codefendants were not completely harmonious. Because Cabrera had already served her sentence for relatively minor crimes, the court exercised its discretion to dismiss the charges in their entirety. The court explicitly stated that it deemed it “unnecessary to consider appellant’s other contentions regarding the admission of certain evidence, which, it is claimed, was obtained in violation of her constitutional rights.”

  • People v. Alicea, 61 N.Y.2d 23 (1983): Reversal for Failure to Inquire About Joint Representation Risks

    People v. Alicea, 61 N.Y.2d 23 (1983)

    When a trial court fails to inquire into a defendant’s awareness of the potential risks inherent in joint representation with a co-defendant, it constitutes reversible error if there is a significant possibility of a conflict of interest.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and mandated a new trial. The court found that the trial court committed reversible error by not questioning the defendant, Alicea, about his awareness of the potential risks involved in being jointly represented by the same counsel as his co-defendant, Barclay. The Court of Appeals determined there was a “significant possibility” of conflict of interest because Alicea and Barclay could have shifted blame to each other regarding possession of the crime’s proceeds. Because the error and the conflict were evident in the record, the court ruled that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was appropriately addressed on direct appeal.

    Facts

    Alicea and James Barclay were co-defendants. They were jointly represented by the same defense counsel. Both Alicea and Barclay were alleged to have possessed the proceeds of a crime.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Alicea. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Alicea appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s failure to inquire about the defendant’s awareness of the risks of joint representation with a co-defendant constitutes reversible error when a significant possibility of conflict of interest exists.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court made no inquiry on the record to ascertain whether the defendant was aware of the potential risks inherent in defense counsel’s joint representation of defendant and James Barclay, a codefendant, and there was a “significant possibility” of conflict of interest between defendant and Barclay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, including People v. Macerola and People v. Baffi, which established that a failure to inquire about the risks of joint representation is reversible error when there is a “significant possibility” of conflict of interest. The court found such a possibility existed in this case. Because Alicea and Barclay were both accused of possessing the crime’s proceeds, separate counsel could have advised each to argue that the other was solely in possession. This created a conflict that the trial court should have explored with the defendant.

    The court also addressed the appropriate venue for resolving the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. While acknowledging that such claims often require factual development best suited for collateral proceedings under CPL 440.10, the court held that because the error (failure to inquire) and the conflict of interest were both evident on the record, the issue could be resolved on direct appeal. The court stated, “where, as here, the record discloses that reversible error has occurred below, defendant should not be relegated to such collateral proceedings to obtain relief.”

  • People v. Graham, 57 N.Y.2d 722 (1982): Enforceability of Defendant’s Waiver of Appeal Rights

    People v. Graham, 57 N.Y.2d 722 (1982)

    A defendant’s explicit agreement to waive the right to appeal an unfavorable verdict, made as a condition of the prosecution’s consent to a jury view of the crime scene, is a valid and binding waiver if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consents to the waiver as a part of trial strategy.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of robbery, and the Appellate Division reversed based on the trial court’s allowing the jury to view the crime scene after deliberations began, due to minor changes in the store layout. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the defendant’s consent to the viewing, made with awareness of the store’s altered state and as part of trial strategy, constituted a waiver of his right to object. Furthermore, his explicit agreement to waive appeal rights in exchange for the prosecution’s consent to the viewing was a valid waiver.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbing a grocery store. The layout of the store had changed slightly between the time of the robbery and the trial. The defendant objected to the jury viewing the scene under these altered conditions but ultimately consented after the trial court denied his request to rearrange the displays. As a condition of his consent, the District Attorney extracted an agreement from the defendant that he would waive his right to appeal if the jury returned an unfavorable verdict.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant of robbery. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction “on the law,” finding that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to view the crime scene after deliberations had begun, given the changes in the store layout. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s consent to the jury viewing the crime scene, despite awareness of changes in the scene’s layout, constituted a waiver of his right to object to the procedure on appeal?
    2. Whether the defendant’s explicit agreement to waive his right to appeal an unfavorable verdict, made as a condition of the District Attorney’s consent to the jury viewing, constituted a valid and binding waiver?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant consented to the viewing after the trial court ruled against him on his request to rearrange the store, and he was aware that the court would not have permitted the visit without both parties’ agreement, implying a strategic decision to risk potential prejudice.
    2. Yes, because the defendant explicitly agreed to forego his right to appeal based on the post-summation viewing if the jury returned an unfavorable verdict, and this agreement was a valid and binding waiver.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the defendant’s consent to the jury viewing was a deliberate choice of trial strategy. The court reasoned that the defendant believed the visit would be helpful to his case and willingly accepted the risk of prejudice due to the store’s altered layout. The court stated, “The only reasonable inference to be drawn from these circumstances is that defendant honestly believed that a jury visit to the scene would be helpful to his case and that he was therefore willing to accept the risk of whatever prejudice might arise as a result of the changes in the layout of the grocery store.”

    Furthermore, the court held that the defendant’s explicit agreement to waive his right to appeal was a valid and binding waiver. The court noted that this agreement “was exacted by the District Attorney as a condition to his own consent, was itself a valid and binding waiver, and it should have been respected when the case was considered at the Appellate Division.” The court emphasized the importance of upholding such agreements, absent extenuating circumstances, reinforcing the principle that defendants are bound by their strategic choices during trial.

  • People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58 (1980): Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases and Defendant’s Right to Testify

    People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58 (1980)

    Collateral estoppel should not rigidly apply in criminal cases, especially when it prevents a defendant from introducing new, crucial evidence, potentially infringing on their right to testify.

    Summary

    Plevy was convicted of burglary after the trial court suppressed his testimony, arguing collateral estoppel based on a prior ruling in a murder case where similar evidence was presented. The New York Court of Appeals held that while collateral estoppel can apply in criminal cases, it shouldn’t when it prevents a defendant from presenting new, crucial evidence, especially their own testimony. However, the Court affirmed Plevy’s conviction because the warrant application, absent the contested evidence, still established probable cause.

    Facts

    A neighbor reported a man fitting Plevy’s description discarding a bag containing a missing woman’s belongings. Another neighbor saw the man carrying the bag towards Plevy’s house and returning without it. Police investigating the disappearance spoke with Plevy, who allowed them into his room. There, an officer observed a plastic bag and other items later connected to the victim. Plevy was later indicted for both murder (in Kings County) and burglary (in Nassau County). The murder and burglary charges arose from the same set of facts related to the missing woman.

    Procedural History

    In the Kings County murder case, Plevy moved to suppress evidence, arguing an illegal search. The motion was partially granted, but the court found Plevy consented to the initial entry based on the officer’s uncontested testimony (Plevy didn’t testify). Plevy was convicted of murder, and the conviction was affirmed. Subsequently, in the Nassau County burglary case, Plevy moved to suppress evidence again, offering to testify he did not consent to the entry. The court denied his request, invoking collateral estoppel. Plevy was convicted of burglary, and the Appellate Division affirmed, holding collateral estoppel applied. Plevy appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether collateral estoppel can be applied against a defendant in a criminal case to preclude the relitigation of a suppression issue determined in a prior case.
    2. Whether, even if collateral estoppel was improperly applied, the remaining information in the warrant application was sufficient to establish probable cause.

    Holding

    1. No, because collateral estoppel should not be rigidly applied to prevent a defendant from presenting new, crucial evidence, particularly their own testimony, on a suppression issue. The defendant should have been allowed to testify.
    2. Yes, because even excluding the evidence obtained after the contested entry, the remaining information in the warrant application established probable cause to search Plevy’s residence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that collateral estoppel aims to conserve resources by preventing relitigation of decided issues. However, in criminal cases, the paramount concern is reaching a correct result. The Court emphasized that the doctrine should yield to more fundamental concerns when applied against a defendant. The court noted, “Thus, although it is frequently said that collateral estoppel applies to criminal cases… it cannot be applied in quite the same way as in civil cases.”

    The Court found that Plevy’s testimony was crucial and that his decision not to testify in the first hearing (the murder case) was legitimate given the high stakes. The Court stated: “The defendant’s decision not to testify at the first hearing but to do so in this case was a legitimate one. Constitutionally the accused has the right to testify or not to testify at any criminal action or proceeding. The doctrine of collateral estoppel cannot be said to be superior to those rights…” The Court determined that the seriousness of the murder charge may have discouraged Plevy from testifying in the initial suppression hearing for fear of aiding the prosecution.

    Despite finding the collateral estoppel application improper, the Court ultimately affirmed Plevy’s conviction. It reasoned that even without the evidence obtained during the contested entry, the warrant application contained sufficient independent evidence to establish probable cause. This evidence included neighbor statements, the victim’s father’s report, and police investigation details regarding Plevy’s possession and disposal of the victim’s belongings.

  • People v. Pilgrim, 52 N.Y.2d 730 (1980): Preserving Objections for Appellate Review

    People v. Pilgrim, 52 N.Y.2d 730 (1980)

    A defendant must object to errors at trial to preserve those errors for appellate review.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. On appeal, he argued that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County and that the trial court erred in failing to submit the venue issue to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support the convictions. The Court further held that the defendant failed to preserve the venue issue for appellate review because he neither requested that the issue be submitted to the jury nor took exception to the court’s failure to do so.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on multiple counts, including criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first and second degrees. Counts 1 and 4 of the indictment were submitted to the jury on theories both of completed sale and agreements to sell. The defendant was convicted on these counts. The defendant appealed, arguing that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s application to dismiss the counts on the ground that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County. The defendant appealed this decision to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support the convictions for criminal sale of a controlled substance based on agreements to sell made in that county.

    2. Whether the defendant preserved the issue of the trial court’s failure to submit the venue issue to the jury for appellate review.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the record contained sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support convictions on the basis of agreements to sell made in that county.

    2. No, because the defendant neither requested that the issue be submitted to the jury nor took exception to the court’s failure to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the record contained sufficient evidence of transactions in Nassau County to support the convictions. The court reasoned that the trial court did not err when it denied the defendant’s application to dismiss the counts on the ground that venue was improperly laid in Nassau County.

    Regarding the failure to submit the venue issue to the jury, the court emphasized the importance of preserving issues for appellate review. The court stated that “defendant neither requested such submission nor took exception to the court’s failure to submit the issue to the jury, his claim of error, if any, has not been preserved for our review.” This highlights the general rule that errors must be brought to the trial court’s attention, giving the court an opportunity to correct them. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal. This rule promotes efficiency in the judicial process and prevents defendants from strategically withholding objections only to raise them later if they are convicted. The absence of a request or an exception indicated to the trial court that the defendant was satisfied with the charge as given and thus, the defendant could not later claim error.

  • People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 918 (1974): Preserving Objections to Jury Instructions

    People v. Fellman, 35 N.Y.2d 918 (1974)

    A defendant’s timely written request for a specific jury instruction, accurately reflecting the law, preserves the objection to the court’s failure to provide that instruction, even if not explicitly reiterated after the charge.

    Summary

    Fellman was convicted of perjury. He appealed, arguing the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the corroboration required for perjury convictions as per CPL 210.50. Fellman’s attorney had submitted a written request for a specific jury instruction on corroboration, but the court did not give the instruction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the written request sufficiently preserved the objection, even though it wasn’t reiterated verbatim after the jury charge, and reversed the perjury conviction due to the omission of the critical corroboration instruction. The court found the error not harmless.

    Facts

    The defendant, Fellman, was prosecuted for perjury. During the trial, Fellman’s attorney submitted a written request to the trial court asking the court to instruct the jury that the falsity of the alleged statement of defendant that he met Tut Robinson on East Falls Street may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. This request was timely.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Fellman. Fellman appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to provide the requested jury instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Fellman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s timely written request for a specific jury instruction, that accurately reflects the law, is sufficient to preserve an objection to the court’s failure to provide that instruction, even if the request is not explicitly reiterated or an exception taken after the charge.

    Holding

    Yes, because the written request, if sufficiently faithful to the law, preserves the objection under CPL 470.05, regardless of whether a literal exception was registered. The court stated that by submitting the written request, “defendant must be ‘deemed to have thereby protested the court’s ultimate * * * failure to * * * instruct’ sufficiently ‘to raise a question of law * * * regardless of whether any actual protest thereto was registered’ (CPL 470.05).”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 470.05 deems a written request for a jury instruction as sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, provided the request accurately reflects the law. The court emphasized the importance of the corroboration rule in perjury cases. The court also found the defense counsel’s general reiteration of all “previously requested” requests sufficient to preserve the issue, even though the corroboration request was not explicitly mentioned in the post-charge colloquy. The court stated, “Taken as a whole, without more, this hardly demonstrated a clear intent to waive a position already preserved with respect to a request on which the verdict could very well have turned.” Because the requested charge related to a central element of the crime (perjury), the omission was not harmless error. The policy consideration is to ensure defendants receive proper jury instructions on critical elements of the charges against them and to give effect to CPL 470.05, lessening burdens on defense counsel to repetitively reiterate points already raised.